On the Nonemptiness of the Core: Connecting Cooperative Games and Asset Pricing
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Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.
Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "On the Nonemptiness of the Core".
Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. We show that the Bondareva–Shapley theorem for infinite cooperative games can be derived from a version of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing.
Ruth: This paper connects cooperative game theory and asset pricing by showing how the characterization of arbitrage-free pricing rules implies the infinite-dimensional version of the Bondareva–Shapley theorem.
Warren: Connecting Core Nonemptiness to No-Arbitrage The paper establishes a direct link between balancedness in cooperative games and no-arbitrage in asset pricing through the Choquet extension of a game.
Ruth: Specifically, anti-balancedness of the game translates into the no-arbitrage condition for its pricing rule.
Paper summary: Iris: To wrap up, this paper "On the Nonemptiness of the Core: Connecting Cooperative Games and Asset Pricing" demonstrates that by identifying a pricing rule with a Choquet extension over measurable simple payoffs, we can derive the Bondareva–Shapley theorem for infinite games from asset pricing theory.
Ruth: The title itself is quite evocative because it addresses two fundamental questions at once: when does a cooperative game admit an allocation no coalition can block, and when does a pricing rule allow for a linear valuation?
Warren: It confirms that the absence of arbitrage in a market setting imposes constraints on the structure of the underlying game's core, specifically by forcing it to be non-empty under certain conditions related to balancedness.
Iris: The implication is that we don't need all those specific structural requirements like bounded variation or sigma-algebra properties for the game anymore, as long as we use this extension method with measurable simple functions.
Ruth: So, the main contribution here is showing how the characterization of arbitrage-free pricing rules in Cornet 2025b implies this infinite dimensional version of the Bondareva–Shapley theorem when you choose that specific payoff space <ref:2611.13189#pg1>.
Warren: It provides a new pathway for transferring ideas between cooperative game theory and mathematical finance, suggesting that these two areas share a common separation principle.
Conclusion: Ruth: So, to wrap up this session on "On the Nonemptiness of the Core: Connecting Cooperative Games and Asset Pricing," we're looking at how they link game theory with asset pricing by showing that if you have a rule for no arbitrage, it forces certain cooperative games to have a core.
Warren: It basically takes the idea from finance—that you can’t make free money—and uses that to prove something about how people cooperate in a game. It's connecting two seemingly totally different worlds.
Iris: The authors use this Choquet extension thing, which is a mathematical way to turn a pricing rule into something that describes the structure of the game itself. They show that anti-balancedness in the game means you can’t have arbitrage in the market.
Ruth: That's right, and what they really nail is how this specific construction lets them prove the infinite dimensional version of something called Bondareva–Shapley theorem for these big games. It gives us a way to characterize when those games aren't just empty sets.
Warren: It means that if you build a market model where arbitrage is impossible, the underlying game structure must satisfy this core condition, even when the number of players goes on forever. That’s a strong constraint on how assets can be valued.
Iris: The main result is that this method works generally for measurable simple payoffs, which is much broader than some older work required. It bypasses those tricky requirements about bounded variation or specific sigma-algebras that other derivations had to worry about.
Ruth: That generality is what makes it useful; it means we don't need super strict rules for the game structure itself to get this connection working. It opens up a lot more possibilities for applying these pricing ideas to complex real-world scenarios where you can't easily define every single coalition.
Warren: So, if we take that idea—arbitrage implies core nonemptiness—and apply it across different models, what happens when the market structure itself gets really messy? That’s where the next part of this discussion needs to go.
Bernard Cornet, Émiklos Pintพr
University of Kansas · Corvinus University of Budapest · HUN-REN-BME-BCE Quantum Technology Research Group
econ.TH
Submitted: 2026-11-09
Updated: 2026-11-09
Comments: 12 pages
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Importance score: 92/100
The gist: We show that the Bondareva–Shapley theorem for infinite cooperative games can be derived from a version of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing.
Key concepts
- Bondareva–Shapley theorem
- This is a result about cooperative games concerning the nonemptiness of the core. The paper shows how this infinite-dimensional version can be derived from asset pricing theory, specifically by linking arbitrage-free pricing rules to game properties.
- Choquet extension
- This mathematical tool allows researchers to extend a game defined on a finite set of coalitions into a more general setting involving measurable simple functions. This extension is crucial because it provides the necessary structure to bridge the gap between cooperative games and continuous pricing rules.
- Arbitrage-free pricing rules
- These are rules in asset pricing that ensure no riskless profit can be made. The paper uses these conditions as a starting point; showing that these rules imply certain game properties allows them to derive results about the core of cooperative games.
Terminology
Summary
We show that the Bondareva–Shapley theorem for infinite cooperative games can be derived from a version of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing. p. 0 On the Nonemptiness of the Core:
Connecting Cooperative Games and Asset
Pricing*
Bernard Cornet† and Miklos Pint ´ er´
‡
November 11, 2026
Abstract
We show that the Bondareva–Shapley theorem for infinite cooperative games can be derived from a version of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing. The link is the Choquet extension of a game,
viewed as a possibly nonlinear pricing rule on the space of measurable simple payoffs. □
4 Conclusion
We have established a direct bridge between cooperative game theory and
mathematical finance. More precisely, the characterization of arbitragefree pricing rules in Cornet (2025b) implies the infinite-dimensional version of the Bondareva–Shapley theorem.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Connecting Core Nonemptiness to No-Arbitrage
The paper establishes a direct link between balancedness in cooperative games and no-arbitrage in asset pricing through the Choquet extension of a game. Specifically, anti-balancedness of the game translates into the no-arbitrage condition for its pricing rule. p. 0 The link is the Choquet extension of a game,
viewed as a possibly nonlinear pricing rule on the space of measurable simple payoffs. Under this identification, balancedness translates into no arbitrage, and a linear functional dominated by the pricing rule yields an allocation in the anti-core; the core statement follows by duality. The asset-pricing theorem provides a continuous linear functional below vˆ; through the duality between simple functions and bounded finitely additive set functions, this functional defines
an element of the anti-core. Applying the argument to the dual game gives
the usual core formulation. The asset-pricing theorem provides a continuous linear functional below vˆ; through the duality between simple functions and bounded finitely additive set functions, this functional defines
an element of the anti-core. Applying the argument to the dual game gives
the usual core formulation.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Derivation via Choquet Extension
The derivation of Theorem 1, characterizing the nonvacuity of the core, follows directly from Theorem 2 of asset pricing. The bridge between these two settings is the Choquet extension vˆ: S(omega, A) → R of a game v: A → R, interpreted as a pricing rule on the space S(omega, A) of measurable simple functions. p. 6 3 From games to asset pricing via the Choquet extension
This section derives Theorem 1, the characterization of the nonvacuity of
the core, from Theorem 2, the version of the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing stated above. The bridge between the two settings is the Choquet extension vˆ : S(Ω, A) → R of a game v : A → R, interpreted as a
pricing rule on the space S(Ω, A) of measurable simple functions. More precisely, the characterization of arbitragefree pricing rules in Cornet (2025b) implies the infinite-dimensional version of the Bondareva–Shapley theorem. Choosing for payoff space X :=
S(Ω, A) yields the full generality obtained by Bartl and Pinter (2023). 8 of Cornet (2025b) uses bounded
measurable payoffs and assumes both that the game has bounded variation and that A is a σ-algebra. Working with measurable simple payoffs
instead, and applying Theorem 1 of Cornet (2025b), removes both assumptions: A may be an arbitrary field, and the game v need only be bounded
above.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Role of Boundedness Conditions
The paper contrasts the generality achieved by using measurable simple payoffs with the requirements of previous derivations. The derivation in Section 2. p. 2 This choice of payoff space is what permits the full generality of the
argument. The derivation in Section 2. The derivation in Section 2. 8 of Cornet (2025b) uses bounded
measurable payoffs and assumes both that the game has bounded variation and that A is a σ-algebra. Working with measurable simple payoffs
instead, and applying Theorem 1 of Cornet (2025b), removes both assumptions: A may be an arbitrary field, and the game v need only be bounded
above. The counterexample in the final section confirms that this remaining condition cannot simply be omitted.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Generalization and Limitations
The connection between the fields allows for the derivation of results in cooperative game theory from asset-pricing theory. The argument in Section 2. p. 2 This choice of payoff space is what permits the full generality of the
argument. The derivation in Section 2. By ´
contrast, the argument in Section 2. 8 of Cornet (2025b), taking for payoff space X := B(Ω, A), requires stronger assumptions: v needs to have
bounded variation and A to be a σ-algebra. In particular, it may provide new insights into both cooperative game theory and mathematical finance and facilitate further transfers of ideas and techniques between them. Finally, Bartl and Pinter (2023) provide an example of a balanced game ´
that is bounded above but not bounded below and whose core is empty
(Example 5, pp. Therefore, one-sided ´
boundedness cannot be dropped in Cornet (2025b) either. The following example is simple and interesting because it demonstrates that even
a game that is unbounded above can be balanced:
Example 5.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Conclusion on Generality
The paper concludes that the characterization of arbitrage-free pricing rules in Cornet (2025b) implies the infinite-dimensional version of the Bondareva–Shapley theorem. Choosing for payoff space X:= S(omega, A) yields the full generality obtained by Bartl and Pinter (2023). p. 9 More precisely, the characterization of arbitragefree pricing rules in Cornet (2025b) implies the infinite-dimensional version of the Bondareva–Shapley theorem. Choosing for payoff space X :=
S(Ω, A) yields the full generality obtained by Bartl and Pinter (2023). We hope that this connection will lead to further interactions between
the two fields. In particular, it may provide new insights into both cooperative game theory and mathematical finance and facilitate further transfers of ideas and techniques between them. We hope that this connection will lead to further interactions between
the two fields. In particular, it may provide new insights into both cooperative game theory and mathematical finance and facilitate further transfers of ideas and techniques between them.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
References
Aliprantis C. D., Border K. p. 6 (i) If the game v : A → R is bounded above by M ≥ 0, then
vˆ(x) ≤ ||x||∞(|v(Ω)| + 2M) for all x ∈ S(Ω, A),
hence vˆ is bounded above on every bounded set, and therefore on some bounded
neighborhood of 0;
(ii) ∂vˆ(0) ⊆ acore(v);
(iii) If v is anti-balanced, then vˆ satisfies (AF). The pair (S(Ω, A), ba(Ω, A)) is a dual pair; see, for example, Aliprantis
and Border (2006, Section 5. The Bondareva–Shapley theorem (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967) gives
necessary and sufficient conditions for the nonemptiness of the core (and,
dually, of the anti-core). This finite-dimensional result has been extended
to several infinite-dimensional settings; see Schmeidler (1967); Kannai (1969,
1992); Marinacci and Montrucchio (2004); Bartl and Pinter (2023, 2024).Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Bartl D., Pinter M. p. 0 Under this identification, balancedness translates into no arbitrage, and a linear functional dominated by the pricing rule yields an allocation in the anti-core; the core statement follows by duality. Applying the arbitrage-free pricing theorem of Cornet (2025b), we
recover the characterization of the nonvacuity of the core initiated
by Schmeidler (1967) and established in full generality by Bartl and
Pinter (2023) for bounded-below games. Under this identification, balancedness translates into no arbitrage, and a linear functional dominated by the pricing rule yields an allocation in the anti-core; the core statement follows by duality. Applying the arbitrage-free pricing theorem of Cornet (2025b), we
recover the characterization of the nonvacuity of the core initiated
by Schmeidler (1967) and established in full generality by Bartl and
Pinter (2023) for bounded-below games. We ´
follow the line of generalizations initiated by Schmeidler (1967) and developed in full generality by Bartl and Pinter (2023). ´
The following result states that a bounded-below game has a nonempty
core if and only if it is balanced.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Bartl D., Pinter M. (2024) The κ-core and the κ-balancedness of TU games. p. 0 Under this identification, balancedness translates into no arbitrage, and a linear functional dominated by the pricing rule yields an allocation in the anti-core; the core statement follows by duality. Applying the arbitrage-free pricing theorem of Cornet (2025b), we
recover the characterization of the nonvacuity of the core initiated
by Schmeidler (1967) and established in full generality by Bartl and
Pinter (2023) for bounded-below games.Where the paper says it
Bastianello L. p. 1 ´
In asset pricing, the corresponding principle is that the absence of arbitrage entails the existence of a linear valuation; see Harrison and Kreps
(1979); Delbaen and Schachermayer (1994, 2006). Building on Chateauneuf
and Cornet (2022) and Bastianello et al (2024), Cornet (2025b) establishes
such a result for pricing rules that need not be linear or subadditive: subject to a local boundedness condition, the relevant no-arbitrage property
is equivalent to the existence of a continuous linear functional dominated
by the pricing rule. ´
In asset pricing, the corresponding principle is that the absence of arbitrage entails the existence of a linear valuation; see Harrison and Kreps
(1979); Delbaen and Schachermayer (1994, 2006). Building on Chateauneuf
and Cornet (2022) and Bastianello et al (2024), Cornet (2025b) establishes
such a result for pricing rules that need not be linear or subadditive: subject to a local boundedness condition, the relevant no-arbitrage property
is equivalent to the existence of a continuous linear functional dominated
by the pricing rule. ´
In asset pricing, the corresponding principle is that the absence of arbitrage entails the existence of a linear valuation; see Harrison and Kreps
(1979); Delbaen and Schachermayer (1994, 2006). Building on Chateauneuf
and Cornet (2022) and Bastianello et al (2024), Cornet (2025b) establishes
such a result for pricing rules that need not be linear or subadditive: subject to a local boundedness condition, the relevant no-arbitrage property
is equivalent to the existence of a continuous linear functional dominated
by the pricing rule. On the Nonemptiness of the Core:
Connecting Cooperative Games and Asset
Pricing*
Bernard Cornet† and Miklos Pint ´ er´
‡
November 11, 2026
Abstract
We show that the Bondareva–Shapley theorem for infinite cooperative games can be derived from a version of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing. The link is the Choquet extension of a game,
viewed as a possibly nonlinear pricing rule on the space of measurable simple payoffs. On the Nonemptiness of the Core:
Connecting Cooperative Games and Asset
Pricing*
Bernard Cornet† and Miklos Pint ´ er´
‡
November 11, 2026
Abstract
We show that the Bondareva–Shapley theorem for infinite cooperative games can be derived from a version of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing. The link is the Choquet extension of a game,
viewed as a possibly nonlinear pricing rule on the space of measurable simple payoffs. ´
In asset pricing, the corresponding principle is that the absence of arbitrage entails the existence of a linear valuation; see Harrison and Kreps
(1979); Delbaen and Schachermayer (1994, 2006). Building on Chateauneuf
and Cornet (2022) and Bastianello et al (2024), Cornet (2025b) establishes
such a result for pricing rules that need not be linear or subadditive: subject to a local boundedness condition, the relevant no-arbitrage property
is equivalent to the existence of a continuous linear functional dominated
by the pricing rule.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Bondareva O. p. 0 On the Nonemptiness of the Core:
Connecting Cooperative Games and Asset
Pricing*
Bernard Cornet† and Miklos Pint ´ er´
‡
November 11, 2026
Abstract
We show that the Bondareva–Shapley theorem for infinite cooperative games can be derived from a version of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing. The link is the Choquet extension of a game,
viewed as a possibly nonlinear pricing rule on the space of measurable simple payoffs. This paper makes that connection
explicit. For finite cooperative games, the Bondareva–Shapley theorem (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967) states that the core (Shapley, 1955; Gillies,
1959) is nonempty if and only if the game is balanced.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Chateauneuf A., Cornet B. (2022) The risk-neutral non-additive probability with market frictions. p. 1 ´
In asset pricing, the corresponding principle is that the absence of arbitrage entails the existence of a linear valuation; see Harrison and Kreps
(1979); Delbaen and Schachermayer (1994, 2006). Building on Chateauneuf
and Cornet (2022) and Bastianello et al (2024), Cornet (2025b) establishes
such a result for pricing rules that need not be linear or subadditive: subject to a local boundedness condition, the relevant no-arbitrage property
is equivalent to the existence of a continuous linear functional dominated
by the pricing rule.Where the paper says it
Choquet G. (1953) Theory of capacities. p. 6 The bridge between the two settings is the Choquet extension vˆ : S(Ω, A) → R of a game v : A → R, interpreted as a
pricing rule on the space S(Ω, A) of measurable simple functions. We recall the Choquet functional introduced by Choquet (1953).Where the paper says it
Cornet B. (2025a) Pricing rules with market frictions: an axiomatic approach, Theory and Decision, 99:123–150. p. 9 □
4 Conclusion
We have established a direct bridge between cooperative game theory and
mathematical finance. More precisely, the characterization of arbitragefree pricing rules in Cornet (2025b) implies the infinite-dimensional version of the Bondareva–Shapley theorem.Where the paper says it
Cornet B. (2025b) Characterizing arbitrage-free Choquet pricing. p. 1 Building on Chateauneuf
and Cornet (2022) and Bastianello et al (2024), Cornet (2025b) establishes
such a result for pricing rules that need not be linear or subadditive: subject to a local boundedness condition, the relevant no-arbitrage property
is equivalent to the existence of a continuous linear functional dominated
by the pricing rule. Our observation is that the theorem characterizing the nonvacuity of
the core follows directly from this asset-pricing result.Where the paper says it
Delbaen F., Schachermayer W. p. 1 In the formulation relevant here, a ´
game defined on an arbitrary field of coalitions and bounded below has a
nonempty core exactly when it is balanced (Bartl and Pinter, 2023). ´
In asset pricing, the corresponding principle is that the absence of arbitrage entails the existence of a linear valuation; see Harrison and Kreps
(1979); Delbaen and Schachermayer (1994, 2006). In the formulation relevant here, a ´
game defined on an arbitrary field of coalitions and bounded below has a
nonempty core exactly when it is balanced (Bartl and Pinter, 2023). ´
In asset pricing, the corresponding principle is that the absence of arbitrage entails the existence of a linear valuation; see Harrison and Kreps
(1979); Delbaen and Schachermayer (1994, 2006). 2 The Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing
We next recall a version of the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing
(Theorem 1 of Cornet (2025b, p. 716)), which belongs to the tradition initiated by Harrison and Kreps (1979); see also Delbaen and Schachermayer
(1994, 2006).Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Delbaen F., Schachermayer W. (2006) The mathematics of arbitrage, Springer. p. 1 In the formulation relevant here, a ´
game defined on an arbitrary field of coalitions and bounded below has a
nonempty core exactly when it is balanced (Bartl and Pinter, 2023). ´
In asset pricing, the corresponding principle is that the absence of arbitrage entails the existence of a linear valuation; see Harrison and Kreps
(1979); Delbaen and Schachermayer (1994, 2006).Where the paper says it
Gillies D. B. (1959) Solutions to general non-zero-sum games, Contributions to the Theory of Games, vol IV. p. 1 For finite cooperative games, the Bondareva–Shapley theorem (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967) states that the core (Shapley, 1955; Gillies,
1959) is nonempty if and only if the game is balanced. Its extension to infinite player sets has required a succession of increasingly general results;
see Schmeidler (1967); Kannai (1969, 1992); Marinacci and Montrucchio
(2004); Bartl and Pinter (2023, 2024).Where the paper says it
Harrison J. p. 1 In the formulation relevant here, a ´
game defined on an arbitrary field of coalitions and bounded below has a
nonempty core exactly when it is balanced (Bartl and Pinter, 2023). ´
In asset pricing, the corresponding principle is that the absence of arbitrage entails the existence of a linear valuation; see Harrison and Kreps
(1979); Delbaen and Schachermayer (1994, 2006). In the formulation relevant here, a ´
game defined on an arbitrary field of coalitions and bounded below has a
nonempty core exactly when it is balanced (Bartl and Pinter, 2023). ´
In asset pricing, the corresponding principle is that the absence of arbitrage entails the existence of a linear valuation; see Harrison and Kreps
(1979); Delbaen and Schachermayer (1994, 2006).Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Kannai Y. (1969) Countably additive measures in cores of games, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and its Applications 27:227–240. p. 1 For finite cooperative games, the Bondareva–Shapley theorem (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967) states that the core (Shapley, 1955; Gillies,
1959) is nonempty if and only if the game is balanced. Its extension to infinite player sets has required a succession of increasingly general results;
see Schmeidler (1967); Kannai (1969, 1992); Marinacci and Montrucchio
(2004); Bartl and Pinter (2023, 2024).Where the paper says it
Kannai Y. (1992) The core and balancedness, Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, vol 1. p. 1 For finite cooperative games, the Bondareva–Shapley theorem (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967) states that the core (Shapley, 1955; Gillies,
1959) is nonempty if and only if the game is balanced. Its extension to infinite player sets has required a succession of increasingly general results;
see Schmeidler (1967); Kannai (1969, 1992); Marinacci and Montrucchio
(2004); Bartl and Pinter (2023, 2024).Where the paper says it
Marinacci M. p. 1 For finite cooperative games, the Bondareva–Shapley theorem (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967) states that the core (Shapley, 1955; Gillies,
1959) is nonempty if and only if the game is balanced. Its extension to infinite player sets has required a succession of increasingly general results;
see Schmeidler (1967); Kannai (1969, 1992); Marinacci and Montrucchio
(2004); Bartl and Pinter (2023, 2024). For finite cooperative games, the Bondareva–Shapley theorem (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967) states that the core (Shapley, 1955; Gillies,
1959) is nonempty if and only if the game is balanced. Its extension to infinite player sets has required a succession of increasingly general results;
see Schmeidler (1967); Kannai (1969, 1992); Marinacci and Montrucchio
(2004); Bartl and Pinter (2023, 2024). 1 Introduction
Two fundamental existence questions arise in cooperative game theory
and in asset pricing. When does a cooperative game admit an allocation
that no coalition can block?Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Schmeidler D. p. 0 Under this identification, balancedness translates into no arbitrage, and a linear functional dominated by the pricing rule yields an allocation in the anti-core; the core statement follows by duality. Applying the arbitrage-free pricing theorem of Cornet (2025b), we
recover the characterization of the nonvacuity of the core initiated
by Schmeidler (1967) and established in full generality by Bartl and
Pinter (2023) for bounded-below games. This paper makes that connection
explicit. For finite cooperative games, the Bondareva–Shapley theorem (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967) states that the core (Shapley, 1955; Gillies,
1959) is nonempty if and only if the game is balanced.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Shapley L. S. (1955) Markets as Cooperative Games, Rand Corporation. p. 1 This paper makes that connection
explicit. For finite cooperative games, the Bondareva–Shapley theorem (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967) states that the core (Shapley, 1955; Gillies,
1959) is nonempty if and only if the game is balanced.Where the paper says it
Shapley L. S. (1967) On Balanced Sets and Cores, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 14:453–460. p. 1 For finite cooperative games, the Bondareva–Shapley theorem (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967) states that the core (Shapley, 1955; Gillies,
1959) is nonempty if and only if the game is balanced. Its extension to infinite player sets has required a succession of increasingly general results;
see Schmeidler (1967); Kannai (1969, 1992); Marinacci and Montrucchio
(2004); Bartl and Pinter (2023, 2024).Where the paper says it
Green — the paper says it, and the page is printed. Red — no passage carries it, so treat that sentence as unverified. The same check runs on your own text: check a summary against its source, $5.
Improvements for AI systems
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The AI system can derive nonemptiness results for infinite player games by applying an asset-pricing theorem, specifically using a version of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing as a bridge to characterize arbitrage-free pricing rules.
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The system can handle game definitions over arbitrary fields of coalitions and bounded below games without requiring the collection of coalitions to be a sigma algebra or the game to have bounded variation, which increases its applicability across different mathematical structures.
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The AI system can translate core existence questions into continuous linear functional problems by utilizing the Choquet extension of a game viewed as a possibly nonlinear pricing rule on measurable simple payoffs.
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The system can perform duality arguments between games and asset pricing concepts to recover the standard core formulation from the anti-core formulation derived from arbitrage-free pricing theorems.
Abstract
We show that the Bondareva--Shapley theorem for infinite cooperative games can be derived from a version of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing. The link is the Choquet extension of a game, viewed as a possibly nonlinear pricing rule on the space of measurable simple payoffs. Under this identification, balancedness translates into no arbitrage, and a linear functional dominated by the pricing rule yields an allocation in the anti-core; the core statement follows by duality. Applying the arbitrage-free pricing theorem of Cornet (2025), we recover the characterization of the nonvacuity of the core initiated by Schmeidler (1967) and established in full generality by Bartl and Pinter (2023) for bounded-below games. Unlike the earlier derivation in Cornet (2025), our argument does not require the game to have bounded variation or the collection of coalitions to be a σ-algebra.