On the Nonemptiness of the Core: Connecting Cooperative Games and Asset Pricing

summary

The gist

We show that the Bondareva–Shapley theorem for infinite cooperative games can be derived from a version of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing.

In short

The paper connects cooperative game theory and asset pricing by showing that characterizing arbitrage-free pricing rules implies the infinite-dimensional Bondareva–Shapley theorem. It uses a Choquet extension to link balancedness in games to no-arbitrage conditions in finance, proving that anti-balancedness translates directly into no-arbitrage for pricing rules.

Key concepts

Bondareva–Shapley theorem
This is a result about cooperative games concerning the nonemptiness of the core. The paper shows how this infinite-dimensional version can be derived from asset pricing theory, specifically by linking arbitrage-free pricing rules to game properties.
Choquet extension
This mathematical tool allows researchers to extend a game defined on a finite set of coalitions into a more general setting involving measurable simple functions. This extension is crucial because it provides the necessary structure to bridge the gap between cooperative games and continuous pricing rules.
Arbitrage-free pricing rules
These are rules in asset pricing that ensure no riskless profit can be made. The paper uses these conditions as a starting point; showing that these rules imply certain game properties allows them to derive results about the core of cooperative games.

Terminology used across episodes

This episode discusses

The paper

On the Nonemptiness of the Core: Connecting Cooperative Games and Asset Pricing · Read on arXiv

Bernard Cornet, Émiklos Pintพr

University of Kansas · Corvinus University of Budapest · HUN-REN-BME-BCE Quantum Technology Research Group

We show that the Bondareva--Shapley theorem for infinite cooperative games can be derived from a version of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing. The link is the Choquet extension of a game, viewed as a possibly nonlinear pricing rule on the space of measurable simple payoffs. Under this identification, balancedness translates into no arbitrage, and a linear functional dominated by the pricing rule yields an allocation in the anti-core; the core statement follows by duality. Applying the arbitrage-free pricing theorem of Cornet (2025), we recover the characterization of the nonvacuity of the core initiated by Schmeidler (1967) and established in full generality by Bartl and Pinter (2023) for bounded-below games. Unlike the earlier derivation in Cornet (2025), our argument does not require the game to have bounded variation or the collection of coalitions to be a σ-algebra.

Transcript

Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.

Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "On the Nonemptiness of the Core".

Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. We show that the Bondareva–Shapley theorem for infinite cooperative games can be derived from a version of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing.

Ruth: This paper connects cooperative game theory and asset pricing by showing how the characterization of arbitrage-free pricing rules implies the infinite-dimensional version of the Bondareva–Shapley theorem.

Warren: Connecting Core Nonemptiness to No-Arbitrage The paper establishes a direct link between balancedness in cooperative games and no-arbitrage in asset pricing through the Choquet extension of a game.

Ruth: Specifically, anti-balancedness of the game translates into the no-arbitrage condition for its pricing rule.

Paper summary: Iris: To wrap up, this paper "On the Nonemptiness of the Core: Connecting Cooperative Games and Asset Pricing" demonstrates that by identifying a pricing rule with a Choquet extension over measurable simple payoffs, we can derive the Bondareva–Shapley theorem for infinite games from asset pricing theory.

Ruth: The title itself is quite evocative because it addresses two fundamental questions at once: when does a cooperative game admit an allocation no coalition can block, and when does a pricing rule allow for a linear valuation?

Warren: It confirms that the absence of arbitrage in a market setting imposes constraints on the structure of the underlying game's core, specifically by forcing it to be non-empty under certain conditions related to balancedness.

Iris: The implication is that we don't need all those specific structural requirements like bounded variation or sigma-algebra properties for the game anymore, as long as we use this extension method with measurable simple functions.

Ruth: So, the main contribution here is showing how the characterization of arbitrage-free pricing rules in Cornet 2025b implies this infinite dimensional version of the Bondareva–Shapley theorem when you choose that specific payoff space <ref:2611.13189#pg1>.

Warren: It provides a new pathway for transferring ideas between cooperative game theory and mathematical finance, suggesting that these two areas share a common separation principle.

Conclusion: Ruth: So, to wrap up this session on "On the Nonemptiness of the Core: Connecting Cooperative Games and Asset Pricing," we're looking at how they link game theory with asset pricing by showing that if you have a rule for no arbitrage, it forces certain cooperative games to have a core.

Warren: It basically takes the idea from finance—that you can’t make free money—and uses that to prove something about how people cooperate in a game. It's connecting two seemingly totally different worlds.

Iris: The authors use this Choquet extension thing, which is a mathematical way to turn a pricing rule into something that describes the structure of the game itself. They show that anti-balancedness in the game means you can’t have arbitrage in the market.

Ruth: That's right, and what they really nail is how this specific construction lets them prove the infinite dimensional version of something called Bondareva–Shapley theorem for these big games. It gives us a way to characterize when those games aren't just empty sets.

Warren: It means that if you build a market model where arbitrage is impossible, the underlying game structure must satisfy this core condition, even when the number of players goes on forever. That’s a strong constraint on how assets can be valued.

Iris: The main result is that this method works generally for measurable simple payoffs, which is much broader than some older work required. It bypasses those tricky requirements about bounded variation or specific sigma-algebras that other derivations had to worry about.

Ruth: That generality is what makes it useful; it means we don't need super strict rules for the game structure itself to get this connection working. It opens up a lot more possibilities for applying these pricing ideas to complex real-world scenarios where you can't easily define every single coalition.

Warren: So, if we take that idea—arbitrage implies core nonemptiness—and apply it across different models, what happens when the market structure itself gets really messy? That’s where the next part of this discussion needs to go.

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