The Power and Limits of Money Burning in Bilateral Trade
cs.GT
Submitted: 2026-11-03
Updated: 2026-11-03
Terminology
Sources
- A Note on the Gains from Trade of the Random-Offerer Mechanism
- Second-Best Gains from Trade in Matching Markets
- A New Lower Bound for the Random Offerer Mechanism in Bilateral Trade using AI-Guided Evolutionary Search
- Welfare Maximization in Bilateral Trade: Improved Approximation Guarantees Beyond the Fixed Price Barrier
- Welfare Approximation in Multilateral Trade
- Money Burning Mechanism Design: From Welfare to Surplus
- The Exact Approximation Ratio of the Optimal Fixed-Price Mechanism in Bilateral Trade
- Tighter Bounds for the Random-Offerer Mechanism in Bilateral Trade
- Better Regret Rates in Bilateral Trade via Sublinear Budget Violation
- Online Two-Sided Markets: Many Buyers Enhance Learning
- Regret Minimization in Bilateral Trade With Perturbed Markets
- Second-Best Bilateral Trade is $1/2$ Efficient
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