Money Burning Mechanism Design: From Welfare to Surplus
cs.GT
Submitted: 2026-08-03
Updated: 2026-11-02
Terminology
Sources
- Dynamic Rental Games with Stagewise Individual Rationality
- Optimal Auction Design for Constrained Buyers
- From Welfare to Utility: Generalized Objectives in Budget-Feasible Procurement
- Knowing Who, Not How Much: Learning-Augmented Mechanisms for Consumer Utility Maximization
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