Second-Best Gains from Trade in Matching Markets
cs.GT
Submitted: 2026-09-16
Updated: 2026-11-02
Terminology
Sources
- The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-Trade
- A Note on the Gains from Trade of the Random-Offerer Mechanism
- Approximating Gains from Trade in Two-sided Markets via Simple Mechanisms
- A New Lower Bound for the Random Offerer Mechanism in Bilateral Trade using AI-Guided Evolutionary Search
- A Geometric Analysis of Gains from Trade
- Tighter Bounds for the Random-Offerer Mechanism in Bilateral Trade
- Second-Best Bilateral Trade is $1/2$ Efficient
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