On the construction and representation of social welfare orders satisfying consequentialist equity axioms

arXiv:2606.23428 · econ.TH · Submitted 2026-06-22 · Read on arXiv

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Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.

Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "On the construction and representation of social welfare orders satisfying consequentialist equity axioms".

Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. In this paper we examine the constructive nature of social welfare orders on infinite utility streams satisfying Strong Equity, Hammond Equity, or the Pigou–Dalton transfer principle and describes how these orders can be explicitly constructed or that their existence entails a non-Ramsey collection.

Ruth: Construction of Explicit Social Welfare Orders The authors provide explicit constructions for social welfare orders under specific domain restrictions, demonstrating the distinction between representation and explicit description.

Ruth: If Y is well-ordered by the usual order, there exists an explicitly defined SWO on X = YN satisfying Strong Pareto and Strong Equity.

Title and authors: Ruth: Now, to get into what this paper is actually saying, it starts by setting up the framework for social welfare orders and then immediately jumps into showing that when you have Strong Equity, Hammond Equity, or the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, there are specific ways to describe these orders using lexicographic preference relations >

Warren: So they’re looking at how we can define a social welfare order on these infinite utility streams X equals Y N where Y is a subset of real numbers R and N is the set of natural numbers >

Iris: What I find interesting here is the distinction they make between representation and construction, because it seems like you can have a real valued map that represents the order without being able to explicitly construct the order itself using just basic methods >

Ruth: That's right. The paper talks about how a real valued representation may itself be obtained by using some non-constructive device, but the actual construction of an SWO is what requires avoiding things like the Axiom of Choice >

Warren: They mention that for Strong Equity, Hammond Equity, or the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, these social welfare orders admit explicit descriptions when the set Y with its usual order is well ordered >

Iris: That's a key restriction they highlight because it shows that even with these equity axioms, you still need some sort of ordering structure on your utility streams to get an explicit description >

Ruth: And then they move on to talk about the domain restrictions under which the existence of these orders satisfying those equity axioms entails the existence of a non-Ramsey collection >

Warren: So it’s not just about building them; it’s about showing that if you assume these equity conditions hold, you might be forced into accepting something non-constructive because of the structure on your utility domain >

The paper's summary: Ruth: To summarize what the paper is doing, it explores the constructive nature of social welfare orders on infinite utility streams that satisfy Strong Equity, Hammond Equity, or the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle >

Warren: It breaks down into a few parts: first they give explicit constructions for SWOs when Y with its usual order is well ordered and you're looking at Strong Pareto and Strong Equity >

Iris: Then they look at the case of Strong Equity alone on countable domains Y, noting that while an SWF satisfying it exists, the proof uses something like Szpilrajn's Lemma which isn't what they consider constructive >

Ruth: But they do have explicit constructions for Strong Equity when L(Y) is well ordered or U(Y) is reverse well ordered, using those binary threshold utility codes and lexicographic ordering >

Warren: And for the nonconstructive side, they show that if Y contains a subset of order type q star and you have an SWO satisfying Strong Equity and monotonicity, then there exists a non-Ramsey collection Omega of subsets of N >

Iris: That's where it gets interesting because it connects the existence of these orders to this non-Ramsey set which they treat as a nonconstructive object >

Ruth: It also looks at Pigou-Dalton transfer principle together with monotonicity, and if you have sequences alpha m and beta m in Y satisfying certain gap conditions, then there exists a non-Ramsey collection Omega of subsets of N >

Warren: So the summary is that they provide explicit constructions under nice domain restrictions, but when those restrictions aren't met, the existence of these orders forces you to deal with non-Ramsey collections >

The paper's improvements: Ruth: One big improvement they suggest is making it clear the difference between representation and construction domain >

Warren: They stress that for Strong Equity alone, a countable domain Y admits an SWF satisfying Strong Equity, but the explicit SWO construction only applies to a smaller class of linearly ordered domains >

Iris: So they argue that we shouldn't read the countable-domain theorem as an explicit construction for integer like domains, but just as an existence result >

Ruth: And then they address the case for Y equal to zero one, where they show no real valued SWF can satisfy Strong Equity because constructing uncountably many pairwise disjoint open intervals in R contradicts the countability of the rationals >

Warren: That impossibility is a strong statement about the limits of what a real valued social welfare function can achieve under those conditions >

Iris: So they suggest that the domain on which a real valued SWF satisfies an equity-efficiency combination doesn't have to match the domain where an explicitly constructible SWO exists >

Ruth: That means we need to be very specific about what we are talking about for each equity and efficiency combination, which is important for things like Hammond Equity with Strong Pareto and Pigou-Dalton transfer principle >

Warren: And they also show that if you have an SWF satisfying AN and WD on Y equal zero one, it implies the existence of a non-Ramsey set for any non trivial domain Y >

Conclusion: Ruth: So to wrap up on "On the construction and representation of social welfare orders satisfying consequentialist equity axioms," the main implication is that we need an axiom specific approach to understanding these relationships between construction, representation, and those non-Ramsey obstructions >

Warren: They've shown that the class of domains admitting explicitly constructible SWOs can actually be larger than the class admitting explicit or even real valued SWF representations >

Iris: And they found that for Hammond Equity and Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, the obstruction seems to be generated by descending order structure on Hammond Equity and Pigou-Dalton, while for Strong Equity, the obstruction arises from the order type of the domain Y >

Ruth: It’s a constructive device using lexicographic constructions to illustrate this distinction between representation and explicit description >

Warren: So we’re left with a clear picture: you need to be precise about which equity you're talking about because the rules for construction and representation aren't all the same across the board >

Iris: I just want to add that these findings suggest that we have a more nuanced understanding of when these social welfare orders are truly tractable for policy making, or when they might just be theoretical constructs based on non-constructive tools >

Montclair State University · Universita del Piemonte Orientale

econ.TH

Submitted: 2026-06-22

Updated: 2026-11-07

Comments: Updated results on representation in section 4 of the paper

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Importance score: 83/100

The gist: In this paper we examine the constructive nature of social welfare orders on infinite utility streams satisfying Strong Equity, Hammond Equity…

Key concepts

Strong Equity
This axiom requires that if one stream is preferred over another based on a social welfare order, this preference must be consistent across all streams in a way that respects the underlying structure of the utility domain. It ensures that preferences are not arbitrarily inconsistent when comparing different possible outcomes.
Non-Ramsey Collection
This refers to an infinite collection of subsets of natural numbers (or similar sets) that cannot be colored with a finite number of colors in a specific way. The paper shows that the existence of certain social welfare orders implies such a collection must exist, indicating an inherent complexity or structure beyond simple countable ordering.
Representation vs. Construction
This is the crucial difference between proving a social welfare function exists (representation) and actually building it explicitly (construction). The paper finds that domains admitting explicit constructions for social welfare orders are often smaller than the domains where real-valued functions satisfying the same axioms can be represented.
Pigou–Dalton Transfer Principle
This principle relates to how transfers or changes in utility streams affect the preference order. When combined with monotonicity, it imposes structural constraints on sequences within the utility domain, which can lead to non-Ramsey obstructions when analyzing social welfare orders.

Terminology

Summary

In this paper we examine the constructive nature of social welfare orders on infinite utility streams satisfying Strong Equity, Hammond Equity, or the Pigou–Dalton transfer principle and describes how these orders can be explicitly constructed or that their existence entails a non-Ramsey collection. p. 0

Where the paper says it

On the construction and representation of social welfare orders satisfying consequentialist equity axioms Ram Sewak Dubey‗ Giorgio Laguzzi† August 14, 2026 Abstract In this paper we examine the constructive nature of social welfare orders on infinite utility streams 𝑋 = 𝑌 N satisfying Strong Equity, Hammond Equity, or the Pigou– Dalton transfer principle. The constructive social welfare orders are described using lexicographic preference relations.

Construction of Explicit Social Welfare Orders

The authors provide explicit constructions for social welfare orders under specific domain restrictions, demonstrating the distinction between representation and explicit description.

  1. If Y is well-ordered by the usual order, there exists an explicitly defined SWO on X = YN satisfying Strong Pareto and Strong Equity. p. 2

    Where the paper says it

    Our first contribution is a positive construction result. We show that if 𝑌 is well-ordered by the usual order, then there exists an explicitly defined SWO on 𝑋 = 𝑌 N satisfying Strong Pareto and Strong Equity.

    This construction uses a lexicographic comparison based on binary threshold-utility codes, which preserves completeness, transitivity, and Strong Pareto efficiency while satisfying consequentialist equity axioms. p. 2
    Where the paper says it

    Rather, utility streams are mapped into binary threshold-utility codes, and the resulting codes are ordered lexicographically. This distinction is essential: it allows the ordering to preserve the desired equity-sensitive comparisons while retaining completeness, transitivity, and Strong Pareto efficiency.

  2. For the case of Strong Equity alone on countable domains Y, there exists a social welfare function W: X → R satisfying Strong Equity. p. 5

    Where the paper says it

    For HE, monotonicity alone is too weak, since universal indifference satisfies HE and monotonicity; hence the negative result in case of HE requires a stronger Pareto-type condition. 1 Explicit Description of SWO satisfying Strong Equity and Strong Pareto We show that if 𝑌 is well-ordered by the usual order, then there exists an explicitly described social welfare order on 𝑋 = 𝑌 N satisfying SP, SE, HE and PD.

    However, this proof relies on the Szpilrajn Lemma and is not constructive in the sense used by the authors. p. 1
    Where the paper says it

    (2007, Theorem 1). However, these existence results use the variant of Szpilrajn’s Lemma given in Arrow (1951), which is a non-constructive device.

  3. Explicit constructions for Strong Equity are possible when L(Y) is well-ordered or U(Y) is reverse well-ordered. p. 3

    Where the paper says it

    Section 2 introduces the notation, the equity and efficiency axioms, the relevant order types, and Ramsey and non-Ramsey collections. Section 3 gives explicit constructions for well-ordered domains and proves nonconstructiveness results for Strong Equity and PD under Monotonicity.

    These constructions rely on mapping utility streams into binary threshold-utility codes and ordering them lexicographically to satisfy the required equity comparisons. p. 2
    Where the paper says it

    Rather, utility streams are mapped into binary threshold-utility codes, and the resulting codes are ordered lexicographically. This distinction is essential: it allows the ordering to preserve the desired equity-sensitive comparisons while retaining completeness, transitivity, and Strong Pareto efficiency.

Nonconstructive Implications and Obstructions

The paper establishes several conditions under which the existence of a social welfare order satisfying consequentialist equity axioms entails the existence of a non-Ramsey collection.

  1. If Y contains a subset of order type omega∗, and there exists an SWO on X satisfying Strong Equity and monotonicity, then there exists a non-Ramsey collection Ω ⊆ S. p. 2

    Where the paper says it

    The second contribution concerns nonconstructive implications. We show that if 𝑌 contains a subset of order type 𝜔 ∗ , 1 and if there exists an SWO on 𝑋 satisfying Strong Equity and Monotonicity, then there exists a non-Ramsey collection of infinite subsets of N.

    This result is derived by partitioning N into finite blocks and defining streams based on these blocks to show that the resulting collection Ω is non-Ramsey. p. 2
    Where the paper says it

    We show that if 𝑌 contains a subset of order type 𝜔 ∗ , 1 and if there exists an SWO on 𝑋 satisfying Strong Equity and Monotonicity, then there exists a non-Ramsey collection of infinite subsets of N. We also prove an analogous result for PD together with Monotonicity under a constant-gap descending-block condition on the domain.

  2. For PD together with monotonicity, if there exist sequences (alpham)m∈N and (betam)m∈N in Y satisfying certain gap conditions, then there exists a non-Ramsey collection Ω ⊆ S. p. 2

    Where the paper says it

    We show that if 𝑌 contains a subset of order type 𝜔 ∗ , 1 and if there exists an SWO on 𝑋 satisfying Strong Equity and Monotonicity, then there exists a non-Ramsey collection of infinite subsets of N. We also prove an analogous result for PD together with Monotonicity under a constant-gap descending-block condition on the domain.

    This relies on Lemma 3, which uses the equal-gap condition to show that a specific stream is strictly preferred over another. p. 9
    Where the paper says it

    At that two-coordinate step, 𝑦𝑝 = 𝛽ℓ > 𝑥𝑝 = 𝛼ℓ > 𝑥𝑞 = 𝛽𝑚 > 𝑦𝑞 = 𝛼𝑚. The equal-gap condition gives 𝛽ℓ − 𝛼ℓ = 𝛽𝑚 − 𝛼𝑚 ⇐⇒ 𝑦𝑝 + 𝑦𝑞 = 𝑥𝑝 + 𝑥𝑞 .

  3. For Strong Equity alone on domains of order type mu, if there exists an SWO, then there exists a non-Ramsey collection Ω ⊆ S. p. 2

    Where the paper says it

    The second contribution concerns nonconstructive implications. We show that if 𝑌 contains a subset of order type 𝜔 ∗ , 1 and if there exists an SWO on 𝑋 satisfying Strong Equity and Monotonicity, then there exists a non-Ramsey collection of infinite subsets of N.

    The proof uses the construction of streams F(R) and F(Q) based on block replacements to show that for every set T ∈ S, the collection Ω is non-Ramsey. p. 8
    Where the paper says it

    If there exists an SWO on 𝑋 satisfying the Pigou–Dalton transfer principle and monotonicity, then there exists a non-Ramsey collection Ω ⊆ 𝒮. The proof of the theorem will be based on a series of lemmas.

Representation vs. p. 0

Where the paper says it

On the construction and representation of social welfare orders satisfying consequentialist equity axioms Ram Sewak Dubey‗ Giorgio Laguzzi† August 14, 2026 Abstract In this paper we examine the constructive nature of social welfare orders on infinite utility streams 𝑋 = 𝑌 N satisfying Strong Equity, Hammond Equity, or the Pigou– Dalton transfer principle. The constructive social welfare orders are described using lexicographic preference relations.

Construction Domain

The paper highlights a crucial distinction between the domain required for real-valued representation of an SWF and the domain where an explicitly constructible SWO exists.

  1. For Strong Equity alone, a countable Y admits an SWF satisfying SE, but the explicit SWO construction applies only to a smaller class of linearly ordered domains. p. 3

    Where the paper says it

    Section 3 gives explicit constructions for well-ordered domains and proves nonconstructiveness results for Strong Equity and PD under Monotonicity. Section 4 studies representation and construction for Strong Equity alone, including positive representation results for countable domains, a non-representability result on the unit interval, and a non-Ramsey obstruction on integer-like domains.

    The countable-domain theorem should be read as an existence result rather than an explicit construction for integer-like domains. p. 3
    Where the paper says it

    Section 3 gives explicit constructions for well-ordered domains and proves nonconstructiveness results for Strong Equity and PD under Monotonicity. Section 4 studies representation and construction for Strong Equity alone, including positive representation results for countable domains, a non-representability result on the unit interval, and a non-Ramsey obstruction on integer-like domains.

  2. For Strong Equity on Y = [0, 1], no real-valued SWF can satisfy SE, and this impossibility is shown by constructing uncountably many pairwise disjoint open intervals in R that contradict the countability of the rationals. p. 7

    Where the paper says it

    Existing impossibility results show that, on many nontrivial domains, equity requirements together with Pareto requirements rule out real-valued representation. The lexicographic order above should therefore be read as an explicit SWO construction, not as a real-valued SWF representation.

  3. The results suggest that the domain on which a real-valued SWF satisfying a given equity-efficiency combination exists need not coincide with the domain on which an explicitly constructible SWO satisfying the same axioms exists. p. 3

    Where the paper says it

    A further contribution is to clarify the scope of earlier correspondence claims relating real-valued representation, explicit SWO construction. The results obtained here show that the domain on which an SWF exists need not coincide with the domain on which an explicitly constructible SWO exists.

Correspondence and Conclusion

The findings suggest a reformulation of earlier correspondence statements, emphasizing that the coincidence between domains for real-valued functions and explicit constructions is not a general feature of consequentialist equity axioms. The paper concludes that the class of domains admitting explicitly constructible SWOs can be larger than the class admitting explicit or even real-valued SWF representations. p. 3

Where the paper says it

This identifies a clear class of domains on which Strong Equity rankings are nonconstructive in the sense used in this paper. A further contribution is to clarify the scope of earlier correspondence claims relating real-valued representation, explicit SWO construction.

The appropriate formulation is axiom-specific, requiring separate identification of representation, construction, and non-Ramsey obstruction domains for each equity and efficiency combination. p. 3
Where the paper says it

Section 3 gives explicit constructions for well-ordered domains and proves nonconstructiveness results for Strong Equity and PD under Monotonicity. Section 4 studies representation and construction for Strong Equity alone, including positive representation results for countable domains, a non-representability result on the unit interval, and a non-Ramsey obstruction on integer-like domains.

This distinction is vital for interpreting results concerning Hammond Equity with Strong Pareto and Pigou–Dalton transfer principle. p. 0
Where the paper says it

On the construction and representation of social welfare orders satisfying consequentialist equity axioms Ram Sewak Dubey‗ Giorgio Laguzzi† August 14, 2026 Abstract In this paper we examine the constructive nature of social welfare orders on infinite utility streams 𝑋 = 𝑌 N satisfying Strong Equity, Hammond Equity, or the Pigou– Dalton transfer principle. The constructive social welfare orders are described using lexicographic preference relations.

The paper also shows that the SWF satisfying AN and WD on Y = [0, 1] implies the existence of a non-Ramsey set for any non-trivial domain Y. p. 7
Where the paper says it

The lexicographic order above should therefore be read as an explicit SWO construction, not as a real-valued SWF representation. • Dubey (2016a, Proposition 1) shows that, when 𝑌 is the set of negative integers, the existence of an SWO on 𝑌 N satisfying HE and WP entails the existence of a non-Ramsey set.

This extends to SWF satisfying AN and PD on Y = [0, 1], implying a non-Ramsey set for every non-trivial domain Y. p. 3
Where the paper says it

SWF satisfying Strong Equity exists. This shows that there exist non-trivial conflict between any real-valued representation and Strong Equity condition, even without adding any efficiency axiom.

The results demonstrate that the obstruction is generated by descending order structure for Hammond Equity and Pigou–Dalton, while for Strong Equity, the obstruction arises from order type. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D60, D70, D90. Keywords and Phrases: Construction, Hammond Equity, Lexicographic order, Non-Ramsey Set, Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, Representation, Social Welfare Orders, Strong Equity.

The paper concludes that the lexicographic constructions provide a constructive device to illustrate this distinction between representation and explicit description. p. 3
Where the paper says it

This shows that there exist non-trivial conflict between any real-valued representation and Strong Equity condition, even without adding any efficiency axiom. Finally, we provide explicit SWO constructions for Strong Equity alone under ordertheoretic restrictions on the domain.

The final summary points toward an axiom-specific approach to understanding these relationships. p. 3
Where the paper says it

The results obtained here show that the domain on which an SWF exists need not coincide with the domain on which an explicitly constructible SWO exists. Thus the relationship between representation and construction is axiom-specific and depends on the order-theoretic and, in the case of PD, additive structure of the utility domain.

Green — the paper says it, and the page is printed. Red — no passage carries it, so treat that sentence as unverified. The same check runs on your own text: check a summary against its source, $5.

Improvements for AI systems

  1. Construct explicit social welfare orders on well-ordered domains by mapping utility streams into binary threshold utility codes and ordering these codes lexicographically to satisfy Strong Pareto and Strong Equity axioms. This allows for a constructive method of ranking infinite utility streams when the domain set Y is well-ordered by the usual order.

  2. Develop algorithms to determine the nonconstructive nature of social welfare orders satisfying Strong Equity and Monotonicity by checking if the domain Y contains a subset of order type q star, 1, which entails the existence of a non-Ramsey collection of infinite subsets of N.

  3. Create methods for testing whether an SWF satisfying Strong Equity is real-valued on countable domains by examining the structure generated by eventual equality and using an order extension principle like Szpilrajn's Lemma to construct a linear order on the equivalence classes.

  4. Implement checks to determine if a real-valued social welfare function can be continuous with respect to the Baire topology on infinite utility streams, as shown in Proposition 3, which demonstrates that for Y = [0, 1], such functions cannot exist due to the creation of uncountably many pairwise disjoint open intervals.

  5. Create tools to verify if an SWF satisfying Strong Equity on a domain Y with more than seven distinct elements is non-constructive by checking if the resulting set of infinite subsets of N forms a non-Ramsey collection, as established in Proposition 2.

  6. Design procedures to identify whether the existence of an SWO satisfying Pigou-Dalton transfer principle and monotonicity on a domain Y with specific sequences (like those in Theorem 2b) implies the existence of a non-Ramsey set, utilizing the block construction method detailed in Lemma 3.

Abstract

In this paper we examine the constructive nature of social welfare orders on infinite utility streams X=Y N satisfying Strong Equity, Hammond Equity, or the Pigou--Dalton transfer principle. The constructive social welfare orders are described using lexicographic preference relations. Social welfare orders satisfying Strong Equity, Hammond Equity, or the Pigou--Dalton transfer principle admit explicit descriptions when Y(<) is well-ordered. We describe restrictions on the domain Y under which the existence of social welfare orders satisfying the aforementioned equity axioms entails the existence of a non-Ramsey collection. For this, we rely on the existence of a non-Ramsey collection, which is treated here as a nonconstructive object.

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