On the construction and representation of social welfare orders satisfying consequentialist equity axioms
summary
The gist
In this paper we examine the constructive nature of social welfare orders on infinite utility streams satisfying Strong Equity, Hammond Equity…
In short
The paper examines constructing explicit social welfare orders for infinite utility streams under conditions like Strong Equity, showing that lexicographic ordering works for well-ordered domains. It also proves that certain equity axioms, when combined with specific domain structures (like order type $\omega^*$), necessitate the existence of non-Ramsey collections, highlighting a distinction between representation and explicit construction.
Key concepts
- Strong Equity
- This axiom requires that if one stream is preferred over another based on a social welfare order, this preference must be consistent across all streams in a way that respects the underlying structure of the utility domain. It ensures that preferences are not arbitrarily inconsistent when comparing different possible outcomes.
- Non-Ramsey Collection
- This refers to an infinite collection of subsets of natural numbers (or similar sets) that cannot be colored with a finite number of colors in a specific way. The paper shows that the existence of certain social welfare orders implies such a collection must exist, indicating an inherent complexity or structure beyond simple countable ordering.
- Representation vs. Construction
- This is the crucial difference between proving a social welfare function exists (representation) and actually building it explicitly (construction). The paper finds that domains admitting explicit constructions for social welfare orders are often smaller than the domains where real-valued functions satisfying the same axioms can be represented.
- Pigou–Dalton Transfer Principle
- This principle relates to how transfers or changes in utility streams affect the preference order. When combined with monotonicity, it imposes structural constraints on sequences within the utility domain, which can lead to non-Ramsey obstructions when analyzing social welfare orders.
Terminology used across episodes
This episode discusses
- On the construction and representation of social welfare orders satisfying consequentialist equity axioms · Paper Radio
The paper
On the construction and representation of social welfare orders satisfying consequentialist equity axioms · Read on arXiv
Montclair State University · Universita del Piemonte Orientale
In this paper we examine the constructive nature of social welfare orders on infinite utility streams X=Y N satisfying Strong Equity, Hammond Equity, or the Pigou--Dalton transfer principle. The constructive social welfare orders are described using lexicographic preference relations. Social welfare orders satisfying Strong Equity, Hammond Equity, or the Pigou--Dalton transfer principle admit explicit descriptions when Y(<) is well-ordered. We describe restrictions on the domain Y under which the existence of social welfare orders satisfying the aforementioned equity axioms entails the existence of a non-Ramsey collection. For this, we rely on the existence of a non-Ramsey collection, which is treated here as a nonconstructive object.
Transcript
Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.
Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "On the construction and representation of social welfare orders satisfying consequentialist equity axioms".
Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. In this paper we examine the constructive nature of social welfare orders on infinite utility streams satisfying Strong Equity, Hammond Equity, or the Pigou–Dalton transfer principle and describes how these orders can be explicitly constructed or that their existence entails a non-Ramsey collection.
Ruth: Construction of Explicit Social Welfare Orders The authors provide explicit constructions for social welfare orders under specific domain restrictions, demonstrating the distinction between representation and explicit description.
Ruth: If Y is well-ordered by the usual order, there exists an explicitly defined SWO on X = YN satisfying Strong Pareto and Strong Equity.
Title and authors: Ruth: Now, to get into what this paper is actually saying, it starts by setting up the framework for social welfare orders and then immediately jumps into showing that when you have Strong Equity, Hammond Equity, or the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, there are specific ways to describe these orders using lexicographic preference relations >
Warren: So they’re looking at how we can define a social welfare order on these infinite utility streams X equals Y N where Y is a subset of real numbers R and N is the set of natural numbers >
Iris: What I find interesting here is the distinction they make between representation and construction, because it seems like you can have a real valued map that represents the order without being able to explicitly construct the order itself using just basic methods >
Ruth: That's right. The paper talks about how a real valued representation may itself be obtained by using some non-constructive device, but the actual construction of an SWO is what requires avoiding things like the Axiom of Choice >
Warren: They mention that for Strong Equity, Hammond Equity, or the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, these social welfare orders admit explicit descriptions when the set Y with its usual order is well ordered >
Iris: That's a key restriction they highlight because it shows that even with these equity axioms, you still need some sort of ordering structure on your utility streams to get an explicit description >
Ruth: And then they move on to talk about the domain restrictions under which the existence of these orders satisfying those equity axioms entails the existence of a non-Ramsey collection >
Warren: So it’s not just about building them; it’s about showing that if you assume these equity conditions hold, you might be forced into accepting something non-constructive because of the structure on your utility domain >
The paper's summary: Ruth: To summarize what the paper is doing, it explores the constructive nature of social welfare orders on infinite utility streams that satisfy Strong Equity, Hammond Equity, or the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle >
Warren: It breaks down into a few parts: first they give explicit constructions for SWOs when Y with its usual order is well ordered and you're looking at Strong Pareto and Strong Equity >
Iris: Then they look at the case of Strong Equity alone on countable domains Y, noting that while an SWF satisfying it exists, the proof uses something like Szpilrajn's Lemma which isn't what they consider constructive >
Ruth: But they do have explicit constructions for Strong Equity when L(Y) is well ordered or U(Y) is reverse well ordered, using those binary threshold utility codes and lexicographic ordering >
Warren: And for the nonconstructive side, they show that if Y contains a subset of order type q star and you have an SWO satisfying Strong Equity and monotonicity, then there exists a non-Ramsey collection Omega of subsets of N >
Iris: That's where it gets interesting because it connects the existence of these orders to this non-Ramsey set which they treat as a nonconstructive object >
Ruth: It also looks at Pigou-Dalton transfer principle together with monotonicity, and if you have sequences alpha m and beta m in Y satisfying certain gap conditions, then there exists a non-Ramsey collection Omega of subsets of N >
Warren: So the summary is that they provide explicit constructions under nice domain restrictions, but when those restrictions aren't met, the existence of these orders forces you to deal with non-Ramsey collections >
The paper's improvements: Ruth: One big improvement they suggest is making it clear the difference between representation and construction domain >
Warren: They stress that for Strong Equity alone, a countable domain Y admits an SWF satisfying Strong Equity, but the explicit SWO construction only applies to a smaller class of linearly ordered domains >
Iris: So they argue that we shouldn't read the countable-domain theorem as an explicit construction for integer like domains, but just as an existence result >
Ruth: And then they address the case for Y equal to zero one, where they show no real valued SWF can satisfy Strong Equity because constructing uncountably many pairwise disjoint open intervals in R contradicts the countability of the rationals >
Warren: That impossibility is a strong statement about the limits of what a real valued social welfare function can achieve under those conditions >
Iris: So they suggest that the domain on which a real valued SWF satisfies an equity-efficiency combination doesn't have to match the domain where an explicitly constructible SWO exists >
Ruth: That means we need to be very specific about what we are talking about for each equity and efficiency combination, which is important for things like Hammond Equity with Strong Pareto and Pigou-Dalton transfer principle >
Warren: And they also show that if you have an SWF satisfying AN and WD on Y equal zero one, it implies the existence of a non-Ramsey set for any non trivial domain Y >
Conclusion: Ruth: So to wrap up on "On the construction and representation of social welfare orders satisfying consequentialist equity axioms," the main implication is that we need an axiom specific approach to understanding these relationships between construction, representation, and those non-Ramsey obstructions >
Warren: They've shown that the class of domains admitting explicitly constructible SWOs can actually be larger than the class admitting explicit or even real valued SWF representations >
Iris: And they found that for Hammond Equity and Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, the obstruction seems to be generated by descending order structure on Hammond Equity and Pigou-Dalton, while for Strong Equity, the obstruction arises from the order type of the domain Y >
Ruth: It’s a constructive device using lexicographic constructions to illustrate this distinction between representation and explicit description >
Warren: So we’re left with a clear picture: you need to be precise about which equity you're talking about because the rules for construction and representation aren't all the same across the board >
Iris: I just want to add that these findings suggest that we have a more nuanced understanding of when these social welfare orders are truly tractable for policy making, or when they might just be theoretical constructs based on non-constructive tools >
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