Uniform price auction with quantity constraints

arXiv:2409.04047 · econ.TH · Submitted 2024-09-06 · Read on arXiv

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Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.

Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "Uniform price auction with quantity constraints".

Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. Uniform price auction with quantity constraints studies the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints <ref:2409.04047#pg2> We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium outcome <ref:2409.04047#pg4> Demand reduction and low price equilibrium may occur since it is advantageous for a bidder to give up some of his/her demand and get the remaining demand at a low price rather than to get his/her entire demand at a higher price <ref:2409.04047#pg4> A low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply <ref:2409.04047#pg4>.

Ruth: Auction Environments and Context The study focuses on uniform price auctions common in real-world markets such as wholesale electricity markets, spectrum auctions, and securities markets <ref:2409.04047#pg3> Quantity constraints arise from demand/supply conditions or regulations, such as retailers with limited final consumer demand or spectrum caps imposed by the government <ref:2409.04047#pg2> The analysis extends to procurement auctions where sellers compete to satisfy a buyer's demand, mirroring the buyer-seller auction environment <ref:2409.04047#pg2> Equilibrium Characterization Procedure The paper introduces an iterative procedure for finding an equilibrium outcome and an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium <ref:2409.04047#pg4> The procedure involves several steps, including defining the maximum bid ˆb1i based on comparing payoffs from overbidding versus bidding zero <ref:2409.04047#pg9> The process continues by ranking these maximum bids and dividing cases based on whether the aggregate demand of others covers the supply <ref:2409.04047#pg9> Results on Equilibrium Outcomes The analysis reveals that a low price equilibrium is only possible when no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply <ref:2409.04047#pg4> The procedure can lead to several outcomes, including cases where bidders drop out at specific price points or where the final equilibrium price is set at one of the bidders’ marginal values <ref:2409.04047#pg9> Furthermore, it is shown that if every bidder's quantity constraint is less than the total supply, a low price equilibrium is the only possible outcome <ref:2409.04047#pg4>.

Warren: Dynamic Implementation and Extensions The paper describes a dynamic implementation using an English auction with quantity constraints where bidders have private information about their values <ref:2409.04047#pg9> The equilibrium strategy in this ascending auction is weakly dominant to remain active if and only if the bid is less than or equal to a calculated maximum bid value <ref:2409.04047#pg9> Extensions are discussed, including incorporating a positive reserve price and analyzing the scenario where sellers adopt a discriminatory pricing rule instead of uniform pricing <ref:2409.04047#pg4>.

Ruth: The latter is strategically equivalent to price competition in a capacity-constrained oligopoly <ref:2409.04047#pg4>.

Title and authors: Ruth: To recap, this paper, "Uniform price auction with quantity constraints," investigates how many bidders with flat demands up to certain limits behave in uniform price auctions and introduces a procedure to find both an equilibrium outcome and an ascending auction that has that outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium.

Warren: And they highlight the possibility of demand reduction because sometimes it's smarter for a bidder to settle for less demand at a lower price than aiming for their full demand at a higher one.

Iris: They also make the strong statement that if no single person's quantity constraint is big enough to meet the total supply, then a low price equilibrium is the only possible outcome in this setting.

Ruth: It's interesting because it suggests that capacity constraints fundamentally change how bidders react to pricing in these auctions.

Warren: And they set up an iterative procedure involving comparing payoffs from overbidding versus bidding zero to figure out the maximum bid for each bidder.

The paper's summary: Iris: The core of their analysis involves this iterative procedure, which starts by defining a maximum bid for each bidder based on comparing what happens if you overbid versus if you just bid zero.

Ruth: And then they rank these maximum bids and break down the cases based on whether the total demand from everyone else covers the supply.

Warren: So they're essentially mapping out a decision tree based on who has enough quantity to meet the supply when others are bidding at a certain level.

Iris: The results show that this procedure can lead to various outcomes, including situations where bidders drop out at specific price points or when the final equilibrium price ends up being one of the bidders' marginal values.

Ruth: And they emphasize that if every bidder's quantity constraint is smaller than the total supply, then a low price equilibrium is the only possible outcome.

The paper's improvements: Warren: The paper suggests an improvement by describing a dynamic implementation using an English auction with quantity constraints where bidders have private information about their values.

Iris: In that ascending auction, the strategy for being active—staying in the game—is weakly dominant if and only if your bid is less than or equal to a calculated maximum bid value derived from the procedure.

Ruth: This means bidders can use this derived maximum bid as a real-time rule for when to participate in that ascending auction, which is a big deal for modeling behavior.

Warren: They also discuss extensions, like incorporating a positive reserve price, and they look at what happens if sellers switch from uniform pricing to a discriminatory pricing rule instead.

Iris: They note that the discriminatory pricing rule actually ends up being strategically equivalent to price competition in a capacity-constrained oligopoly, which is an important connection to other market structures.

Conclusion: Ruth: So, wrapping up this paper on "Uniform price auction with quantity constraints," they found that the equilibrium outcome isn't necessarily unique, and sometimes it results in inefficiency where a bidder with a higher marginal value ends up getting fewer units than someone with a lower marginal value.

Warren: That inefficiency seems inevitable if no single bidder's quantity constraint is big enough to cover the entire supply, which they say is the case under those conditions.

Iris: They conclude by summarizing how the equilibrium price and fulfilled demands are determined by the stopping condition of that iterative procedure, noting that the equilibrium price is always set at either one of a bidder's marginal values or zero.

Ruth: And they also point out that a challenging future research area would be constructing a procedure for general marginal values and multiple bids, which sounds like it opens up new avenues for analysis.

Warren: They end by summarizing that the procurement auction with capacity constraints under discriminatory pricing is equivalent to price competition in a capacity-constrained oligopoly.

Iris: To wrap things up, what this study really shows is how quantity constraints force bidders into certain trade-offs regarding demand reduction and low prices in uniform auctions.

Kiho Yoon

Korea University

econ.TH

Submitted: 2024-09-06

Updated: 2026-04-08

Journal ref: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 26(2), June 2026, pp. 227-242

DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2025-0074

Project page: https://kihoyoon.github.io

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Importance score: 77/100

The gist: Uniform price auction with quantity constraints studies the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints…

Key concepts

Uniform Price Auction with Quantity Constraints
This is an auction format where all bidders submit a single bid for their entire quantity demand. This setup is common in markets like electricity or spectrum auctions where sellers have limits on how much they can supply, and buyers have limits on how much they can purchase.
Iterative Procedure
A systematic step-by-step method developed to find the equilibrium outcome of the auction. It involves defining maximum bids based on payoff comparisons and ranking these bids to determine when the aggregate demand covers or fails to cover the supply, leading toward a stable result.
Low Price Equilibrium
A market state where bidders strategically reduce their demand or accept a very low price because obtaining their full demand at a higher price is less profitable than getting only part of it at a lower cost. This equilibrium is only possible if no single bidder's capacity constraint is large enough to cover the entire supply.

Terminology

Summary

Uniform price auction with quantity constraints studies the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints <ref:2409. p. 0

Where the paper says it

io Abstract We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium outcome.

04047#pg2> We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium outcome <ref:2409. p. 0
Where the paper says it

io Abstract We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium outcome.

p. 0
Where the paper says it

io Abstract We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium outcome.

p. 0
Where the paper says it

io Abstract We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium outcome.

04047#pg4> Demand reduction and low price equilibrium may occur since it is advantageous for a bidder to give up some of his/her demand and get the remaining demand at a low price rather than to get his/her entire demand at a higher price <ref:2409. p. 0
Where the paper says it

We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium outcome. Demand reduction and low price equilibrium may occur since it is advantageous for a bidder to give up some of his/her demand and get the remaining demand at a low price rather than to get his/her entire demand at a higher price.

04047#pg4> A low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply <ref:2409. p. 0
Where the paper says it

We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply. Keywords: capacity constraint, ascending auction, procurement, demand reduction, low price equilibrium JEL Classification: C72; D44; D82 1 arXiv:2409.

04047#pg4>.

Auction Environments and Context

The study focuses on uniform price auctions common in real-world markets such as wholesale electricity markets, spectrum auctions, and securities markets <ref:2409.04047#pg3> Quantity constraints arise from demand/supply conditions or regulations, such as retailers with limited final consumer demand or spectrum caps imposed by the government <ref:2409. p. 1

Where the paper says it

Quantity constraints may arise due to demand/supply conditions or regulations. For example, buyers in an auction might be retailers with limited final consumer demand, possibly due to low regional population density.

04047#pg2> The analysis extends to procurement auctions where sellers compete to satisfy a buyer's demand, mirroring the buyer-seller auction environment <ref:2409.04047#pg2>

Equilibrium Characterization Procedure

The paper introduces an iterative procedure for finding an equilibrium outcome and an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium <ref:2409.04047#pg4> The procedure involves several steps, including defining the maximum bid ˆb1i based on comparing payoffs from overbidding versus bidding zero <ref:2409.04047#pg9> The process continues by ranking these maximum bids and dividing cases based on whether the aggregate demand of others covers the supply <ref:2409. p. 2

Where the paper says it

The remaining bidders get their respective demands and the bidder who just dropped out gets nothing; (ii) if the aggregate demand is greater than the supply, then the clock increases again. Each bidder’s decision at each moment is essentially whether (i) to outbid the current prevailing price and get his/her entire demand quantity or (ii) to get only the residual quantity, which is the difference between the supply and the aggregate demand of others, at a low price.

04047#pg9>

Results on Equilibrium Outcomes

The analysis reveals that a low price equilibrium is only possible when no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply <ref:2409.04047#pg4> The procedure can lead to several outcomes, including cases where bidders drop out at specific price points or where the final equilibrium price is set at one of the bidders’ marginal values <ref:2409.04047#pg9> Furthermore, it is shown that if every bidder's quantity constraint is less than the total supply, a low price equilibrium is the only possible outcome <ref:2409.04047#pg4>.

Dynamic Implementation and Extensions

The paper describes a dynamic implementation using an English auction with quantity constraints where bidders have private information about their values <ref:2409.04047#pg9> The equilibrium strategy in this ascending auction is weakly dominant to remain active if and only if the bid is less than or equal to a calculated maximum bid value <ref:2409. p. 0

Where the paper says it

io Abstract We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium outcome.

04047#pg9> Extensions are discussed, including incorporating a positive reserve price and analyzing the scenario where sellers adopt a discriminatory pricing rule instead of uniform pricing <ref:2409. p. 4
Where the paper says it

Let bi denote bidder i’s bid. The auction adopts the uniform pricing rule and the price is set to the lowest winning bid (a.

04047#pg4>. The latter is strategically equivalent to price competition in a capacity-constrained oligopoly <ref:2409. p. 0
Where the paper says it

We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply. Keywords: capacity constraint, ascending auction, procurement, demand reduction, low price equilibrium JEL Classification: C72; D44; D82 1 arXiv:2409.

04047#pg4>.

Conclusion on Inefficiency

The equilibrium outcome found by the procedure may not be unique, and it can result in inefficiency where a bidder with a higher marginal value obtains fewer units than one with a lower marginal value <ref:2409.04047#pg9> This inefficiency is inevitable if no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the whole supply <ref:2409. p. 0

Where the paper says it

We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply. Keywords: capacity constraint, ascending auction, procurement, demand reduction, low price equilibrium JEL Classification: C72; D44; D82 1 arXiv:2409.

04047#pg4>. The paper concludes by summarizing the resulting equilibrium price and fulfilled demands based on the stopping condition of the iterative procedure <ref:2409. p. 3
Where the paper says it

Section 3 contains the main characterization: It introduces an iterative procedure for finding an equilibrium outcome as well as an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium. Section 4 concludes.

04047#pg9> The equilibrium price is always set at one of the bidders’ marginal values or at zero <ref:2409. p. 6
Where the paper says it

The equilibrium price and fulfilled demands are p ∗ = 0, q∗ 1 = q1 and q ∗ 2 = m − q1 in the former, and p ∗ = 0, q∗ 1 = m − q2 and q ∗ 2 = q2 in the latter. Observe that, for the case when the bidders are symmetric such that v1 = v2 = v and q1 = q2 = q, (i) if q ≥ m, then each bidder bids v, and (ii) if q < m, then one bidder bids (2q − m)v/q or higher and the other bidder bids zero.

04047#pg9>. The paper also notes that a challenging future research agenda involves constructing a procedure for general marginal values and multiple bids <ref:2409.04047#pg9>. The procurement auction with capacity constraints under discriminatory pricing is equivalent to price competition in a capacity-constrained oligopoly <ref:2409. p. 0
Where the paper says it

We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply. Keywords: capacity constraint, ascending auction, procurement, demand reduction, low price equilibrium JEL Classification: C72; D44; D82 1 arXiv:2409.

04047#pg4>.

REFERENCES

arXiv:2409.04047v2 [econ. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Keywords: capacity constraint, ascending auction, procurement, demand reduction, low price equilibrium JEL Classification: C72; D44; D82 1 arXiv:2409. 04047v2 [econ.

p. 0
Where the paper says it

Keywords: capacity constraint, ascending auction, procurement, demand reduction, low price equilibrium JEL Classification: C72; D44; D82 1 arXiv:2409. 04047v2 [econ.

TH] 8 Apr 2026<ref:2409. p. 0
Where the paper says it

04047v2 [econ. TH] 8 Apr 2026

p. 0
Where the paper says it

04047v2 [econ. TH] 8 Apr 2026

04047#pg2> Uniform price auction with quantity constraints studies the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints <ref:2409. p. 0
Where the paper says it

io Abstract We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium outcome.

04047#pg2> We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium outcome <ref:2409.04047#pg3> Demand reduction and low price equilibrium may occur since it is advantageous for a bidder to give up some of his/her demand and get the remaining demand at a low price rather than to get his/her entire demand at a higher price <ref:2409. p. 0
Where the paper says it

We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium outcome. Demand reduction and low price equilibrium may occur since it is advantageous for a bidder to give up some of his/her demand and get the remaining demand at a low price rather than to get his/her entire demand at a higher price.

p. 0
Where the paper says it

We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium outcome. Demand reduction and low price equilibrium may occur since it is advantageous for a bidder to give up some of his/her demand and get the remaining demand at a low price rather than to get his/her entire demand at a higher price.

04047#pg3> A low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply <ref:2409. p. 0
Where the paper says it

We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply. Keywords: capacity constraint, ascending auction, procurement, demand reduction, low price equilibrium JEL Classification: C72; D44; D82 1 arXiv:2409.

04047#pg3>

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Uniform price auction with quantity constraints<ref:2409.04047#pg2> Kiho Yoon Department of Economics, Korea University 145 Anam-ro, Seongbuk-gu, Seoul, Korea 02841 kiho@korea. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Uniform price auction with quantity constraints Kiho Yoon Department of Economics, Korea University 145 Anam-ro, Seongbuk-gu, Seoul, Korea 02841 kiho@korea. kr https://kihoyoon.

ac.kr https://kihoyoon. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Uniform price auction with quantity constraints Kiho Yoon Department of Economics, Korea University 145 Anam-ro, Seongbuk-gu, Seoul, Korea 02841 kiho@korea. kr https://kihoyoon.

github.io Abstract We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints <ref:2409. p. 0
Where the paper says it

kr https://kihoyoon. io Abstract We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints.

04047#pg2> We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium outcome <ref:2409.04047#pg3> Demand reduction and low price equilibrium may occur since it is advantageous for a bidder to give up some of his/her demand and get the remaining demand at a low price rather than to get his/her entire demand at a higher price <ref:2409.04047#pg3> We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply <ref:2409. p. 0
Where the paper says it

We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply. Keywords: capacity constraint, ascending auction, procurement, demand reduction, low price equilibrium JEL Classification: C72; D44; D82 1 arXiv:2409.

04047#pg3> Keywords capacity constraint ascending auction procurement demand reduction low price equilibrium JEL Classification C72; D44; D82 arXiv:2409. p. 0
Where the paper says it

We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply. Keywords: capacity constraint, ascending auction, procurement, demand reduction, low price equilibrium JEL Classification: C72; D44; D82 1 arXiv:2409.

04047v2 [econ.TH] 8 Apr 2026<ref:2409.04047#pg2>

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Introduction We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints <ref:2409.04047#pg2> Though not analyzed extensively in the literature, this class of auction environments is common in real-world markets such as wholesale electricity markets, spectrum auctions, and securities markets <ref:2409. p. 1

Where the paper says it

1 Introduction We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. Though not analyzed extensively in the literature, this class of auction environments is common in real-world markets such as wholesale electricity markets, spectrum auctions, and securities markets.

04047#pg2> The predominant auction format in the European electricity market is the uniform price auction, also known as the ‘pay-as-clear’ auction (ACER, 2022, p. p. 1
Where the paper says it

Though not analyzed extensively in the literature, this class of auction environments is common in real-world markets such as wholesale electricity markets, spectrum auctions, and securities markets. The predominant auction format in the European electricity market is the uniform price auction, also known as the ‘pay-as-clear’ auction (ACER, 2022, p.

19) <ref:2409. p. 0
Where the paper says it

We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply. Keywords: capacity constraint, ascending auction, procurement, demand reduction, low price equilibrium JEL Classification: C72; D44; D82 1 arXiv:2409.

04047#pg2> The same is broadly true for electricity markets in the United States <ref:2409. p. 1
Where the paper says it

The predominant auction format in the European electricity market is the uniform price auction, also known as the ‘pay-as-clear’ auction (ACER, 2022, p. The same is broadly true for electricity markets in the United States.

04047#pg2> Quantity constraints may arise due to demand/supply conditions or regulations <ref:2409. p. 1
Where the paper says it

The US treasury securities, as well as most private securities, are largely sold via the uniform price auction, also known as the ‘single-price’ auction (Malvey and Archibald, 1998; Horta¸csu et al. Quantity constraints may arise due to demand/supply conditions or regulations.

04047#pg2> For example, buyers in an auction might be retailers with limited final consumer demand, possibly due to low regional population density <ref:2409. p. 1
Where the paper says it

Quantity constraints may arise due to demand/supply conditions or regulations. For example, buyers in an auction might be retailers with limited final consumer demand, possibly due to low regional population density.

04047#pg2> Similarly, sellers in a procurement auction (such as electricity companies in day-ahead markets) may have constant marginal costs up to their capacity limits <ref:2409. p. 1
Where the paper says it

For example, buyers in an auction might be retailers with limited final consumer demand, possibly due to low regional population density. Similarly, sellers in a procurement auction (such as electricity companies in day-ahead markets) may have constant marginal costs up to their capacity limits.

04047#pg2> In spectrum auctions, the government often imposes spectrum caps that limit the quantity of spectrum a single bidder may obtain so as to prevent excessive market concentration and enhance competitiveness<ref:2409. p. 1
Where the paper says it

Similarly, sellers in a procurement auction (such as electricity companies in day-ahead markets) may have constant marginal costs up to their capacity limits. In spectrum auctions, the government often imposes spectrum caps that limit the quantity of spectrum a single bidder may obtain so as to prevent excessive market concentration and enhance competitiveness.

04047#pg2> We first present an iterative procedure for finding an equilibrium outcome of the uniform price auction when there are many quantity-constrained bidders <ref:2409. p. 1
Where the paper says it

1 In treasury auctions and equity initial public offerings (IPOs), large investors may not acquire more than a certain percentage of the total shares. We first present an iterative procedure for finding an equilibrium outcome of the uniform price auction when there are many quantity-constrained bidders.

04047#pg3> This outcome is a Nash equilibrium outcome when bidders’ valuations for the good and the quantity constraints are common knowledge among bidders <ref:2409. p. 1
Where the paper says it

We first present an iterative procedure for finding an equilibrium outcome of the uniform price auction when there are many quantity-constrained bidders. This outcome is a Nash equilibrium outcome when bidders’ valuations for the good and the quantity constraints are common knowledge among bidders.

04047#pg3> Moreover, this is the dominant strategy equilibrium outcome of an ascending auction when bidders have private information about their respective valuations <ref:2409. p. 2
Where the paper says it

equilibrium outcome of an ascending auction when bidders have private information about their respective valuations. Our ascending auction is a variant of the English auction that incorporates bidders’ quantity constraints.

04047#pg3> Our ascending auction is a variant of the English auction that incorporates bidders’ quantity constraints <ref:2409. p. 2
Where the paper says it

equilibrium outcome of an ascending auction when bidders have private information about their respective valuations. Our ascending auction is a variant of the English auction that incorporates bidders’ quantity constraints.

04047#pg3> In this auction, the clock showing the current price increases continuously over time and bidders decide when to drop out <ref:2409. p. 2
Where the paper says it

Our ascending auction is a variant of the English auction that incorporates bidders’ quantity constraints. In this auction, the clock showing the current price increases continuously over time and bidders decide when to drop out.

04047#pg3> When a bidder drops out, the clock stops temporarily and the auctioneer checks whether the aggregate demand of remaining bidders is greater than or equal to the supply <ref:2409. p. 2
Where the paper says it

In addition, the auction keeps track of the provisional price, which is set to zero or to the reserve price initially. When a bidder drops out, the clock stops temporarily and the auctioneer checks whether the aggregate demand of remaining bidders is greater than or equal to the supply.

04047#pg3> If the former is less than the latter, then the auction ends and the final price is set to the provisional price <ref:2409. p. 2
Where the paper says it

When a bidder drops out, the clock stops temporarily and the auctioneer checks whether the aggregate demand of remaining bidders is greater than or equal to the supply. If the former is less than the latter, then the auction ends and the final price is the provisional price.

04047#pg3> The remaining bidders get their respective demands and the bidder who just dropped out gets the residual supply <ref:2409. p. 2
Where the paper says it

If the former is less than the latter, then the auction ends and the final price is the provisional price. The remaining bidders get their respective demands and the bidder who just dropped out gets the residual supply.

04047#pg3> Otherwise, the provisional price is updated to the current price just stopped<ref:2409. p. 2
Where the paper says it

The remaining bidders get their respective demands and the bidder who just dropped out gets the residual supply. Otherwise, the provisional price is updated to the current price just stopped: (i) if the aggregate demand is equal to the supply, the auction ends and the final price is set to the provisional price, which has just been updated.

04047#pg3> (i) if the aggregate demand is equal to the supply, the auction ends and the final price is set to the provisional price, which has just been updated<ref:2409. p. 2
Where the paper says it

The remaining bidders get their respective demands and the bidder who just dropped out gets the residual supply. Otherwise, the provisional price is updated to the current price just stopped: (i) if the aggregate demand is equal to the supply, the auction ends and the final price is set to the provisional price, which has just been updated.

04047#pg3> (ii) if the aggregate demand is greater than the supply, then the clock increases again<ref:2409. p. 2
Where the paper says it

Otherwise, the provisional price is updated to the current price just stopped: (i) if the aggregate demand is equal to the supply, the auction ends and the final price is set to the provisional price, which has just been updated. The remaining bidders get their respective demands and the bidder who just dropped out gets nothing; (ii) if the aggregate demand is greater than the supply, then the clock increases again.

04047#pg3> Each bidder’s decision at each moment is essentially whether (i) to outbid the current prevailing price and get his/her entire demand quantity or (ii) to get only the residual quantity, which is the difference between the supply and the aggregate demand of others, at a low price<ref:2409. p. 2
Where the paper says it

The remaining bidders get their respective demands and the bidder who just dropped out gets nothing; (ii) if the aggregate demand is greater than the supply, then the clock increases again. Each bidder’s decision at each moment is essentially whether (i) to outbid the current prevailing price and get his/her entire demand quantity or (ii) to get only the residual quantity, which is the difference between the supply and the aggregate demand of others, at a low price.

04047#pg3> When the aggregate demand of others at the current prevailing price is not sufficient to cover the supply, it may sometimes be advantageous for a bidder to give up some of his/her demand and get the remaining demand at a low price (say, zero) rather than to get his/her entire demand at a higher price <ref:2409. p. 2
Where the paper says it

Each bidder’s decision at each moment is essentially whether (i) to outbid the current prevailing price and get his/her entire demand quantity or (ii) to get only the residual quantity, which is the difference between the supply and the aggregate demand of others, at a low price. When the aggregate demand of others at the current prevailing price is not sufficient to cover the supply, it may sometimes be advantageous for a bidder to give up some of his/her demand and get the remaining demand at a low price (say, zero) rather than to get his/her entire demand at a higher price.

04047#pg3> In fact, a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply <ref:2409. p. 0
Where the paper says it

We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply. Keywords: capacity constraint, ascending auction, procurement, demand reduction, low price equilibrium JEL Classification: C72; D44; D82 1 arXiv:2409.

04047#pg3> Demand reduction and low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions have attracted some attention in the literature <ref:2409. p. 2
Where the paper says it

In fact, a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply. Demand reduction and low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions have attracted some attention in the literature.

04047#pg3> Noussair (1995), Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) bidders interact frequently <ref:2409. p. 2
Where the paper says it

Demand reduction and low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions have attracted some attention in the literature. Noussair (1995), Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) bidders interact frequently.

04047#pg3> and Ausubel et al. p. 3
Where the paper says it

and Ausubel et al. (2014) have shown that a bidder has an incentive to shade his/her bid for units except for the first unit, resulting in a low equilibrium price.

(2014) have shown that a bidder has an incentive to shade his/her bid for units except for the first unit, resulting in a low equilibrium price <ref:2409. p. 3
Where the paper says it

and Ausubel et al. (2014) have shown that a bidder has an incentive to shade his/her bid for units except for the first unit, resulting in a low equilibrium price.

p. 3
Where the paper says it

and Ausubel et al. (2014) have shown that a bidder has an incentive to shade his/her bid for units except for the first unit, resulting in a low equilibrium price.

04047#pg3> We note that the reason for this phenomenon in the current paper is different from the one in those papers since a bidder can submit only one lumpy bid for all units, not several different bids<ref:2409. p. 3
Where the paper says it

(2014) have shown that a bidder has an incentive to shade his/her bid for units except for the first unit, resulting in a low equilibrium price. We note that the reason for this phenomenon in the current paper is different from the one in those papers since a bidder can submit only one lumpy bid for all units, not several different bids, in our setting.

p. 3
Where the paper says it

(2014) have shown that a bidder has an incentive to shade his/her bid for units except for the first unit, resulting in a low equilibrium price. We note that the reason for this phenomenon in the current paper is different from the one in those papers since a bidder can submit only one lumpy bid for all units, not several different bids, in our setting.

04047#pg3> Tenorio (1999) has considered lumpy bids in a setting with three identical units of a good and two symmetric bidders <ref:2409. p. 3
Where the paper says it

We note that the reason for this phenomenon in the current paper is different from the one in those papers since a bidder can submit only one lumpy bid for all units, not several different bids, in our setting. 3 Tenorio (1999) has considered lumpy bids in a setting with three identical units of a good and two symmetric bidders.

p. 3
Where the paper says it

We note that the reason for this phenomenon in the current paper is different from the one in those papers since a bidder can submit only one lumpy bid for all units, not several different bids, in our setting. 3 Tenorio (1999) has considered lumpy bids in a setting with three identical units of a good and two symmetric bidders.

04047#pg3> In comparison, our iterative procedure systematically finds an equilibrium outcome for arbitrary units of a good and any number of asymmetric bidders <ref:2409. p. 3
Where the paper says it

3 Tenorio (1999) has considered lumpy bids in a setting with three identical units of a good and two symmetric bidders. In comparison, our iterative procedure systematically finds an equilibrium outcome for arbitrary units of a good and any number of asymmetric bidders.

p. 3
Where the paper says it

3 Tenorio (1999) has considered lumpy bids in a setting with three identical units of a good and two symmetric bidders. In comparison, our iterative procedure systematically finds an equilibrium outcome for arbitrary units of a good and any number of asymmetric bidders.

04047#pg3> Wilson (1979), Back and Zender (1993) and Wang and Zender (2002) have found similar phenomena in share auctions under the common-value postulate instead of the private-value postulate considered in this paper <ref:2409. p. 3
Where the paper says it

In comparison, our iterative procedure systematically finds an equilibrium outcome for arbitrary units of a good and any number of asymmetric bidders. Wilson (1979), Back and Zender (1993) and Wang and Zender (2002) have found similar phenomena in share auctions under the common-value postulate instead of the private-value postulate considered in this paper and the papers cited above.

p. 3
Where the paper says it

In comparison, our iterative procedure systematically finds an equilibrium outcome for arbitrary units of a good and any number of asymmetric bidders. Wilson (1979), Back and Zender (1993) and Wang and Zender (2002) have found similar phenomena in share auctions under the common-value postulate instead of the private-value postulate considered in this paper and the papers cited above.

04047#pg3> Several papers on wholesale electricity markets including von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), Fabra et al. p. 3
Where the paper says it

Wilson (1979), Back and Zender (1993) and Wang and Zender (2002) have found similar phenomena in share auctions under the common-value postulate instead of the private-value postulate considered in this paper and the papers cited above. Several papers on wholesale electricity markets including von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), Fabra et al.

p. 3
Where the paper says it

Wilson (1979), Back and Zender (1993) and Wang and Zender (2002) have found similar phenomena in share auctions under the common-value postulate instead of the private-value postulate considered in this paper and the papers cited above. Several papers on wholesale electricity markets including von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), Fabra et al.

(2006), Schwenen (2015) and Anderson and Holmberg (2018) study procurement auctions in which suppliers with capacity constraints compete to satisfy the buyer’s electricity demand <ref:2409. p. 3
Where the paper says it

Several papers on wholesale electricity markets including von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), Fabra et al. (2006), Schwenen (2015) and Anderson and Holmberg (2018) study procurement auctions in which suppliers (generators) with capacity constraints compete to satisfy the buyer’s electricity demand.

p. 3
Where the paper says it

Several papers on wholesale electricity markets including von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), Fabra et al. (2006), Schwenen (2015) and Anderson and Holmberg (2018) study procurement auctions in which suppliers (generators) with capacity constraints compete to satisfy the buyer’s electricity demand.

04047#pg3> Since the procurement auction where many sellers submit offers to a buyer is the mirror image of the auction where many buyers submit bids to a seller, our analysis can be applied equally well to this environment <ref:2409. p. 3
Where the paper says it

(2006), Schwenen (2015) and Anderson and Holmberg (2018) study procurement auctions in which suppliers (generators) with capacity constraints compete to satisfy the buyer’s electricity demand. Since the procurement auction where many sellers submit offers to a buyer is the mirror image of the auction where many buyers submit bids to a seller, our analysis can be applied equally well to this environment.

p. 3
Where the paper says it

(2006), Schwenen (2015) and Anderson and Holmberg (2018) study procurement auctions in which suppliers (generators) with capacity constraints compete to satisfy the buyer’s electricity demand. Since the procurement auction where many sellers submit offers to a buyer is the mirror image of the auction where many buyers submit bids to a seller, our analysis can be applied equally well to this environment.

04047#pg3> The main analysis in these papers deals with either the two-bidder case or the symmetric-bidder case <ref:2409. p. 3
Where the paper says it

Since the procurement auction where many sellers submit offers to a buyer is the mirror image of the auction where many buyers submit bids to a seller, our analysis can be applied equally well to this environment. The main analysis in these papers deals with either the two-bidder case or the symmetric-bidder case.

p. 3
Where the paper says it

Since the procurement auction where many sellers submit offers to a buyer is the mirror image of the auction where many buyers submit bids to a seller, our analysis can be applied equally well to this environment. The main analysis in these papers deals with either the two-bidder case or the symmetric-bidder case.

04047#pg3>

--- Page 4 ---

and Ausubel et al. (2014) have shown that a bidder has an incentive to shade his/her bid for units except for the first unit, resulting in a low equilibrium price <ref:2409.04047#pg3> We note that the reason for this phenomenon in the current paper is different from the one in those papers since a bidder can submit only one lumpy bid for all units, not several different bids<ref:2409.04047#pg3> Tenorio (1999) has considered lumpy bids in a setting with three identical units of a good and two symmetric bidders <ref:2409.04047#pg3> In comparison, our iterative procedure systematically finds an equilibrium outcome for arbitrary units of a good and any number of asymmetric bidders <ref:2409.04047#pg3> Wilson (1979), Back and Zender (1993) and Wang and Zender (2002) have found similar phenomena in share auctions under the common-value postulate instead of the private-value postulate considered in this paper <ref:2409.04047#pg3> Several papers on wholesale electricity markets including von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), Fabra et al. (2006), Schwenen (2015) and Anderson and Holmberg (2018) study procurement auctions in which suppliers with capacity constraints compete to satisfy the buyer’s electricity demand <ref:2409.04047#pg3> Since the procurement auction where many sellers submit offers to a buyer is the mirror image of the auction where many buyers submit bids to a seller, our analysis can be applied equally well to this environment <ref:2409.04047#pg3> The main analysis in these papers deals with either the two-bidder case or the symmetric-bidder case <ref:2409.04047#pg3>

--- Page 5 ---

The two-bidder case Consider an auction in which m units of a good are up for sale to two bidders <ref:2409.04047#pg2> Bidder i for i = 1, 2 has a constant marginal value vi > 0 up to his/her quantity constraint qi > 0, but attaches no value afterward <ref:2409. p. 4

Where the paper says it

2 The two-bidder case Consider an auction in which m units of a good are up for sale to two bidders. Bidder i for i = 1, 2 has a constant marginal value vi > 0 up to his/her quantity constraint qi > 0, but attaches no value afterward.

04047#pg2> Assume without loss of generality that v1 ≥ v2 <ref:2409. p. 4
Where the paper says it

Bidder i for i = 1, 2 has a constant marginal value vi > 0 up to his/her quantity constraint qi > 0, but attaches no value afterward. Assume without loss of generality that v1 ≥ v2.

04047#pg2> Assume also that q1 + q2 > m since the problem is trivial otherwise <ref:2409. p. 4
Where the paper says it

Assume without loss of generality that v1 ≥ v2. Assume also that q1 + q2 > m since the problem is trivial otherwise.

04047#pg2> Each bidder submits one bid for his/her demand. p. 4
Where the paper says it

Assume also that q1 + q2 > m since the problem is trivial otherwise. Each bidder submits one bid for his/her demand.

Let bi denote bidder i’s bid <ref:2409. p. 4
Where the paper says it

Each bidder submits one bid for his/her demand. Let bi denote bidder i’s bid.

04047#pg2> The auction adopts the uniform pricing rule and the price is set to the lowest winning bid (a. p. 4
Where the paper says it

Let bi denote bidder i’s bid. The auction adopts the uniform pricing rule and the price is set to the lowest winning bid (a.

k.a. the last accepted bid) <ref:2409. p. 4
Where the paper says it

The auction adopts the uniform pricing rule and the price is set to the lowest winning bid (a. the last accepted bid).

04047#pg2> Hence, when b1 > b2, the price is set to b1 if q1 ≥ m, and set to b2 if q1 The case when b1 Lastly, when b1 = b2, the price is set to this common bid of b1 = b2<ref:2409. p. 4
Where the paper says it

The case when b1 < b2 can be similarly described. Lastly, when b1 = b2, the price is set to this common bid of b1 = b2.

04047#pg2> We note that this framework is similar to that of Fabra et al. p. 4
Where the paper says it

Lastly, when b1 = b2, the price is set to this common bid of b1 = b2. We note that this framework is similar to that of Fabra et al.

(2006) which studies procurement auctions <ref:2409. p. 4
Where the paper says it

We note that this framework is similar to that of Fabra et al. (2006) which studies procurement auctions.

04047#pg2> In particular, that paper provides a characterization of equilibria for the two-bidder case, although it is not as procedural as the approach in the present paper<ref:2409. p. 4
Where the paper says it

(2006) which studies procurement auctions. In particular, that paper provides a characterization of equilibria for the two-bidder case, although it is not as procedural as the approach in the present paper.

04047#pg2>

--- Page 6 ---

[1] q1 ≥ m and q2 ≥ m: Since q2 ≥ m, which means that bidder 1 can get nothing if his/her bid is lower than bidder 2’s, bidder 1 has an incentive to bid above b2 whenever b2 Likewise, bidder 2 has an incentive to bid above b1 whenever b1 Obviously, bidder 2 does not bid above v2 because doing so results in a negative payoff<ref:2409.04047#pg4> Therefore, an equilibrium bid profile is b1 = b2 = v2<ref:2409. p. 4

Where the paper says it

Obviously, bidder 2 does not bid above v2 because doing so results in a negative payoff. Therefore, an equilibrium bid profile is b1 = b2 = v2.

04047#pg4> The equilibrium price is p∗ = v2 and the fulfilled demands are q∗1 = m and q∗2 = 0. p. 4
Where the paper says it

Therefore, an equilibrium bid profile is b1 = b2 = v2. The equilibrium price is p ∗ = v2 and the fulfilled demands are q ∗ 1 = m and q ∗ 2 = 0.

4<ref:2409. p. 0
Where the paper says it

We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply. Keywords: capacity constraint, ascending auction, procurement, demand reduction, low price equilibrium JEL Classification: C72; D44; D82 1 arXiv:2409.

04047#pg4> It is well-known that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium may not exist when the set of possible bids is not discrete, for instance, an interval in IR+ <ref:2409. p. 4
Where the paper says it

The equilibrium price is p ∗ = v2 and the fulfilled demands are q ∗ 1 = m and q ∗ 2 = 0. 4 4 It is well-known that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium may not exist when the set of possible bids is not discrete, for instance, an interval in IR+.

04047#pg4> This can be easily overcome if we introduce the smallest money unit, say > 0<ref:2409. p. 4
Where the paper says it

4 4 It is well-known that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium may not exist when the set of possible bids is not discrete, for instance, an interval in IR+. This can be easily overcome if we introduce the smallest money unit, say > 0.

04047#pg4> This makes the set of possible bids as a discrete set, thus avoiding the problems due to the presence of indifference<ref:2409. p. 4
Where the paper says it

This can be easily overcome if we introduce the smallest money unit, say > 0. This makes the set of possible bids as a discrete set, thus avoiding the problems due to the presence of indifference.

04047#pg4> Hence, the equilibrium when v1 > v2 is that b2 = v2 and b1 = v2 + because bidder 1 is ready to outbid bidder 2 and obtain all units of the good<ref:2409. p. 4
Where the paper says it

This makes the set of possible bids as a discrete set, thus avoiding the problems due to the presence of indifference. Hence, the equilibrium when v1 > v2 is that b2 = v2 and b1 = v2 + because bidder 1 is ready to outbid bidder 2 and obtain all units of the good.

04047#pg4> Since we can take arbitrarily small, the equilibrium becomes b1 = b2 = v2 with the understanding that bidder 1 has a priority over bidder 2 in obtaining all the units he/she demands<ref:2409. p. 4
Where the paper says it

Hence, the equilibrium when v1 > v2 is that b2 = v2 and b1 = v2 + because bidder 1 is ready to outbid bidder 2 and obtain all units of the good. Since we can take arbitrarily small, the equilibrium becomes b1 = b2 = v2 with the understanding that bidder 1 has a priority over bidder 2 in obtaining all the units he/she demands.

04047#pg4> We will follow this convention throughout the paper<ref:2409. p. 4
Where the paper says it

Since we can take arbitrarily small, the equilibrium becomes b1 = b2 = v2 with the understanding that bidder 1 has a priority over bidder 2 in obtaining all the units he/she demands. We will follow this convention throughout the paper.

04047#pg4>

--- Page 7 ---

[2] q1 ≥ m and q2 < m: Since q1 ≥ m, bidder 2 has an incentive to bid above b1 whenever b1 On the other hand, bidder 1 compares m(v1−b2), the payoff from overbidding b2 and getting m units, with (m − q2)v1, the payoff from bidding ze…

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Improvements for AI systems

  1. System can find a Nash equilibrium outcome of uniform price auctions when many asymmetric quantity constrained bidders exist through an iterative procedure. This procedure systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium outcome.

  2. The improved system can determine the optimal bidding strategy for bidders in private information settings by solving the English auction with quantity constraints using the derived dominant strategy equilibrium strategies. This allows the system to model bidder behavior based on their marginal values and remaining supply in real-time during an ascending auction.

  3. The system can identify demand reduction and low price equilibrium scenarios where a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply. This capability allows for accurate prediction of market outcomes under specific capacity constraints, indicating when bidders will strategically give up some of their demand at a lower price.

Abstract

We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium outcome. Demand reduction and low price equilibrium may occur since it is advantageous for a bidder to give up some of his/her demand and get the remaining demand at a low price rather than to get his/her entire demand at a higher price. We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no bidder's quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply.

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