Uniform price auction with quantity constraints
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Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.
Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "Uniform price auction with quantity constraints".
Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. Uniform price auction with quantity constraints studies the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints <ref:2409.04047#pg2> We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium outcome <ref:2409.04047#pg4> Demand reduction and low price equilibrium may occur since it is advantageous for a bidder to give up some of his/her demand and get the remaining demand at a low price rather than to get his/her entire demand at a higher price <ref:2409.04047#pg4> A low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply <ref:2409.04047#pg4>.
Ruth: Auction Environments and Context The study focuses on uniform price auctions common in real-world markets such as wholesale electricity markets, spectrum auctions, and securities markets <ref:2409.04047#pg3> Quantity constraints arise from demand/supply conditions or regulations, such as retailers with limited final consumer demand or spectrum caps imposed by the government <ref:2409.04047#pg2> The analysis extends to procurement auctions where sellers compete to satisfy a buyer's demand, mirroring the buyer-seller auction environment <ref:2409.04047#pg2> Equilibrium Characterization Procedure The paper introduces an iterative procedure for finding an equilibrium outcome and an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium <ref:2409.04047#pg4> The procedure involves several steps, including defining the maximum bid ˆb1i based on comparing payoffs from overbidding versus bidding zero <ref:2409.04047#pg9> The process continues by ranking these maximum bids and dividing cases based on whether the aggregate demand of others covers the supply <ref:2409.04047#pg9> Results on Equilibrium Outcomes The analysis reveals that a low price equilibrium is only possible when no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply <ref:2409.04047#pg4> The procedure can lead to several outcomes, including cases where bidders drop out at specific price points or where the final equilibrium price is set at one of the bidders’ marginal values <ref:2409.04047#pg9> Furthermore, it is shown that if every bidder's quantity constraint is less than the total supply, a low price equilibrium is the only possible outcome <ref:2409.04047#pg4>.
Warren: Dynamic Implementation and Extensions The paper describes a dynamic implementation using an English auction with quantity constraints where bidders have private information about their values <ref:2409.04047#pg9> The equilibrium strategy in this ascending auction is weakly dominant to remain active if and only if the bid is less than or equal to a calculated maximum bid value <ref:2409.04047#pg9> Extensions are discussed, including incorporating a positive reserve price and analyzing the scenario where sellers adopt a discriminatory pricing rule instead of uniform pricing <ref:2409.04047#pg4>.
Ruth: The latter is strategically equivalent to price competition in a capacity-constrained oligopoly <ref:2409.04047#pg4>.
Title and authors: Ruth: To recap, this paper, "Uniform price auction with quantity constraints," investigates how many bidders with flat demands up to certain limits behave in uniform price auctions and introduces a procedure to find both an equilibrium outcome and an ascending auction that has that outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium.
Warren: And they highlight the possibility of demand reduction because sometimes it's smarter for a bidder to settle for less demand at a lower price than aiming for their full demand at a higher one.
Iris: They also make the strong statement that if no single person's quantity constraint is big enough to meet the total supply, then a low price equilibrium is the only possible outcome in this setting.
Ruth: It's interesting because it suggests that capacity constraints fundamentally change how bidders react to pricing in these auctions.
Warren: And they set up an iterative procedure involving comparing payoffs from overbidding versus bidding zero to figure out the maximum bid for each bidder.
The paper's summary: Iris: The core of their analysis involves this iterative procedure, which starts by defining a maximum bid for each bidder based on comparing what happens if you overbid versus if you just bid zero.
Ruth: And then they rank these maximum bids and break down the cases based on whether the total demand from everyone else covers the supply.
Warren: So they're essentially mapping out a decision tree based on who has enough quantity to meet the supply when others are bidding at a certain level.
Iris: The results show that this procedure can lead to various outcomes, including situations where bidders drop out at specific price points or when the final equilibrium price ends up being one of the bidders' marginal values.
Ruth: And they emphasize that if every bidder's quantity constraint is smaller than the total supply, then a low price equilibrium is the only possible outcome.
The paper's improvements: Warren: The paper suggests an improvement by describing a dynamic implementation using an English auction with quantity constraints where bidders have private information about their values.
Iris: In that ascending auction, the strategy for being active—staying in the game—is weakly dominant if and only if your bid is less than or equal to a calculated maximum bid value derived from the procedure.
Ruth: This means bidders can use this derived maximum bid as a real-time rule for when to participate in that ascending auction, which is a big deal for modeling behavior.
Warren: They also discuss extensions, like incorporating a positive reserve price, and they look at what happens if sellers switch from uniform pricing to a discriminatory pricing rule instead.
Iris: They note that the discriminatory pricing rule actually ends up being strategically equivalent to price competition in a capacity-constrained oligopoly, which is an important connection to other market structures.
Conclusion: Ruth: So, wrapping up this paper on "Uniform price auction with quantity constraints," they found that the equilibrium outcome isn't necessarily unique, and sometimes it results in inefficiency where a bidder with a higher marginal value ends up getting fewer units than someone with a lower marginal value.
Warren: That inefficiency seems inevitable if no single bidder's quantity constraint is big enough to cover the entire supply, which they say is the case under those conditions.
Iris: They conclude by summarizing how the equilibrium price and fulfilled demands are determined by the stopping condition of that iterative procedure, noting that the equilibrium price is always set at either one of a bidder's marginal values or zero.
Ruth: And they also point out that a challenging future research area would be constructing a procedure for general marginal values and multiple bids, which sounds like it opens up new avenues for analysis.
Warren: They end by summarizing that the procurement auction with capacity constraints under discriminatory pricing is equivalent to price competition in a capacity-constrained oligopoly.
Iris: To wrap things up, what this study really shows is how quantity constraints force bidders into certain trade-offs regarding demand reduction and low prices in uniform auctions.
Kiho Yoon
Korea University
econ.TH
Submitted: 2024-09-06
Updated: 2026-04-08
Journal ref: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 26(2), June 2026, pp. 227-242
Project page: https://kihoyoon.github.io
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Importance score: 77/100
The gist: Uniform price auction with quantity constraints studies the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints…
Key concepts
- Uniform Price Auction with Quantity Constraints
- This is an auction format where all bidders submit a single bid for their entire quantity demand. This setup is common in markets like electricity or spectrum auctions where sellers have limits on how much they can supply, and buyers have limits on how much they can purchase.
- Iterative Procedure
- A systematic step-by-step method developed to find the equilibrium outcome of the auction. It involves defining maximum bids based on payoff comparisons and ranking these bids to determine when the aggregate demand covers or fails to cover the supply, leading toward a stable result.
- Low Price Equilibrium
- A market state where bidders strategically reduce their demand or accept a very low price because obtaining their full demand at a higher price is less profitable than getting only part of it at a lower cost. This equilibrium is only possible if no single bidder's capacity constraint is large enough to cover the entire supply.
Terminology
Summary
Uniform price auction with quantity constraints studies the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints <ref:2409. p. 0 io
Abstract
We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an
iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as
an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium
outcome. io
Abstract
We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an
iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as
an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium
outcome. io
Abstract
We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an
iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as
an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium
outcome. io
Abstract
We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an
iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as
an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium
outcome. We present an
iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as
an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium
outcome. Demand reduction and low price equilibrium may occur since it is advantageous for a bidder to give up some of his/her demand and get the remaining
demand at a low price rather than to get his/her entire demand at a higher price. We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no
bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply. Keywords: capacity constraint, ascending auction, procurement, demand reduction, low price equilibrium
JEL Classification: C72; D44; D82
1
arXiv:2409.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
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Auction Environments and Context
The study focuses on uniform price auctions common in real-world markets such as wholesale electricity markets, spectrum auctions, and securities markets <ref:2409.04047#pg3> Quantity constraints arise from demand/supply conditions or regulations, such as retailers with limited final consumer demand or spectrum caps imposed by the government <ref:2409. p. 1 Quantity constraints may arise due to demand/supply conditions or regulations. For
example, buyers in an auction might be retailers with limited final consumer demand,
possibly due to low regional population density.Where the paper says it
Equilibrium Characterization Procedure
The paper introduces an iterative procedure for finding an equilibrium outcome and an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium <ref:2409.04047#pg4> The procedure involves several steps, including defining the maximum bid ˆb1i based on comparing payoffs from overbidding versus bidding zero <ref:2409.04047#pg9> The process continues by ranking these maximum bids and dividing cases based on whether the aggregate demand of others covers the supply <ref:2409. p. 2 The
remaining bidders get their respective demands and the bidder who just dropped out gets
nothing; (ii) if the aggregate demand is greater than the supply, then the clock increases
again. Each bidder’s decision at each moment is essentially whether (i) to outbid the current
prevailing price and get his/her entire demand quantity or (ii) to get only the residual
quantity, which is the difference between the supply and the aggregate demand of others,
at a low price.Where the paper says it
Results on Equilibrium Outcomes
The analysis reveals that a low price equilibrium is only possible when no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply <ref:2409.04047#pg4> The procedure can lead to several outcomes, including cases where bidders drop out at specific price points or where the final equilibrium price is set at one of the bidders’ marginal values <ref:2409.04047#pg9> Furthermore, it is shown that if every bidder's quantity constraint is less than the total supply, a low price equilibrium is the only possible outcome <ref:2409.04047#pg4>.
Dynamic Implementation and Extensions
The paper describes a dynamic implementation using an English auction with quantity constraints where bidders have private information about their values <ref:2409.04047#pg9> The equilibrium strategy in this ascending auction is weakly dominant to remain active if and only if the bid is less than or equal to a calculated maximum bid value <ref:2409. p. 0 io
Abstract
We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an
iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as
an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium
outcome. Let bi denote bidder i’s bid. The
auction adopts the uniform pricing rule and the price is set to the lowest winning bid
(a. We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no
bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply. Keywords: capacity constraint, ascending auction, procurement, demand reduction, low price equilibrium
JEL Classification: C72; D44; D82
1
arXiv:2409.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Conclusion on Inefficiency
The equilibrium outcome found by the procedure may not be unique, and it can result in inefficiency where a bidder with a higher marginal value obtains fewer units than one with a lower marginal value <ref:2409.04047#pg9> This inefficiency is inevitable if no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the whole supply <ref:2409. p. 0 We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no
bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply. Keywords: capacity constraint, ascending auction, procurement, demand reduction, low price equilibrium
JEL Classification: C72; D44; D82
1
arXiv:2409. Section 3 contains the main
characterization: It introduces an iterative procedure for finding an equilibrium outcome
as well as an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium. Section 4 concludes. The equilibrium price and fulfilled demands are p
∗ = 0, q∗
1 = q1
and q
∗
2 = m − q1 in the former, and p
∗ = 0, q∗
1 = m − q2 and q
∗
2 = q2 in the latter. Observe that, for the case when the bidders are symmetric such that v1 = v2 = v and
q1 = q2 = q, (i) if q ≥ m, then each bidder bids v, and (ii) if q < m, then one bidder bids
(2q − m)v/q or higher and the other bidder bids zero. We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no
bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply. Keywords: capacity constraint, ascending auction, procurement, demand reduction, low price equilibrium
JEL Classification: C72; D44; D82
1
arXiv:2409.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
REFERENCES
arXiv:2409.04047v2 [econ. p. 0 Keywords: capacity constraint, ascending auction, procurement, demand reduction, low price equilibrium
JEL Classification: C72; D44; D82
1
arXiv:2409. 04047v2 [econ. Keywords: capacity constraint, ascending auction, procurement, demand reduction, low price equilibrium
JEL Classification: C72; D44; D82
1
arXiv:2409. 04047v2 [econ. 04047v2 [econ. TH] 8 Apr 2026 04047v2 [econ. TH] 8 Apr 2026 io
Abstract
We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an
iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as
an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium
outcome. We present an
iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as
an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium
outcome. Demand reduction and low price equilibrium may occur since it is advantageous for a bidder to give up some of his/her demand and get the remaining
demand at a low price rather than to get his/her entire demand at a higher price. We present an
iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as
an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium
outcome. Demand reduction and low price equilibrium may occur since it is advantageous for a bidder to give up some of his/her demand and get the remaining
demand at a low price rather than to get his/her entire demand at a higher price. We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no
bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply. Keywords: capacity constraint, ascending auction, procurement, demand reduction, low price equilibrium
JEL Classification: C72; D44; D82
1
arXiv:2409.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
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Uniform price auction with quantity constraints<ref:2409.04047#pg2> Kiho Yoon Department of Economics, Korea University 145 Anam-ro, Seongbuk-gu, Seoul, Korea 02841 kiho@korea. p. 0 Uniform price auction with quantity constraints
Kiho Yoon
Department of Economics, Korea University
145 Anam-ro, Seongbuk-gu, Seoul, Korea 02841
kiho@korea. kr
https://kihoyoon. Uniform price auction with quantity constraints
Kiho Yoon
Department of Economics, Korea University
145 Anam-ro, Seongbuk-gu, Seoul, Korea 02841
kiho@korea. kr
https://kihoyoon. kr
https://kihoyoon. io
Abstract
We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no
bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply. Keywords: capacity constraint, ascending auction, procurement, demand reduction, low price equilibrium
JEL Classification: C72; D44; D82
1
arXiv:2409. We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no
bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply. Keywords: capacity constraint, ascending auction, procurement, demand reduction, low price equilibrium
JEL Classification: C72; D44; D82
1
arXiv:2409.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
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Introduction We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints <ref:2409.04047#pg2> Though not analyzed extensively in the literature, this class of auction environments is common in real-world markets such as wholesale electricity markets, spectrum auctions, and securities markets <ref:2409. p. 1 1 Introduction
We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have
flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. Though not analyzed extensively
in the literature, this class of auction environments is common in real-world markets such as
wholesale electricity markets, spectrum auctions, and securities markets. Though not analyzed extensively
in the literature, this class of auction environments is common in real-world markets such as
wholesale electricity markets, spectrum auctions, and securities markets. The predominant
auction format in the European electricity market is the uniform price auction, also known
as the ‘pay-as-clear’ auction (ACER, 2022, p. We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no
bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply. Keywords: capacity constraint, ascending auction, procurement, demand reduction, low price equilibrium
JEL Classification: C72; D44; D82
1
arXiv:2409. The predominant
auction format in the European electricity market is the uniform price auction, also known
as the ‘pay-as-clear’ auction (ACER, 2022, p. The same is broadly true for electricity
markets in the United States. The US
treasury securities, as well as most private securities, are largely sold via the uniform price
auction, also known as the ‘single-price’ auction (Malvey and Archibald, 1998; Horta¸csu
et al. Quantity constraints may arise due to demand/supply conditions or regulations. Quantity constraints may arise due to demand/supply conditions or regulations. For
example, buyers in an auction might be retailers with limited final consumer demand,
possibly due to low regional population density. For
example, buyers in an auction might be retailers with limited final consumer demand,
possibly due to low regional population density. Similarly, sellers in a procurement auction
(such as electricity companies in day-ahead markets) may have constant marginal costs
up to their capacity limits. Similarly, sellers in a procurement auction
(such as electricity companies in day-ahead markets) may have constant marginal costs
up to their capacity limits. In spectrum auctions, the government often imposes spectrum
caps that limit the quantity of spectrum a single bidder may obtain so as to prevent
excessive market concentration and enhance competitiveness. 1
In treasury auctions and
equity initial public offerings (IPOs), large investors may not acquire more than a certain
percentage of the total shares. We first present an iterative procedure for finding an equilibrium outcome of the uniform price auction when there are many quantity-constrained bidders. We first present an iterative procedure for finding an equilibrium outcome of the uniform price auction when there are many quantity-constrained bidders. This outcome is
a Nash equilibrium outcome when bidders’ valuations for the good and the quantity constraints are common knowledge among bidders. equilibrium outcome of an ascending auction when bidders have private information about
their respective valuations. Our ascending auction is a variant of the English auction that
incorporates bidders’ quantity constraints. equilibrium outcome of an ascending auction when bidders have private information about
their respective valuations. Our ascending auction is a variant of the English auction that
incorporates bidders’ quantity constraints. Our ascending auction is a variant of the English auction that
incorporates bidders’ quantity constraints. In this auction, the clock showing the current
price increases continuously over time and bidders decide when to drop out. In addition,
the auction keeps track of the provisional price, which is set to zero or to the reserve price
initially. When a bidder drops out, the clock stops temporarily and the auctioneer checks
whether the aggregate demand of remaining bidders is greater than or equal to the supply. When a bidder drops out, the clock stops temporarily and the auctioneer checks
whether the aggregate demand of remaining bidders is greater than or equal to the supply. If the former is less than the latter, then the auction ends and the final price is the provisional price. If the former is less than the latter, then the auction ends and the final price is the provisional price. The remaining bidders get their respective demands and the bidder who just
dropped out gets the residual supply. The remaining bidders get their respective demands and the bidder who just
dropped out gets the residual supply. Otherwise, the provisional price is updated to the
current price just stopped: (i) if the aggregate demand is equal to the supply, the auction
ends and the final price is set to the provisional price, which has just been updated. The remaining bidders get their respective demands and the bidder who just
dropped out gets the residual supply. Otherwise, the provisional price is updated to the
current price just stopped: (i) if the aggregate demand is equal to the supply, the auction
ends and the final price is set to the provisional price, which has just been updated. Otherwise, the provisional price is updated to the
current price just stopped: (i) if the aggregate demand is equal to the supply, the auction
ends and the final price is set to the provisional price, which has just been updated. The
remaining bidders get their respective demands and the bidder who just dropped out gets
nothing; (ii) if the aggregate demand is greater than the supply, then the clock increases
again. The
remaining bidders get their respective demands and the bidder who just dropped out gets
nothing; (ii) if the aggregate demand is greater than the supply, then the clock increases
again. Each bidder’s decision at each moment is essentially whether (i) to outbid the current
prevailing price and get his/her entire demand quantity or (ii) to get only the residual
quantity, which is the difference between the supply and the aggregate demand of others,
at a low price. Each bidder’s decision at each moment is essentially whether (i) to outbid the current
prevailing price and get his/her entire demand quantity or (ii) to get only the residual
quantity, which is the difference between the supply and the aggregate demand of others,
at a low price. When the aggregate demand of others at the current prevailing price is not
sufficient to cover the supply, it may sometimes be advantageous for a bidder to give up
some of his/her demand and get the remaining demand at a low price (say, zero) rather
than to get his/her entire demand at a higher price. We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no
bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply. Keywords: capacity constraint, ascending auction, procurement, demand reduction, low price equilibrium
JEL Classification: C72; D44; D82
1
arXiv:2409. In fact, a low price equilibrium is the
only possible equilibrium when no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the
supply. Demand reduction and low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions have attracted
some attention in the literature. Demand reduction and low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions have attracted
some attention in the literature. Noussair (1995), Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998)
bidders interact frequently. and Ausubel et al. (2014) have shown that a bidder has an incentive to shade his/her
bid for units except for the first unit, resulting in a low equilibrium price. and Ausubel et al. (2014) have shown that a bidder has an incentive to shade his/her
bid for units except for the first unit, resulting in a low equilibrium price. and Ausubel et al. (2014) have shown that a bidder has an incentive to shade his/her
bid for units except for the first unit, resulting in a low equilibrium price. (2014) have shown that a bidder has an incentive to shade his/her
bid for units except for the first unit, resulting in a low equilibrium price. We note that
the reason for this phenomenon in the current paper is different from the one in those
papers since a bidder can submit only one lumpy bid for all units, not several different
bids, in our setting. (2014) have shown that a bidder has an incentive to shade his/her
bid for units except for the first unit, resulting in a low equilibrium price. We note that
the reason for this phenomenon in the current paper is different from the one in those
papers since a bidder can submit only one lumpy bid for all units, not several different
bids, in our setting. We note that
the reason for this phenomenon in the current paper is different from the one in those
papers since a bidder can submit only one lumpy bid for all units, not several different
bids, in our setting. 3 Tenorio (1999) has considered lumpy bids in a setting with three
identical units of a good and two symmetric bidders. We note that
the reason for this phenomenon in the current paper is different from the one in those
papers since a bidder can submit only one lumpy bid for all units, not several different
bids, in our setting. 3 Tenorio (1999) has considered lumpy bids in a setting with three
identical units of a good and two symmetric bidders. 3 Tenorio (1999) has considered lumpy bids in a setting with three
identical units of a good and two symmetric bidders. In comparison, our iterative procedure
systematically finds an equilibrium outcome for arbitrary units of a good and any number
of asymmetric bidders. 3 Tenorio (1999) has considered lumpy bids in a setting with three
identical units of a good and two symmetric bidders. In comparison, our iterative procedure
systematically finds an equilibrium outcome for arbitrary units of a good and any number
of asymmetric bidders. In comparison, our iterative procedure
systematically finds an equilibrium outcome for arbitrary units of a good and any number
of asymmetric bidders. Wilson (1979), Back and Zender (1993) and Wang and Zender
(2002) have found similar phenomena in share auctions under the common-value postulate
instead of the private-value postulate considered in this paper and the papers cited above. In comparison, our iterative procedure
systematically finds an equilibrium outcome for arbitrary units of a good and any number
of asymmetric bidders. Wilson (1979), Back and Zender (1993) and Wang and Zender
(2002) have found similar phenomena in share auctions under the common-value postulate
instead of the private-value postulate considered in this paper and the papers cited above. Wilson (1979), Back and Zender (1993) and Wang and Zender
(2002) have found similar phenomena in share auctions under the common-value postulate
instead of the private-value postulate considered in this paper and the papers cited above. Several papers on wholesale electricity markets including von der Fehr and Harbord
(1993), Fabra et al. Wilson (1979), Back and Zender (1993) and Wang and Zender
(2002) have found similar phenomena in share auctions under the common-value postulate
instead of the private-value postulate considered in this paper and the papers cited above. Several papers on wholesale electricity markets including von der Fehr and Harbord
(1993), Fabra et al. Several papers on wholesale electricity markets including von der Fehr and Harbord
(1993), Fabra et al. (2006), Schwenen (2015) and Anderson and Holmberg (2018) study
procurement auctions in which suppliers (generators) with capacity constraints compete to
satisfy the buyer’s electricity demand. Several papers on wholesale electricity markets including von der Fehr and Harbord
(1993), Fabra et al. (2006), Schwenen (2015) and Anderson and Holmberg (2018) study
procurement auctions in which suppliers (generators) with capacity constraints compete to
satisfy the buyer’s electricity demand. (2006), Schwenen (2015) and Anderson and Holmberg (2018) study
procurement auctions in which suppliers (generators) with capacity constraints compete to
satisfy the buyer’s electricity demand. Since the procurement auction where many sellers
submit offers to a buyer is the mirror image of the auction where many buyers submit bids
to a seller, our analysis can be applied equally well to this environment. (2006), Schwenen (2015) and Anderson and Holmberg (2018) study
procurement auctions in which suppliers (generators) with capacity constraints compete to
satisfy the buyer’s electricity demand. Since the procurement auction where many sellers
submit offers to a buyer is the mirror image of the auction where many buyers submit bids
to a seller, our analysis can be applied equally well to this environment. Since the procurement auction where many sellers
submit offers to a buyer is the mirror image of the auction where many buyers submit bids
to a seller, our analysis can be applied equally well to this environment. The main analysis
in these papers deals with either the two-bidder case or the symmetric-bidder case. Since the procurement auction where many sellers
submit offers to a buyer is the mirror image of the auction where many buyers submit bids
to a seller, our analysis can be applied equally well to this environment. The main analysis
in these papers deals with either the two-bidder case or the symmetric-bidder case.Where the paper says it
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and Ausubel et al. (2014) have shown that a bidder has an incentive to shade his/her bid for units except for the first unit, resulting in a low equilibrium price <ref:2409.04047#pg3> We note that the reason for this phenomenon in the current paper is different from the one in those papers since a bidder can submit only one lumpy bid for all units, not several different bids<ref:2409.04047#pg3> Tenorio (1999) has considered lumpy bids in a setting with three identical units of a good and two symmetric bidders <ref:2409.04047#pg3> In comparison, our iterative procedure systematically finds an equilibrium outcome for arbitrary units of a good and any number of asymmetric bidders <ref:2409.04047#pg3> Wilson (1979), Back and Zender (1993) and Wang and Zender (2002) have found similar phenomena in share auctions under the common-value postulate instead of the private-value postulate considered in this paper <ref:2409.04047#pg3> Several papers on wholesale electricity markets including von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), Fabra et al. (2006), Schwenen (2015) and Anderson and Holmberg (2018) study procurement auctions in which suppliers with capacity constraints compete to satisfy the buyer’s electricity demand <ref:2409.04047#pg3> Since the procurement auction where many sellers submit offers to a buyer is the mirror image of the auction where many buyers submit bids to a seller, our analysis can be applied equally well to this environment <ref:2409.04047#pg3> The main analysis in these papers deals with either the two-bidder case or the symmetric-bidder case <ref:2409.04047#pg3>
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The two-bidder case Consider an auction in which m units of a good are up for sale to two bidders <ref:2409.04047#pg2> Bidder i for i = 1, 2 has a constant marginal value vi > 0 up to his/her quantity constraint qi > 0, but attaches no value afterward <ref:2409. p. 4 2 The two-bidder case
Consider an auction in which m units of a good are up for sale to two bidders. Bidder
i for i = 1, 2 has a constant marginal value vi > 0 up to his/her quantity constraint qi > 0,
but attaches no value afterward. Bidder
i for i = 1, 2 has a constant marginal value vi > 0 up to his/her quantity constraint qi > 0,
but attaches no value afterward. Assume without loss of generality that v1 ≥ v2. Assume without loss of generality that v1 ≥ v2. Assume
also that q1 + q2 > m since the problem is trivial otherwise. Assume
also that q1 + q2 > m since the problem is trivial otherwise. Each bidder submits one bid for his/her demand. Each bidder submits one bid for his/her demand. Let bi denote bidder i’s bid. Let bi denote bidder i’s bid. The
auction adopts the uniform pricing rule and the price is set to the lowest winning bid
(a. The
auction adopts the uniform pricing rule and the price is set to the lowest winning bid
(a. the last accepted bid). The case when b1 < b2 can be similarly described. Lastly, when b1 = b2,
the price is set to this common bid of b1 = b2. Lastly, when b1 = b2,
the price is set to this common bid of b1 = b2. We note that this framework is similar to that of Fabra et al. We note that this framework is similar to that of Fabra et al. (2006) which studies
procurement auctions. (2006) which studies
procurement auctions. In particular, that paper provides a characterization of equilibria
for the two-bidder case, although it is not as procedural as the approach in the present
paper.Where the paper says it
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[1] q1 ≥ m and q2 ≥ m: Since q2 ≥ m, which means that bidder 1 can get nothing if his/her bid is lower than bidder 2’s, bidder 1 has an incentive to bid above b2 whenever b2 Likewise, bidder 2 has an incentive to bid above b1 whenever b1 Obviously, bidder 2 does not bid above v2 because doing so results in a negative payoff<ref:2409.04047#pg4> Therefore, an equilibrium bid profile is b1 = b2 = v2<ref:2409. p. 4 Obviously, bidder 2 does not bid above
v2 because doing so results in a negative payoff. Therefore, an equilibrium bid profile is
b1 = b2 = v2. Therefore, an equilibrium bid profile is
b1 = b2 = v2. The equilibrium price is p
∗ = v2 and the fulfilled demands are q
∗
1 = m and
q
∗
2 = 0. We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no
bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply. Keywords: capacity constraint, ascending auction, procurement, demand reduction, low price equilibrium
JEL Classification: C72; D44; D82
1
arXiv:2409. The equilibrium price is p
∗ = v2 and the fulfilled demands are q
∗
1 = m and
q
∗
2 = 0. 4
4
It is well-known that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium may not exist when the set of possible bids
is not discrete, for instance, an interval in IR+. 4
4
It is well-known that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium may not exist when the set of possible bids
is not discrete, for instance, an interval in IR+. This can be easily overcome if we introduce the smallest
money unit, say > 0. This can be easily overcome if we introduce the smallest
money unit, say > 0. This makes the set of possible bids as a discrete set, thus avoiding the problems
due to the presence of indifference. This makes the set of possible bids as a discrete set, thus avoiding the problems
due to the presence of indifference. Hence, the equilibrium when v1 > v2 is that b2 = v2 and b1 = v2 +
because bidder 1 is ready to outbid bidder 2 and obtain all units of the good. Hence, the equilibrium when v1 > v2 is that b2 = v2 and b1 = v2 +
because bidder 1 is ready to outbid bidder 2 and obtain all units of the good. Since we can take arbitrarily
small, the equilibrium becomes b1 = b2 = v2 with the understanding that bidder 1 has a priority over
bidder 2 in obtaining all the units he/she demands. Since we can take arbitrarily
small, the equilibrium becomes b1 = b2 = v2 with the understanding that bidder 1 has a priority over
bidder 2 in obtaining all the units he/she demands. We will follow this convention throughout the paper.Where the paper says it
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[2] q1 ≥ m and q2 < m: Since q1 ≥ m, bidder 2 has an incentive to bid above b1 whenever b1 On the other hand, bidder 1 compares m(v1−b2), the payoff from overbidding b2 and getting m units, with (m − q2)v1, the payoff from bidding ze…
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Improvements for AI systems
-
System can find a Nash equilibrium outcome of uniform price auctions when many asymmetric quantity constrained bidders exist through an iterative procedure. This procedure systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium outcome.
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The improved system can determine the optimal bidding strategy for bidders in private information settings by solving the English auction with quantity constraints using the derived dominant strategy equilibrium strategies. This allows the system to model bidder behavior based on their marginal values and remaining supply in real-time during an ascending auction.
-
The system can identify demand reduction and low price equilibrium scenarios where
a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply.
This capability allows for accurate prediction of market outcomes under specific capacity constraints, indicating when bidders will strategically give up some of their demand at a lower price.
Abstract
We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium outcome. Demand reduction and low price equilibrium may occur since it is advantageous for a bidder to give up some of his/her demand and get the remaining demand at a low price rather than to get his/her entire demand at a higher price. We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no bidder's quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply.