Identification of Rational Inattention-Additive Random Utility Models
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Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.
Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "Identification of Rational Inattention-Additive Random Utility Models".
Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. This paper introduces Rational Inattention-Additive Random Utility Models (RI-ARUMs), a novel class of econometric models based on Matˇejka and McKay (2015) that incorporates additive unobserved heterogeneity to analyze behavioral biases in decision-making processes The paper shows that some systematic components of the model are nonparametrically identified even if the distributions of unobserved variables and the prior of decision makers are both unknown to the Econometrician Model Framework and Components The authors propose a general class of RI-ARUMs as an econometric toolkit for analyzing empirical behavioral biases The model extends the classic representative agent model by allowing Decision Makers (DMs) to have knowledge about parts of the uncertain payoffs, replacing the unconditional prior with a conditional one based on existing knowledge This results in three key components modeled additively in observed and unobserved heterogeneity: "The conditional prior of the payoffs, the cost of information, and the realised payoffs" The model contains a special case corresponding to the classic full-information ARUM or a degenerate prior Theoretical Insights into Choice Probabilities The authors provide theoretical new insights into features and properties of rational inattention discrete choice models by analyzing conditional choice probabilities (CCPs) using convex optimization theory They note that optimal CCPs may be situated on the boundary of the probability simplex, which is important for subsequent identification analysis The optimal signal rule is derived by maximizing an objective function involving expected payoffs and information cost The resulting optimal CCPs are characterized by a multinomial mixed–logit model where the integrated CCPs enter as alternative-specific weights Nonparametric Identification Results The paper develops nonparametric identification results for the unknown conditional prior, cost of information, and realized payoffs under four scenarios regarding unobserved heterogeneity In the most benevolent sub-scenario—where DMs have correct beliefs about payoffs—strong identification results are achieved In a more testing environment where the Econometrician has no knowledge of the DM’s prior, only certain features of the model can be identified The identification results extend existing nonparametric identification results for ARUMs to allow for rational inattention Identification with Unobserved Heterogeneity When unobserved heterogeneity is added to all three components (payoffs, information cost, and prior), the authors rely on the identity involving the composite mapping Π which is integrated with respect to the distribution of unobserved variables Fε They show that for certain components like u1, identification can be achieved under specific assumptions by leveraging properties of this integrated mapping However, identification of u0 in the case where the prior is completely unknown and unrestricted remains difficult without very strong restrictions on the deviation of subjective beliefs from the physical law Identification Strategies for Structural Functions The paper presents general results for identifying composite functions of the form Φ(w, z) = Ψ(ν(w), z) under increasing number restrictions on the model The final identification result shows that under specific support conditions and normalisations, structural functions like u0 are identified on certain index regions The analysis demonstrates that while some components like u1 can be identified even with unobserved heterogeneity, identification of u0 is much more challenging unless the prior is not too badly misspecified Finally, the paper concludes that identifying the DM’s prior πV1 remains largely unachievable without very strong restrictions Based on the discrete choice rational inattention model, a flexible class of econometric models is developed with a comprehensive identification analysis showing what can and cannot be identified under different scenarios The authors establish that functions u0, u1, and λ are identified even when unobserved heterogeneity is present under suitable assumptions However, identifying the prior πV1 remains largely unachievable without very strong restrictions References Allen R.
Ruth: and Rehbeck J.
Warren: (2019) Identification with additively separable heterogeneity.
Ruth: Econometrica, 87(3):1021–1054 Allen R.
Title and authors: Ruth: So we’re looking at this paper now, "Identification of Rational Inattention-Additive Random Utility Models." It’s pretty dense, but the core idea is bringing additive random utility models and rational inattention together.
Warren: Yeah, it builds on Matˇejka and McKay's work from two thousand fifteen but adds this additive unobserved heterogeneity <ref:2611.14752#pg1>. The main thing they’re showing is that even if you don't know the distribution of the unobserved variables or what the decision makers’ prior belief is, you can still identify some parts of the model.
Iris: Exactly, and that's where it gets interesting for us as econometricians. They are proposing this general class of models called RI-ARUMs as a toolkit for analyzing behavioral biases in decision-making processes.
Ruth: So, what does that actually mean when we translate it into something we can use? It seems like they're tackling the problem of how people make choices when they aren't perfectly informed about what’s on the other side of those options.
Warren: They do that by modeling three additive components: the conditional prior, the cost of information, and then the realized payoffs. That structure is key to how they build their toolkit for empirical work.
Iris: And they also dive into choice probabilities using convex optimization theory to find out what the optimal choice probabilities look like in this rational inattention setting.
The paper's summary: Ruth: In essence, the paper is filling a gap in the literature because there wasn't much theoretical work on the econometrics of rational inattention discrete choice models before this.
Warren: Right, and they lay out four different scenarios for how unobserved heterogeneity can be present. The most benevolent one is when decision makers have correct beliefs about the payoffs, which gives them strong identification results.
Iris: And then there’s the more testing environment where the econometrician has no knowledge of the prior belief at all, and in that case, they’re only able to identify certain features of the model. That’s a crucial limitation for practical application.
Ruth: The paper suggests that their approach provides a general blueprint for taking these complex structural representative agent models and actually turning them into data analysis tools.
Warren: And one of the main contributions is showing that some systematic components of these primitives are nonparametrically identified even if you don't know the distributions or the prior belief.
Iris: That’s a big deal because it means we don't always need perfect knowledge of everything to do identification in these complex models, provided you stick to certain assumptions.
The paper's improvements: Ruth: Now let's talk about what they suggest improving or extending from the original model setup. They focus on how you can identify specific parts of the model under different conditions.
Warren: They develop nonparametric identification results for the unknown conditional prior, the cost of information, and realized payoffs across four scenarios involving unobserved heterogeneity. That’s a lot to manage.
Iris: The paper explores how they handle this uncertainty when unobserved heterogeneity is added to all three components—the payoffs, the information cost, and the prior belief. They rely on an identity involving a composite mapping called Pi which is integrated over the distribution of those unobserved variables.
Ruth: And while that integrated mapping helps identify some things like u1 under specific assumptions, they admit that identifying u0 in the case where the prior is completely unknown remains difficult without very strong restrictions on how much subjective beliefs can deviate from physical laws.
Warren: They also present general results for identifying composite functions of a form called Phi of w and z, which means they can identify structural functions like u0 on certain index regions under increasing number restrictions.
Iris: The final point is that they conclude that identifying the decision maker’s prior, Pi V1, remains largely unachievable without very strong restrictions on how far the subjective beliefs misspecify the actual law.
Conclusion: Ruth: So to wrap up, this paper introduces a flexible class of econometric models with a comprehensive identification analysis showing what can and cannot be identified under different scenarios for rational inattention.
Warren: The main implication is that they’ve established that functions u0, u1, and lambda are actually identified even when unobserved heterogeneity is present under suitable assumptions.
Iris: That’s a strong statement because it means you get identification for those specific components even with uncertainty about the environment. But identifying the prior belief Pi V1 still needs very strict restrictions to work reliably.
Ruth: So, they provide a comprehensive analysis showing what works and what doesn't in this framework, which is really helpful for anyone trying to build these models from scratch.
Warren: It sets a clear direction for future research into how we can make these RI-ARUMs more robust when applied to real data where priors are messy.
Iris: Yeah, it’s a solid paper that gives us the tools to test the limits of rational inattention models and see where the identification breaks down.
Dennis Kristensen, Ruolei Zhu
University College London
econ.EM, stat.ME
Submitted: 2026-11-10
Updated: 2026-11-10
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Importance score: 75/100
The gist: This paper introduces Rational Inattention-Additive Random Utility Models (RI-ARUMs), a novel class of econometric models based on Matˇejka and McKay (2015) that incorporates additive unobserved…
Key concepts
- Rational Inattention
- This concept describes a decision-maker's tendency to focus their attention on only a subset of available options rather than considering all possibilities. This leads to making decisions based on incomplete information, as the agent cannot process every piece of information simultaneously.
- Additive Random Utility Models (ARUMs)
- These are econometric models that extend standard choice models by incorporating unobserved heterogeneity in three key areas: the payoffs themselves, the cost of obtaining information, and the decision-maker's prior beliefs. This allows for a more flexible analysis of complex behavioral patterns.
- Nonparametric Identification
- This is a method used to identify unknown parts of a model without assuming specific functional forms for those unknown components. The paper demonstrates that under certain conditions, key parameters like the conditional prior and realized payoffs can be identified even if their underlying distributions are completely unknown.
- Conditional Choice Probabilities (CCPs)
- CCPs represent the probability that a decision-maker chooses one option over another given their current knowledge. The paper uses convex optimization theory to show how optimal CCPs are determined, which helps in deriving rules for identifying model components.
Terminology
Summary
This paper introduces Rational Inattention-Additive Random Utility Models (RI-ARUMs), a novel class of econometric models based on Matˇejka and McKay (2015) that incorporates additive unobserved heterogeneity to analyze behavioral biases in decision-making processes The paper shows that some systematic components of the model are nonparametrically identified even if the distributions of unobserved variables and the prior of decision makers are both unknown to the Econometrician
Model Framework and Components
The authors propose a general class of RI-ARUMs as an econometric toolkit for analyzing empirical behavioral biases The model extends the classic representative agent model by allowing Decision Makers (DMs) to have knowledge about parts of the uncertain payoffs, replacing the unconditional prior with a conditional one based on existing knowledge This results in three key components modeled additively in observed and unobserved heterogeneity: The conditional prior of the payoffs, the cost of information, and the realised payoffs
The model contains a special case corresponding to the classic full-information ARUM or a degenerate prior
Theoretical Insights into Choice Probabilities
The authors provide theoretical new insights into features and properties of rational inattention discrete choice models by analyzing conditional choice probabilities (CCPs) using convex optimization theory They note that optimal CCPs may be situated on the boundary of the probability simplex, which is important for subsequent identification analysis The optimal signal rule is derived by maximizing an objective function involving expected payoffs and information cost The resulting optimal CCPs are characterized by a multinomial mixed–logit model where the integrated CCPs enter as alternative-specific weights
Nonparametric Identification Results
The paper develops nonparametric identification results for the unknown conditional prior, cost of information, and realized payoffs under four scenarios regarding unobserved heterogeneity In the most benevolent sub-scenario—where DMs have correct beliefs about payoffs—strong identification results are achieved In a more testing environment where the Econometrician has no knowledge of the DM’s prior, only certain features of the model can be identified The identification results extend existing nonparametric identification results for ARUMs to allow for rational inattention
Identification with Unobserved Heterogeneity
When unobserved heterogeneity is added to all three components (payoffs, information cost, and prior), the authors rely on the identity involving the composite mapping Π which is integrated with respect to the distribution of unobserved variables Fε They show that for certain components like u1, identification can be achieved under specific assumptions by leveraging properties of this integrated mapping However, identification of u0 in the case where the prior is completely unknown and unrestricted remains difficult without very strong restrictions on the deviation of subjective beliefs from the physical law
Identification Strategies for Structural Functions
The paper presents general results for identifying composite functions of the form Φ(w, z) = Ψ(ν(w), z) under increasing number restrictions on the model The final identification result shows that under specific support conditions and normalisations, structural functions like u0 are identified on certain index regions The analysis demonstrates that while some components like u1 can be identified even with unobserved heterogeneity, identification of u0 is much more challenging unless the prior is not too badly misspecified Finally, the paper concludes that identifying the DM’s prior πV1 remains largely unachievable without very strong restrictions
Conclusion
Based on the discrete choice rational inattention model, a flexible class of econometric models is developed with a comprehensive identification analysis showing what can and cannot be identified under different scenarios The authors establish that functions u0, u1, and λ are identified even when unobserved heterogeneity is present under suitable assumptions However, identifying the prior πV1 remains largely unachievable without very strong restrictions
References
Allen R. and Rehbeck J. p. 2 (2010), and Matzkin (2012) and Matzkin (2019). Finally, Allen and Rehbeck (2019) provides identification results for an extended version
of ARUM that allows for perturbations of the random utilities, while Allen and Rehbeck
(2025) identify random-coefficient distributions in latent utility models using restrictions
on the mean demand mapping. (2010), and Matzkin (2012) and Matzkin (2019). Finally, Allen and Rehbeck (2019) provides identification results for an extended version
of ARUM that allows for perturbations of the random utilities, while Allen and Rehbeck
(2025) identify random-coefficient distributions in latent utility models using restrictions
on the mean demand mapping. Related results for discrete choice with multidimensional unobserved heterogeneity include Matzkin (2007a),
Berry and Haile (2009), Briesch et al. (2010), and Matzkin (2012) and Matzkin (2019).Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Allen R. and Rehbeck J. (2025) Identification of random coefficient latent utility models. p. 2 (2010), and Matzkin (2012) and Matzkin (2019). Finally, Allen and Rehbeck (2019) provides identification results for an extended version
of ARUM that allows for perturbations of the random utilities, while Allen and Rehbeck
(2025) identify random-coefficient distributions in latent utility models using restrictions
on the mean demand mapping.Where the paper says it
An Y., Hu Y., and Xiao R. (2021) Dynamic decisions under subjective expectations: A structural analysis. p. 3 Similarly, An et al. (2021) study dynamic discrete-choice models where agents have subjective and potentially incorrect transition beliefs.Where the paper says it
Berry S. T. and Haile P. p. 2 (2013), Fox and Gandhi (2016), and Fox (2021). Related results for discrete choice with multidimensional unobserved heterogeneity include Matzkin (2007a),
Berry and Haile (2009), Briesch et al. (2013), Fox and Gandhi (2016), and Fox (2021). Related results for discrete choice with multidimensional unobserved heterogeneity include Matzkin (2007a),
Berry and Haile (2009), Briesch et al. (2013), Fox and Gandhi (2016), and Fox (2021). Related results for discrete choice with multidimensional unobserved heterogeneity include Matzkin (2007a),
Berry and Haile (2009), Briesch et al. Liao (2024) considers partial
identification of a Berry–Levinsohn–Pakes (BLP) demand model, where consumers are
rationally inattentive. For related nonparametric identification results in differentiatedproducts demand models using market-level and individual-level data, respectively, see
Berry and Haile (2014) and Berry and Haile (2024).Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Berry S. T. and Haile P. A. (2014) Identification in differentiated products markets using market level data. p. 3 For related nonparametric identification results in differentiatedproducts demand models using market-level and individual-level data, respectively, see
Berry and Haile (2014) and Berry and Haile (2024). The framework of these papers is
different from ours since in theirs the Econometrician observes aggregate market shares
across different markets, while we consider the case of individual choices in a single
population.Where the paper says it
Berry S. T. and Haile P. A. (2024) Nonparametric identification of differentiated products demand using micro data. p. 3 Liao (2024) considers partial
identification of a Berry–Levinsohn–Pakes (BLP) demand model, where consumers are
rationally inattentive. For related nonparametric identification results in differentiatedproducts demand models using market-level and individual-level data, respectively, see
Berry and Haile (2014) and Berry and Haile (2024).Where the paper says it
Bertoli S., Moraga J. F.-H., and Guichard L. (2020) Rational inattention and migration decisions. p. 1 (2020), Brown and Jeon (2024), Joo (2023), Natan (2025), and Turlo et al. However, there is precious little theoretical work on the econometrics of rational
inattention discrete choice models.Where the paper says it
Briesch R., Chintagunta P., and Matˇejka R. p. 0 Identification of Rational Inattention–Additive
Random Utility Models
Dennis Kristensen∗ Ruolei Zhu†
November 13, 2026
Abstract
This paper introduces a novel class of econometric models, called Rational
Inattention-Additive Random Utility Models. It is based on the discrete choice
rational inattention model of Matˇejka and McKay (2015) with additive unobserved
heterogeneity incorporated. Related results for discrete choice with multidimensional unobserved heterogeneity include Matzkin (2007a),
Berry and Haile (2009), Briesch et al. (2010), and Matzkin (2012) and Matzkin (2019).Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Brown Z. Y. and Jeon J. p. 1 (2020),
Caplin et al. (2020), Brown and Jeon (2024), Joo (2023), Natan (2025), and Turlo et al. However, there are two important
differences: First, the mixture weights are endogenous and depend on the underlying
prior in a highly complex manner. In contrast, the distribution of random coefficients
is primitive and the conditional logit specification does not contain these endogenous
unconditional choice probabilities.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Caplin A., Csaba D., Leahy J., and Nov O. p. 0 14752v1 [econ. EM] 10 Nov 2026 (2020), Brown and Jeon (2024), Joo (2023), Natan (2025), and Turlo et al. However, there is precious little theoretical work on the econometrics of rational
inattention discrete choice models.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Caplin A., Dean M., and Leahy J. (2019) Rational inattention, optimal consideration sets, and stochastic choice. p. 1 Under rational inattention, DMs are uncertain about the payoffs of the available alternatives and gathering
information about these is costly. DMs then have to decide on the optimal trade-off
between expected utility and information cost, resulting in stochastic choice behaviour
also from the DMs’ perspective.Where the paper says it
Caplin A., Dean M., and Leahy J. (2022) Rationally inattentive behavior: Characterizing and generalizing shannon entropy. p. 5 Upon receiving signal S = s from a given signal rule, the DM updates her beliefs and
forms a posterior of V given S = s and V0 = v0 denoted PV |S,V0
(·|s, v0), which enables her
to compute expected payoffs EPV |S,V0
[Vj
|S = s, V0 = v0] for j ∈ J . However, there is an
information cost λ·I(PS|V,V0
) of receiving a given type of signal, where I(PS|V,V0
) quantifies
the amount of information she receives, as measured by Shannon mutual information,
I(PS|V,V0
|V0 = v0) = H(πV |V0
(·|v0)) − EPS|V0
H(PV |S,V0
(·|S, v0))
,
with H(·) denoting the Shannon entropy and PS|V0
(s|v0) := R
V
PS|V,V0
(s|v, v0)dπV |V0
(v|v0)
is the marginal distribution of S|V0 = v0.Where the paper says it
Chen X., Hansen L. P., and Hansen P. G. (2024) Robust inference for moment condition models without rational expectations. p. 3 Chen et al. (2024) consider
models where agents’ subjective probabilities differ from the DGP and study how this
affects identification and construct robust confidence sets for set-identified functionals.Where the paper says it
Dunker F., Hoderlein S., and Kaido H. (2013) Random coefficients in static games of complete information. p. 2 However, there are two important
differences: First, the mixture weights are endogenous and depend on the underlying
prior in a highly complex manner. In contrast, the distribution of random coefficients
is primitive and the conditional logit specification does not contain these endogenous
unconditional choice probabilities.Where the paper says it
Fosgerau M. and Kristensen D. p. 0 Identification of Rational Inattention–Additive
Random Utility Models
Dennis Kristensen∗ Ruolei Zhu†
November 13, 2026
Abstract
This paper introduces a novel class of econometric models, called Rational
Inattention-Additive Random Utility Models. It is based on the discrete choice
rational inattention model of Matˇejka and McKay (2015) with additive unobserved
heterogeneity incorporated. This is done under the following
1Although our class of models shares the same name as the one proposed by Fosgerau et al. (2020),
ours is fundamentally different from theirs.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Fosgerau M., Melo E., De Palma A., and Shum M. (2020) Discrete choice and rational inattention: A general equivalence result. p. 3 Finally, as part of our identification analysis, we develop a number of master theorems that provide general conditions for identification of composite mappings, where the
”outer” mapping is one-to-one on a set that is allowed to vary with other covariates. This
result extends existing results found in the literature such as Allen and Rehbeck (2019)
and Fosgerau and Kristensen (2020), and should be useful in showing identification in
other complex models of discrete choice as noted earlier.Where the paper says it
Fox J. T. (2021) A note on nonparametric identification of distributions of random coefficients in multinomial choice models. p. 2 Identification of random-coefficient distributions in discrete choice
models is considered by Ichimura and Thompson (1998), Gautier and Kitamura (2013),
Dunker et al. (2013), Fox and Gandhi (2016), and Fox (2021).Where the paper says it
Fox J. T. and Gandhi A. p. 2 Identification of random-coefficient distributions in discrete choice
models is considered by Ichimura and Thompson (1998), Gautier and Kitamura (2013),
Dunker et al. (2013), Fox and Gandhi (2016), and Fox (2021). Identification of random-coefficient distributions in discrete choice
models is considered by Ichimura and Thompson (1998), Gautier and Kitamura (2013),
Dunker et al. (2013), Fox and Gandhi (2016), and Fox (2021).Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Fox J. T., Kim K., Ryan S. P., and Bajari P. (2012) The random coefficients logit model is identified. p. 2 However, there are two important
differences: First, the mixture weights are endogenous and depend on the underlying
prior in a highly complex manner. In contrast, the distribution of random coefficients
is primitive and the conditional logit specification does not contain these endogenous
unconditional choice probabilities.Where the paper says it
Gautier E. and Kitamura Y. p. 2 , Matzkin (1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 2007b) and
references therein. Identification of random-coefficient distributions in discrete choice
models is considered by Ichimura and Thompson (1998), Gautier and Kitamura (2013),
Dunker et al. , Matzkin (1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 2007b) and
references therein. Identification of random-coefficient distributions in discrete choice
models is considered by Ichimura and Thompson (1998), Gautier and Kitamura (2013),
Dunker et al.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Ichimura H. and Thompson T. p. 2 , Matzkin (1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 2007b) and
references therein. Identification of random-coefficient distributions in discrete choice
models is considered by Ichimura and Thompson (1998), Gautier and Kitamura (2013),
Dunker et al. However, there are two important
differences: First, the mixture weights are endogenous and depend on the underlying
prior in a highly complex manner. In contrast, the distribution of random coefficients
is primitive and the conditional logit specification does not contain these endogenous
unconditional choice probabilities.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Joo J. (2023) Rational inattention as an empirical framework for discrete choice and consumer-welfare evaluation. p. 1 (2020), Brown and Jeon (2024), Joo (2023), Natan (2025), and Turlo et al. However, there is precious little theoretical work on the econometrics of rational
inattention discrete choice models.Where the paper says it
Liao M. (2024) Identification of a rational inattention discrete choice model. p. 0 Identification of Rational Inattention–Additive
Random Utility Models
Dennis Kristensen∗ Ruolei Zhu†
November 13, 2026
Abstract
This paper introduces a novel class of econometric models, called Rational
Inattention-Additive Random Utility Models. It is based on the discrete choice
rational inattention model of Matˇejka and McKay (2015) with additive unobserved
heterogeneity incorporated.Where the paper says it
Matˇejka F. and McKay A. p. 0 Identification of Rational Inattention–Additive
Random Utility Models
Dennis Kristensen∗ Ruolei Zhu†
November 13, 2026
Abstract
This paper introduces a novel class of econometric models, called Rational
Inattention-Additive Random Utility Models. It is based on the discrete choice
rational inattention model of Matˇejka and McKay (2015) with additive unobserved
heterogeneity incorporated. Our model and techniques share features with this literature, but rational inattention
introduces additional challenges that require new tools and results. Similar to random–
coefficient ARUM, the CCPs that the DM faces in our RI-ARUM model have a mixed–
logit form due to the uncertainty regarding payoffs.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Matzkin R. L. (1991) Semiparametric estimation of monotone and concave utility functions for polychotomous choice models. p. 2 , Matzkin (1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 2007b) and
references therein. Identification of random-coefficient distributions in discrete choice
models is considered by Ichimura and Thompson (1998), Gautier and Kitamura (2013),
Dunker et al.Where the paper says it
Matzkin R. L. (1992) Nonparametric and distribution-free estimation of the binary threshold crossing and the binary choice models. p. 2 , Matzkin (1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 2007b) and
references therein. Identification of random-coefficient distributions in discrete choice
models is considered by Ichimura and Thompson (1998), Gautier and Kitamura (2013),
Dunker et al.Where the paper says it
Matzkin R. L. (1993) Nonparametric identification and estimation of polychotomous choice models. p. 2 , Matzkin (1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 2007b) and
references therein. Identification of random-coefficient distributions in discrete choice
models is considered by Ichimura and Thompson (1998), Gautier and Kitamura (2013),
Dunker et al.Where the paper says it
Matzkin R. L. (1994) Restrictions of economic theory in nonparametric methods. p. 2 Our identification results extend existing nonparametric identification results for ARUMs
to allow for rational inattention; see, e. , Matzkin (1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 2007b) and
references therein. 1 Introduction
Many economic decision problems are discrete in nature. Additive Random Utility Models
(ARUMs) (McFadden et al.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
McFadden D. (1981) Econometric models of probabilistic choice. p. 0 Identification of Rational Inattention–Additive
Random Utility Models
Dennis Kristensen∗ Ruolei Zhu†
November 13, 2026
Abstract
This paper introduces a novel class of econometric models, called Rational
Inattention-Additive Random Utility Models. It is based on the discrete choice
rational inattention model of Matˇejka and McKay (2015) with additive unobserved
heterogeneity incorporated.Where the paper says it
McFadden D. et al. (1973) Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior. p. 2 However, there are two important
differences: First, the mixture weights are endogenous and depend on the underlying
prior in a highly complex manner. In contrast, the distribution of random coefficients
is primitive and the conditional logit specification does not contain these endogenous
unconditional choice probabilities. (2020), Brown and Jeon (2024), Joo (2023), Natan (2025), and Turlo et al. However, there is precious little theoretical work on the econometrics of rational
inattention discrete choice models.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Sørensen J. R.-V. and Fosgerau M. p. 1 We analyse the
conditional choice probabilities (CCPs) that the DM faces as functions of the underlying
primitives using tools from convex optimisation theory. As such this part of the paper
shares ideas and techniques with Sørensen and Fosgerau (2022) who use similar tools
in their analysis of CCPs in ARUM. The first-moment restriction is imposed for convenience and can be relaxed. Following
the normalisation approach of McFadden (1981) and Sørensen and Fosgerau (2022), one
could instead work with a centred version of Q0
, obtained by subtracting its value at a
fixed interior probability vector.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Turlo S., Fina M., Kasinger J., Laghaie A., and Otter T. (2025) Discrete choice in marketing through the lens of rational inattention. p. 1 (2020), Brown and Jeon (2024), Joo (2023), Natan (2025), and Turlo et al. However, there is precious little theoretical work on the econometrics of rational
inattention discrete choice models.Where the paper says it
Wang H. (2026) Estimating a rational inattention discrete choice model: A semiparametric approach. p. 0 Identification of Rational Inattention–Additive
Random Utility Models
Dennis Kristensen∗ Ruolei Zhu†
November 13, 2026
Abstract
This paper introduces a novel class of econometric models, called Rational
Inattention-Additive Random Utility Models. It is based on the discrete choice
rational inattention model of Matˇejka and McKay (2015) with additive unobserved
heterogeneity incorporated.Where the paper says it
Widder D. V. (1941) The Laplace Transform. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ
Zhu R. (2026a) Demand estimation for rationally inattentive consumers. p. 3 In
contrast, our results do not require any such restrictions. Liao (2024) considers partial
identification of a Berry–Levinsohn–Pakes (BLP) demand model, where consumers are
rationally inattentive.Where the paper says it
Zhu R. (2026b) Estimation of rational inattention–additive random utility models. p. 0 Identification of Rational Inattention–Additive
Random Utility Models
Dennis Kristensen∗ Ruolei Zhu†
November 13, 2026
Abstract
This paper introduces a novel class of econometric models, called Rational
Inattention-Additive Random Utility Models. It is based on the discrete choice
rational inattention model of Matˇejka and McKay (2015) with additive unobserved
heterogeneity incorporated.Where the paper says it
Proofs of Section 2
Proof of Lemma 2.1 For each fixed v0, this is the standard Shannon rational inattention problem with prior πV V0 (·v0). p. 4 In Section 2, we introduce a novel
class of conditional rational inattention discrete choice models for a given population
of DMs and analyse the properties of the CCPs coming out of this class of models. In
Section 3, we formulate our RI–ARUM and set up the general identification problem that
the Econometrician faces. Matˇejka and McKay
(2015) and Caplin et al. We will now analyse the maximisation problem (2. Instead, we first show that P
0∗
(v0) can be expressed as the solution to a maximisation
problem implied by the original one: Replacing P
0∗
j
(v0) by a fixed candidate P
0
(v0) in
Equation (2. 3) and then substituting the resulting expression (2. In particular, given the
model allows for corner solutions, we cannot characterise P
∗
j
(v0, v1) as a solution to a
simple set of first-order conditions. Instead, we first show that P
0∗
(v0) can be expressed as the solution to a maximisation
problem implied by the original one: Replacing P
0∗
j
(v0) by a fixed candidate P
0
(v0) in
Equation (2. When these beliefs coincide with the true distribution, the prior also describes
heterogeneity across realised states. Otherwise, it need not coincide with the objective
3 5) strictly concave on the relevant simplex, cf. Matˇejka and McKay
(2015) and Caplin et al. by Matˇejka and McKay (2015); see also Caplin et al. (2019, 2022). 3 Any additive transformation of the prior πV1 on V1 to a new prior π˜V1
corresponding to a common location shift V + 1J+1C, where C ∈ R is a random variable
with E [|C|] < ∞, does not affect the DM’s strategy:
P
0∗
(v0, λ) ∈ arg max
P0∈∆(J )
Q
0
(P
0
; v0, λ) = arg max
P0∈∆(J )
Q˜0
(P
0
; v0, λ). where Q0
(P
0
; v0, λ) and Q˜0
(P
0
; v0, λ) are the objective functions corresponding to πV1 and
π˜V1
, respectively. 3 Any additive transformation of the prior πV1 on V1 to a new prior π˜V1
corresponding to a common location shift V + 1J+1C, where C ∈ R is a random variable
with E [|C|] < ∞, does not affect the DM’s strategy:
P
0∗
(v0, λ) ∈ arg max
P0∈∆(J )
Q
0
(P
0
; v0, λ) = arg max
P0∈∆(J )
Q˜0
(P
0
; v0, λ). where Q0
(P
0
; v0, λ) and Q˜0
(P
0
; v0, λ) are the objective functions corresponding to πV1 and
π˜V1
, respectively. 2),
we obtain the following characterisation of P
0∗
(v0) as the maximiser of an integrated
version Q0 of the original objective function Q:
Lemma 2. 2 The optimal vector of integrated CCPs satisfies
P
0∗
(v0) ∈ arg max
P0∈∆(J )
Q
0
(P
0
; v0), (2. 2 The optimal vector of integrated CCPs satisfies
P
0∗
(v0) ∈ arg max
P0∈∆(J )
Q
0
(P
0
; v0), (2. 4)
where
Q
0
(P
0
; v0) := λ
Z
V
log X
j∈J
P
0
j
(v0) exp (vj/λ)
! Above additive model for the conditional prior is a special case of the general framework of the previous section. In particular, the following version of the affine independence
assumption of Lemma 2.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Proofs of Section 4
Proof of Theorem 4.1 The proof proceeds as in Fosgerau and Kristensen (2020) Proof of Theorem 4. p. 3 Finally, as part of our identification analysis, we develop a number of master theorems that provide general conditions for identification of composite mappings, where the
”outer” mapping is one-to-one on a set that is allowed to vary with other covariates. This
result extends existing results found in the literature such as Allen and Rehbeck (2019)
and Fosgerau and Kristensen (2020), and should be useful in showing identification in
other complex models of discrete choice as noted earlier. For any vector of probabilities over J , say,
(p0, p1, . , pJ ), we let p = (p1, . ARUMs assume that the problem is deterministic from the decision makers’
(DMs’) perspective in the sense that the DMs have full knowledge of their payoffs of
each of the discrete alternatives. At the same time, ARUMs generate stochastic choice
behaviour from the viewpoint of the researchers through the assumption that a component
of each payoff is unobserved by them.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Proofs of Section 5
Proof of Theorem 5.1 Apply Theorem 4. p. 9 7)
=
v0 ∈ R
J
: P
0∗
(v1|v0, λ) ∈ int ∆(J ) for all v1 ∈ R
J
is the set of ”regular” known payoffs, where the second equality uses Eq. The following theorem first characterises V0,reg (λ), and then analyses the behaviour of P
0∗
(v0, λ)
on this set:
10Where the paper says it
Proof of Theorem 5.3 With w = x0 and z = (x1, x2), Theorem 2. p. 9 7)
=
v0 ∈ R
J
: P
0∗
(v1|v0, λ) ∈ int ∆(J ) for all v1 ∈ R
J
is the set of ”regular” known payoffs, where the second equality uses Eq. The following theorem first characterises V0,reg (λ), and then analyses the behaviour of P
0∗
(v0, λ)
on this set:
10Where the paper says it
Proofs of Section 5.4
Proof of Theorem 5.4 Let (x1,π, x2,π) and X0 π be as in the theorem, and set λ = λ(x2,π). p. 9 7)
=
v0 ∈ R
J
: P
0∗
(v1|v0, λ) ∈ int ∆(J ) for all v1 ∈ R
J
is the set of ”regular” known payoffs, where the second equality uses Eq. The following theorem first characterises V0,reg (λ), and then analyses the behaviour of P
0∗
(v0, λ)
on this set:
10 7)
=
v0 ∈ R
J
: P
0∗
(v1|v0, λ) ∈ int ∆(J ) for all v1 ∈ R
J
is the set of ”regular” known payoffs, where the second equality uses Eq. The following theorem first characterises V0,reg (λ), and then analyses the behaviour of P
0∗
(v0, λ)
on this set:
10 7)
=
v0 ∈ R
J
: P
0∗
(v1|v0, λ) ∈ int ∆(J ) for all v1 ∈ R
J
is the set of ”regular” known payoffs, where the second equality uses Eq. The following theorem first characterises V0,reg (λ), and then analyses the behaviour of P
0∗
(v0, λ)
on this set:
10 7)
=
v0 ∈ R
J
: P
0∗
(v1|v0, λ) ∈ int ∆(J ) for all v1 ∈ R
J
is the set of ”regular” known payoffs, where the second equality uses Eq. The following theorem first characterises V0,reg (λ), and then analyses the behaviour of P
0∗
(v0, λ)
on this set:
10Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Proofs of Section 5.2
Proof of Theorem 5.2 Under Assumption 5. p. 0 ARUMs assume that the problem is deterministic from the decision makers’
(DMs’) perspective in the sense that the DMs have full knowledge of their payoffs of
each of the discrete alternatives. At the same time, ARUMs generate stochastic choice
behaviour from the viewpoint of the researchers through the assumption that a component
of each payoff is unobserved by them. This identity in
turn allows us to analyse the mapping (v0, λ) 7→ P
0∗
(v0, λ). In particularly, we will show
that P
0∗
(·, λ) : V0,reg 7→ int ∆(J ) is one-to-one, where
V0,reg (λ) =
v0 ∈ R
J
: P
0∗
(v0, λ) ∈ int ∆(J )
(2.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Proofs of Section 5.3
Proof of Theorem 5.3 With w = x1 and z = (x1, x2), Theorem 2. p. 9 7)
=
v0 ∈ R
J
: P
0∗
(v1|v0, λ) ∈ int ∆(J ) for all v1 ∈ R
J
is the set of ”regular” known payoffs, where the second equality uses Eq. The following theorem first characterises V0,reg (λ), and then analyses the behaviour of P
0∗
(v0, λ)
on this set:
10Where the paper says it
Proof of Theorem 5.4 Let (x1,π, x2,π) and X0 π be as in the theorem, and set λ = λ(x2, π). p. 9 7)
=
v0 ∈ R
J
: P
0∗
(v1|v0, λ) ∈ int ∆(J ) for all v1 ∈ R
J
is the set of ”regular” known payoffs, where the second equality uses Eq. The following theorem first characterises V0,reg (λ), and then analyses the behaviour of P
0∗
(v0, λ)
on this set:
10 7)
=
v0 ∈ R
J
: P
0∗
(v1|v0, λ) ∈ int ∆(J ) for all v1 ∈ R
J
is the set of ”regular” known payoffs, where the second equality uses Eq. The following theorem first characterises V0,reg (λ), and then analyses the behaviour of P
0∗
(v0, λ)
on this set:
10Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
**Proofs of Section 5.
Green — the paper says it, and the page is printed. Red — no passage carries it, so treat that sentence as unverified. The same check runs on your own text: check a summary against its source, $5.
Improvements for AI systems
-
Rational Inattention-Additive Random Utility Models (RI-ARUMs) allow econometric models to be built as a general blueprint for taking complex structural representative agent models to data, incorporating observed and unobserved heterogeneity into the primitives of the structural model.
-
The system can perform nonparametric identification of unknown components like conditional prior, cost of information, and realized payoffs even if distributions are unknown to the econometrician under specific conditions.
-
The improved system can identify alternative-specific covariates u1(x1) and information costs lambda(x2) using finite-difference log-odds formulas or choice probabilities at two covariate values without requiring prior identification of u1.
-
The system can identify the common variables u0 and lambda by assuming the prior is known, allowing for the inversion of an integral equation derived from optimal integrated conditional choice probabilities.
-
The improved system can identify unobserved heterogeneity in all three components (u0, u1, and lambda) under certain assumptions regarding the deviation of subjective beliefs from physical laws.
Abstract
This paper introduces a novel class of econometric models, called Rational Inattention-Additive Random Utility Models. It is based on the discrete choice rational inattention model of Matvejka and McKay (2015) with additive unobserved heterogeneity incorporated. We show that some of the systematic components of the primitives of the model are nonparametrically identified even if the distributions of unobserved variables and the prior of decision makers are both unknown to the Econometrician. If additional information about the prior is known to the Econometrician, even stronger identification results become available.
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