Inequality-Aware Regulation
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Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.
Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "Inequality-Aware Regulation".
Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. Inequality-Aware Regulation studies regulation of a screening monopolist when the regulator cares about the distribution of surplus across heterogeneous consumers and the firm When the regulator gives greater weight to consumers with lower willingness to pay, baseline regulation is optimal Model Setup The model considers a profit-maximizing firm offering a menu of quality–price options and consumers choosing from this menu based on their privately known willingness to pay (WTP) type A regulatory contract specifies required quality–price options, and the regulator maximizes a weighted utilitarian objective placing greater weight on consumers on average than on the firm and weakly higher weights on consumers with lower WTP The consumer utility is defined as utility type theta minus price, where quality is related to WTP through a function v(q) Baseline Regulation and Redistribution The main result shows that optimal regulatory contracts take the form of baseline regulation, requiring affordable basic options for low-WTP consumers while leaving the firm free to design premium options Baseline regulation uses the firm’s pricing incentives to support redistribution by enabling the regulator to require affordable basic options through surplus extracted from premium buyers Two redistributive considerations favor limiting basic quality, as lower basic quality makes options less attractive to high-WTP consumers and entails either leaving more information rents to low-cost firms or accepting a greater probability of shutdown Optimal Regulation Structures The optimal regulation depends on consumer-side redistributive preferences; baseline regulation is sufficient when strong concerns exist, requiring a single basic option chosen by a range of low-WTP consumers The required basic menu depends on the regulator’s consumer-side redistributive preferences, and a range of basic options may be needed when these preferences are weak but a single protected option is sufficient when they are strong Effect of Consumer Weights Proposition 1 describes how consumer-side redistributive concerns affect regulation, showing that if consumer-side redistributive concerns become stronger or the welfare weight on firm profit decreases, basic qualities weakly decrease and the operating cutoff weakly decreases Stronger consumer-side redistributive concerns lead to weakly lower basic quality because higher-WTP consumers value quality more, limiting their rents from access to the basic menu Scope of Regulation and Premium Options Under fully flexible regulation, the ability to prohibit side contracting allows the regulator to use premium quality to screen the firm, and restricting premium quality under a high-cost contract reduces information rents needed to induce truthful reporting Under strong consumer-side redistributive concerns, requiring only a single basic option is sufficient because condition (ii) ensures that among low-WTP consumers, expanding a group from the bottom of the distribution does not raise its average redistributive virtual value Premium Regulation Scenarios When consumer welfare weights increase with WTP, optimal regulation can become optimal to require a single subsidized premium option chosen by high-WTP consumers while leaving the firm free to design and price lower-quality options Requiring this premium option alone implements the full-control optimum, where every consumer with positive welfare weight necessarily obtains at least the utility from the required option The required premium quality exceeds even the efficient quality of the highest-WTP consumer in this scenario Private Information and Incentives The firm’s private information reduces the scope of optimal regulation, as higher quality requirements mean greater information rents for lower-cost firms or a higher probability of shutdown The regulator only requires the firm to offer basic options because requiring more than that would entail leaving more information rents to lower-cost firms or accepting a greater probability of shutdown The ability to restrict premium quality also changes the shutdown decision, as limiting premium sales of a high-cost contract can be preferable to shutdown even at high costs Baseline regulation addresses both market power and redistribution by improving qualities available to low-WTP consumers and shifting surplus from the firm to consumers through the utility guarantee created by basic options The regulator’s perspective shows that an unregulated market has two main shortcomings, which baseline regulation addresses The lowest type receives positive utility, and consumer incentive compatibility extends this gain to higher types because regulated qualities are no lower than monopoly qualities The paper concludes that the required basic menu depends on the regulator’s consumer-side redistributive preferences The firm’s choice of additional options is constrained by the regulatory contract, and its optimal response is the proposed allocation References Ahlvik, Lassi, Matti Liski, and Mikael Mäkimattila (2024) “Pigouvian income taxation.” Akbarpour, Mohammad, Piotr Dworczak, and Scott Duke Kominers (2024) “Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms,” Journal of Political Economy Amador, Manuel and Kyle Bagwell (2022) “Regulating a Monopolist with Uncertain Costs without Transfers,” Theoretical Economics Armstrong, Mark and David E.
Ruth: M.
Warren: Sappington (2007) “Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation,” in Armstrong, Mark and Robert Porter eds.
Ruth: Handbook of Industrial Organization Augias, Victor, Alexis Ghersengorin, and Daniel M.
Title and authors: Ruth: We're talking about the title and authors of this paper, "Inequality-Aware Regulation," and what that really means for policy. The authors are Mikael Mäkimattila, along with Matti Liski, Pauli Murto, Juuso Välimäki, Piotr Dworczak, Nathan Hancart, Daniel Hauser, Bård Harstad Johannes Hörner Andreas Kleiner Eero Mäenpää Tuomas Markkula Léopold Monjoie Juan-Pablo Montero Jukka Pirttilä Markus Reisinger and Julia Salmi.
Warren: It's a big group of people on this one. They seem to be really deep in the weeds with the mechanisms, which suggests a lot of rigorous modeling behind these findings.
Iris: I think that's because they are tackling two design problems at once: how the regulator screens a privately informed firm with rules that shape how the firm screens consumers and distributes surplus among them.
Ruth: That’s a good way to put it. The paper is interested in this interaction between market power and the distribution of that surplus, which standard aggregate models often abstract away.
Warren: So, if we think about it simply, the paper argues that regulation shouldn't just aim for the biggest pie for everyone combined, but rather address how that pie is sliced up.
Iris: Right. The authors are doing this by using a weighted utilitarian objective function where they place more importance on consumers with lower willingness to pay, and weakly higher weights on those low-WTP consumers compared to the firm's profit.
The paper's summary: Ruth: Now, let's look at the actual summary of "Inequality-Aware Regulation." It shows that optimal regulatory contracts take a specific form: baseline regulation.
Warren: What does that baseline regulation actually involve in practice? Is it just setting some minimum quality standard?
Iris: It requires affordable basic options for low-WTP consumers, and the regulator uses the firm's pricing incentives to extract surplus from premium buyers to support those lower prices for the basic options.
Ruth: That’s because those basic options provide a utility guarantee, and that guarantee shapes what kind of additional offers the firm makes.
Warren: And it's not just about giving things away; they argue that requiring higher quality basics also puts constraints on premium design. Lower basic quality can make those premium options less attractive to the high-WTP consumers who value quality more.
Iris: That’s a key trade-off they explore: lower basic quality might mean leaving more information rents to low-cost firms, or it could lead to a higher chance of the firm shutting down entirely.
The paper's improvements: Ruth: The authors suggest several ways the paper improves on previous thinking. They show how consumer-side redistributive concerns affect regulation.
Warren: So, if we make those concerns stronger—meaning the regulator cares more about fairness for lower-WTP people—what happens to the required basic quality?
Iris: Proposition one shows that if these consumer-side concerns become stronger or the welfare weight on firm profit decreases, then basic qualities weakly decrease and the operating cutoff weakly decreases <ref:2611.12301#pg2>.
Ruth: That means strong concerns lead to a single basic option being enough, which simplifies things for the regulator. If they are strong enough, requiring only one protected option is sufficient because expanding that group from the bottom of the distribution doesn't raise its average redistributive virtual value.
Warren: That’s a nice simplification for policy design. It suggests that when you have high consumer-side concern, you can keep your regulatory tools very focused on just making sure those low-WTP consumers get a decent start.
Conclusion: Ruth: So, to wrap up the paper "Inequality-Aware Regulation," the main implication is that baseline regulation successfully addresses both market power and redistribution simultaneously.
Warren: It achieves this by improving the quality available to low-WTP consumers and shifting surplus from the firm to consumers through a utility guarantee created by those basic options.
Iris: They show that an unregulated market has two main shortcomings that this baseline regulation fixes: it leaves the lowest type without positive utility, and it fails to extend consumer incentive compatibility up to higher types because regulated qualities are at least as good as what a monopoly would provide.
Ruth: The final point is that the required basic menu really depends on the regulator's specific consumer-side redistributive preferences, and the firm's choice of extra options gets constrained by that contract.
Warren: It sounds like a very targeted approach to market structure problems, focusing specifically on how quality standards can be used as a tool for fairness.
Mikael Äkimattila
University of Oslo · GRAPE
econ.TH
Submitted: 2026-11-09
Updated: 2026-11-09
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Importance score: 92/100
The gist: Inequality-Aware Regulation studies regulation of a screening monopolist when the regulator cares about the distribution of surplus across heterogeneous consumers and the firm When the regulator…
Key concepts
- Weighted Utilitarian Objective
- This is the regulator's goal: maximizing a combined score of consumer utilities and firm profit. The key feature is that the regulator places more importance (weight) on consumers with lower willingness to pay than on the firm or average consumers, driving the regulatory design toward redistribution.
- Baseline Regulation
- This optimal contract requires the firm to provide a set of affordable basic quality-price options for low-WTP consumers. The regulator uses these basic options as a tool to extract surplus from high-WTP buyers, effectively shifting wealth from the firm to those who value the quality most.
- Consumer-Side Redistributive Concerns
- This refers to how much the regulator cares about fairness in how consumer benefits are distributed. When these concerns are strong, regulation tends to require only a single basic option for low-WTP consumers, as expanding this group doesn't significantly increase overall welfare gains.
Terminology
Summary
Inequality-Aware Regulation studies regulation of a screening monopolist when the regulator cares about the distribution of surplus across heterogeneous consumers and the firm When the regulator gives greater weight to consumers with lower willingness to pay, baseline regulation is optimal
Model Setup
The model considers a profit-maximizing firm offering a menu of quality–price options and consumers choosing from this menu based on their privately known willingness to pay (WTP) type A regulatory contract specifies required quality–price options, and the regulator maximizes a weighted utilitarian objective placing greater weight on consumers on average than on the firm and weakly higher weights on consumers with lower WTP The consumer utility is defined as utility type theta minus price, where quality is related to WTP through a function v(q)
Baseline Regulation and Redistribution
The main result shows that optimal regulatory contracts take the form of baseline regulation, requiring affordable basic options for low-WTP consumers while leaving the firm free to design premium options Baseline regulation uses the firm’s pricing incentives to support redistribution by enabling the regulator to require affordable basic options through surplus extracted from premium buyers Two redistributive considerations favor limiting basic quality, as lower basic quality makes options less attractive to high-WTP consumers and entails either leaving more information rents to low-cost firms or accepting a greater probability of shutdown
Optimal Regulation Structures
The optimal regulation depends on consumer-side redistributive preferences; baseline regulation is sufficient when strong concerns exist, requiring a single basic option chosen by a range of low-WTP consumers The required basic menu depends on the regulator’s consumer-side redistributive preferences, and a range of basic options may be needed when these preferences are weak but a single protected option is sufficient when they are strong
Effect of Consumer Weights
Proposition 1 describes how consumer-side redistributive concerns affect regulation, showing that if consumer-side redistributive concerns become stronger or the welfare weight on firm profit decreases, basic qualities weakly decrease and the operating cutoff weakly decreases Stronger consumer-side redistributive concerns lead to weakly lower basic quality because higher-WTP consumers value quality more, limiting their rents from access to the basic menu
Scope of Regulation and Premium Options
Under fully flexible regulation, the ability to prohibit side contracting allows the regulator to use premium quality to screen the firm, and restricting premium quality under a high-cost contract reduces information rents needed to induce truthful reporting Under strong consumer-side redistributive concerns, requiring only a single basic option is sufficient because condition (ii) ensures that among low-WTP consumers, expanding a group from the bottom of the distribution does not raise its average redistributive virtual value
Premium Regulation Scenarios
When consumer welfare weights increase with WTP, optimal regulation can become optimal to require a single subsidized premium option chosen by high-WTP consumers while leaving the firm free to design and price lower-quality options Requiring this premium option alone implements the full-control optimum, where every consumer with positive welfare weight necessarily obtains at least the utility from the required option The required premium quality exceeds even the efficient quality of the highest-WTP consumer in this scenario
Private Information and Incentives
The firm’s private information reduces the scope of optimal regulation, as higher quality requirements mean greater information rents for lower-cost firms or a higher probability of shutdown The regulator only requires the firm to offer basic options because requiring more than that would entail leaving more information rents to lower-cost firms or accepting a greater probability of shutdown The ability to restrict premium quality also changes the shutdown decision, as limiting premium sales of a high-cost contract can be preferable to shutdown even at high costs
Conclusion on Regulation
Baseline regulation addresses both market power and redistribution by improving qualities available to low-WTP consumers and shifting surplus from the firm to consumers through the utility guarantee created by basic options The regulator’s perspective shows that an unregulated market has two main shortcomings, which baseline regulation addresses The lowest type receives positive utility, and consumer incentive compatibility extends this gain to higher types because regulated qualities are no lower than monopoly qualities The paper concludes that the required basic menu depends on the regulator’s consumer-side redistributive preferences The firm’s choice of additional options is constrained by the regulatory contract, and its optimal response is the proposed allocation
References
Ahlvik, Lassi, Matti Liski, and Mikael Mäkimattila (2024) “Pigouvian income taxation.”
Akbarpour, Mohammad, Piotr Dworczak, and Scott Duke Kominers (2024) “Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms,” Journal of Political Economy
Amador, Manuel and Kyle Bagwell (2022) “Regulating a Monopolist with Uncertain Costs without Transfers,” Theoretical Economics
Armstrong, Mark and David E. M. Sappington (2007) “Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation,” in Armstrong, Mark and Robert Porter eds. p. 3 Related literature. Theory of regulation studies how to control market power
when firms are better informed than the regulator about their operating environment (see Armstrong and Sappington, 2007, for a survey). Related literature. Theory of regulation studies how to control market power
when firms are better informed than the regulator about their operating environment (see Armstrong and Sappington, 2007, for a survey).Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Augias, Victor, Alexis Ghersengorin, and Daniel M. A. Barreto (2026) “Redistribution Through Market Segmentation,” https://arxiv. p. 4 Augias et al. (2026) characterize optimal redistributive segmentation of a monopoly market. Augias et al. (2026) characterize optimal redistributive segmentation of a monopoly market.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Baron, David P. and Roger B. Myerson (1982) “Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs without Transfers,” Econometrica
Besanko, David, Shabtai Donnenfeld, and Lawrence J. White (1987) “Monopoly and Quality Distortion: Effects and Remedies,” Quarterly Journal of Economics
Bhaskar, Dhruva, Andrew McClellan, and Evan Sadler (2023) “Regulation Design in Insurance Markets,” American Economic Review
Borenstein, Severin (2012) “The redistributional impact of nonlinear electricity pricing,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
Corts, Kenneth S. (1995) “Regulation of a Multi-Product Monopolist: Effects on Pricing and Bundling,” Journal of Industrial Economics
da Costa, Carlos E and Lucas J Maestri (2019) “Optimal Mirrleesian taxation in non-competitive labor markets,” Economic Theory
Doligalski, Paweł, G Piotr Dworczak, Mohammad Akbarpour, and Scott Kominers (2025) “Optimal redistribution via income taxation and market design,” Technical report, GRAPE Group for Research in Applied Economics
Döpper, Hendrik, Alexander MacKay, Nathan H Miller, and Joel Stiebale (2025) “Rising markups and the role of consumer preferences,” Journal of Political Economy
Dworczak, Piotr, Scott Duke Kominers, and Mohammad Akbarpour (2021) “Redistribution Through Markets,” Econometrica
Dworczak, Piotr and Ellen V. Muir (2026) “A Mechanism-Design Approach to Property Rights,” Working paper, October 2
Herkenhoff, Kyle F. and Gajendran Raveendranathan (2025) “Who Bears the Welfare Costs of Monopoly? p. 4 (2026) characterize optimal redistributive segmentation of a monopoly market. There is also empirical work that examines
distributional implications of market power (Herkenhoff and Raveendranathan,
2025; Döpper et al. (2026) characterize optimal redistributive segmentation of a monopoly market. There is also empirical work that examines
distributional implications of market power (Herkenhoff and Raveendranathan,
2025; Döpper et al.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Kang, Zi Yang and Mitchell Watt (2026) “Topping Up and Optimal Redistribution,” https://ziyangkang.com/files/TUOR.pdf, Working paper
Krishna, Kala (1990) “Protection and the Product Line: Monopoly and Product Quality,” International Economic Review
Leisten, Matthew (2024) “Economic Inequality and Market Power,” 10.2139/ssrn.4634316, Working paper
Maskin, Eric and John Riley (1984) “Monopoly with incomplete information,” The RAND Journal of Economics
Monjoie, Leopold (2026) “Redistributive Peak Load Pricing,” https://leopoldmonjoie.com/papers/peak-load-pricing. p. 2 Baseline regulation uses the firm’s pricing incentives to support redistribution. The surplus the firm extracts from premium buyers enables the regulator
to require affordable basic options for consumers whose utility it values more.Where the paper says it
Mussa, Michael and Sherwin Rosen (1978) “Monopoly and product quality,” Journal of Economic theory
Olmstead, Sheila M, W Michael Hanemann, and Robert N Stavins (2007) “Water demand under alternative price structures,” Journal of Environmental economics and management
Schlom, Christoph (2024) “Price Distribution Regulation,” https://knowledge.uchicago.edu/records/dwpgn-48712, Working paper
Stantcheva, Stefanie (2014) “Optimal income taxation with adverse selection in the labour market,” Review of Economic Studies
Tobin, James (1970) “On limiting the domain of inequality,” The Journal of Law and Economics
Weitzman, Martin L (1977) “Is the price system or rationing more effective in getting a commodity to those who need it most?” The Bell Journal of Economics
Xia, Zizhe (2025) “Regulating Monopoly Quality without Transfers,” 10.2139/ssrn.5390550, Working paper
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Market power and distributional concerns are central motivations for regulatory intervention in private markets Market power and distributional concerns are central motivations for regulatory intervention in private markets >
The single most informative sentence about the paper's subject and finding is: Baseline regulation uses the firm’s pricing incentives to support redistribution
Pruning redundant reasoning tokens
The model involves a profit-maximizing firm offering a menu of quality–price options and consumers choosing based on their privately known willingness to pay type The regulator maximizes a weighted utilitarian objective placing greater weight on consumers on average than on the firm and weakly higher weights on consumers with lower WTP The consumer problem is characterized by quality being nondecreasing in theta and utility satisfying an envelope formula The firm’s problem involves choosing the most profitable nondecreasing convex utility function above the regulatory guarantee
How the training signal is built
The regulator's objective function is given by equation (1), maximizing the weighted sum of consumer utilities and firm profit The firm’s maximal profit is expressed in terms of a supremum over nondecreasing convex utility functions above the guarantee, involving the virtual value and virtual cost The relaxed allocation problem (R) sets aside consumer participation and partly the firm’s incentive compatibility to find an optimal quality schedule
Where the gains come from
Theorem 1 shows that optimal regulation takes the form of baseline regulation, protecting basic options for low-WTP consumers and leaving premium design free The basic qualities lie between the unregulated and efficient levels, reflecting two redistributive costs of quality provision Strong consumer-side redistributive concerns lead to a single basic option being sufficient because condition (ii) ensures that expanding a group from the bottom of the distribution does not raise its average redistributive virtual value The regulator’s perspective shows that an unregulated market has two main shortcomings, which baseline regulation addresses by improving qualities available to low-WTP consumers and shifting surplus from the firm to consumers
In fully flexible regulation, the optimal quality allocation solves (R) without the constraint q ≥ qm, and consumer utility is strictly lower than under unregulated monopoly for types above theta star When consumer welfare weights increase with WTP, it is optimal to require a single premium option sold below cost and chosen by high-WTP consumers while leaving the firm free to design and price lower-quality options This premium option alone implements the full-control optimum, where every consumer with positive welfare weight necessarily obtains at least the utility from the required option The paper shows that requiring only basic options is sufficient under strong consumer-side redistributive concerns
Ahlvik, Lassi, Matti Liski, and Mikael Mäkimattila (2024) “Pigouvian income taxation.”
Akbarpour, Mohammad, Piotr Dworczak, and Scott Duke Kominers (2024) “Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms,” Journal of Political Economy
Amador, Manuel and Kyle Bagwell (2022) “Regulating a Monopolist with Uncertain Costs without Transfers,” Theoretical Economics
Armstrong, Mark and David E. M. Sappington (2007) “Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation,” in Armstrong, Mark and Robert Porter eds. Handbook of Industrial Organization
Augias, Victor, Alexis Ghersengorin, and Daniel M. A. Barreto (2026) “Redistribution Through Market Segmentation,” https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.14174v6, Working paper
Baron, David P. and Roger B. Myerson (1982) “Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs without Transfers,” Econometrica
Besanko, David, Shabtai Donnenfeld, and Lawrence J. White (1987) “Monopoly and Quality Distortion: Effects and Remedies,” Quarterly Journal of Economics
Bhaskar, Dhruva, Andrew McClellan, and Evan Sadler (2023) “Regulation Design in Insurance Markets,” American Economic Review
Borenstein, Severin (2012) “The redistributional impact of nonlinear electricity pricing,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
Corts, Kenneth S. (1995) “Regulation of a Multi-Product Monopolist: Effects on Pricing and Bundling,” Journal of Industrial Economics
da Costa, Carlos E and Lucas J Maestri (2019) “Optimal Mirrleesian taxation in non-competitive labor markets,” Economic Theory
Doligalski, Paweł, G Piotr Dworczak, Mohammad Akbarpour, and Scott Kominers (2025) “Optimal redistribution via income taxation and market design,” Technical report, GRAPE Group for Research in Applied Economics
Döpper, Hendrik, Alexander MacKay, Nathan H Miller, and Joel Stiebale (2025) “Rising markups and the role of consumer preferences,” Journal of Political Economy
Dworczak, Piotr, Scott Duke Kominers, and Mohammad Akbarpour (2021) “Redistribution Through Markets,” Econometrica
Dworczak, Piotr and Ellen V. Muir (2026) “A Mechanism-Design Approach to Property Rights,” Working paper, October 2
Herkenhoff, Kyle F. and Gajendran Raveendranathan (2025) “Who Bears the Welfare Costs of Monopoly? The Case of the Credit Card Industry,” The Review of Economic Studies
Kang, Zi Yang and Mitchell Watt (2026) “Topping Up and Optimal Redistribution,” https://ziyangkang.com/files/TUOR.pdf, Working paper
Krishna, Kala (1990) “Protection and the Product Line: Monopoly and Product Quality,” International Economic Review
Leisten, Matthew (2024) “Economic Inequality and Market Power,” 10.2139/ssrn.
Green — the paper says it, and the page is printed. Red — no passage carries it, so treat that sentence as unverified. The same check runs on your own text: check a summary against its source, $5.
Improvements for AI systems
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Ability to model regulation that places consumer heterogeneity and redistributive concerns at the center of analysis by using a weighted utilitarian objective, allowing for more nuanced policy evaluation than standard aggregate surplus models.
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Capability to design optimal regulatory contracts as baseline regulation, requiring only affordable basic options for low-willingness-to-pay consumers while leaving the firm free to design premium options based on its private production costs and consumer surplus extraction incentives.
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Functionality to determine the appropriate scope of regulation, switching between requiring a range of basic options when consumer-side redistributive concerns are weak and requiring only a single basic option when those concerns are strong.
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Skill in analyzing the trade-offs involved in designing basic options, specifically understanding how raising basic quality constrains premium markups and how private information about costs introduces tensions regarding information rents versus shutdown risk.
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Capacity to evaluate the effect of consumer-side redistributive preferences on regulatory outcomes, demonstrating that stronger concerns lead to weakly lower basic quality and a contraction of the range of consumers choosing basic options.
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Functionality to compare different regulatory instruments, such as fully flexible regulation versus mechanisms that abstract from firm private information and consumer redistributive preferences, showing how full control can screen the firm through premium quality restrictions.
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Skill in analyzing the effect of changing welfare weights on redistribution within the consumer side, showing how favoring high-willingness-to-pay consumers can lead to requiring a single subsidized premium option rather than a range of basic options.
Abstract
I study regulation of a screening monopolist when the regulator cares about the distribution of surplus across heterogeneous consumers and the firm. Consumers privately know their willingness to pay for quality, and the firm privately knows its production costs. Regulatory contracts specify quality-price options that the firm must offer. I show that when the regulator gives greater weight to consumers with lower willingness to pay, baseline regulation is optimal: the regulator requires affordable basic options but leaves the firm free to design and price premium options. Under strong consumer-side redistributive concerns, a single required basic option suffices. The regulator uses the firm's incentive to extract surplus from premium buyers to support low regulated prices for basic options.