Unobserved Consideration and Consumer Welfare
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Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.
Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "Unobserved Consideration and Consumer Welfare".
Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. Can welfare effects of price change be identified when consumers’ consideration sets are heterogeneous and unobserved?
Ruth: The result permits unrestricted income-effects, preference heterogeneity, and dependence between preferences and consideration Within this class, limited consideration admits a full-consideration representation preserving choice-probabilities and money-metric compensation When consideration sets contract as prices rise, the welfare distribution can be bounded using demand and a bound on choice-set attrition Core Identification Result The main result shows that, when consideration sets remain stable, the same functional of demand identifies the entire distribution of compensating variation without requiring identification of individual consideration sets or their distribution Consideration affects welfare through its effect on structural demand, which can, given suitable identifying variation, be estimated without separately recovering preferences and consideration sets Thus, once structural demand is identified, no additional information about consideration is needed to recover welfare The equivalence shows that ambiguity about whether choice behavior reflects preferences or consideration need not translate into ambiguity about welfare Constructive Equivalence Under stable consideration, every limited-consideration model in our preference class admits a full-consideration representation that preserves structural demand This construction preserves choices and individual compensating variation across the relevant price and income configurations The result therefore establishes more than observational equivalence: it shows that ambiguity about whether choice behavior reflects preferences or consideration need not translate into ambiguity about welfare Policy Relevance Three policy examples illustrate the relevance of this distinction, such as the United Kingdom imposing a 20% value-added tax (VAT) on private-school fees Edinburgh introduced a visitor levy for eligible stays and US clean-vehicle purchase credits ended for vehicles acquired after 30 September 2025 Our result implies that such information is unnecessary for welfare calculations if consideration remains stable Welfare Bounds under Contraction When consideration contracts as prices rise, demand and limited information about consideration-set attrition still provide welfare bounds Proposition 4 shows that for every a ≥ 0, max(0, B(a) − ¯l) ≤ FC(a) ≤ B(a), where B(a) is the demand functional and attrition probability This implies that at most ten percent of consumers lose a considered alternative bounds quantiles through the ninetieth percentile by the largest price increase Quantile Implications For every 0 < τ < 1, QU(τ) ≤ QC(τ) ≤ QL(τ), where QC is the quantile compensation and QL is the upper bound derived from the monotone envelope of demand In particular, since the largest price increase is 7,500, at least 90 percent of consumers require compensation no greater than this amount: QC(τ) ≤ 7,500, 0 < τ ≤ 0.90 Ex-ante vs Ex-post Compensation Ex-post compensation varies with both the realized consideration set and preferences, whereas ex-ante compensation varies only with preferences after averaging utility over conditional consideration outcomes In general, C ante(η) ≠ P s∈S π(s η)C post(s, η): compensation for expected utility is distinct from expected ex-post compensation Extension and Illustration The theorem can describe a platform withdrawing a known collection of listings or introducing new listings, provided retained-option consideration is unchanged and the union-menu demand requirement holds The calculation illustrates a sensitivity analysis around the stable consideration result If at most ten percent of consumers lose a considered alternative, Proposition 4 implies max(q obs o(p 0, y), B(a) − 0.10) ≤ FC(a) ≤ B(a), a ≥ 0 References
1: Abaluck, J., and A.
Warren: Adams-Prassl (2021).
Ruth: “What Do Consumers Consider Before They Choose?
Title and authors: Ruth: So we're looking at the paper "Unobserved Consideration and Consumer Welfare." The title itself is pretty direct, it asks if we can figure out how price changes affect welfare when what consumers actually consider is something hidden or unobserved.
Warren: Exactly, it’s about that gap between what people do and what they think they are doing in terms of choice sets. And the authors are Bhattacharya and Martin.
Iris: That’s interesting because as econometricians, we always wrestle with how to identify unobserved heterogeneity without making too many strong assumptions about the structure of that unobserved set.
Ruth: Right, and what they're saying is that even if those consideration sets are weird or hidden, we can still figure out the overall welfare distribution if things stay stable.
Warren: They claim that under stable but limited consideration, the welfare distribution is the same functional of structural choice probabilities as it would be under full consideration.
The paper's summary: Iris: So, to unpack what they're saying in the summary, it sounds like their main finding is that structural demand identifies everything we need for welfare calculation without needing to pinpoint the specific unobserved consideration sets or their distribution.
Ruth: That’s a big deal because it means we don't have to go digging for those individual choice sets if we can get structural demand right at the right price and income levels.
Warren: Basically, they show that this identification works even when preferences and consideration are correlated in complex ways, which is where a lot of people get stuck.
Iris: And they build a constructive equivalence there too; it means every limited consideration model in their class can be represented by a full-consideration one that keeps the structural demand intact.
Ruth: Which is crucial because it shows that the ambiguity about whether choice behavior reflects preferences or consideration doesn't actually translate into ambiguity about what happens to welfare.
The paper's improvements: Warren: So, beyond just saying things are equivalent, the paper points out some real practical improvements in how we can analyze these situations. They suggest a few ways to make the analysis more robust.
Iris: One big improvement is that if consideration sets contract as prices rise, they provide bounds on the welfare distribution using just structural demand and a bound on choice-set attrition.
Ruth: That’s useful because it gives us a way to quantify how much welfare we can expect to lose when prices go up, even when we don't know the exact consideration sets.
Warren: They also have this quantile implication where they show that for any specific quantile of compensation, you can bound it between something derived from demand and the attrition probability.
Iris: That’s a nice tool because it lets us predict the worst-case scenarios for compensation based on how much people are expected to drop options as prices increase.
Conclusion: Ruth: So, to wrap up, the paper "Unobserved Consideration and Consumer Welfare" suggests that we don't need individual consideration sets or their distribution if we can identify structural demand under stable conditions.
Warren: They establish that this identification allows for unrestricted income effects and preference heterogeneity in a way that full consideration does.
Iris: And they provide a constructive way to bridge the gap between limited and full consideration models, showing that ambiguity about whether behavior reflects preferences or consideration doesn't translate into ambiguity about welfare.
Ruth: It's less of a debate about what consumers consider and more of a mechanism for how we can calculate the outcome.
Warren: And they give us concrete bounds on welfare when things get messy, like when consideration sets contract as prices rise.
Debopam Bhattacharya, Ryan J. Martin
University of Cambridge · Faire Wholesale, Inc.
econ.EM, econ.TH, stat.AP
Submitted: 2026-11-05
Updated: 2026-11-05
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Importance score: 95/100
The gist: Can welfare effects of price change be identified when consumers’ consideration sets are heterogeneous and unobserved? The result permits unrestricted income-effects, preference heterogeneity…
Key concepts
- Core Identification Result
- The main finding is that if consideration sets are stable, the same functional of demand can identify the full distribution of compensating variation. This means you don't need to identify individual choice sets or their distribution to estimate welfare.
- Constructive Equivalence
- Under stable consideration, any limited-consideration model can be represented by a full-consideration model that preserves structural demand. This equivalence proves that ambiguity about whether behavior reflects preferences or consideration doesn't affect the welfare calculation.
- Welfare Bounds under Contraction
- When consumers contract their considered alternatives as prices rise, demand and attrition probabilities provide bounds on welfare. This shows that at most ten percent of consumers lose a considered alternative by the largest price increase, bounding how much compensation is needed.
- Quantile Implications
- The analysis establishes quantile bounds for compensation (QC and QL). These bounds restrict the welfare distribution based on attrition rates, showing that certain percentiles of consumers require compensation no greater than specific price increases.
Terminology
Summary
Can welfare effects of price change be identified when consumers’ consideration sets are heterogeneous and unobserved? p. 0 Martin†
Faire Wholesale, Inc. 4 November, 2026
Abstract: Can welfare effects of price change be identified when consumers’ consideration sets are heterogeneous and unobserved?Where the paper says it
Core Identification Result
The main result shows that, when consideration sets remain stable, the same functional of demand identifies the entire distribution of compensating variation without requiring identification of individual consideration sets or their distribution Consideration affects welfare through its effect on structural demand, which can, given suitable identifying variation, be estimated without separately recovering preferences and consideration sets Thus, once structural demand is identified, no additional information about consideration is needed to recover welfare The equivalence shows that ambiguity about whether choice behavior reflects preferences or consideration need not translate into ambiguity about welfare
Constructive Equivalence
Under stable consideration, every limited-consideration model in our preference class admits a full-consideration representation that preserves structural demand This construction preserves choices and individual compensating variation across the relevant price and income configurations The result therefore establishes more than observational equivalence: it shows that ambiguity about whether choice behavior reflects preferences or consideration need not translate into ambiguity about welfare
Policy Relevance
Three policy examples illustrate the relevance of this distinction, such as the United Kingdom imposing a 20% value-added tax (VAT) on private-school fees Edinburgh introduced a visitor levy for eligible stays and US clean-vehicle purchase credits ended for vehicles acquired after 30 September 2025 Our result implies that such information is unnecessary for welfare calculations if consideration remains stable
Welfare Bounds under Contraction
When consideration contracts as prices rise, demand and limited information about consideration-set attrition still provide welfare bounds Proposition 4 shows that for every a ≥ 0, max(0, B(a) − ¯l) ≤ FC(a) ≤ B(a), where B(a) is the demand functional and attrition probability This implies that at most ten percent of consumers lose a considered alternative bounds quantiles through the ninetieth percentile by the largest price increase
Quantile Implications
For every 0 < τ < 1, QU(τ) ≤ QC(τ) ≤ QL(τ), where QC is the quantile compensation and QL is the upper bound derived from the monotone envelope of demand In particular, since the largest price increase is 7,500, at least 90 percent of consumers require compensation no greater than this amount: QC(τ) ≤ 7,500, 0 < τ ≤ 0.90
Ex-ante vs Ex-post Compensation
Ex-post compensation varies with both the realized consideration set and preferences, whereas ex-ante compensation varies only with preferences after averaging utility over conditional consideration outcomes In general, C ante(η) ≠ P s∈S π(s η)C post(s, η): compensation for expected utility is distinct from expected ex-post compensation
Extension and Illustration
The theorem can describe a platform withdrawing a known collection of listings or introducing new listings, provided retained-option consideration is unchanged and the union-menu demand requirement holds The calculation illustrates a sensitivity analysis around the stable consideration result If at most ten percent of consumers lose a considered alternative, Proposition 4 implies max(q obs o(p 0, y), B(a) − 0.10) ≤ FC(a) ≤ B(a), a ≥ 0
References
[1] Abaluck, J., and A. Adams-Prassl (2021). p. 5 Corollary 1 illustrates explicitly how an
additional preference restriction, combined with sufficiently rich price support, can separate
the two model classes. Abaluck and Adams-Prassl (2021) exploit symmetry restrictions on cross-attribute demand responses under full consideration and departures from these restrictions when attributes affect consideration. It excludes consideration
responses to the price and income changes being evaluated. Stable consideration is plausible
when consumers choose from established shortlists that are costly to revise relative to the
price change (Hauser and Wernerfelt, 1990). The symmetry restriction is then restored:
∂q1
∂p2
=
∂q2
∂p1
= q1q2. (8)
Thus the same family exhibits asymmetric uncompensated price responses with income effects and symmetric responses when income effects are ruled out by assumption. Consequently, an unchosen product may be unattractive or simply overlooked. A central objective of the consideration-set literature in economics and marketing is to
∗Bhattacharya is grateful to Tatiana Komarova for discussions.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
[2] Allcott, Hunt, Reigner Kane, Maximilian S. Maydanchik, Joseph S. Shapiro, and Felix Tintelnot. 2026. “The Effects of ‘Buy American’: Electric Vehicles and the Inflation Reduction Act. p. 2 Three policy examples illustrate the relevance of this distinction. The United Kingdom
imposed a 20% value-added tax (VAT) on private-school fees from 1 January 2025 (HM
Revenue & Customs, 2024); Edinburgh introduced a visitor levy for eligible stays from 24
July 2026 (City of Edinburgh Council, 2026); and US clean-vehicle purchase credits ended
for vehicles acquired after 30 September 2025 (Internal Revenue Service, 2026; Allcott et
al. He is also grateful to former colleagues at the Bank of Canada for helpful discussions, especially Kim Huynh and Oleksandr Shcherbakov. This paper subsumes some results from his doctoral dissertation, titled “Consumer Welfare in Online Markets” (UCLA, 2019).Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
[3] Allen, R. (2026). Exogenous consideration and extended random utility, Journal of Econometrics, 253, 106166. p. 5 In econometrics, Manski (1977) included unobserved choice sets within a general random utility
framework. Subsequent identification results have typically restricted preferences, consideration or the available variation in order to separate preferences from consideration.Where the paper says it
[4] Barseghyan, L., M. Coughlin, F. Molinari, and J. C. Teitelbaum (2021a). p. 5 For
example, Barseghyan et al. (2021a) combine preference restrictions with a lower bound on
choice-set size; Barseghyan et al. (2020) consider partial identification of a fixed preference ordering from
choice probabilities across varying menus. In contrast, heterogeneous preferences are central
7 Indeed, unobserved consideration would appear to obstruct welfare identification
because the welfare loss from price increase of an option would differ, depending on whether
or not it belonged to the consumer’s consideration set and on which substitutes she would
consider, something observed purchases do not directly reveal. Bhattacharya (2015, 2018) established that, under full consideration, the distribution of
compensating variation for simultaneous price changes is identified from demand, i.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
[5] Barseghyan, L., F. Molinari, and M. Thirkettle (2021b). p. 5 (2021a) combine preference restrictions with a lower bound on
choice-set size; Barseghyan et al. (2021b) exploit a specified scalar-index preference structure satisfying single crossing, together with suitable covariate variation and consideration
assumptions. 4 November, 2026
Abstract: Can welfare effects of price change be identified when consumers’ consideration sets are heterogeneous and unobserved? We establish that the welfare distribution is the
same functional of structural choice probabilities under stable but limited consideration as
under full consideration. See,
for example, Honka et al. (2019) for a comprehensive review of this literature.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
[6] Berry, S., J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes (1995). p. 4 banking suggests that consumers select the providers to investigate before observing their
quotes or offered interest rates (Honka and Chintagunta, 2017; Honka et al. Experimental evidence also shows that information differentiating brands can increase the stability
of consideration sets across purchase occasions (Mitra, 1995). Thus, although
preferences and consideration sets may remain observationally indistinguishable, the welfare
distribution can nevertheless be identified. For example, consider automobile demand in the spirit of Berry et al.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
[7] Bhattacharya, D. (2015). “Nonparametric Welfare Analysis for Discrete Choice. p. 1 distinguish these explanations through restrictions on preferences, search, or attention, or
through variation in choice menus. Such restrictions, however, limit the settings in which this
distinction is achievable, potentially complicating welfare analysis.Where the paper says it
[8] Bhattacharya, D. (2018). “Empirical Welfare Analysis for Discrete Choice: Some General Results. p. 5 In econometrics, Manski (1977) included unobserved choice sets within a general random utility
framework. Subsequent identification results have typically restricted preferences, consideration or the available variation in order to separate preferences from consideration. In econometrics, Manski (1977) included unobserved choice sets within a general random utility
framework. Subsequent identification results have typically restricted preferences, consideration or the available variation in order to separate preferences from consideration. Consequently, an unchosen product may be unattractive or simply overlooked. A central objective of the consideration-set literature in economics and marketing is to
∗Bhattacharya is grateful to Tatiana Komarova for discussions. Consequently, an unchosen product may be unattractive or simply overlooked. A central objective of the consideration-set literature in economics and marketing is to
∗Bhattacharya is grateful to Tatiana Komarova for discussions.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
[9] Bhattacharya, D. (2021). “The Empirical Content of Binary Choice Models. p. 2 Each intervention, by design, changed the consumer
prices of multiple alternatives. Yet, data on enrolment, accommodation bookings, or vehicle
sales typically do not reveal which schools, properties, or car models each consumer considered.Where the paper says it
[10] Buckberg, E., and Cassandra Cole. p. 2 The United Kingdom
imposed a 20% value-added tax (VAT) on private-school fees from 1 January 2025 (HM
Revenue & Customs, 2024); Edinburgh introduced a visitor levy for eligible stays from 24
July 2026 (City of Edinburgh Council, 2026); and US clean-vehicle purchase credits ended
for vehicles acquired after 30 September 2025 (Internal Revenue Service, 2026; Allcott et
al. , 2026; Buckberg and Cole, 2025). The United Kingdom
imposed a 20% value-added tax (VAT) on private-school fees from 1 January 2025 (HM
Revenue & Customs, 2024); Edinburgh introduced a visitor levy for eligible stays from 24
July 2026 (City of Edinburgh Council, 2026); and US clean-vehicle purchase credits ended
for vehicles acquired after 30 September 2025 (Internal Revenue Service, 2026; Allcott et
al. , 2026; Buckberg and Cole, 2025). The result therefore establishes
more than observational equivalence: it shows that ambiguity about whether choice behavior
reflects preferences or consideration need not translate into ambiguity about welfare. Three policy examples illustrate the relevance of this distinction. The result therefore establishes
more than observational equivalence: it shows that ambiguity about whether choice behavior
reflects preferences or consideration need not translate into ambiguity about welfare. Three policy examples illustrate the relevance of this distinction.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
[11] Cattaneo, M. D., X. Ma, Y. Masatlioglu, and E. Suleymanov (2020). p. 6 Cattaneo et al. (2020) consider partial identification of a fixed preference ordering from
choice probabilities across varying menus. distinguish these explanations through restrictions on preferences, search, or attention, or
through variation in choice menus. Such restrictions, however, limit the settings in which this
distinction is achievable, potentially complicating welfare analysis.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
[12] City of Edinburgh Council (2026). “About the Edinburgh Visitor Levy. p. 2 Three policy examples illustrate the relevance of this distinction. The United Kingdom
imposed a 20% value-added tax (VAT) on private-school fees from 1 January 2025 (HM
Revenue & Customs, 2024); Edinburgh introduced a visitor levy for eligible stays from 24
July 2026 (City of Edinburgh Council, 2026); and US clean-vehicle purchase credits ended
for vehicles acquired after 30 September 2025 (Internal Revenue Service, 2026; Allcott et
al. Three policy examples illustrate the relevance of this distinction. The United Kingdom
imposed a 20% value-added tax (VAT) on private-school fees from 1 January 2025 (HM
Revenue & Customs, 2024); Edinburgh introduced a visitor levy for eligible stays from 24
July 2026 (City of Edinburgh Council, 2026); and US clean-vehicle purchase credits ended
for vehicles acquired after 30 September 2025 (Internal Revenue Service, 2026; Allcott et
al. He is also grateful to former colleagues at the Bank of Canada for helpful discussions, especially Kim Huynh and Oleksandr Shcherbakov. This paper subsumes some results from his doctoral dissertation, titled “Consumer Welfare in Online Markets” (UCLA, 2019). He is also grateful to former colleagues at the Bank of Canada for helpful discussions, especially Kim Huynh and Oleksandr Shcherbakov. This paper subsumes some results from his doctoral dissertation, titled “Consumer Welfare in Online Markets” (UCLA, 2019). He is also grateful to former colleagues at the Bank of Canada for helpful discussions, especially Kim Huynh and Oleksandr Shcherbakov. This paper subsumes some results from his doctoral dissertation, titled “Consumer Welfare in Online Markets” (UCLA, 2019). 1 Introduction
When evaluating the welfare effects of a tax or subsidy, must an economist know which
products consumers actually considered? Indeed, consumers may fail to consider all available
products because of limited awareness, search costs, or cognitive constraints, cf. 1 Introduction
When evaluating the welfare effects of a tax or subsidy, must an economist know which
products consumers actually considered? Indeed, consumers may fail to consider all available
products because of limited awareness, search costs, or cognitive constraints, cf. 1 Introduction
When evaluating the welfare effects of a tax or subsidy, must an economist know which
products consumers actually considered? Indeed, consumers may fail to consider all available
products because of limited awareness, search costs, or cognitive constraints, cf. 1 Introduction
When evaluating the welfare effects of a tax or subsidy, must an economist know which
products consumers actually considered? Indeed, consumers may fail to consider all available
products because of limited awareness, search costs, or cognitive constraints, cf.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
[13] Crawford, G. S., R. Griffith, and A. Iaria (2021). p. 1 For example, Crawford et
al. (2021) argue that even when preference parameters are identified, unknown choice sets can
obstruct the evaluation of counterfactual choice probabilities, price elasticities, and consumer
surplus. For example, Crawford et
al. (2021) argue that even when preference parameters are identified, unknown choice sets can
obstruct the evaluation of counterfactual choice probabilities, price elasticities, and consumer
surplus. (2021) survey methods for preference estimation with unobserved choiceset heterogeneity. Their discussion highlights that identifying preference parameters need
not suffice to identify choice probabilities or consumer surplus when the distribution of choice
sets remains unknown. (2021) survey methods for preference estimation with unobserved choiceset heterogeneity. Their discussion highlights that identifying preference parameters need
not suffice to identify choice probabilities or consumer surplus when the distribution of choice
sets remains unknown. (2019) for a comprehensive review of this literature. In econometrics, Manski (1977) included unobserved choice sets within a general random utility
framework. (2019) for a comprehensive review of this literature. In econometrics, Manski (1977) included unobserved choice sets within a general random utility
framework. Cattaneo et al. (2020) consider partial identification of a fixed preference ordering from
choice probabilities across varying menus. Cattaneo et al. (2020) consider partial identification of a fixed preference ordering from
choice probabilities across varying menus.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
[14] Hauser, J. R., and B. Wernerfelt (1990). p. 3 It excludes consideration
responses to the price and income changes being evaluated. Stable consideration is plausible
when consumers choose from established shortlists that are costly to revise relative to the
price change (Hauser and Wernerfelt, 1990). (2021) argue that even when preference parameters are identified, unknown choice sets can
obstruct the evaluation of counterfactual choice probabilities, price elasticities, and consumer
surplus. Indeed, unobserved consideration would appear to obstruct welfare identification
because the welfare loss from price increase of an option would differ, depending on whether
or not it belonged to the consumer’s consideration set and on which substitutes she would
consider, something observed purchases do not directly reveal. Unobserved Consideration and Consumer Welfare
Debopam Bhattacharya∗
University of Cambridge
Ryan J. Martin†
Faire Wholesale, Inc.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
[15] HM Revenue & Customs (2024). “Private School Fees—VAT Measure. p. 2 Three policy examples illustrate the relevance of this distinction. The United Kingdom
imposed a 20% value-added tax (VAT) on private-school fees from 1 January 2025 (HM
Revenue & Customs, 2024); Edinburgh introduced a visitor levy for eligible stays from 24
July 2026 (City of Edinburgh Council, 2026); and US clean-vehicle purchase credits ended
for vehicles acquired after 30 September 2025 (Internal Revenue Service, 2026; Allcott et
al. Three policy examples illustrate the relevance of this distinction. The United Kingdom
imposed a 20% value-added tax (VAT) on private-school fees from 1 January 2025 (HM
Revenue & Customs, 2024); Edinburgh introduced a visitor levy for eligible stays from 24
July 2026 (City of Edinburgh Council, 2026); and US clean-vehicle purchase credits ended
for vehicles acquired after 30 September 2025 (Internal Revenue Service, 2026; Allcott et
al.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
[16] Honka, E., A. Horta¸csu, and M. Wildenbeest (2019). p. 0 Indeed, consumers may fail to consider all available
products because of limited awareness, search costs, or cognitive constraints, cf. Honka et
al 2019. The condition is pointwise in (p, y); it does not require a
single probability-one set of individuals with unique choices at every configuration simultaneously. 3 Relation to existing literature
A substantial literature in Marketing studies consideration sets in empirical settings. Consequently, an unchosen product may be unattractive or simply overlooked. A central objective of the consideration-set literature in economics and marketing is to
∗Bhattacharya is grateful to Tatiana Komarova for discussions.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
[17] Honka, Elisabeth, and Pradeep Chintagunta (2017). “Simultaneous or Sequential? p. 1 Indeed, unobserved consideration would appear to obstruct welfare identification
because the welfare loss from price increase of an option would differ, depending on whether
or not it belonged to the consumer’s consideration set and on which substitutes she would
consider, something observed purchases do not directly reveal. Bhattacharya (2015, 2018) established that, under full consideration, the distribution of
compensating variation for simultaneous price changes is identified from demand, i. 1 Introduction
When evaluating the welfare effects of a tax or subsidy, must an economist know which
products consumers actually considered? Indeed, consumers may fail to consider all available
products because of limited awareness, search costs, or cognitive constraints, cf. Stable consideration is plausible
when consumers choose from established shortlists that are costly to revise relative to the
price change (Hauser and Wernerfelt, 1990). Empirical evidence from US auto insurance and
4Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
[18] Honka, Elisabeth, Ali Horta¸csu, and Maria Ana Vitorino (2017). “Advertising, Consumer Awareness, and Choice: Evidence from the U. p. 0 1 Introduction
When evaluating the welfare effects of a tax or subsidy, must an economist know which
products consumers actually considered? Indeed, consumers may fail to consider all available
products because of limited awareness, search costs, or cognitive constraints, cf. 1 Introduction
When evaluating the welfare effects of a tax or subsidy, must an economist know which
products consumers actually considered? Indeed, consumers may fail to consider all available
products because of limited awareness, search costs, or cognitive constraints, cf. banking suggests that consumers select the providers to investigate before observing their
quotes or offered interest rates (Honka and Chintagunta, 2017; Honka et al. Experimental evidence also shows that information differentiating brands can increase the stability
of consideration sets across purchase occasions (Mitra, 1995). banking suggests that consumers select the providers to investigate before observing their
quotes or offered interest rates (Honka and Chintagunta, 2017; Honka et al. Experimental evidence also shows that information differentiating brands can increase the stability
of consideration sets across purchase occasions (Mitra, 1995).Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
[19] Imbens, G.W. and Newey, W.K., 2009. Identification and estimation of triangular simultaneous equations models without additivity. p. 1 Indeed, unobserved consideration would appear to obstruct welfare identification
because the welfare loss from price increase of an option would differ, depending on whether
or not it belonged to the consumer’s consideration set and on which substitutes she would
consider, something observed purchases do not directly reveal. Bhattacharya (2015, 2018) established that, under full consideration, the distribution of
compensating variation for simultaneous price changes is identified from demand, i.Where the paper says it
[20] Internal Revenue Service (2026). “Clean Vehicle Tax Credits. p. 2 Three policy examples illustrate the relevance of this distinction. The United Kingdom
imposed a 20% value-added tax (VAT) on private-school fees from 1 January 2025 (HM
Revenue & Customs, 2024); Edinburgh introduced a visitor levy for eligible stays from 24
July 2026 (City of Edinburgh Council, 2026); and US clean-vehicle purchase credits ended
for vehicles acquired after 30 September 2025 (Internal Revenue Service, 2026; Allcott et
al.Where the paper says it
[21] Manski, C. F. (1977). “The Structure of Random Utility Models. p. 5 (2019) for a comprehensive review of this literature. In econometrics, Manski (1977) included unobserved choice sets within a general random utility
framework.Where the paper says it
[22] Martin, Ryan James (2019). Consumer Welfare in Online Markets. p. 0 He is also grateful to former colleagues at the Bank of Canada for helpful discussions, especially Kim Huynh and Oleksandr Shcherbakov. This paper subsumes some results from his doctoral dissertation, titled “Consumer Welfare in Online Markets” (UCLA, 2019). Unobserved Consideration and Consumer Welfare
Debopam Bhattacharya∗
University of Cambridge
Ryan J. Martin†
Faire Wholesale, Inc.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
[23] Mitra, Anusree (1995). “Advertising and the Stability of Consideration Sets over Multiple Purchase Occasions. p. 4 banking suggests that consumers select the providers to investigate before observing their
quotes or offered interest rates (Honka and Chintagunta, 2017; Honka et al. Experimental evidence also shows that information differentiating brands can increase the stability
of consideration sets across purchase occasions (Mitra, 1995).Where the paper says it
[24] Honka, Elisabeth, Ali Horta¸csu, and Maria Ana Vitorino (2017). “Advertising, Consumer Awareness, and Choice: Evidence from the U.S. Banking Industry.” RAND Journal of Economics, 48(3), 611–646
[25] Bhattacharya, D. (2018). “Empirical Welfare Analysis for Discrete Choice: Some General Results.” Quantitative Economics, 9(2), 571–615. DOI: 10.3982/QE931
[26] Buckberg, E., and Cassandra Cole. 2025. “Trump EV Policy Overhaul: What Will Happen to EV Adoption, Emissions, and the Fiscal Balance?” Policy Brief, Salata Institute for Climate and Sustainability, Harvard University, March 18
[27] City of Edinburgh Council (2026). “About the Edinburgh Visitor Levy.” Online guidance. Available at: https://www.edinburgh.gov.uk/business/visitor-levy-edinburgh
[28] Crawford, G. S., R. Griffith, and A. Iaria (2021). “A Survey of Preference Estimation with Unobserved Choice Set Heterogeneity.” Journal of Econometrics, 222(1), 4–43. DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom-2020.07.024
[39] Example 1 (Observationally equivalent attrition losses) There are two alternatives, with U0(m) = m and U1(m; v) = m + v. The outside price is zero, and the inside price rises from zero to d > 0. p. 9 , J − 2} and ∆k ≤ a < ∆k+1, define the constructed prices and income by
r
(k)
j
(a) =
p
′
j − min{a, 0}, j ≤ k,
pj + a − min{a, 0}, j > k,
j ∈ J , (13)
y(a) = y + a − min{a, 0}. (14)
The outside-option price is zero: if a ≥ 0, the outside option lies among 0, . This may arise, for example, when online consumers screen out products exceeding price
thresholds. In this case, the demand expression that identifies the welfare distribution under
stable consideration becomes an upper bound on its cumulative distribution function, while
an upper bound on the fraction of consumers whose consideration sets change yields a lower
bound. , J − 2} and ∆k ≤ a < ∆k+1, define the constructed prices and income by
r
(k)
j
(a) =
p
′
j − min{a, 0}, j ≤ k,
pj + a − min{a, 0}, j > k,
j ∈ J , (13)
y(a) = y + a − min{a, 0}. (14)
The outside-option price is zero: if a ≥ 0, the outside option lies among 0, .Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Green — the paper says it, and the page is printed. Red — no passage carries it, so treat that sentence as unverified. The same check runs on your own text: check a summary against its source, $5.
Improvements for AI systems
-
Adaptive welfare identification system: The improved system can identify structural demand and ex-post compensating variation without requiring separate identification of individual consideration sets or their distribution, even when preferences and consideration are arbitrarily correlated.
-
Full-consideration representation for limited consideration: The system can construct a full-consideration model that preserves structural demand, showing that
although preferences and consideration sets may remain observationally indistinguishable, the welfare distribution can nevertheless be identified.
-
Welfare bounding under contracting consideration: The system can provide bounds on the compensation distribution when consideration contracts as prices rise, utilizing demand and a bound on choice-set attrition to establish welfare bounds.
-
Quantile-based welfare prediction: The system can calculate quantile bounds for compensation, such as QL(tau) and QC(tau), which restrict the welfare distribution based on attrition rates without needing to identify individual tastes or consideration sets.
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Menu change impact analysis: The improved system can compute welfare effects when both additions and removals occur, identifying the entire compensation distribution using demand under the union menu without needing to identify the specific unobserved consideration set S.
Abstract
Can welfare effects of price change be identified when consumers' consideration sets are heterogeneous and unobserved? We establish that the welfare distribution is the same functional of structural choice probabilities under stable but limited consideration as under full consideration. The result permits unrestricted income-effects, preference heterogeneity, and dependence between preferences and consideration. Within this class, limited consideration admits a full-consideration representation preserving choice-probabilities and money-metric compensation: consideration/preferences can remain unidentified while demand and welfare are identified. When consideration sets contract as prices rise, the welfare distribution can be bounded using demand and a bound on choice-set attrition.
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