Unobserved Consideration and Consumer Welfare

summary

The gist

Can welfare effects of price change be identified when consumers’ consideration sets are heterogeneous and unobserved? The result permits unrestricted income-effects, preference heterogeneity…

In short

The paper investigates whether welfare effects from price changes can be identified when consumers' consideration sets are different and unobserved. It shows that even with limited information about what consumers consider, structural demand can identify the entire distribution of compensating variation. This allows for welfare estimation without needing to know individual consumer preferences or their specific consideration sets.

Key concepts

Core Identification Result
The main finding is that if consideration sets are stable, the same functional of demand can identify the full distribution of compensating variation. This means you don't need to identify individual choice sets or their distribution to estimate welfare.
Constructive Equivalence
Under stable consideration, any limited-consideration model can be represented by a full-consideration model that preserves structural demand. This equivalence proves that ambiguity about whether behavior reflects preferences or consideration doesn't affect the welfare calculation.
Welfare Bounds under Contraction
When consumers contract their considered alternatives as prices rise, demand and attrition probabilities provide bounds on welfare. This shows that at most ten percent of consumers lose a considered alternative by the largest price increase, bounding how much compensation is needed.
Quantile Implications
The analysis establishes quantile bounds for compensation (QC and QL). These bounds restrict the welfare distribution based on attrition rates, showing that certain percentiles of consumers require compensation no greater than specific price increases.

Terminology used across episodes

This episode discusses

The paper

Unobserved Consideration and Consumer Welfare · Read on arXiv

Debopam Bhattacharya, Ryan J. Martin

University of Cambridge · Faire Wholesale, Inc.

Can welfare effects of price change be identified when consumers' consideration sets are heterogeneous and unobserved? We establish that the welfare distribution is the same functional of structural choice probabilities under stable but limited consideration as under full consideration. The result permits unrestricted income-effects, preference heterogeneity, and dependence between preferences and consideration. Within this class, limited consideration admits a full-consideration representation preserving choice-probabilities and money-metric compensation: consideration/preferences can remain unidentified while demand and welfare are identified. When consideration sets contract as prices rise, the welfare distribution can be bounded using demand and a bound on choice-set attrition.

Transcript

Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.

Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "Unobserved Consideration and Consumer Welfare".

Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. Can welfare effects of price change be identified when consumers’ consideration sets are heterogeneous and unobserved?

Ruth: The result permits unrestricted income-effects, preference heterogeneity, and dependence between preferences and consideration Within this class, limited consideration admits a full-consideration representation preserving choice-probabilities and money-metric compensation When consideration sets contract as prices rise, the welfare distribution can be bounded using demand and a bound on choice-set attrition Core Identification Result The main result shows that, when consideration sets remain stable, the same functional of demand identifies the entire distribution of compensating variation without requiring identification of individual consideration sets or their distribution Consideration affects welfare through its effect on structural demand, which can, given suitable identifying variation, be estimated without separately recovering preferences and consideration sets Thus, once structural demand is identified, no additional information about consideration is needed to recover welfare The equivalence shows that ambiguity about whether choice behavior reflects preferences or consideration need not translate into ambiguity about welfare Constructive Equivalence Under stable consideration, every limited-consideration model in our preference class admits a full-consideration representation that preserves structural demand This construction preserves choices and individual compensating variation across the relevant price and income configurations The result therefore establishes more than observational equivalence: it shows that ambiguity about whether choice behavior reflects preferences or consideration need not translate into ambiguity about welfare Policy Relevance Three policy examples illustrate the relevance of this distinction, such as the United Kingdom imposing a 20% value-added tax (VAT) on private-school fees Edinburgh introduced a visitor levy for eligible stays and US clean-vehicle purchase credits ended for vehicles acquired after 30 September 2025 Our result implies that such information is unnecessary for welfare calculations if consideration remains stable Welfare Bounds under Contraction When consideration contracts as prices rise, demand and limited information about consideration-set attrition still provide welfare bounds Proposition 4 shows that for every a ≥ 0, max(0, B(a) − ¯l) ≤ FC(a) ≤ B(a), where B(a) is the demand functional and attrition probability This implies that at most ten percent of consumers lose a considered alternative bounds quantiles through the ninetieth percentile by the largest price increase Quantile Implications For every 0 < τ < 1, QU(τ) ≤ QC(τ) ≤ QL(τ), where QC is the quantile compensation and QL is the upper bound derived from the monotone envelope of demand In particular, since the largest price increase is 7,500, at least 90 percent of consumers require compensation no greater than this amount: QC(τ) ≤ 7,500, 0 < τ ≤ 0.90 Ex-ante vs Ex-post Compensation Ex-post compensation varies with both the realized consideration set and preferences, whereas ex-ante compensation varies only with preferences after averaging utility over conditional consideration outcomes In general, C ante(η) ≠ P s∈S π(s η)C post(s, η): compensation for expected utility is distinct from expected ex-post compensation Extension and Illustration The theorem can describe a platform withdrawing a known collection of listings or introducing new listings, provided retained-option consideration is unchanged and the union-menu demand requirement holds The calculation illustrates a sensitivity analysis around the stable consideration result If at most ten percent of consumers lose a considered alternative, Proposition 4 implies max(q obs o(p 0, y), B(a) − 0.10) ≤ FC(a) ≤ B(a), a ≥ 0 References

1: Abaluck, J., and A.

Warren: Adams-Prassl (2021).

Ruth: “What Do Consumers Consider Before They Choose?

Title and authors: Ruth: So we're looking at the paper "Unobserved Consideration and Consumer Welfare." The title itself is pretty direct, it asks if we can figure out how price changes affect welfare when what consumers actually consider is something hidden or unobserved.

Warren: Exactly, it’s about that gap between what people do and what they think they are doing in terms of choice sets. And the authors are Bhattacharya and Martin.

Iris: That’s interesting because as econometricians, we always wrestle with how to identify unobserved heterogeneity without making too many strong assumptions about the structure of that unobserved set.

Ruth: Right, and what they're saying is that even if those consideration sets are weird or hidden, we can still figure out the overall welfare distribution if things stay stable.

Warren: They claim that under stable but limited consideration, the welfare distribution is the same functional of structural choice probabilities as it would be under full consideration.

The paper's summary: Iris: So, to unpack what they're saying in the summary, it sounds like their main finding is that structural demand identifies everything we need for welfare calculation without needing to pinpoint the specific unobserved consideration sets or their distribution.

Ruth: That’s a big deal because it means we don't have to go digging for those individual choice sets if we can get structural demand right at the right price and income levels.

Warren: Basically, they show that this identification works even when preferences and consideration are correlated in complex ways, which is where a lot of people get stuck.

Iris: And they build a constructive equivalence there too; it means every limited consideration model in their class can be represented by a full-consideration one that keeps the structural demand intact.

Ruth: Which is crucial because it shows that the ambiguity about whether choice behavior reflects preferences or consideration doesn't actually translate into ambiguity about what happens to welfare.

The paper's improvements: Warren: So, beyond just saying things are equivalent, the paper points out some real practical improvements in how we can analyze these situations. They suggest a few ways to make the analysis more robust.

Iris: One big improvement is that if consideration sets contract as prices rise, they provide bounds on the welfare distribution using just structural demand and a bound on choice-set attrition.

Ruth: That’s useful because it gives us a way to quantify how much welfare we can expect to lose when prices go up, even when we don't know the exact consideration sets.

Warren: They also have this quantile implication where they show that for any specific quantile of compensation, you can bound it between something derived from demand and the attrition probability.

Iris: That’s a nice tool because it lets us predict the worst-case scenarios for compensation based on how much people are expected to drop options as prices increase.

Conclusion: Ruth: So, to wrap up, the paper "Unobserved Consideration and Consumer Welfare" suggests that we don't need individual consideration sets or their distribution if we can identify structural demand under stable conditions.

Warren: They establish that this identification allows for unrestricted income effects and preference heterogeneity in a way that full consideration does.

Iris: And they provide a constructive way to bridge the gap between limited and full consideration models, showing that ambiguity about whether behavior reflects preferences or consideration doesn't translate into ambiguity about welfare.

Ruth: It's less of a debate about what consumers consider and more of a mechanism for how we can calculate the outcome.

Warren: And they give us concrete bounds on welfare when things get messy, like when consideration sets contract as prices rise.

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