Brave New Data: Pricing Expertise and Discovery

arXiv:2611.07278 · econ.TH · Submitted 2026-11-05 · Read on arXiv

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Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.

Ruth: I'm Ruth.

Warren: And I'm Warren, here with Iris.

Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "Brave New Data: Pricing Expertise and Discovery".

Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. We study how a data buyer procures evidence from an expert whose initial knowledge and subsequent investigation are private The optimal contract pays only for disclosed evidence, independently of the initial report.

Ruth: Model Setup and Incentives The model studies a data procurement setting in which an expert provides an initial assessment and undertakes further investigation.

Warren: The agent has private information about the state, denoted as µ, where Pr(θ = 1 µ) = µ.

Ruth: Investigation can produce a certificate, which is verifiable evidence establishing that the targeted state is true.

Paper summary: Ruth: So, we're looking at this new paper called "Brave New Data: Pricing Expertise and Discovery". It’s about how someone who knows something privately, like an expert who assesses a state or condition, gives you an initial report and then does some more digging. The core idea is figuring out the best contract for paying that expert.

Warren: Right. The paper studies this data procurement setting where the buyer has private information about a state, let's call it mu, and the expert can either give a certificate proving that state or they can just stay silent and do more investigation to find evidence. The main thing they claim is that the optimal contract only pays for the evidence that actually gets disclosed, regardless of whether it was the initial report or what came from the expert's further search.

Iris: It seems like they are setting up a model where we have an expert who knows something private and can produce verifiable evidence later on. The research focuses on how this structure affects what happens next for both the buyer and the expert, which is kind of like looking at moral hazard in delegated information acquisition CHADE AND KOVRIJNYKH two thousand sixteen <ref:2611.07278#pg1>.

Ruth: Exactly. They look at two benchmark environments where they control what's being observed, and they find that when acquiring evidence is cheap, it makes sense for the contract to give equal rewards for both potential certificates. But as costs go up, rewarding only one certificate becomes the optimal move even if the environment is symmetric <ref:2611.07278#pg3>.

Warren: That's interesting because it means that when acquisition costs are high, we switch from paying for both possibilities to just one of them, even though the situation looks identical on paper. It suggests that the value of discovery changes depending on how much effort it takes to find out.

Iris: The authors characterize this optimal contract using some thresholds, k1 and k2, which depend directly on those acquisition costs. These thresholds dictate when the principal switches from offering rewards for both certificates to rewarding only one or when they change the intensity of the search for a single certificate <ref:2611.07278#pg3>.

Ruth: So, those thresholds essentially map out two different payment structures, one where you reward both possibilities and another where you only reward one. The choice between those two structures is about balancing how easy it is to get the discovery versus how valuable that discovery actually is for making decisions <ref:2611.07278#pg2>.

Warren: That sounds like the decision value of discovery, which they define as the expected loss avoidance before subtracting any payments or acquisition costs. It's about how much avoiding a bad decision is worth compared to what you pay the expert <ref:2611.07278#pg3>.

Iris: They show that truthful reporting by the expert turns out to be weakly optimal under these report-independent payments, which is something interesting given the setup of their equilibrium selection <ref:2611.07278#pg3>. That means if you tell the truth, you're not really punished in this model.

Ruth: So, what does this mean for us? It highlights that we need to look at the expert's contribution beyond just their first assessment. The contract structure itself is what shapes how much discovery happens along two different lines: which certificates get rewarded and what the resulting search targets are <ref:2611.07278#pg3>.

Warren: And the choice between those payment structures reflects how those two margins work together to determine both the ease of inducing discovery and its actual value for a decision-maker. It’s not just about one thing; it’s about that trade-off <ref:2611.07278#pg2>.

Iris: The model's limitations, as stated by the authors, is that they are studying a setting where the expert provides an initial assessment and then undertakes further investigation <ref:2611.07278#pg3>. They focus on how this structure works under report-independent payments <ref:2611.07278#pg3>, but it doesn't necessarily cover every single nuance of real-world data procurement where the initial report is heavily relied upon CHADE AND KOVRIJNYKH two thousand sixteen.

Ruth: That’s fair. The paper’s main contribution seems to be establishing this framework for pricing expertise and discovery, showing how cost regimes shift the optimal payment structure from rewarding both options to rewarding only one <ref:2611.07278#pg3>.

Warren: It really boils down to when acquisition costs become high enough that the symmetry of the environment doesn't matter anymore, and you just pay for one outcome because it’s more efficient, even if you lose some potential accuracy on the other side <ref:2611.07278#pg3>.

Iris: So, to sum up, "Brave New Data: Pricing Expertise and Discovery" shows that the contract design is crucial; it determines whether we incentivize both potential discoveries or just one, based on how expensive it is to find the evidence <ref:2611.07278#pg3>.

Ruth: And for the world, this means that when you're buying data from an expert, you need to think about what the contract is doing—it’s not just about the initial assessment, but how that further search is incentivized <ref:2611.07278#pg3>.

Warren: It gives us a way to analyze why some experts might be more willing to do deep investigation than others, depending on those cost thresholds <ref:2611.07278#pg3>.

Iris: We've covered the main points about the optimal contract structure and how costs drive the choice between rewarding both or just one certificate in this paper <ref:2611.07278#pg3>.

Conclusion: Ruth: So we've been looking at how this paper, "Brave New Data: Pricing Expertise and Discovery," tackles the whole process of buying information from an expert who does some deep digging after an initial report.

Warren: It’s about figuring out what kind of contract you need to have when you're paying that expert. Basically, it’s not just about paying for their first opinion; it’s about how much you pay for the actual new evidence they find.

Iris: The authors are setting up a model where the principal has some private information, and the expert can either give a certificate proving that state or keep searching privately. They use this setup to figure out the optimal payment rules.

Ruth: And what they found is that if you make the contract right, it can be set up so you only pay for evidence that actually gets disclosed, regardless of where it comes from. It's about making sure your money matches the actual discovery made.

Warren: The big shift they show is how the optimal payment structure changes depending on how much effort is needed to find that proof. If finding that evidence is cheap, you might pay for both possibilities equally.

Iris: But as the cost of acquiring that evidence goes up, the contract switches to rewarding only one piece of evidence instead of both. That’s a big structural change in how the principal makes decisions about what they fund.

Ruth: It means you have to choose between two ways to incentivize discovery, and that choice depends on whether you value the certainty of finding one thing or having a shot at finding either thing.

Warren: What this really means for anyone buying data is that your contract design is critical; it dictates whether you’re incentivizing broad search or narrow focus based on those cost thresholds they define.

Iris: So while this model shows how cost regimes determine the optimal payment, we still have to ask what happens when the expert's initial assessment itself is flawed, which isn't covered here.

Ruth: Exactly. We’ve seen how costs drive the incentive structure for discovery, but next up we need to look at what those thresholds actually mean for the actual decisions made by the buyer.

Dihan Zou

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

econ.TH

Submitted: 2026-11-05

Updated: 2026-11-05

Project page: https://archiquan.github.io/papers/Learning-Optimal-Data-Markets.pdf

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Importance score: 76/100

The gist: We study how a data buyer procures evidence from an expert whose initial knowledge and subsequent investigation are private The optimal contract pays only for disclosed evidence…

Key concepts

Initial Assessment
The expert provides a first opinion or assessment about the true state of affairs ($\mu$). This is private information known only to the expert before further investigation begins. The buyer observes this report and decides whether to proceed with further evidence gathering.
Certificate
This is verifiable evidence produced by the expert's investigation that confirms a specific targeted state ($ heta=1$) is true. It serves as concrete proof of discovery, which the data buyer can use to make decisions about acquiring more information.
Extensive Margin
This margin relates to which certificates receive rewards in the contract structure. It concerns the decision of whether to pay for both possible outcomes or only one outcome when multiple pieces of evidence are available. This choice is influenced by how easy it is to induce discovery.
Intensive Margin
This margin focuses on the effort expended by the expert once a specific search target has been chosen. It describes the level of investigation or search intensity an expert undertakes, conditional on what they are trying to prove.

Terminology

Summary

We study how a data buyer procures evidence from an expert whose initial knowledge and subsequent investigation are private The optimal contract pays only for disclosed evidence, independently of the initial report. p. 0

Where the paper says it

The buyer balances the ease of inducing discovery against its value for decisions beyond the expert’s initial assessment. An optimal contract pays only for disclosed evidence, independently of the initial report.

Model Setup and Incentives

The model studies a data procurement setting in which an expert provides an initial assessment and undertakes further investigation. The agent has private information about the state, denoted as µ, where Pr(θ = 1 µ) = µ. p. 5

Where the paper says it

The principal and agent initially share the same prior, and payments can depend on reports and the subsequently observed state. In our setting, the expert’s private initial information affects both the probability of discovering evidence and its incremental value for the buyer’s decision.

Investigation can produce a certificate, which is verifiable evidence establishing that the targeted state is true. p. 3
Where the paper says it

The agent then reports her assessment and privately chooses which state to investigate and how much effort to exert. Investigation can produce a certificate: verifiable evidence establishing that the targeted state is true.

The principal observes the initial report and either one certificate or silence (no disclosure), and then chooses his action optimally. p. 3
Where the paper says it

Acquired evidence can be withheld but cannot be fabricated. The principal observes the initial report and either one certificate or silence (no disclosure), and then chooses his action optimally.

Benchmark Analysis

The paper presents optimal contracts in two benchmark environments where the principal directly observes µ. In the first benchmark, the principal also controls evidence acquisition. p. 9

Where the paper says it

3 Benchmark Analysis: Free Expertise This section presents the optimal contracts in two benchmark environments in which the principal directly observes µ. In the first benchmark (“first best”), the principal also controls evidence acquisition.

In the second benchmark, the agent privately chooses her search target and effort. p. 9
Where the paper says it

In the first benchmark (“first best”), the principal also controls evidence acquisition. In the second benchmark (“second best”), the agent privately chooses her search target and effort.

The first best analysis shows that when acquisition is cheap, equal rewards for both certificates are optimal. p. 4
Where the paper says it

The principal therefore chooses which certificates to reward and the size of their bonuses to balance the reduction in decision loss against expected payments. When acquisition is sufficiently cheap, equal rewards for both certificates are optimal. p. 4

Where the paper says it

The principal therefore chooses which certificates to reward and the size of their bonuses to balance the reduction in decision loss against expected payments. When acquisition is sufficiently cheap, equal rewards for both certificates are optimal.

Optimal Contract Characterization

The optimal contract can be chosen to pay nothing when no certificate is disclosed and to offer either equal rewards for both certificates or a reward for only one. The choice between these payment structures balances the ease of inducing discovery against its value for the principal’s decision. p. 4

Where the paper says it

These payments do not depend on the initial report, although the principal uses that report when interpreting silence and choosing his action. The choice between these payment structures balances the ease of inducing discovery against its value for the principal’s decision.

The optimal bonuses are characterized by thresholds k1 and k2, which depend on acquisition costs. p. 0
Where the paper says it

When acquisition is cheap, equal rewards for evidence of either state induce intensive search whose failure is informative. As costs rise, rewarding evidence of only one state becomes optimal despite the symmetry of the environment, reducing expected payments at the expense of decision accuracy.

Key Findings on Cost Regimes

The optimal contract shapes discovery along two margins: the extensive margin concerns which certificates receive rewards and the resulting search targets; the intensive margin concerns effort conditional on a target. When acquisition is sufficiently cheap, equal rewards for both certificates are optimal. As acquisition becomes more costly, the optimal payment structure switches to rewarding only one certificate. p. 4

Where the paper says it

The value of investigation comes from both its discoveries and what the principal learns when it fails. As acquisition becomes more costly, the optimal payment structure switches to rewarding only one certificate, even though the two states are symmetric in the primitives.

The transition between regimes illustrated in panels (b) and (c) involves a downward jump in effort.

Decision Value and Thresholds

The value of discovery measures expected loss avoidance before subtracting payments or acquisition costs. The first threshold, k1, marks an adjustment along the extensive margin: the principal switches from rewarding both certificates to rewarding only one. p. 4

Where the paper says it

The value of investigation comes from both its discoveries and what the principal learns when it fails. As acquisition becomes more costly, the optimal payment structure switches to rewarding only one certificate, even though the two states are symmetric in the primitives.

The second threshold, k2, changes search intensity within the one-certificate contract. p. 5
Where the paper says it

Payments depend on certificates generated through costly search, and the state remains unverifiable when no certificate is produced. 2 The second strand concerns contracting with adverse selection and moral hazard.

These thresholds are defined by S(k1) = C(k1), C(k2) = I(k2). p. 1
Where the paper says it

3 Optimal equal rewards . 4 The two parameter thresholds .

The regime ordering follows from the preceding inequalities, independently of this numerical evaluation.

Conclusion and Implications

These findings highlight the importance of evaluating expert-generated data by its contribution beyond the expert’s initial assessment. The paper establishes that truthful reporting is weakly optimal under report-independent payments, as allowed by the model’s equilibrium selection. p. 8

Where the paper says it

The following lemma establishes that these conditions provide a lossless formulation of the contracting problem. Without loss, the principal may restrict attention to truthful reporting and full disclosure, for which the feasible set of the contracts is characterized by nonnegativity, (FD), and (IC).

The contract shapes discovery along two margins. p. 3
Where the paper says it

The same conflict shapes discovery bonuses: the additional payment for a certificate relative to the payment when no certificate is disclosed. Consider two distinct types with the same search target.

The choice between payment structures reflects how these margins jointly determine the ease of inducing discovery and its value for decisions. p. 4
Where the paper says it

These payments do not depend on the initial report, although the principal uses that report when interpreting silence and choosing his action. The choice between these payment structures balances the ease of inducing discovery against its value for the principal’s decision.

References

BEN-PORATH, E., E. DEKEL, AND B. L. LIPMAN (2026): “Mechanism Design for Acquisition of/Stochastic Evidence,” Theoretical Economics, 21, 99–131. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Brave New Data: Pricing Expertise and Discovery Dihan Zou* November 6, 2026 Abstract We study the procurement of verifiable evidence from an expert who privately assesses a binary state and chooses the direction and intensity of evidence acquisition. The buyer balances the ease of inducing discovery against its value for decisions beyond the expert’s initial assessment.

BERGEMANN, D. p. 6

Where the paper says it

Their multiplicative-separability condition does not hold in our acquisition technology, so our pooling result requires a separate argument. 3 The third strand concerns the design and sale of information; see Bergemann and Bonatti (2019) for a survey.

p. 6
Where the paper says it

Their multiplicative-separability condition does not hold in our acquisition technology, so our pooling result requires a separate argument. 3 The third strand concerns the design and sale of information; see Bergemann and Bonatti (2019) for a survey.

p. 6
Where the paper says it

Their multiplicative-separability condition does not hold in our acquisition technology, so our pooling result requires a separate argument. 3 The third strand concerns the design and sale of information; see Bergemann and Bonatti (2019) for a survey.

AND A. BONATTI (2019): “Markets for Information: An Introduction,” Annual Review of Economics, 11, 85–107. p. 6
Where the paper says it

Their multiplicative-separability condition does not hold in our acquisition technology, so our pooling result requires a separate argument. 3 The third strand concerns the design and sale of information; see Bergemann and Bonatti (2019) for a survey.

BERGEMANN, D., A. BONATTI, AND T. p. 6

Where the paper says it

Their multiplicative-separability condition does not hold in our acquisition technology, so our pooling result requires a separate argument. 3 The third strand concerns the design and sale of information; see Bergemann and Bonatti (2019) for a survey.

GAN (2022): “The Economics of Social Data,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 53, 263–296. p. 0
Where the paper says it

JEL Classification: D82, D83, D86, O33. *Department of Economics, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

BERGEMANN, D., A. BONATTI, AND A. p. 6

Where the paper says it

Their multiplicative-separability condition does not hold in our acquisition technology, so our pooling result requires a separate argument. 3 The third strand concerns the design and sale of information; see Bergemann and Bonatti (2019) for a survey.

SMOLIN (2018): “The Design and Price of Information,” American Economic Review, 108, 1–48. p. 6
Where the paper says it

Bergemann et al. (2018) analyze a seller who designs and prices experiments for a buyer with private initial information.

CHADE, H. AND N. KOVRIJNYKH (2016): “Delegated Information Acquisition with Moral Hazard,” Journal of Economic Theory, 162, 55–92. p. 5

Where the paper says it

2Foundational contributions include Lambert (1986), Demski and Sappington (1987), and Osband (1989). See also Chade and Kovrijnykh (2016), Rappoport and Somma (2017), and Sharma et al.

CHE, Y.-K. AND K. MIERENDORFF (2019): “Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Attention,” American Economic Review, 109, 2993–3029. p. 9

Where the paper says it

6Che and Mierendorff (2019) likewise show that, conditional on experimentation, searching for evidence of the less likely state is optimal in their one-period example. In their dynamic setting, however, the option to continue learning can make searching for evidence of the more likely state optimal.

DASGUPTA, S. p. 6

Where the paper says it

We establish the reduction needed for our specific contracting protocol. Related work studies screening existing knowledge (Dasgupta, 2023; Dasgupta and Xia, 2025).

p. 6
Where the paper says it

We establish the reduction needed for our specific contracting protocol. Related work studies screening existing knowledge (Dasgupta, 2023; Dasgupta and Xia, 2025).

: “Screening Knowledge,” Working paper, https://ssrn. p. 6
Where the paper says it

We establish the reduction needed for our specific contracting protocol. Related work studies screening existing knowledge (Dasgupta, 2023; Dasgupta and Xia, 2025).

com/abstract=4403119. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Brave New Data: Pricing Expertise and Discovery Dihan Zou* November 6, 2026 Abstract We study the procurement of verifiable evidence from an expert who privately assesses a binary state and chooses the direction and intensity of evidence acquisition. The buyer balances the ease of inducing discovery against its value for decisions beyond the expert’s initial assessment.

DASGUPTA, S. AND Z. XIA (2025): “Screening Knowledge with Verifiable Evidence,” Working paper, https://www. p. 6

Where the paper says it

We establish the reduction needed for our specific contracting protocol. Related work studies screening existing knowledge (Dasgupta, 2023; Dasgupta and Xia, 2025).

economics.utoronto.ca/conferences/index.php/cetc/2025/paper/viewFile/1926. p. 6
Where the paper says it

We establish the reduction needed for our specific contracting protocol. Related work studies screening existing knowledge (Dasgupta, 2023; Dasgupta and Xia, 2025).

DEMSKI, J. S. AND D. E. M. SAPPINGTON (1987): “Delegated Expertise,” Journal of Accounting Research, 25, 68–89. p. 5

Where the paper says it

2 The second strand concerns contracting with adverse selection and moral hazard. 2Foundational contributions include Lambert (1986), Demski and Sappington (1987), and Osband (1989).

EPOCH AI (2026): “About FrontierMath,” Accessed October 19, 2026. p. 2

Where the paper says it

1OpenAI (2024) describes its initial concerns about benchmark reliability and the subsequent review by professional software developers. Epoch AI (2026) documents OpenAI’s commission and the contracts with researchers to produce problems for the Tier 4 expansion.

OSBAND, K.: “Optimal Forecasting Incentives,” Journal of Political Economy, 97, 1091–1112. p. 5

Where the paper says it

A further increase in acquisition cost produces a discrete reduction in the optimal reward. With weaker search incentives, failure becomes less informative, and some agents who strongly favor the rewarded state generate no improvement in the principal’s decision: both a certificate and silence lead to the same action.

PREMISE (n. p. 2

Where the paper says it

For example, OpenAI engaged professional software developers to assess and review software engineering tasks for inclusion in SWE-bench Verified, an expert-validated benchmark for evaluating the coding capabilities of large language models. Other examples include Epoch AI’s contracts with mathematicians to create original problems for FrontierMath and Premise’s payments to local contributors to collect geospatial data.

d.): “Geospatial Solutions NGO Uses Premise to Fill in Location Data Gaps in Ministry Records,” Case study, accessed October 19, 2026. p. 2
Where the paper says it

For example, OpenAI engaged professional software developers to assess and review software engineering tasks for inclusion in SWE-bench Verified, an expert-validated benchmark for evaluating the coding capabilities of large language models. Other examples include Epoch AI’s contracts with mathematicians to create original problems for FrontierMath and Premise’s payments to local contributors to collect geospatial data.

QUAN, L. AND Y. SONG (2026): “Learning-Optimal Design of Data Markets,” Working paper, https://archiquan. p. 6

Where the paper says it

Bergemann et al. (2022) and Quan and Song (2026) examine data markets with informational externalities and endogenous participation, respectively.

github.io/papers/Learning-Optimal-Data-Markets. p. 6
Where the paper says it

Bergemann et al. (2022) and Quan and Song (2026) examine data markets with informational externalities and endogenous participation, respectively.

pdf.

RAPPOPORT, D. p. 5

Where the paper says it

2Foundational contributions include Lambert (1986), Demski and Sappington (1987), and Osband (1989). See also Chade and Kovrijnykh (2016), Rappoport and Somma (2017), and Sharma et al.

AND V. SOMMA (2017): “Incentivizing Information Design,” Working paper, https://ssrn. p. 5
Where the paper says it

2Foundational contributions include Lambert (1986), Demski and Sappington (1987), and Osband (1989). See also Chade and Kovrijnykh (2016), Rappoport and Somma (2017), and Sharma et al.

com/abstract=3001416. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Brave New Data: Pricing Expertise and Discovery Dihan Zou* November 6, 2026 Abstract We study the procurement of verifiable evidence from an expert who privately assesses a binary state and chooses the direction and intensity of evidence acquisition. The buyer balances the ease of inducing discovery against its value for decisions beyond the expert’s initial assessment.

SHARMA, S., E. TSAKAS, AND M. VOORNEVELD (2025): “Procuring Unverifiable Information,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 50, 1433–1453. p. 5

Where the paper says it

In our setting, the expert’s private initial information affects both the probability of discovering evidence and its incremental value for the buyer’s decision. Payments depend on certificates generated through costly search, and the state remains unverifiable when no certificate is produced.

WHITMEYER, M. p. 5

Where the paper says it

His analysis allows researchers to choose both how much and how to learn, and shows how screening distorts experimentation when realized posterior beliefs are contractible. Whitmeyer and Zhang (2023) characterize minimum-cost contracts that induce the acquisition and truthful reporting of soft information.

AND K. ZHANG (2023): “Buying Opinions,” Working paper, https://arxiv. p. 5
Where the paper says it

His analysis allows researchers to choose both how much and how to learn, and shows how screening distorts experimentation when realized posterior beliefs are contractible. Whitmeyer and Zhang (2023) characterize minimum-cost contracts that induce the acquisition and truthful reporting of soft information.

org/abs/2202.05249v5.

——— (2026): “Testing Experts Who Can Learn,” Working paper, https://arxiv. p. 6

Where the paper says it

Whitmeyer and Zhang (2026) study whether outcome-contingent contracts can distinguish experts from nonexperts when initial beliefs are private and experts can learn. They identify conditions under which learning makes screening possible.

org/abs/2303.15723v4.

WITTBRODT, C. p. 6

Where the paper says it

Related work studies screening existing knowledge (Dasgupta, 2023; Dasgupta and Xia, 2025). Wittbrodt and Yoder (2026) study costly experimentation by a privately informed agent through menus of observable experiments without transfers.

AND N. YODER (2026): “Delegating Experiments,” Working paper, https://ndyoder. p. 6
Where the paper says it

Related work studies screening existing knowledge (Dasgupta, 2023; Dasgupta and Xia, 2025). Wittbrodt and Yoder (2026) study costly experimentation by a privately informed agent through menus of observable experiments without transfers.

github.io/delegating experiments 063026. p. 6
Where the paper says it

Bergemann et al. (2018) analyze a seller who designs and prices experiments for a buyer with private initial information.

YODER, N.: “Designing Incentives for Heterogeneous Researchers,” Journal of Political Economy, 130, 2018–2054. p. 6

Where the paper says it

Bergemann et al. (2018) analyze a seller who designs and prices experiments for a buyer with private initial information.

Green — the paper says it, and the page is printed. Red — no passage carries it, so treat that sentence as unverified. The same check runs on your own text: check a summary against its source, $5.

Improvements for AI systems

  1. Adaptive evidence acquisition strategy: The system can dynamically adjust its search intensity based on whether acquiring evidence of a state confirms or overturns its initial assessment, as described by The principal chooses an action a in arg min a in arg min E h (a - θ) 2 µ, e ˆ and the findings that Searching the more likely state therefore improves the decision only if effort makes silence sufficiently informative to reverse that action.

  2. Optimal contract design for varying costs: The system can select between equal rewards for both certificates when acquisition is cheap or rewarding only one certificate when it is more costly, based on whether acquisition is cheap versus more costly, which reduces expected payments at the expense of decision accuracy in high-cost regimes.

  3. Prior-informed incentive compatibility: The system's reporting and search choices will be constrained by joint incentive compatibility, meaning those investigating a given state consider it at least as likely as do those investigating the other state, which prevents the principal from inducing every agent to investigate her less likely state.

  4. Threshold-based decision switching: For sufficiently high acquisition costs, the system can switch its strategy based on cost thresholds k1 and k2, where the optimal bonus switches to rewarding only one certificate or where the two distinct bonuses in part (ii) are both optimal, leading to different search intensities.

  5. Decision value maximization: The system can evaluate the net benefit of evidence by calculating the value of discovery V(µ, ˆθ, q) as min(µ, 1 − µ) − E h (a(µ, e) - θ) 2 µ, ˆθ, qi, measuring expected loss avoidance before subtracting payments or acquisition costs.

  6. Targeted effort allocation: The system can determine the optimal effort schedule q(µ) based on the contract type, such as q(µ) = min (min[µW1/k, 1], 1), which balances the cost of investigation against expected rewards under different incentive structures like equal rewards or one-certificate rewards.

  7. Non-asymmetric search target selection: The system's search target will be determined by the interaction between expertise and evidence, such as The principal values evidence that changes his action: a certificate of the less likely state overturns the action favored by the prior, whereas one of the more likely state confirms it.

  8. Cost-benefit comparison for contract selection: The system can compare different contract candidates like the positive equal-reward candidate S(k) and the capped one-certificate candidate C(k) to select the optimal payment structure based on which yields a lower expected cost, as demonstrated by the crossing point k1 where S(k) k1, C(k) is therefore the best one-certificate cost."

Abstract

We study the procurement of verifiable evidence from an expert who privately assesses a binary state and chooses the direction and intensity of evidence acquisition. The buyer balances the ease of inducing discovery against its value for decisions beyond the expert's initial assessment. An optimal contract pays only for disclosed evidence, independently of the initial report. When acquisition is cheap, equal rewards for evidence of either state induce intensive search whose failure is informative. As costs rise, rewarding evidence of only one state becomes optimal despite the symmetry of the environment, reducing expected payments at the expense of decision accuracy.

Sources

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