Universal Nonexistence of Monotone Equilibrium in Multiunit Auctions with Risk Aversion

arXiv:2611.06644 · econ.TH · Submitted 2026-11-04 · Read on arXiv

Listen

Radio episode about this paper

Transcript

Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.

Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "Universal Nonexistence of Monotone Equilibrium in Multiunit Auctions with Risk Aversion".

Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. The paper establishes universal nonexistence results for monotone pure-strategy equilibria in multiunit auctions under various conditions, specifically addressing risk-averse bidders.

Ruth: The core finding is that even a single strictly risk-averse bidder can rule out the existence of an admissible monotone equilibrium in both uniform-price and discriminatory auctions.

Warren: Under uniform pricing, Theorem 1 asserts universal nonexistence: for any number of bidders n at least 2 and supply m at least 3, there exist independent type distributions under which neither the highest-losing-bid nor the lowest-winning-bid pricing rules admit an admissible monotone equilibrium.

Ruth: The constructed densities are bounded above and away from zero on the entire type space.

Paper summary: Ruth: So wrapping up on the paper "Universal Nonexistence of Monotone Equilibrium in Multiunit Auctions with Risk Aversion," the authors establish universal nonexistence results for monotone pure-strategy equilibria in multiunit auctions when bidders are risk-averse Ruth. It shows that even with just one strictly risk-averse bidder, you can construct scenarios where neither uniform pricing nor discriminatory pricing admits an admissible monotone equilibrium Ruth.

Warren: The paper basically argues that the structure of multiunit auctions combined with risk aversion creates a fundamental conflict against having a monotone equilibrium under these specific conditions Warren. It’s not about finding one weird case; it's about showing that across many different type distributions, no such stable, nondecreasing bidding strategy can exist Warren.

Iris: The implications are that any model of these markets needs to be flexible enough to handle the possibility of nonmonotone bidding behavior when risk aversion is a factor Iris. It tells us that if we only look for those neat monotone equilibria, we might miss the actual market dynamics when real bidders are involved Iris.

Ruth: So, in simple terms, this paper demonstrates that risk aversion fundamentally challenges monotonicity in multiunit auctions by showing nonexistence under uniform and discriminatory pricing for at least three units Ruth. It’s a strong theoretical result about the limits of equilibrium existence in these settings Ruth.

Warren: It suggests that when you move beyond the simplest models, you have to be prepared for bidding strategies that aren't smoothly increasing with marginal values, especially with risk-averse participants Warren. That’s what this paper is telling us about how those markets actually behave under real constraints Warren.

Conclusion: Ruth: So we're wrapping up on this paper titled "Universal Nonexistence of Monotone Equilibrium in Multiunit Auctions with Risk Aversion." Basically, they’ve shown that if you introduce risk aversion into multiunit auctions, you can’t have a simple stable equilibrium where everyone just bids smoothly.

Warren: Right. They prove that even a single risk-averse bidder can rule out those monotone equilibria under both uniform and discriminatory pricing schemes for three or more units. That means the neat, nondecreasing bidding strategies we usually expect just don't exist in these settings when people are risk-averse.

Iris: What they’re doing is constructing specific type distributions—the ways bidders actually have their preferences—where this nonexistence holds true, and those distributions are spread out across the entire space. That means it’s not just a fluke in one scenario; it holds generally for any profile of strictly increasing, concave utilities that includes at least one risk-averse participant.

Ruth: It’s interesting because it suggests that if you want to model these markets realistically, you can't assume everyone will behave monotonically in terms of their bids as they move along their type space. They point to the need for bidding behavior that isn't perfectly smooth in marginal values.

Warren: And from a trading standpoint, if those monotone equilibria don't exist, it means any strategy relying on that predictable monotonicity is going to fail under these conditions. The cost of running such a strategy would be too high or the payoff structure wouldn't allow for it.

Iris: My concern is whether this extends beyond just the simple cases they tested. They mention specific scenarios like two-unit auctions versus three units, and all-pay auctions with finite bid grids, which are more complex. We need to see if this universal nonexistence holds up when we add those extra constraints or look at different auction formats like all-pay.

Ruth: That's exactly the next step. The paper sets a strong baseline here by showing the fundamental conflict between risk aversion and monotonicity in multiunit auctions, but we need to see how that plays out when you start adding more complexity to the rules and the bidder types.

Wei He, Yeneng Sun, Hanping Xu

The Chinese University of Hong Kong · National University of Singapore · Harbin Institute of Technology

econ.TH

Submitted: 2026-11-04

Updated: 2026-11-04

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Importance score: 97/100

The gist: The paper establishes universal nonexistence results for monotone pure-strategy equilibria in multiunit auctions under various conditions, specifically addressing risk-averse bidders.

Key concepts

Monotone Equilibrium
This refers to a bidding strategy where bidders' bids are non-decreasing as their private information (type) increases. The paper investigates whether such a perfectly ordered outcome can ever occur in multiunit auctions, especially when bidders are risk-averse.
Risk Aversion
This describes bidders who prefer a certain payoff over one with the same expected value but less variance, typically represented by concave utility functions. The research shows that introducing even one such risk-averse bidder is sufficient to prevent monotone equilibria from existing in these auctions.
Uniform Pricing
In this scenario, all units are priced identically. Theorem 1 proves that for $n imes m$ auctions (where $m eq 2$), there are type distributions where neither the highest-losing-bid nor the lowest-winning-bid pricing rules yield a monotone equilibrium.
Discriminatory Pricing
Here, different units receive different prices. Theorem 2 demonstrates that for any number of bidders, there is always a configuration of types and units where no pure strategy monotone equilibrium exists under discriminatory pricing schemes.

Terminology

Summary

The paper establishes universal nonexistence results for monotone pure-strategy equilibria in multiunit auctions under various conditions, specifically addressing risk-averse bidders. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Universal Nonexistence of Monotone Equilibrium in Multiunit Auctions with Risk Aversion Wei He∗ Yeneng Sun† Hanping Xu‡ November 5, 2026 Abstract We establish universal nonexistence results for monotone pure-strategy equilibrium in multiunit auctions with risk-averse bidders. Fix any number of bidders greater than one and any profile of strictly increasing concave utilities, with at least one strictly risk-averse bidder.

The core finding is that even a single strictly risk-averse bidder can rule out the existence of an admissible monotone equilibrium in both uniform-price and discriminatory auctions. p. 2
Where the paper says it

The two nonexistence results highlight a fundamental conflict between risk aversion and monotonicity. Even one strictly risk-averse bidder, however mild her risk aversion is, can rule out admissible monotone equilibrium in both uniform-price and discriminatory auctions.

Under uniform pricing, Theorem 1 asserts universal nonexistence: for any number of bidders n at least 2 and supply m at least 3, there exist independent type distributions under which neither the highest-losing-bid nor the lowest-winning-bid pricing rules admit an admissible monotone equilibrium. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Fix any number of bidders greater than one and any profile of strictly increasing concave utilities, with at least one strictly risk-averse bidder. Under uniform pricing, for every supply of at least three units, we construct independent, full-support type distributions under which neither lowest-winning-bid nor highest-losing-bid pricing admits an admissible monotone equilibrium.

The constructed densities are bounded above and away from zero on the entire type space. p. 4
Where the paper says it

Working with strictly increasing utilities and full-dimensional type densities, Reny (2011) explains the failure of single crossing under the coordinatewise order and establishes existence under a novel order on types, including in discriminatory auctions with CARA bidders. We take the utility functions as given and establish nonexistence for every profile of strictly increasing, concave payoffs (with one strictly concave), with independent type distributions whose densities are bounded above and away from zero on the entire space of ordered marginal values.

p. 4
Where the paper says it

Working with strictly increasing utilities and full-dimensional type densities, Reny (2011) explains the failure of single crossing under the coordinatewise order and establishes existence under a novel order on types, including in discriminatory auctions with CARA bidders. We take the utility functions as given and establish nonexistence for every profile of strictly increasing, concave payoffs (with one strictly concave), with independent type distributions whose densities are bounded above and away from zero on the entire space of ordered marginal values.

Under discriminatory pricing, Theorem 2 shows universal nonexistence: for any n at least 2, there exists an integer m at least 3 and independent type distributions such that the auction has no monotone pure-strategy equilibrium. p. 2

Where the paper says it

Under discriminatory pricing, we establish nonexistence of monotone pure-strategy equilibrium without any admissibility or no-overbidding restriction. Whenever there is one strictly risk-averse bidder, we identify an environment with finitely many units and independent type distributions under which no monotone pure-strategy equilibrium exists.

This result holds even without admissibility or no-overbidding restrictions. p. 2
Where the paper says it

6 The same distributions work for both pricing rules. Under discriminatory pricing, we establish nonexistence of monotone pure-strategy equilibrium without any admissibility or no-overbidding restriction.

The results apply to any number of bidders greater than one and any profile of strictly increasing, concave utilities, provided at least one bidder is strictly risk-averse. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Universal Nonexistence of Monotone Equilibrium in Multiunit Auctions with Risk Aversion Wei He∗ Yeneng Sun† Hanping Xu‡ November 5, 2026 Abstract We establish universal nonexistence results for monotone pure-strategy equilibrium in multiunit auctions with risk-averse bidders. Fix any number of bidders greater than one and any profile of strictly increasing concave utilities, with at least one strictly risk-averse bidder.

The constructed densities are bounded above and away from zero on the entire type space. These findings suggest that studying bidding or comparing auction formats when bidders are risk-averse necessitates allowing for bidding behavior that is nonmonotone in marginal values. p. 1
Where the paper says it

For risk-neutral bidders with independent private values, Reny (1999), McAdams (2003, 2006),2 and Jackson and Swinkels (2005) establish the existence of monotone pure-strategy equilibrium in a range of multiunit auction models. In a monotone equilibrium, a bidding strategy is nondecreasing in the bidder’s vector of marginal values.

The paper also explores specific scenarios:

  1. Two-Unit Case: The two-unit case, particularly with CARA utilities, admits a monotone no-overbidding pure-strategy equilibrium for any number of bidders and type distributions. However, the introduction of a third unit changes the surplus structure such that the utility cost associated with paying more for the first unit remains unchanged while the additional surplus from a third unit yields less utility, potentially reversing bidding incentives. p. 3

    Where the paper says it

    The additional surplus from securing the third unit is unchanged, but strict concavity makes this increment yield a smaller utility gain. When she wins only one unit, neither her surplus nor the utility cost of a higher payment changes.

  2. All-Pay Auctions: The analysis extends to all-pay auctions and finite bid grids. Theorem 3 demonstrates nonexistence for continuous-bid all-pay auctions on specific sets of bids, showing no pure equilibrium whose third bid for bidder 1 is coordinatewise nondecreasing on a full measure set. p. 9

    Where the paper says it

    Proposition 1. For all sufficiently small ε > 0, the auction in Example 1 has no admissible pure equilibrium in which bidder 1’s third bid is coordinatewise nondecreasing.

    Proposition 9 shows that there exist type distributions and grids where the all-pay auction has no pure equilibrium whose last bid for bidder 1 is coordinatewise nondecreasing. p. 9
    Where the paper says it

    Proposition 1. For all sufficiently small ε > 0, the auction in Example 1 has no admissible pure equilibrium in which bidder 1’s third bid is coordinatewise nondecreasing.

  3. Finite Bid Grids: The analysis of finite bid grids confirms nonexistence under uniform pricing (Proposition 7) and discriminatory pricing (Corollary 1), showing that for sufficiently large integer r, neither pricing rule admits a nontrivial pure equilibrium with a coordinatewise nondecreasing last bid for bidder 1. Lemma 8 further shows that if certain grid conditions are met, the continuous-bid auction must also have a monotone pure equilibrium, contrasting with the nonexistence results. p. 4

    Where the paper says it

    Then some lower types would rather raise their bids and secure the third unit than keep losing it to the weak rival. 7 Our results are related to the nonexistence example of McAdams (2007b), who shows that risk aversion can rule out monotone equilibrium in weakly undominated pure strategies in a two-unit highest-losing-bid uniform pricing auction.

In summary, the paper provides strong theoretical evidence against the existence of monotone equilibria in multiunit auctions when risk aversion is present. p. 1

Where the paper says it

For example, Armantier and Sbaï (2006) find evidence of heterogeneous risk aversion in French Treasury auctions, and Häfner (2023) shows that accounting for risk aversion changes estimates of rents in Swiss import-quota auctions. In single-unit first-price auctions, the existence of monotone equilibrium with riskaverse bidders has been extensively studied in various settings; see, for example, Maskin and Riley (1984, 2000), Lizzeri and Persico (2000), and Reny and Zamir (2004).

The universal nonexistence theorems establish this conflict across uniform and discriminatory pricing rules for m at least 3 units, emphasizing that risk aversion fundamentally challenges monotonicity in these settings. p. 2
Where the paper says it

3 He explains why monotone best replies can fail under discriminatory pricing with two decreasing absolute risk averse (DARA) bidders and two units, while suggesting that they may exist under highest-losing-bid uniform pricing with DARA bidders. 4 We establish two universal nonexistence theorems.

Green — the paper says it, and the page is printed. Red — no passage carries it, so treat that sentence as unverified. The same check runs on your own text: check a summary against its source, $5.

Improvements for AI systems

  1. Improved system can prove that even mild risk aversion precludes admissible monotone equilibrium in multiunit auctions under uniform pricing when supply is at least three units, regardless of whether lowest-winning-bid or highest-losing-bid pricing is used.

  2. Improved system can construct independent type distributions with full support that preclude monotone pure-strategy equilibrium under discriminatory pricing for any number of bidders greater than one and a single strictly risk-averse bidder.

  3. Improved system can demonstrate that the third unit matters by showing how a higher second value can increase surplus against a weak rival without changing it when only one is won, while the utility cost of paying more for the first unit remains unchanged, thus reversing bidding incentives even under CARA preferences.

  4. Improved system can verify that for two units and CARA utilities, a monotone no-overbidding pure-strategy equilibrium exists under uniform pricing or discriminatory pricing with independent type distributions.

  5. Improved system can identify specific regions in the marginal value space where the expected utility gain from deviating is strictly positive, leading to a contradiction of monotonicity by showing that every high type exceeds every low type coordinatewise but bids strictly less on unit k plus one.

  6. Improved system can establish bounds on expected equilibrium utility for bidders in a three-unit setting under discriminatory pricing, showing that the gap between first and last bids is bounded by O(r minus 1/3) as the index r increases.

  7. Improved system can prove that for all alpha in [0, 1], candidate equilibria are excluded in both uniform and discriminatory pricing under finite bid grids by showing that deviations satisfy constraints derived from the original equilibrium strategy.

  8. Improved system can establish a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium for two-unit auctions with CARA bidders under highest-losing-bid pricing, providing an explicit form for the equilibrium strategy as sigma i(x, y) = (x, beta i(y)) with beta i nondecreasing and 0 <= beta i(y) <= y.

  9. Improved system can prove that the set of all measurable strategies satisfying relevant grid caps is closed under pointwise coordinatewise maxima and measurable pasting, leading to a monotone equilibrium in lowest-winning-bid or discriminatory pricing on finite grids.

  10. Improved system can analyze the limiting behavior of equilibrium bids as the index r tends to infinity, showing that for every fixed admissible choice of parameters and a, the constructed distributions exclude a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium.

Abstract

We establish universal nonexistence results for monotone pure-strategy equilibrium in multiunit auctions with risk-averse bidders. Fix any number of bidders greater than one and any profile of strictly increasing concave utilities, with at least one strictly risk-averse bidder. Under uniform pricing, for every supply of at least three units, we construct independent, full-support type distributions under which neither lowest-winning-bid nor highest-losing-bid pricing admits an admissible monotone equilibrium. Under discriminatory pricing, we construct a finite supply and independent, full-support type distributions that preclude monotone pure-strategy equilibrium. We extend these results to all-pay auctions and finite bid grids.

Related papers