Choice via Dual Ownership

arXiv:2610.06428 · econ.TH · Submitted 2026-10-05 · Read on arXiv

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Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.

Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "Choice via Dual Ownership".

Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. We consider a model of collective choice where for each menu there is an agent who is accountable for the choice made Specifically, we assume that two agents (individuals or selves) allocate choice tasks over different menus using an ownership rule: the owner of the decision over a menu picks what maximizes his own preference and is accountable for it.

Ruth: We characterize three distinct ownership rules under different (nested) choice environments Keywords: menu-dependent choice, collective choice, accountability, bounded rationality.

Warren: Model Formalization The model introduces ownership rules where for each menu attribute the choice to one agent between two; then the owner of the menu makes a decision that maximizes his preference.

Ruth: Formally, an ownership rule (over menus) ω: P(X) → O associates a menu in P(X) to a preference in O.

Paper summary: Ruth: So, to recap, "Choice via Dual Ownership" introduces ownership rules where an agent accountable for a menu makes the choice maximizing their preference. They set up this rule across three different nested environments: minimal preferences function, standard orders function, and rich orders correspondence.

Warren: The core thesis is characterizing the specific conditions a choice function must satisfy to respect these rules in each environment. It’s about finding those necessary and sufficient conditions for choice functions to align with that particular ownership structure.

Iris: The paper emphasizes that the agent doesn't have to be an individual; it could be two selves competing, like present versus future, or two rationales competing over a decision process leading to a choice. That’s what they mean by the owner being accountable for their selection according to their own preference.

Ruth: It moves beyond just looking at single agents making decisions; it incorporates the idea that different entities can hold ownership over different menus based on how those menus are structured. The examples they use, like a child and a parent having preferences about welfare, illustrate this menu-dependent aspect.

Warren: The environments themselves are crucial because they define the assumptions we make about the underlying binary relations—whether we stick to strict preferences or broader orders correspondence. This context is what makes the problem different for each study.

Iris: They focus on revealed preferences, which means they’re looking at what actual choices people make and seeing how those choices reveal something about these ownership rules in these contexts. The paper connects this to earlier work on path independent choice correspondences, like that of Aizerman and Malishevski.

Ruth: It feels like they are providing a comprehensive map for understanding bounded rationality in these collective choice situations by showing exactly what structures the behavior must fit into. It helps us see the constraints imposed by how the problem is set up.

Conclusion: Warren: Thinking about this whole thing, "Choice via Dual Ownership" is really about how the menu structure influences which binary relation we use to decide over a menu, and this paper lays out those rules clearly. The authors explore these three distinct ownership rules across minimal, standard, and rich environments.

Ruth: It’s not just about finding one perfect rule; it’s about understanding that the required conditions change depending on the environment you are in. We see how simple conditions like weak alpha are needed in one setup while a much larger set of requirements appears for another.

Iris: The implication for us is seeing how complex choice behavior can be when you introduce multiple rationales or multiple selves into the decision-making process. It grounds these abstract concepts in testable implications within specific environments, which is what they aim for with their revealed preference characterizations.

Warren: And they point out that while they found some independence between the axioms used for the standard and rich environments, it still shows how sensitive these results are to the exact setup of the problem. It’s not a simple universal solution.

Ruth: The paper provides a framework for analyzing collective choice where accountability is central, showing how bounded rationality manifests depending on what kind of ownership rule is in play. It’s a deep dive into the structure of choice itself.

Université de Montréal · Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia

econ.TH

Submitted: 2026-10-05

Updated: 2026-11-12

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Importance score: 72/100

The gist: We consider a model of collective choice where for each menu there is an agent who is accountable for the choice made Specifically…

Key concepts

Ownership Rule
This rule assigns a specific preference to each menu based on which agent owns the decision. It dictates that the owner of a menu selects the option that maximizes their personal preference, making them responsible for that outcome.
Minimal Choice Environment
This environment assumes preferences are strict (asymmetric). In this setting, a monotonic ownership rule partitions menus into upper and downsets. A choice function respects this rule if and only if it satisfies the weak-alpha condition.
Rich Choice Environment
This environment allows for set-valued choices (correspondences) instead of strict preferences. Here, Borda ownership is studied, requiring a complex set of conditions (PC, ATT, EFF, etc.) for a choice correspondence to respect it.

Terminology

Summary

We consider a model of collective choice where for each menu there is an agent who is accountable for the choice made Specifically, we assume that two agents (individuals or selves) allocate choice tasks over different menus using an ownership rule: the owner of the decision over a menu picks what maximizes his own preference and is accountable for it. p. 0

Where the paper says it

We consider a model of collective choice where for each menu there is an agent who is accountable for the choice made. Specifically, we assume that two agents (individuals or selves) allocate choice tasks over different menus using an ownership rule: the owner of the decision over a menu picks what maximizes his own preference and is accountable for it.

We characterize three distinct ownership rules under different (nested) choice environments Keywords: menu-dependent choice, collective choice, accountability, bounded rationality. p. 0
Where the paper says it

We characterize three distinct ownership rules under different (nested) choice environments. Keywords: menu-dependent choice, collective choice, accountability, bounded rationality JEL Classification Numbers: D10, D71, D90 1 INTRODUCTION Since the seminal contribution by Kalai et al.

Model Formalization

The model introduces ownership rules where for each menu attribute the choice to one agent between two; then the owner of the menu makes a decision that maximizes his preference. Formally, an ownership rule (over menus) ω: P(X) → O associates a menu in P(X) to a preference in O. p. 3

Where the paper says it

Formally, consider a pair of preferences O = {≻1,≻2} on X. An ownership rule (over menus) ω : P(X) → O associates a menu in P(X) to a preference in O.

The choice behavior generated via an ownership rule acts as a two-step process: first, it calls on ω to select which preference to deploy; second, it chooses as if maximizing it. p. 3
Where the paper says it

An ownership rule (over menus) ω : P(X) → O associates a menu in P(X) to a preference in O. The choice behavior generated via an ownership rule acts as a two-step process: first, it calls on ω to select which preference to deploy; second, it chooses as if maximizing it.

Definition 1 states that a choice function c on P(X) respects single ownership if there exists a pair of preferences O = ≻1,≻2 on X and an ownership rule ω: P(X) → O such that c(A) = max(A,ω(A)) for any A ∈ P(X). p. 3
Where the paper says it

Definition 1. A choice function c on P(X) respects single ownership if there exists a pair of preferences O = {≻1,≻2} on X and an ownership rule ω : P(X) → O such that c(A) = max(A,ω(A)) for any A ∈ P(X).

Choice Environments

The paper operationalizes ownership rules over two binary relations in three different (nested) choice environments commonly studied in abstract choice theory. Table 1 labels the three nested environments and summarizes their assumptions on the two binary relations and on the observability of choice. p. 6

Where the paper says it

Table 1 labels the three nested environments and summarizes their assumptions on the two binary relations and on the observability of choice. binary relations choice map Environment ≻1,≻2 c(·) 1.

  1. Minimal preferences function assumes that c(·) is a choice function and that the two binary relations ≻1,≻2 are preferences (i. p. 6

    Where the paper says it

    Rich orders correspondence Table 1: Three choice environments 3. 1 MINIMAL CHOICE ENVIRONMENT The minimal choice environment assumes that c(·) is a choice function and that the two binary relations ≻1,≻2 are preferences (i.

    e., asymmetric). p. 3
    Where the paper says it

    Following Cherepanov et al. [2013], a preference is an asymmetric binary relation ≻ on X; and a connected4 , transitive preference is an order.

  2. Standard orders function assumes orders instead of preferences but keeps a single-valued choice function. p. 7

    Where the paper says it

    This fits well with the parent-child paradigm, where one expects the first to exhibit more rationality than the second: the choices of the parent, who decides over larger menus, are rationalized by an order while the choices of the child over smaller menus by a preference. 2 STANDARD CHOICE ENVIRONMENT We now turn to a standard choice environment, assuming orders instead of preferences but keeping a single-valued choice function.

  3. Rich orders correspondence assumes orders but allows set-valued choices, so that c is now a correspondence. p. 8

    Where the paper says it

    This special case can be characterized similarly to the above: one has to drop Condition 2 and require each menu Ai to have size at least 3 in the definition of prevalence. 3 RICH CHOICE ENVIRONMENT The rich choice environment assumes orders but allows set-valued choices, so that c is now a correspondence.

Characterizations of Choice Behavior

The paper provides revealed preference characterizations for each environment.

3.1 Minimal Choice Environment studies the testable implications of a monotonic ownership rule in this minimal choice environment. p. 6

Where the paper says it

This last assumption is weaker than usual, but for instance it features prominently in the model of choice by sequential application of multiple criteria studied by Manzini and Mariotti [2007]. We study the testable implications of a monotonic ownership rule in this minimal choice environment.

A monotonic ownership rule partitions the set of menus into two blocks, respectively called upper set and downset. p. 6
Where the paper says it

An ownership rule is monotone if, for any three menus A ⊂ B ⊂C, ω(A) ̸= ω(B) implies ω(B) = ω(C). A monotonic ownership rule partitions the set of menus into two blocks, respectively called upper set and downset.

Theorem 1 shows that a choice function respects monotone ownership in a minimal environment if and only if it satisfies weak-α. p. 7
Where the paper says it

Our first result shows that Weak-α characterizes monotone choice functions in the minimal environment. A choice function respects monotone ownership in a minimal environment if and only if it satisfies weak-α.

3.2 Standard Choice Environment characterizes choice behavior via simple ownership in a standard environment. p. 7

Where the paper says it

Formally, we say that the ownership rule is simple if ω(A) = ω(B) for all menus A,B of size 2. We characterize choice behavior via simple ownership in a standard environment.

Theorem 2 states that a choice function respects simple ownership in a standard environment if and only if it satisfies PC and AP. p. 8
Where the paper says it

The independence of the two axioms is shown in Appendix B. A choice function respects simple ownership in a standard environment if and only if it satisfies PC and AP.

3.3 Rich Choice Environment characterizes choice behavior via Borda ownership in a rich environment. p. 9

Where the paper says it

Borda ownership, instead, fits a requirement of accountability: given that someone has to be responsible for making a choice, it assigns ownership to minimize the non-owner’s discontent. We characterize choice behavior via Borda ownership in a rich environment.

Theorem 3 states that a choice correspondence respects Borda ownership in a rich environment if and only if it satisfies PC, ATT, EFF, EI, NBI, SI and EXP. p. 8
Where the paper says it

3 RICH CHOICE ENVIRONMENT The rich choice environment assumes orders but allows set-valued choices, so that c is now a correspondence. In a simple case like the “top and top” procedure, the (joint) ownership rule is a constant function mapping each menu to the pair {≻1,≻2}.

Independence of Axioms

The paper collects examples that show the independence of axioms used in Theorem 2 and in Theorem 3. For instance, B. p. 3

Where the paper says it

Many examples in the introduction can be formalized by suitable restrictions on the ownership rule. For instance, consider a situation where two agents (individuals or selves) assign choice ownership according to the size of the menu: one agent handles 4 A binary relation ≻ is connected if, for any x ̸= y, either y ≻ x or x ≻ y.

1 shows the independence of the axioms of Theorem 2 by providing an example where PC holds without AP. p. 8
Where the paper says it

Our next result characterizes choice behavior under a simple ownership rule. The independence of the two axioms is shown in Appendix B.

B.2 demonstrates the independence of the axioms used in Theorem 3 by showing examples where each axiom fails while others hold.

Conclusion and Future Directions

The notion of an ownership rule models how the structure of a choice problem affects which binary relation is used to decide over a menu We conjecture that the general case of n binary relations is much harder to tackle. Future research directions include studying ownership rules in structured settings such as consumer choice or choice under uncertainty. p. 1

Where the paper says it

future) competing to own a consumption/saving decision, or there may be two rationales competing to own the process leading to a choice. Therefore, we say simply that an ownership rule assigns a preference to each menu, and leave it unspecified to whom or what the preference refers.

One may also develop notions of random ownership and extend the analysis to stochastic choice. p. 2
Where the paper says it

Our general notion of an ownership rule provides a unified way to study such choice procedures. Manzini and Mariotti [2018] studies the Dual Random Utility model (D-RUM), where the stochastic choice function is generated by probability distribution(s) over two linear orders.

Finally, choice via ownership rules can be applied to more than two binary relations. p. 2
Where the paper says it

Their menudependent version of the D-RUM can be seen as a stochastic analogue of an ownership rule. In this paper, we operationalize ownership rules over two binary relations in three different (nested) choice environments, commonly studied in abstract choice theory.

Proofs and Results

The proofs involve complex inductive constructions to show that the defined orders rationalize the choice correspondence under Borda ownership. The proof of Theorem 3 involves an inductive construction using a lexicographic order for adding alternatives. p. 2

Where the paper says it

More recently, Eliaz et al. [2011] and De Clippel and Eliaz [2012] have studied a few important cases where at most two alternatives are chosen using one or two linear orders.

This construction proceeds by induction on the size of choice problems. p. 2
Where the paper says it

As the examples suggest, sometimes the context itself is a source of bounded rationality because some features (e. , size, domain, complexity) interfere with maximizing a single preference over all choice problems.

The final result shows that if the menu A is all ties, then c(A) must be a doubleton under the conditions EI, NBI, SI and EXP. p. 7
Where the paper says it

Because a violation reveals an ownership change, monotonicity requires no further ownership flips along the same chain. Our first result shows that Weak-α characterizes monotone choice functions in the minimal environment.

Summary of Key Concepts

The core concept is the ownership rule which assigns a preference to each menu. The paper distinguishes between single ownership, joint ownership, and general ownership based on how the decision is imputed to an agent or set of agents. p. 0

Where the paper says it

We consider a model of collective choice where for each menu there is an agent who is accountable for the choice made. Specifically, we assume that two agents (individuals or selves) allocate choice tasks over different menus using an ownership rule: the owner of the decision over a menu picks what maximizes his own preference and is accountable for it.

The three environments differ in the rationality of conditions on binary relations and their observability requirements. p. 2
Where the paper says it

These environments differ in the rationality of the conditions on the underlying binary relations (asymmetry, transitivity, etc. ) and in their observability requirements (singleor multi-valued choice).

The Borda ownership rule is a specific form of joint ownership that seeks to minimize the non-owner’s discontent. p. 9
Where the paper says it

In the spirit of bargaining, the fallback solution seeks a compromise that takes everyone into account. Borda ownership, instead, fits a requirement of accountability: given that someone has to be responsible for making a choice, it assigns ownership to minimize the non-owner’s discontent.

The paper establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for choice functions to respect these different ownership rules in each environment. p. 2
Where the paper says it

In this paper, we operationalize ownership rules over two binary relations in three different (nested) choice environments, commonly studied in abstract choice theory. These environments differ in the rationality of the conditions on the underlying binary relations (asymmetry, transitivity, etc.

References

AIZERMAN, M. A. AND A. V. MALISHEVSKI (1981): “General Theory of Best Variants Choice: Some Aspects,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 26, 1030–1040. p. 2

Where the paper says it

The ownership rules introduced in this paper model precisely such menu dependence, and thus can be seen as a next step from their work. Our results also relate to early work by Aizerman and Malishevski [1981], who show that path independent choice correspondences are those generated by selecting the maximizers of a fixed set of linear orders.

AMBRUS, A. AND K. ROZEN (2015): “Rationalising choice with multi-self models,” The Economic Journal, 125, 1136–1156. p. 1

Where the paper says it

One may imagine a two-step choice procedure, where the agent facing the menu activates a binary relation and then maximizes that binary relation to make her choice. This sort of menu-dependent dictatorship is very different from the aggregation of binary relations across all menus studied in Ambrus and Rozen [2015].

APESTEGUIA, J. p. 2

Where the paper says it

We conjecture that the general case of n binary relations is much harder to tackle. Indeed, Apesteguia and Ballester [2010] and Demuynck [2011] show that the general problem of rationalizing choice behavior is NP-complete, whereas the main case of polynomial computability (for a specific model of sequential rationalization) in Demuynck [2011, Theorem 3] requires at most two binary relations.

p. 2
Where the paper says it

We conjecture that the general case of n binary relations is much harder to tackle. Indeed, Apesteguia and Ballester [2010] and Demuynck [2011] show that the general problem of rationalizing choice behavior is NP-complete, whereas the main case of polynomial computability (for a specific model of sequential rationalization) in Demuynck [2011, Theorem 3] requires at most two binary relations.

AND M. A. BALLESTER (2010): “The computational complexity of rationalizing behavior,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 46, 356–363. p. 2
Where the paper says it

We conjecture that the general case of n binary relations is much harder to tackle. Indeed, Apesteguia and Ballester [2010] and Demuynck [2011] show that the general problem of rationalizing choice behavior is NP-complete, whereas the main case of polynomial computability (for a specific model of sequential rationalization) in Demuynck [2011, Theorem 3] requires at most two binary relations.

APESTEGUIA, J., M. A. BALLESTER, AND J. p. 2

Where the paper says it

We conjecture that the general case of n binary relations is much harder to tackle. Indeed, Apesteguia and Ballester [2010] and Demuynck [2011] show that the general problem of rationalizing choice behavior is NP-complete, whereas the main case of polynomial computability (for a specific model of sequential rationalization) in Demuynck [2011, Theorem 3] requires at most two binary relations.

LU (2017): “Single-crossing random utility models,” Econometrica, 85, 661–674. p. 2
Where the paper says it

Our general notion of an ownership rule provides a unified way to study such choice procedures. Manzini and Mariotti [2018] studies the Dual Random Utility model (D-RUM), where the stochastic choice function is generated by probability distribution(s) over two linear orders.

AU, P. H. AND K. KAWAI (2011): “Sequentially rationalizable choice with transitive rationales,” Games and Economic Behavior, 73, 608–614. p. 1

Where the paper says it

It also departs from the sequential application of shortlisting and choosing initiated by Manzini and Mariotti [2007], which has spawned a large literature (e. , Au and Kawai [2011], 3 For an interesting variant, focus on the parent’s welfare and swap the child with a piece of GenAI.

CHEREPANOV, V. p. 0

Where the paper says it

, 2002, Eliaz et al. , 2011]; shortlisting [Cherepanov et al.

, T. FEDDERSEN, AND A. SANDRONI (2013): “Rationalization,” Theoretical Economics, 8, 775–800. p. 2
Where the paper says it

We conjecture that the general case of n binary relations is much harder to tackle. Indeed, Apesteguia and Ballester [2010] and Demuynck [2011] show that the general problem of rationalizing choice behavior is NP-complete, whereas the main case of polynomial computability (for a specific model of sequential rationalization) in Demuynck [2011, Theorem 3] requires at most two binary relations.

CHEUNG, P. H. AND Y. MASATLIOGLU (2025): “Frame-dependent random utility,” arXiv:2502. p. 2

Where the paper says it

Our general notion of an ownership rule provides a unified way to study such choice procedures. Manzini and Mariotti [2018] studies the Dual Random Utility model (D-RUM), where the stochastic choice function is generated by probability distribution(s) over two linear orders.

00209.

DE CLIPPEL, G. p. 0

Where the paper says it

, 2011]; shortlisting [Cherepanov et al. , 2013]; aggregation [Ambrus and Rozen, 2015]; and bargaining between two agents [De Clippel and Eliaz, 2012].

AND K. ELIAZ (2012): “Reason-based choice: A bargaining rationale for the attraction and compromise effects,” Theoretical Economics, 7, 125–162. p. 9
Where the paper says it

Compare Borda ownership with the fallback bargaining solution: both describe procedures to make a choice when there are two agents with potentially different orders. In the spirit of bargaining, the fallback solution seeks a compromise that takes everyone into account.

DEMUYNCK, T. p. 2

Where the paper says it

We conjecture that the general case of n binary relations is much harder to tackle. Indeed, Apesteguia and Ballester [2010] and Demuynck [2011] show that the general problem of rationalizing choice behavior is NP-complete, whereas the main case of polynomial computability (for a specific model of sequential rationalization) in Demuynck [2011, Theorem 3] requires at most two binary relations.

(2011): “The computational complexity of rationalizing boundedly rational choice behavior,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 47, 425–433. p. 2
Where the paper says it

We conjecture that the general case of n binary relations is much harder to tackle. Indeed, Apesteguia and Ballester [2010] and Demuynck [2011] show that the general problem of rationalizing choice behavior is NP-complete, whereas the main case of polynomial computability (for a specific model of sequential rationalization) in Demuynck [2011, Theorem 3] requires at most two binary relations.

ELIAZ, K., M. RICHTER, AND A. RUBINSTEIN (2011): “Choosing the two finalists,” Economic Theory, 46, 211–219. p. 1

Where the paper says it

It also departs from the sequential application of shortlisting and choosing initiated by Manzini and Mariotti [2007], which has spawned a large literature (e. , Au and Kawai [2011], 3 For an interesting variant, focus on the parent’s welfare and swap the child with a piece of GenAI.

GARICANO, L. p. 1

Where the paper says it

When the menu has only low stakes, the child owns the decision and gets to choose his favorite item; when high stakes are present, the parent overrides her child and the decision is made using her preferences. 3 Somewhat similarly, in the model of knowledge hierarchies by Garicano [2000], standard problems are solved by subordinates, and exceptional problems by their supervisors.

: “Hierarchies and the organization of knowledge in production,” Journal of Political Economy, 108, 874–904. p. 1
Where the paper says it

3 Somewhat similarly, in the model of knowledge hierarchies by Garicano [2000], standard problems are solved by subordinates, and exceptional problems by their supervisors. An M-form organization is arranged into distinct, semi-autonomous units, often called divisions.

HORAN, S.: “A simple model of two-stage choice,” Journal of Economic Theory, 162, 372–406. p. 2

Where the paper says it

Their menudependent version of the D-RUM can be seen as a stochastic analogue of an ownership rule. In this paper, we operationalize ownership rules over two binary relations in three different (nested) choice environments, commonly studied in abstract choice theory.

HUBER, J., J. W. PAYNE, AND C. PUTO (1982): “Adding asymmetrically dominated alternatives: Violations of regularity and the similarity hypothesis,” Journal of Consumer Research, 9, 90–98.

KALAI, G., A. RUBINSTEIN, AND R. SPIEGLER (2002): “Rationalizing choice functions by multiple rationales,” Econometrica, 70, 2481–2488. p. 0

Where the paper says it

[2002], it has been widely known that the presence of multiple binary relations may explain choice behavior that departs from classical rationality. This multiplicity may refer to selves, individuals and, more generally, distinct criteria or rationales by which a choice may be made.

LUCE, R. D. AND H. RAIFFA (1957): Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey, New York: Wiley. p. 5

Where the paper says it

some alternative from A ∗ is available. Primacy generalizes the revisitation of the dinner example from Luce and Raiffa [1957] in Kalai et al.

MANZINI, P. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Financial support under PRIN 20222Z3CR7 “Nudging under limited attention” is acknowledged. 1These include: sequential applications [Manzini and Mariotti, 2007, Horan, 2016]; multiple maximizations [Kalai et al.

AND M. MARIOTTI (2007): “Sequentially rationalizable choice,” American Economic Review, 97, 1824–1839. p. 6
Where the paper says it

, asymmetric). This last assumption is weaker than usual, but for instance it features prominently in the model of choice by sequential application of multiple criteria studied by Manzini and Mariotti [2007].

——— (2012): “Categorize then choose: Boundedly rational choice and welfare,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 10, 1141–1165. p. 1

Where the paper says it

A child and a parent have their own preferences about the child’s welfare. When the menu has only low stakes, the child owns the decision and gets to choose his favorite item; when high stakes are present, the parent overrides her child and the decision is made using her preferences.

MASATLIOGLU, Y. p. 2

Where the paper says it

Masatlioglu et al. [2012], Manzini and Mariotti [2012], Horan [2016]).

, D. NAKAJIMA, AND E. Y. OZBAY (2012): “Revealed attention,” American Economic Review, 102, 2183–2205. p. 0
Where the paper says it

*We thank Franz Dietrich, Federico Echenique, Sean Horan, Marco Mariotti, Alessandro Pavan, John Quah, and seminar audiences for their useful comments. Financial support under PRIN 20222Z3CR7 “Nudging under limited attention” is acknowledged.

PINA POLO, F. p. 0

Where the paper says it

For a prominent example, consider how joint leadership by the Roman consuls worked. Among many provisions to promote collegiality (collegialitas) and parity (par potestas), the consuls were assigned2 distinct spheres of responsibility (provinciæ); see Pina Polo [2011].

: The Consul at Rome, Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Among many provisions to promote collegiality (collegialitas) and parity (par potestas), the consuls were assigned2 distinct spheres of responsibility (provinciæ); see Pina Polo [2011]. Intuitively, each consul was responsible for handling the choice problems within his remit or, in our jargon, owned the decisions for his provincia.

RUBINSTEIN, A.: Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory, Princeton: Prince30 ton University Press, 2 ed. p. 2

Where the paper says it

[2012], Manzini and Mariotti [2012], Horan [2016]). Our objective is to study the observable implications of menu-dependent ownership in the setup of abstract choice theory.

SZPILRAJN, E.: “Sur l’extension de l’ordre partiel,” Fundamenta Mathematicae, 16, 386–389.

TYSON, C. J.: “Cognitive constraints, contraction consistency, and the satisficing criterion,” Journal of Economic Theory, 138, 51–70. p. 6

Where the paper says it

Our goal is to characterize the choice functions generated by a monotone ownership rule. It is well known that contraction consistency (or Sen’s condition α) is a necessary condition for the rationalizability of a choice function.

Green — the paper says it, and the page is printed. Red — no passage carries it, so treat that sentence as unverified. The same check runs on your own text: check a summary against its source, $5.

Improvements for AI systems

  1. Implement a choice function that respects single ownership by first calling on an ownership rule omega to select a preference, and then choosing as if maximizing that preference, as defined in Definition 1: c(A) = max(A,ω(A)) for any A ∈ P(X).

  2. Develop systems capable of handling joint ownership where the choice correspondence is defined by the union of maximizers from two preferences, as described in Definition 2: c(A) = [≻i∈ω(A) max(A,≻i) for any A ∈ P(X).

  3. Design AI models that operate under a minimal choice environment by satisfying the Weak-alpha condition: For all menus B ⊂ B′ ⊆ A ⊂ A′, if c(A′) ∈ A and c(A) ≠ c(A′), then c(B′) ∈ B implies c(B) = c(B′).

  4. Create decision systems for standard choice environments that adhere to the simple ownership rule by satisfying Pairwise Consistency (PC): If c(x,y) = x and c(y,z) = y, then c(x,z) = x.

  5. Build complex choice systems for rich environments utilizing Borda ownership by satisfying a set of seven axioms: PC, ATT, EFF, EI, NBI, SI and EXP.

  6. Integrate a mechanism to verify the rationalizability of a choice correspondence under Borda ownership by checking satisfaction of the required axioms as outlined in Theorem 3.

Abstract

When there are multiple agents (or rationales), an ownership rule assigns the choice for each menu to one of them. We study choice under dual ownership, where decision control alternates between two preferences. The main contribution is the behavioral characterization of a rule that endogenously decides ownership to maximize consensus. We also axiomatize two simpler exogenous rules. Identification results are provided for each rule.

Sources

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