Hidden Eligibility and the Credibility of Adoption

arXiv:2609.31744 · econ.TH · Submitted 2026-09-23 · Read on arXiv

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Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.

Ruth: I'm Ruth.

Warren: And I'm Warren, here with Iris.

Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "Hidden Eligibility and the Credibility of Adoption".

Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. Public support for early adoption can affect what later users learn from observed choices <ref:2609.31744#pg2> An eligibility record identifies these choices and allows later users to interpret them separately <ref:2609.31744#pg6> The results identify when an eligibility record is a useful part of the design of an adoption program <ref:2609.31744#pg9>.

Ruth: Model Setup and Benchmark The model considers two users who decide sequentially whether to adopt <ref:2609.31744#pg3> The early user receives a private signal about a common payoff state <ref:2609.31744#pg6> Before the early user receives her signal, the government randomly assigns eligibility for a fixed rebate <ref:2609.31744#pg6>.

Warren: The planner chooses coverage and commits either to report eligibility or to leave it unobserved <ref:2609.31744#pg6>.

Ruth: The objective includes the users’ material payoffs and an additional social benefit from early adoption <ref:2609.31744#pg6>.

Title and authors: Ruth: Let's start with what the paper is actually trying to do. The title "Hidden Eligibility and the Credibility of Adoption" points directly at how keeping eligibility hidden affects adoption choices later on >

Warren: I think that's accurate. It suggests that if a person gets an early advantage, but they don't know why, it messes with how everyone else learns from those initial actions >

Iris: The authors are essentially asking when making this record public changes the government’s choice from doing nothing to starting a positive rebate program >

Ruth: They look at the optimal coverage decision under two main conditions: when eligibility is completely hidden, and when it's disclosed >

Warren: Under total opacity, they find that zero coverage is uniquely optimal because you can't tell if the information matters yet >

The paper's summary: Ruth: So, to summarize the main finding of this paper, they show that under conditions of opacity, zero coverage is the only best choice for the government >

Warren: But when you allow disclosure, positive coverage becomes optimal if two specific conditions are met about how much people benefit from early adoption versus what they might lose by not having that social learning >

Iris: That's a big part of it. The paper characterizes this utility by showing that disclosure doesn't recover the private information suppressed by the rebate, so the early benefit has to compensate for that loss >

Ruth: Right. They look at how disclosure changes what actions people take and they find that the optimal disclosed program actually raises welfare while keeping the expected total adoption rate exactly where it was before >

Warren: That's interesting. So, the decision to disclose isn't just about getting more people to adopt; it's about changing *which* actions get followed under imperfect compliance >

The paper's improvements: Iris: The paper suggests a few ways this research can be improved. They look at how disclosure changes decisions, specifically characterizing thresholds where an eligible adoption stops being persuasive and then disclosure becomes valuable >

Ruth: I see that. It basically tries to find the tipping point for when a late user starts ignoring their own private signal because they think the system is too transparent >

Warren: And they also look at how late users respond to a private signal even if eligibility rarely changes their actions, showing that an eligible adoption can still be persuasive >

Iris: They also introduce the idea that information about eligibility is valuable when it changes the action chosen after at least one private-signal realization, which helps calculate welfare gains when a late user actually has their own information >

Conclusion: Ruth: So, wrapping this up, the paper "Hidden Eligibility and the Credibility of Adoption" identifies exactly when an eligibility record becomes a useful part of the program's design >

Warren: It depends on both the benefit that early adoption gives and how much you lose by expanding the program overall >

Iris: And it really hinges on considering those two things together, because the amount of adoption and the quality of later decisions are linked to this whole setup >

Ruth: It shows that even when eligibility is hidden, a positive program can be worthwhile if you consider all these factors in your design choice >

Toulouse School of Economics · International College of Economics and Finance, HSE University

econ.TH

Submitted: 2026-09-23

Updated: 2026-11-13

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Importance score: 80/100

The gist: Public support for early adoption can affect what later users learn from observed choices <ref:2609.31744#pg2> An eligibility record identifies these choices and allows later users to interpret them…

Key concepts

Eligibility Record
A record that identifies which users are eligible for a rebate. This record allows later users to analyze the choices made by early adopters in a way that is separate from the general population's behavior, helping them interpret observed actions more accurately.
Opacity vs. Disclosure
This refers to whether eligibility status is hidden or publicly known. The model shows that zero coverage is optimal when eligibility is hidden (opaque), but positive coverage can be optimal when it is disclosed, provided specific conditions regarding marginal returns are met.
Imperfect Compliance
This describes situations where users do not always follow the rules, even if they are eligible. The paper explores how this imperfect compliance interacts with private information from late users to determine if an eligible adoption remains persuasive.

Terminology

Summary

Public support for early adoption can affect what later users learn from observed choices <ref:2609. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Hidden Eligibility and the Credibility of Adoption Georgy Lukyanov∗ Mikhail Zolotarev† September 2026 Abstract Public support for early adoption can affect what later users learn from observed choices. An adopter may have favourable private information, or may have received a rebate.

31744#pg2> An eligibility record identifies these choices and allows later users to interpret them separately <ref:2609. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Announcing the program does not tell them which adoptions occurred without support. An eligibility record identifies these choices and allows later users to interpret them separately.

31744#pg6> The results identify when an eligibility record is a useful part of the design of an adoption program <ref:2609. p. 0
Where the paper says it

The policy reversal survives when both extensions are present. The results identify when an eligibility record is a useful part of the design of an adoption program.

31744#pg9>.

Model Setup and Benchmark

The model considers two users who decide sequentially whether to adopt <ref:2609.31744#pg3> The early user receives a private signal about a common payoff state <ref:2609. p. 1

Where the paper says it

We consider two users who decide sequentially whether to adopt. The early user receives a private signal about a common payoff state.

31744#pg6> Before the early user receives her signal, the government randomly assigns eligibility for a fixed rebate <ref:2609. p. 1
Where the paper says it

Both face the same adoption cost. Before the early user receives her signal, the government randomly assigns eligibility for a fixed rebate.

31744#pg6>. The planner chooses coverage and commits either to report eligibility or to leave it unobserved <ref:2609. p. 1
Where the paper says it

In the benchmark, the payment induces an eligible user to adopt after either signal. The government chooses coverage and commits either to report eligibility or to leave it unobserved.

31744#pg6>. The objective includes the users’ material payoffs and an additional social benefit from early adoption <ref:2609. p. 1
Where the paper says it

The government chooses coverage and commits either to report eligibility or to leave it unobserved. Its objective includes the users’ material payoffs and an additional social benefit from early adoption.

31744#pg6>.

Optimal Coverage Determination

The main result concerns the optimal policy once coverage can also change <ref:2609.31744#pg6> Zero coverage is uniquely optimal under opacity and positive coverage is optimal under disclosure if and only if two conditions hold <ref:2609. p. 1

Where the paper says it

Our main result concerns the optimal policy once coverage can also change. We show that zero coverage is uniquely optimal under opacity and positive coverage is optimal under disclosure if and only if two conditions hold.

31744#pg6>. The marginal return at zero must be positive under disclosure and non-positive under opacity <ref:2609. p. 1
Where the paper says it

We show that zero coverage is uniquely optimal under opacity and positive coverage is optimal under disclosure if and only if two conditions hold. The marginal return at zero must be positive under disclosure and non-positive under opacity.

31744#pg6>. In addition, the best direct return from early adoption must be smaller than the late surplus lost when the program eliminates social learning <ref:2609. p. 1
Where the paper says it

The marginal return at zero must be positive under disclosure and non-positive under opacity. In addition, the best direct return from early adoption must be smaller than the late surplus lost when the program eliminates social learning.

31744#pg6>.

Welfare Analysis and Policy Change

The welfare effect is not explained by an increase in total adoption <ref:2609.31744#pg6> Disclosure changes which actions are followed <ref:2609. p. 5

Where the paper says it

Disclosure changes which actions are followed. It does not preserve all the information that would have existed without intervention.

31744#pg7> The optimal disclosed program raises welfare while leaving expected total adoption unchanged <ref:2609. p. 7
Where the paper says it

A larger opaque program can lower both. The optimal disclosed program raises welfare while leaving expected total adoption unchanged.

31744#pg9>. The disclosed optimum is unique and satisfies C'(r∗T) = aT and lies strictly below one whenever (15) holds <ref:2609.31744#pg9>.

Imperfect Compliance and Private Information

If eligibility rarely changes a user’s action, even an eligible adoption remains persuasive <ref:2609.31744#pg6> If 0 ≤ ρ. If ρ > r¯, the late user does not follow eligible adoptions under disclosure <ref:2609. p. 9

Where the paper says it

At ρ = r¯, welfare still coincides, although the tie convention can make adoption differ. (ii) If ρ > r¯, the late user does not follow eligible adoptions under disclosure.

31744#pg9>. The comparison of optimal coverage can also survive a late private signal <ref:2609. p. 1
Where the paper says it

We characterize this threshold and extend the optimal-coverage result. We also allow the late user to receive a private signal.

31744#pg6>.

Implementation and Scope

The analysis applies most directly to randomized pilots, private coupons, and invitation-based rebates with exogenous assignment <ref:2609.31744#pg9> The random-assignment assumption limits the policy interpretation <ref:2609. p. 2

Where the paper says it

strategic and may convey the seller’s information. Here the government is uninformed about the state, assignment is random, and the additional early action is real.

31744#pg9>. The results suggest treating the eligibility record as part of the program’s design <ref:2609. p. 0
Where the paper says it

The policy reversal survives when both extensions are present. The results identify when an eligibility record is a useful part of the design of an adoption program.

31744#pg9>.

Conclusion

Under the conditions we identify, a positive program becomes worthwhile even though no intervention is optimal when eligibility is hidden <ref:2609.31744#pg9>. The result depends on both the benefit of early adoption and the cost of expanding the program <ref:2609. p. 1

Where the paper says it

These are different users, so this is a change in the allocation of adoption across cohorts. 1 The extra social benefit from early adoption must compensate for the private-surplus loss and the cost of the program.

31744#pg9>. The amount of adoption and the quality of later decisions should therefore be considered together when assessing the program <ref:2609. p. 0
Where the paper says it

This creates a question about the administration of the program. Suppose that later households know the rebate amount and the assignment procedure, but do not know which early users were eligible.

31744#pg9>.

Green — the paper says it, and the page is printed. Red — no passage carries it, so treat that sentence as unverified. The same check runs on your own text: check a summary against its source, $5.

Improvements for AI systems

  1. Improved policy design for adoption programs by including an eligibility record as part of the program design when both imperfect compliance and private information for late users are present. This allows a government to choose between reporting eligibility or leaving it unobserved, leading to optimal coverage decisions based on marginal returns under disclosure versus opacity.

  2. Development of decision rules that identify when an eligibility record is a useful part of the design of an adoption program. The paper characterizes this utility by showing that Disclosure does not recover the private information suppressed by the rebate, so the early benefit must compensate for this loss.

  3. Enhanced analysis of welfare gains under imperfect compliance and late private information to determine when disclosure changes decisions. This involves characterizing thresholds where an eligible adoption ceases to justify imitation and disclosure becomes valuable based on how users respond to the rebate.

  4. A framework for assessing the value of late user private signals in adoption programs by showing that Information about eligibility is valuable when it changes the action chosen after at least one private-signal realization. This allows for the calculation of welfare gains when a late user has their own information.

  5. Methodology for analyzing heterogeneous late adoption costs to determine how dispersion in costs affects the optimal coverage policy. This shows that Heterogeneity removes the discrete jump; it does not imply that every distribution produces a decline in total uptake under opacity, suggesting continuous heterogeneity can be preserved.

Abstract

Subsidies encourage adoption, but they also change what others can learn from it. We study a government that chooses the amount and coverage of an early-adoption rebate and the information released about eligibility. Both early and late adoption create positive externalities. When eligibility is hidden, expanding the programme makes adoption less informative. As the benefit of early adoption rises, the optimal programme jumps from a small one that preserves imitation to a larger one that gives it up. We show that partial disclosure can support intermediate coverage and strictly improve on both optimally chosen opacity and full disclosure. An optimal report certifies the eligibility of some users, leaving the remaining adoptions sufficiently persuasive to induce imitation. We characterise the conditions for this policy and compare coverage under the alternative reporting rules. Analytical extensions allow delivery failures, private information, and heterogeneous adoption costs. The discontinuous change in optimal coverage can persist even when cost heterogeneity makes welfare continuous in coverage.

Sources

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