Do wind and solar curtail at negative electricity prices? Incentives and evidence across two decades of German renewable support schemes

arXiv:2609.10053 · econ.GN, q-fin.EC · Submitted 2026-09-09 · Read on arXiv

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Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.

Ruth: I'm Ruth.

Warren: And I'm Warren, here with Iris.

Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "Do wind and solar curtail at negative electricity prices? Incentives and evidence across two decades of German renewable support schemes".

Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. In many power systems, wind and solar generation increasingly often exceeds electricity demand, and curtailing renewable generation in those hours matters both for prices and for the physical stability of the grid.

Ruth: This paper studies wind and solar energy in Germany to determine if these generators have an incentive to stop producing when electricity prices are negative.

Warren: Incentives Derived from Support Schemes The study derives the financial implications for each of the multiple support policies that Germany has implemented, calculating the implied incentives for each cohort hour by hour.

Ruth: The marginal revenue under a fixed premium is calculated as market price plus the fixed amount paid per MWh, resulting in a curtailment threshold of minus the support at stake.

Title and authors: Ruth: So, to start, let's talk about who wrote this and what the title actually tells us. We’re looking at "Do wind and solar curtail at negative electricity prices? Incentives and evidence across two decades of German renewable support schemes."

Warren: It seems like the paper is a deep dive into how different policy instruments over twenty years have influenced the behavior of Germany's wind and solar fleets when wholesale prices dip below zero.

Iris: The authors are doing something pretty specific here, estimating incentives for each cohort of generators on an hourly basis, which is a very granular way to look at this problem.

Ruth: And what this means for us is that we’re moving beyond just saying "negative prices are bad" and trying to figure out *why* some generators keep producing when those prices turn negative.

Warren: It’s about uncovering the hidden economic drivers behind the physical decisions made by these power plants over a long period.

Iris: And the implication is that we need a much clearer picture of how these support schemes translate into actual production decisions in real-time.

The paper's summary: Ruth: Now, let's get into what the paper actually found regarding the incentives and the observed behavior. They set their calculated incentives against what they estimate as market-based curtailment using a new time series of technical generation potential derived from historical weather data.

Warren: That comparison is key because it lets them determine what fraction of generation actually responds to those price signals they’ve built into the model.

Iris: The results are pretty telling, especially when you look at the numbers for two thousand twenty-five: for wind energy, almost all generators had an incentive to stop producing if prices dropped below negative fifty euros per megawatt hour, but only half of them actually did that <ref:2609.10053#pg1,generators had an incentive to stop producing>.

Ruth: That means there's a real gap between what they *want* to do economically and what they *actually* do physically in those deep negative price hours.

Warren: And for solar energy, the situation is even more concerning because nearly two-thirds of the potential generation had no incentive to curtail at all when prices were negative.

Iris: The paper notes that for solar, even with the deeply negative prices below fifty euros per megawatt hour, just thirty-nine percent of solar generation had an incentive to curtail.

The paper's improvements: Ruth: The authors themselves suggest a few ways this research could be improved moving forward. They focus on how we can get a better handle on the incentives across different policy regimes.

Warren: They point out that they need to be clearer about how different support instruments, like fixed premiums or contracts for difference, distort those production decisions for each generator cohort.

Iris: They also suggest that we should try to model how changes in policy rules, like suspension rules—which basically decide when something stops being paid—affect the curtailment threshold itself.

Ruth: That’s a good point because if the threshold shifts from positive to zero or negative depending on how long an episode lasts, it fundamentally changes the incentive structure we're trying to measure.

Warren: And they also tackle the estimation side by developing a new time series of technical generation potential based on historical weather data, specifically to avoid endogeneity issues in that market-based curtailment estimate.

Conclusion: Ruth: So wrapping this up, the main implication is that expanding wind and solar requires them to actually respond to price signals, otherwise the system won't adjust properly. In two thousand twenty-five during periods of deeply negative prices below fifty euros per megawatt hour, most wind generators had an incentive to stop production, but only half did <ref:2609.10053#pg1,wind generators had an incentive to stop>.

Warren: And for solar, the situation is different because nearly two-thirds of the potential had no incentive to curtail at all mostly because they receive a feed-in tariff that shields them from wholesale prices.

Iris: The final point is that this isn't just a problem for the public budget anymore; it's becoming an acute system operations concern, and if supply keeps exceeding demand, we need curtailment.

Ruth: So we’re looking at the "Do wind and solar curtail at negative electricity prices? Incentives and evidence across two decades of German renewable support schemes" paper as a clear signal that the current setup isn't fully aligning with system needs.

Warren: It shows that while there are incentives for production, the mechanism for actually cutting back is often missing or underutilized in practice.

Iris: This research gives us the framework to see exactly where that response rate falls short and what it means for grid stability when renewables supply the bulk of electricity.

Hertie School, Berlin · Neon Neue Energieökonomik, Berlin

econ.GN, q-fin.EC

Submitted: 2026-09-09

Updated: 2026-11-10

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Importance score: 79/100

The gist: In many power systems, wind and solar generation increasingly often exceeds electricity demand, and curtailing renewable generation in those hours matters both for prices and for the physical…

Key concepts

Incentives Derived from Support Schemes
This looks at how different government support policies affect a generator's decision. For example, under a fixed premium, the revenue calculation changes, setting a specific 'curtailment threshold'—the point where stopping production becomes financially beneficial.
Market-Based Curtailment Estimation
The paper estimates how much renewable energy is actually curtailed in the market. This is done by creating a new time series of generation potential using historical weather data and adjusting it to ensure the model accurately reflects real-world generation, avoiding errors from past data.
Exposure Rate vs. Response Rate
The exposure rate shows how many generators had an incentive to curtail during negative prices. The response rate shows how many actually did curtail production. Comparing these two reveals the fraction of generation that actually changes its behavior based on the price signal.

Terminology

Summary

In many power systems, wind and solar generation increasingly often exceeds electricity demand, and curtailing renewable generation in those hours matters both for prices and for the physical stability of the grid. p. 0

Where the paper says it

energy This version: 8 September 2026 Abstract: In many power systems, wind and solar generation increasingly often exceeds electricity demand. Curtailing renewable generation in those hours matters both for prices and for the physical stability of the grid.

This paper studies wind and solar energy in Germany to determine if these generators have an incentive to stop producing when electricity prices are negative. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Turning off wind turbines and solar panels is technically easier than ramping down a large power station, yet support schemes often give renewables an economic incentive to keep producing at negative prices. This paper studies wind and solar energy in Germany.

Incentives Derived from Support Schemes

The study derives the financial implications for each of the multiple support policies that Germany has implemented, calculating the implied incentives for each cohort hour by hour. The marginal revenue under a fixed premium is calculated as market price plus the fixed amount paid per MWh, resulting in a curtailment threshold of minus the support at stake. p. 5

Where the paper says it

No price is low enough to make curtailing pay, so no curtailment threshold exists. Under a fixed premium, a fixed amount 𝑠 per MWh is paid on top of market revenues, so marginal revenue is 𝑝 + 𝑠.

For contracts for difference settled against a period average, the marginal revenue is p plus (k minus r), leading to a curtailment threshold of r minus k when capture price exceeds the strike price. p. 5
Where the paper says it

Under a two-sided contract for difference settled against a period average 𝑟, marginal revenue is 𝑝 + (𝑘 − 𝑟), with no floor at zero. When the capture price exceeds the strike price the per-MWh settlement becomes a charge.

Under tradable certificates, the marginal revenue is p plus n times c, and the curtailment threshold is minus n times c. p. 6
Where the paper says it

As without support, the curtailment threshold is zero. Typology of support instruments and implied curtailment thresholds Instrument Reference price Marginal revenue Curtailment threshold 𝒑 ∗ Use in Germany Feed-in tariff - 𝑀𝑅 = 𝑓 No incentive at any price EEG tariff: all plants to 2011, optional to 2015, below 100 kW since 2016 (rooftop solar) Fixed premium per MWh - 𝑀𝑅 = 𝑝 + 𝑠 𝑝 ∗ = −𝑠 - Two-sided CfD, hourly Hourly dayahead price 𝑀𝑅 = 𝑘 No incentive at any price - Two-sided CfD, reference Period average capture price 𝑟 𝑀𝑅 = 𝑝 + (𝑘 − 𝑟) 𝑝 ∗ = 𝑟 − 𝑘 (positive when 𝑟 > 𝑘) Revenue skim Dec 2022 to Jun 2023: supported plants above 1 MW, monthly; to be introduced 2027 One-sided CfD, hourly Hourly dayahead price 𝑀𝑅 = max{𝑝, 𝑘} No incentive at any price - One-sided CfD, reference Period average capture price 𝑟 𝑀𝑅 = 𝑝 + max{𝑘 − 𝑟, 0} 𝑝 ∗ = −max{𝑘 − 𝑟, 0} EEG market premium since 2012 (monthly): wind, solar from 100 kW; mandatory from 500 kW (2014) and 100 kW (2016); auctions since 2017 Tradable certificates per MWh - 𝑀𝑅 = 𝑝 + 𝑛 ⋅ 𝑐 𝑝 ∗ = −𝑛 ⋅ 𝑐 - Capacity or investment payment - 𝑀𝑅 = 𝑝 𝑝 ∗ = 0 -

Market-Based Curtailment Estimation

The paper estimates market-based curtailment of wind and solar energy by developing a new time series of technical generation potential from historical weather data and calibrating it to avoid endogeneity. This estimation proceeds in three steps: deriving financial implications, estimating market-based curtailment, and comparing expected curtailment (according to incentives) with observed curtailment. p. 1

Where the paper says it

The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, I derive the financial implications for each of the multiple support policies that Germany has implemented.

The actual market-based curtailment is estimated as the gap between generation potential and actual generation minus grid-related curtailment on an hourly granularity. p. 4
Where the paper says it

Wind turbines pitch their blades out of the wind and solar inverters reduce output within seconds and at no cost. Per-MWh subsidy payments tied to actual generation shift the curtailment threshold below zero.

Comparison of Expected vs. p. 2

Where the paper says it

This requires developing a new time series of technical generation potential from historical weather data and a careful calibration to avoid endogeneity. The third step is to compare expected curtailment (according to incentives) and observed curtailment to determine the fraction of generation that responds to incentives.

Actual Behavior

The analysis compares expected curtailment (according to incentives) and observed curtailment to determine the fraction of generation that responds to incentives. Across all negative-price hours of 2025, 64% of wind generation had an incentive to curtail (exposure rate), but only 27% actually did curtail (response rate), resulting in a curtailed rate of 17% for wind. p. 9

Where the paper says it

For those generators settling on the monthly capture rate, market premium payments are large because of the low capture prices of that month. Of the 95 GW total potential, around 30 GW had no incentive to curtail at any price, most of it rooftop solar, just over 40 GW have a curtailment threshold between -120 and -1 EUR/MWh.

For solar energy, only 4% of the potential generation was curtailed during negative prices. p. 4
Where the paper says it

(2022) Germany, 2009 to 2016 BART counterfactual on hourly day-ahead prices The 2012 market premium with direct marketing cut negative-price hours by about 70 % Van Steenberghe and Ovaere (2025), working paper Great Britain, 2019 to 2024 Unit-level offshore wind, CfD versus merchant Merchant farms cut output 69 to 83 % in negative hours, CfD units only once the six-hour rule binds; 2. 9 TWh excess generation, GBP 176 m support cost Consultant reports Dexter Energy (2025) Netherlands, 2024 to 2025 Market and imbalance data About 11 % of potential Dutch solar output curtailed through imbalancemarket arbitrage Storpeak (2026) Spain, 2024 to 2025 Market data Solar curtailment of about 2 % of potential in 2024 and 2.

Implications for System Operation

The findings indicate that in 2025, at prices below -50 EUR/MWh, almost all wind generators had an incentive to stop producing, but only half of them did. Solar is the opposite case: nearly two thirds of the potential had no incentive to curtail at all, mostly because it receives a feed-in tariff that shields it from wholesale prices. p. 0

Where the paper says it

I find that in 2025, at prices below -50 EUR/MWh, almost all wind generators had an incentive to stop producing, but only half of them did. Solar is the opposite case: nearly two thirds of the potential had no incentive to curtail at all, mostly because it receives a feed-in tariff that shields it from wholesale prices.

The conclusion is that a further expansion of wind and solar requires them to respond to price signals. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Low exposure and response rates inflate subsidy payments and make the power system harder to operate safely. I conclude that a further expansion of wind and solar requires them to respond to price signals.

Long-Term Trends and Stiff Generation

The capacity that has an incentive to curtail at a given negative price has changed over time, driven by policy reforms, prices, and growth. The stock of capacity with no incentive to curtail at any price has grown over the twenty years, from 23 GW in 2006 to 64 GW in 2025. p. 3

Where the paper says it

It measures the incentive as a continuous threshold per cohort, which moves with capture prices and episode length, rather than as a contract type. It spans twenty years and the full sequence of German rule changes.

Stiff generation, which is wind and solar that keeps producing even at deeply negative prices, has increased in recent years, reaching 48 GW in 2026 against an average load of 43 GW in the same hours. p. 1
Where the paper says it

In a liberalized market the wholesale price is the main mechanism to signal scarcity and abundance: a price falling below zero signals that wind and solar generators should reduce output. While negative wholesale prices are nothing new, they have become much more common in recent years, now making up around 6 % of all hours in many European power markets (Figure 1), and even more in some parts of Australia, the US, Chile, and other markets (AEMO, 2026; EIA, 2025; ACERA, 2025).

Financial Loss Channels

The financial loss from selling at negative spot prices is borne by owners, the public, and through other channels. These channels include the owner losing the margin, the public paying support payments, and a market value that sets the premium on every supported megawatt-hour of that month. p. 9

Where the paper says it

Figure 3 shows the German merit order curve (short-term supply curve) for this hour. For those generators settling on the monthly capture rate, market premium payments are large because of the low capture prices of that month.

Over 2022 to August 2026, these channels add up to about EUR 2. p. 4
Where the paper says it

(2022) Germany, 2009 to 2016 BART counterfactual on hourly day-ahead prices The 2012 market premium with direct marketing cut negative-price hours by about 70 % Van Steenberghe and Ovaere (2025), working paper Great Britain, 2019 to 2024 Unit-level offshore wind, CfD versus merchant Merchant farms cut output 69 to 83 % in negative hours, CfD units only once the six-hour rule binds; 2. 9 TWh excess generation, GBP 176 m support cost Consultant reports Dexter Energy (2025) Netherlands, 2024 to 2025 Market and imbalance data About 11 % of potential Dutch solar output curtailed through imbalancemarket arbitrage Storpeak (2026) Spain, 2024 to 2025 Market data Solar curtailment of about 2 % of potential in 2024 and 2.

5 billion, of which the owners bear 0.5 billion and the public purse 2. p. 7
Where the paper says it

Recent contracts floor settlement at zero or suspend delivery in negative hours, which restores the zero threshold. How common each clause is cannot be observed, because PPA terms are not public and no register records them.

0 billion.

Conclusion

Operating power systems with wind and solar capacity that greatly exceeds even peak demand is becoming the new normal. To avoid negative prices but also to ensure physical stability of the power grid, it is important that renewable generation is curtailed in such moments. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Curtailing renewable generation in those hours matters both for prices and for the physical stability of the grid. Turning off wind turbines and solar panels is technically easier than ramping down a large power station, yet support schemes often give renewables an economic incentive to keep producing at negative prices.

This paper shows for the case of Germany that this is nevertheless often not done. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Turning off wind turbines and solar panels is technically easier than ramping down a large power station, yet support schemes often give renewables an economic incentive to keep producing at negative prices. This paper studies wind and solar energy in Germany.

In 2025, during periods of deeply negative prices (below-50 EUR/MWh), almost all wind generators had an incentive to stop production, but only half did. p. 0
Where the paper says it

It then sets those incentives against observed behavior, using a new estimate of market-based curtailment built from reanalysis weather data. I find that in 2025, at prices below -50 EUR/MWh, almost all wind generators had an incentive to stop producing, but only half of them did.

In contrast, nearly two thirds of solar energy had no incentive to curtail, mostly because it received feed-in tariffs that shielded it from wholesale prices. p. 0
Where the paper says it

I find that in 2025, at prices below -50 EUR/MWh, almost all wind generators had an incentive to stop producing, but only half of them did. Solar is the opposite case: nearly two thirds of the potential had no incentive to curtail at all, mostly because it receives a feed-in tariff that shields it from wholesale prices.

Of those that were exposed to prices, just a quarter actually cut production. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Solar is the opposite case: nearly two thirds of the potential had no incentive to curtail at all, mostly because it receives a feed-in tariff that shields it from wholesale prices. Of the exposed remainder, just over a fifth cut production.

This is no longer only a problem from a public budget perspective, but increasingly a system operations concern. In a future where wind and solar energy supply the bulk of electricity, it is clear that installed capacity will be larger than peak load and their potential to produce electricity exceeds electricity demand in many hours of the year. p. 0
Where the paper says it

energy This version: 8 September 2026 Abstract: In many power systems, wind and solar generation increasingly often exceeds electricity demand. Curtailing renewable generation in those hours matters both for prices and for the physical stability of the grid.

Such a system can only work if supply adjusts to demand, i. p. 1
Where the paper says it

Introduction Wind turbines and solar panels have become so cheap that cost-optimal power system configurations often have far more wind and solar capacity than peak demand. Germany and Spain already operate wind and solar capacity of roughly twice their peak load.

e., if wind and solar generators curtail excess energy. p. 1
Where the paper says it

Curtailment of excess energy is part of efficient systems operation, not a failure of it. In a liberalized market the wholesale price is the main mechanism to signal scarcity and abundance: a price falling below zero signals that wind and solar generators should reduce output.

Germany has reached a point where this is becoming an acute problem. p. 9
Where the paper says it

The dashed curves show the effect of the suspension rules. Nevertheless, it is becoming clear that the vast majority of the 78 GW of installed wind capacity had an incentive to curtail once prices reach -40 EUR/MWh while for solar at that price around 80 GW still have an incentive to produce.

Green — the paper says it, and the page is printed. Red — no passage carries it, so treat that sentence as unverified. The same check runs on your own text: check a summary against its source, $5.

Improvements for AI systems

  1. Improved understanding of renewable energy curtailment incentives across policy regimes by identifying how different support instruments distort production decisions, such as how marginal revenue equals p + s under a fixed premium or p = -sigma (1) for a per-MWh subsidy.

  2. Ability to quantify the response rate of wind and solar generators to negative prices, specifically distinguishing between the incentive to curtail and the actual behavior, as shown by comparing exposure rate with response rate.

  3. Capacity for projecting future system behavior by analyzing how changes in policy rules, such as suspension rules, affect the curtailment threshold, which can shift from a positive value to zero or negative depending on the episode length.

  4. Capability to model and estimate market-based curtailment using reanalysis weather data, by fitting a physical model of wind and solar generation based on reanalysis data to calibration hours where no plant had a price incentive to curtail.

  5. Enhanced predictive modeling for system stability by predicting stiff generation—wind and solar that keeps producing even at deeply negative prices, as this capacity has increased in recent years against the average load.

Abstract

In many power systems, installed wind and solar now exceed peak electricity demand. In very sunny or windy periods, curtailing renewable generation becomes a precondition for grid stability. While turning off wind turbines and solar panels is technically easy, support schemes often give renewables an economic incentive to keep producing at negative prices. This paper studies wind and solar energy in Germany, estimating, for each cohort of generators, hour by hour the incentives implied by two decades of support policy. It then sets those incentives against observed behavior, using a new estimate of market-based curtailment built from reanalysis weather data. I find that in 2025, at prices below -50 EUR/MWh, almost all wind generators had an incentive to stop producing, but only half of them did. Nearly two thirds of solar capacity had no incentive to curtail at all, mostly because it receives a feed-in tariff that shields it from wholesale prices. Of the exposed remainder, about one in seven cut production. Low exposure and response rates inflate subsidy payments and make the power system harder to operate safely. I conclude that a further expansion of wind and solar requires them to respond to price signals, which depends on policy makers providing proper incentives and on generators acting on them.

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