Do wind and solar curtail at negative electricity prices? Incentives and evidence across two decades of German renewable support schemes

summary

The gist

In many power systems, wind and solar generation increasingly often exceeds electricity demand, and curtailing renewable generation in those hours matters both for prices and for the physical…

In short

The study analyzed German wind and solar energy to see if generators stop producing when electricity prices are negative, considering various support schemes. It found that while many had an incentive to curtail at low prices, actual curtailment was often lower. The findings suggest that current systems need more renewable generation to respond to price signals for grid stability.

Key concepts

Incentives Derived from Support Schemes
This looks at how different government support policies affect a generator's decision. For example, under a fixed premium, the revenue calculation changes, setting a specific 'curtailment threshold'—the point where stopping production becomes financially beneficial.
Market-Based Curtailment Estimation
The paper estimates how much renewable energy is actually curtailed in the market. This is done by creating a new time series of generation potential using historical weather data and adjusting it to ensure the model accurately reflects real-world generation, avoiding errors from past data.
Exposure Rate vs. Response Rate
The exposure rate shows how many generators had an incentive to curtail during negative prices. The response rate shows how many actually did curtail production. Comparing these two reveals the fraction of generation that actually changes its behavior based on the price signal.

Terminology used across episodes

This episode discusses

The paper

Do wind and solar curtail at negative electricity prices? Incentives and evidence across two decades of German renewable support schemes · Read on arXiv

Hertie School, Berlin · Neon Neue Energieökonomik, Berlin

In many power systems, installed wind and solar now exceed peak electricity demand. In very sunny or windy periods, curtailing renewable generation becomes a precondition for grid stability. While turning off wind turbines and solar panels is technically easy, support schemes often give renewables an economic incentive to keep producing at negative prices. This paper studies wind and solar energy in Germany, estimating, for each cohort of generators, hour by hour the incentives implied by two decades of support policy. It then sets those incentives against observed behavior, using a new estimate of market-based curtailment built from reanalysis weather data. I find that in 2025, at prices below -50 EUR/MWh, almost all wind generators had an incentive to stop producing, but only half of them did. Nearly two thirds of solar capacity had no incentive to curtail at all, mostly because it receives a feed-in tariff that shields it from wholesale prices. Of the exposed remainder, about one in seven cut production. Low exposure and response rates inflate subsidy payments and make the power system harder to operate safely. I conclude that a further expansion of wind and solar requires them to respond to price signals, which depends on policy makers providing proper incentives and on generators acting on them.

Transcript

Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.

Ruth: I'm Ruth.

Warren: And I'm Warren, here with Iris.

Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "Do wind and solar curtail at negative electricity prices? Incentives and evidence across two decades of German renewable support schemes".

Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. In many power systems, wind and solar generation increasingly often exceeds electricity demand, and curtailing renewable generation in those hours matters both for prices and for the physical stability of the grid.

Ruth: This paper studies wind and solar energy in Germany to determine if these generators have an incentive to stop producing when electricity prices are negative.

Warren: Incentives Derived from Support Schemes The study derives the financial implications for each of the multiple support policies that Germany has implemented, calculating the implied incentives for each cohort hour by hour.

Ruth: The marginal revenue under a fixed premium is calculated as market price plus the fixed amount paid per MWh, resulting in a curtailment threshold of minus the support at stake.

Title and authors: Ruth: So, to start, let's talk about who wrote this and what the title actually tells us. We’re looking at "Do wind and solar curtail at negative electricity prices? Incentives and evidence across two decades of German renewable support schemes."

Warren: It seems like the paper is a deep dive into how different policy instruments over twenty years have influenced the behavior of Germany's wind and solar fleets when wholesale prices dip below zero.

Iris: The authors are doing something pretty specific here, estimating incentives for each cohort of generators on an hourly basis, which is a very granular way to look at this problem.

Ruth: And what this means for us is that we’re moving beyond just saying "negative prices are bad" and trying to figure out *why* some generators keep producing when those prices turn negative.

Warren: It’s about uncovering the hidden economic drivers behind the physical decisions made by these power plants over a long period.

Iris: And the implication is that we need a much clearer picture of how these support schemes translate into actual production decisions in real-time.

The paper's summary: Ruth: Now, let's get into what the paper actually found regarding the incentives and the observed behavior. They set their calculated incentives against what they estimate as market-based curtailment using a new time series of technical generation potential derived from historical weather data.

Warren: That comparison is key because it lets them determine what fraction of generation actually responds to those price signals they’ve built into the model.

Iris: The results are pretty telling, especially when you look at the numbers for two thousand twenty-five: for wind energy, almost all generators had an incentive to stop producing if prices dropped below negative fifty euros per megawatt hour, but only half of them actually did that <ref:2609.10053#pg1,generators had an incentive to stop producing>.

Ruth: That means there's a real gap between what they *want* to do economically and what they *actually* do physically in those deep negative price hours.

Warren: And for solar energy, the situation is even more concerning because nearly two-thirds of the potential generation had no incentive to curtail at all when prices were negative.

Iris: The paper notes that for solar, even with the deeply negative prices below fifty euros per megawatt hour, just thirty-nine percent of solar generation had an incentive to curtail.

The paper's improvements: Ruth: The authors themselves suggest a few ways this research could be improved moving forward. They focus on how we can get a better handle on the incentives across different policy regimes.

Warren: They point out that they need to be clearer about how different support instruments, like fixed premiums or contracts for difference, distort those production decisions for each generator cohort.

Iris: They also suggest that we should try to model how changes in policy rules, like suspension rules—which basically decide when something stops being paid—affect the curtailment threshold itself.

Ruth: That’s a good point because if the threshold shifts from positive to zero or negative depending on how long an episode lasts, it fundamentally changes the incentive structure we're trying to measure.

Warren: And they also tackle the estimation side by developing a new time series of technical generation potential based on historical weather data, specifically to avoid endogeneity issues in that market-based curtailment estimate.

Conclusion: Ruth: So wrapping this up, the main implication is that expanding wind and solar requires them to actually respond to price signals, otherwise the system won't adjust properly. In two thousand twenty-five during periods of deeply negative prices below fifty euros per megawatt hour, most wind generators had an incentive to stop production, but only half did <ref:2609.10053#pg1,wind generators had an incentive to stop>.

Warren: And for solar, the situation is different because nearly two-thirds of the potential had no incentive to curtail at all mostly because they receive a feed-in tariff that shields them from wholesale prices.

Iris: The final point is that this isn't just a problem for the public budget anymore; it's becoming an acute system operations concern, and if supply keeps exceeding demand, we need curtailment.

Ruth: So we’re looking at the "Do wind and solar curtail at negative electricity prices? Incentives and evidence across two decades of German renewable support schemes" paper as a clear signal that the current setup isn't fully aligning with system needs.

Warren: It shows that while there are incentives for production, the mechanism for actually cutting back is often missing or underutilized in practice.

Iris: This research gives us the framework to see exactly where that response rate falls short and what it means for grid stability when renewables supply the bulk of electricity.

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