Separating the Wheat from the Chaff

arXiv:2601.00653 · econ.TH · Submitted 2026-01-02 · Read on arXiv

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Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.

Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "Separating the Wheat from the Chaff".

Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. Separating the Wheat from the Chaff studies a reputational cheap-talk environment in which a judge must choose between an expert and a quack to identify the expert, showing that truth-telling by the expert is robust and that learning in this setting exhibits an “information begets information” property The Core Game Structure The study introduces a three-player reputational cheap-talk game where a judge selects one of two speakers, one of whom is an expert perfectly informed about the state and the other is a quack with no information The speakers simultaneously send messages, and the judge selects one, with both seeking to be chosen while the judge wishes to identify the expert In this setting, an equilibrium exists where the expert reports truthfully and the quack strategically mimics the expert’s speech The judge's objective is to select the correct speaker, and each speaker wishes to be selected.

Ruth: Equilibrium Features The paper characterizes an equilibrium in which the expert always messages the true state ω and the quack’s messaging strategy replicates the prior state distribution, U

-1, 1: This equilibrium is supported by different selection strategies φ that reward speakers who send extreme messages.

Warren: A key feature is that when indifferent between two consistent messages, the judge must favor the consistent speaker who sends a more extreme message This premium given to extremism does not induce exaggeration by the expert, but instead sustains truthful communication.

Ruth: Information Amplification A central feature of equilibrium is that information begets information, meaning judges with more precise private knowledge are more likely to identify the expert and learn the true state This mechanism implies that exposure to competing sources of uncertain reliability may amplify informational inequality across audiences This observation offers a simple explanation for the coexistence of widespread access to information and growing informational inequality, without appealing to partisan bias or selective exposure.

Paper summary: Warren: So thinking about the whole paper, "Separating the Wheat from the Chaff," what does it actually mean for us outside of this game structure? Ruth I think it means that in environments where people have varying levels of information and are trying to figure out who to trust, competition itself can be a mechanism that forces some level of honesty.

Iris: It’s about how the setup—the judge choosing between an expert and a quack—creates incentives that favor truth-telling from the informed side, even when the stakes are high for both participants. Warren And it shows us that this isn't just a simple game; there are specific rules, like favoring more extreme messages when things are tied, that drive the equilibrium.

Ruth: Right, so if you look at it simply, the expert tells the truth because the structure rewards it through those tie-breaking rules. Warren And for someone just listening to this show, what's the big picture here? It’s about how reliable information can be pulled out of strategic claims through these competitive dynamics.

Iris: It points toward a way that reliable information can be extracted from messy situations, even when the sources aren't perfectly trustworthy. Ruth And it also shows that this process can have a side effect where it amplifies existing differences in what different groups believe they know about the situation.

Warren: The paper is quite robust across different assumptions about how much noise there is or how people are initially set up to believe certain things. Iris And one limitation the authors themselves mention is that this whole model relies on a specific baseline where the judge has some domain-specific heuristics, which means it doesn't capture every single nuance of real-world decision making.

Ruth: That makes sense; they're not trying to model reality perfectly, just to show what happens under these specific conditions. Warren But what they do show is that truth-telling by the expert is maintained because the structure is set up to keep it that way through those selection rules and the information feedback loop.

Iris: So ultimately, this paper gives us a framework for understanding why certain behaviors emerge in competitive information settings, showing how incentives shape communication patterns between experts and those who aren't.

Conclusion: Ruth: So we've been looking at how this game between an expert and a quack plays out, and now we’re going to wrap up what "Separating the Wheat from the Chaff" actually means for us.

Warren: It boils down to competition disciplining communication. The core idea is that in the judge's best scenario, the expert tells his true state, and that quack just copies him strategically.

Iris: And they do that because when things are tied on what both speakers say, the judge has to pick the one who makes a more extreme message. That premium for extremity sustains truth-telling from the expert.

Ruth: Right, so competition isn't just random noise; it’s actually a mechanism that forces the expert to be honest because of how the judge is set up to reward those specific types of signals.

Warren: It’s about extracting reliable information from what would otherwise be a messy exchange between someone who knows the truth and someone who doesn't.

Iris: But there’s a caveat, and it’s important. This whole structure amplifies existing differences in what different groups already think they know about the situation.

Ruth: So we have this system where reliable information can be pulled out from strategic claims, but it also has this side effect of making pre-existing knowledge gaps between audiences wider.

Warren: The authors show that this works even when you add more complexity, like different ways people start to believe things or varying noise in the judge's private signals.

Iris: They also look at how learning happens. If the judge has a clearer signal about what’s happening, they get better at figuring out the true state of things.

Ruth: It suggests that exposure to competing sources of information can actually increase informational inequality across different groups in a way that isn't just about bias.

Warren: That’s the big picture for me—it shows how we can extract reliable signals even when the sources aren't perfectly trustworthy, provided you have a judge with some level of private knowledge.

Iris: And they also look at sequential communication, which changes things entirely by disrupting the quack’s symmetry with the expert.

Ruth: It’s a tight squeeze for these speakers—the expert stays truthful, the quack mimics him in this setup—and it's a neat mechanism for extracting signal.

Warren: So what this means for us is that when you look at how information flows between experts and non-experts, the structure matters more than just the individual claims being made.

Toulouse School of Economics · London School of Economics

econ.TH

Submitted: 2026-01-02

Updated: 2026-11-04

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Importance score: 76/100

The gist: Separating the Wheat from the Chaff studies a reputational cheap-talk environment in which a judge must choose between an expert and a quack to identify the expert…

Key concepts

Reputational Cheap-Talk Game
A three-player game where a judge chooses between an expert (who knows the truth) and a quack (who doesn't). Both speakers want to be chosen, but the judge wants to identify the expert. The core finding is that this competition leads to predictable behaviors in communication.
Information Begets Information
This means that judges with more precise private knowledge about a situation are better at identifying the expert and learning the true state. Exposure to different sources of uncertain reliability can actually make informational inequality between audiences grow, even if it doesn't rely on bias.
Ex-Ante Symmetry
In this context, ex-ante symmetry refers to whether a speaker's strategy is identical regardless of what the other speaker does beforehand. The paper shows that sequential communication (speakers reporting one after another) breaks this symmetry for the quack relative to the expert.

Terminology

Summary

Separating the Wheat from the Chaff studies a reputational cheap-talk environment in which a judge must choose between an expert and a quack to identify the expert, showing that truth-telling by the expert is robust and that learning in this setting exhibits an “information begets information” property

The Core Game Structure

The study introduces a three-player reputational cheap-talk game where a judge selects one of two speakers, one of whom is an expert perfectly informed about the state and the other is a quack with no information The speakers simultaneously send messages, and the judge selects one, with both seeking to be chosen while the judge wishes to identify the expert In this setting, an equilibrium exists where the expert reports truthfully and the quack strategically mimics the expert’s speech The judge's objective is to select the correct speaker, and each speaker wishes to be selected.

Equilibrium Features

The paper characterizes an equilibrium in which the expert always messages the true state ω and the quack’s messaging strategy replicates the prior state distribution, U[-1, 1] This equilibrium is supported by different selection strategies φ that reward speakers who send extreme messages. A key feature is that when indifferent between two consistent messages, the judge must favor the consistent speaker who sends a more extreme message This premium given to extremism does not induce exaggeration by the expert, but instead sustains truthful communication. p. 3

Where the paper says it

As a result, we find that, in equilibrium, when breaking ties, the judge must favor the consistent speaker who sends a more extreme message. Perhaps surprisingly, this premium given to extremism does not incite the expert to exaggerate his own report.

p. 3
Where the paper says it

As a result, we find that, in equilibrium, when breaking ties, the judge must favor the consistent speaker who sends a more extreme message. Perhaps surprisingly, this premium given to extremism does not incite the expert to exaggerate his own report.

Information Amplification

A central feature of equilibrium is that information begets information, meaning judges with more precise private knowledge are more likely to identify the expert and learn the true state This mechanism implies that exposure to competing sources of uncertain reliability may amplify informational inequality across audiences This observation offers a simple explanation for the coexistence of widespread access to information and growing informational inequality, without appealing to partisan bias or selective exposure.

Robustness and Extensions

The findings are robust across various distributional assumptions; the judge’s best equilibrium continues to feature truth-telling by the expert and a selection rule that favors more extreme messages when breaking ties Extensions explore non-uniform state distributions, asymmetric prior beliefs about speaker identities, and non-uniform noise in the judge’s private signal. In these extensions, the quack's incentives to mimic the expert dampen as we go from higher to lower messages.

Learning Dynamics

The judge's learning about the state is characterized by Proposition 2, which shows that the probability that the judge learns the state is given by Pn Gˆ = 1ifω o = 1 − ε¯23 This probability is increasing in the precision of the judge’s private signal. Furthermore, Proposition 3 shows that the reduction in expected posterior variance is an increasing function of the judge’s noise ε¯ ∈ [0, 1] This means that less informed judges benefit most from communication coming from competing and potentially unreliable sources in terms of posterior variance reduction.

The Role of Communication Order

Sequential communication, where speakers report to the judge after one another, is shown to destroy the quack’s ex-ante symmetry with the expert In this setting, sequential communication destroys the quack’s ex-ante symmetry with the expert. The key insight is that sequential communication destroys the quack’s ex-ante symmetry with the expert. p. 3

Where the paper says it

The selection rule used by the judge in such indifference cases is a key equilibrium object. If the judge breaks ties uniformly, randomly selecting one of the two consistent speakers, the quack has incentives to “pander to the mean,” because more moderate messages are ex-ante more likely to be consistent with the judge’s signal.

Conclusion

In summary, competition between speakers can discipline communication: in the judge’s best equilibrium, the expert reports truthfully, the quack strategically mimics the expert’s speech, and the judge rationally favors more extreme messages when breaking ties These forces generate a simple mechanism through which reliable information can be extracted from strategic claims while sometimes also amplifying pre-existing differences in audiences’ information. In the judge’s best equilibrium, the expert reports his signal truthfully, and the quack’s messaging strategy does not “pander” to states that are most likely to arise The paper concludes by showing that sequential communication destroys the quack’s ex-ante symmetry with the expert. p. 2

Where the paper says it

We focus on the equilibrium that yields the highest ex-ante value to the judge. In this equilibrium, (1) the expert reports the state truthfully; (2) the quack chooses his message at random, replicating the marginal distribution over messages used by the expert; (3) when indifferent, the judge is biased towards selecting the speaker who sent the more extreme message.

p. 2
Where the paper says it

We focus on the equilibrium that yields the highest ex-ante value to the judge. In this equilibrium, (1) the expert reports the state truthfully; (2) the quack chooses his message at random, replicating the marginal distribution over messages used by the expert; (3) when indifferent, the judge is biased towards selecting the speaker who sent the more extreme message.

References

Acemoglu, D., Chernozhukov, V., and M. Yildız (2009). “Fragility of Asymptotic Agreement under Bayesian Learning,” Theoretical Economics, 11, 187–225

Andreoni, J., and T. Mylovanov (2012). p. 6

Where the paper says it

This result rests on the fact that speakers are only concerned about building reputation as an expert, which implies that, fixing the expert’s strategy, the communication game is zero-sum between the quack and the judge. 4Relatedly, Andreoni and Mylovanov (2012) show how two-dimensional uncertainty — in our case, about the state and about the speakers’ expertise — might lead to divergence of posterior beliefs along a one-dimensional subspace.

“Diverging Opinions,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 4, 209–232

Angelucci, C., and A. Prat (2024). p. 3

Where the paper says it

This observation offers a simple explanation for the coexistence of widespread access to information and growing informational inequality, without appealing to partisan bias or selective exposure. It also connects naturally to recent experimental evidence: Angelucci and Prat (2024) show that individuals differ sharply in their ability to identify true news when confronted with both true and false reports, and that these differences are strongly related to background characteristics that plausibly proxy for prior information or domain knowledge.

“Is Journalistic Truth Dead? p. 0
Where the paper says it

We show that learning in this environment exhibits an “information begets information” property: judges with more precise private information are more likely to identify the expert and learn the true state, implying that exposure to competing sources of uncertain reliability may amplify informational inequality across audiences. 1 Introduction New media technologies do not discriminate between truth and lies, leaving it up to people to decide whom to believe.

Measuring How Informed Voters are about Political News,” American Economic Review, 114, 887–925

Battaglini, M. (2002). “Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk,” Econometrica, 70, 1379–1401

Brandenburger, A., and B. Polak (1996). p. 5

Where the paper says it

One implication is that information polarization or inequality can arise because different media outlets cater to pre-existing heterogeneous priors across a population. A similar “echo-chamber” result supports informational inequalities in Perego 2 In Brandenburger and Polak (1996), the sender’s concern isn’t about the receiver’s assessment of their ability, but about the quality of their decisions.

“When Managers Cover Their Posteriors: Making the Decisions the Market Wants to See,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 27, 523–541

Cheng, I.-H., and A. Hsiaw (2022). p. 6

Where the paper says it

and Yuksel (2022), and the mechanism is strengthened by media competition. Our paper proposes an alternative explanation for the coexistence of widespread access to information and growing information inequality, which does not appeal to media companies pandering to their audience (remember that our benchmark equilibrium features truth-telling by the expert and no pandering by the quack).

“Distrust in Experts and the Origins of Disagreement,” Journal of Economic Theory, 200, 1–60

Crawford, V., and J. Sobel (1982). p. 4

Where the paper says it

As a result, commitment has no value in this environment: the judge’s payoff (the probability of identifying the expert) is pinned down entirely by how successfully the quack can masquerade as informed. Related literature: Our paper contributes to the vast literature on cheap talk models, starting with Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Green and Stokey (2007), and especially that on reputational cheap talk.

“Strategic Information Transmission,” Econometrica, 50, 1431–1451

Dixit, A., and J. Weibull (2007). p. 4

Where the paper says it

As a result, commitment has no value in this environment: the judge’s payoff (the probability of identifying the expert) is pinned down entirely by how successfully the quack can masquerade as informed. Related literature: Our paper contributes to the vast literature on cheap talk models, starting with Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Green and Stokey (2007), and especially that on reputational cheap talk.

“Political Polarization,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104, 7351–7356

Effinger, M. R., and M. K. Polborn (2001). p. 4

Where the paper says it

Related literature: Our paper contributes to the vast literature on cheap talk models, starting with Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Green and Stokey (2007), and especially that on reputational cheap talk. Morris (2001) shows 5

“Herding and Anti-Herding: A Model of Reputational Differentiation,” European Economic Review, 45, 385–403

Friedman, E. (1998). “Public Debate among Experts,” Northwestern University, CMS-EMS Working Paper 1234

Gentzkow, M., and J. M. Shapiro (2006). p. 5

Where the paper says it

2, we show that pandering by the quack to extreme messages — against the prior — can arise due to the structure of the receiver’s private information. 3 Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) is particularly close to our work in motivation: they interpret media companies as speakers who wish to develop a reputation for expertise (in their model, expertise is tied with honesty).

“Media Bias and Reputation,” Journal of Political Economy, 114, 280–316

Glazer, J., and C.-T. Ma (1999). “Efficient Allocation of a ‘Prize’—King Solomon’s Dilemma,” Games and Economic Behavior, 27, 222–233

Glazer, J., and A. Rubinstein (2001). p. 6

Where the paper says it

Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001) find that (sometimes) it is best to start with the best informed speaker when speakers proceed sequentially. Glazer and Rubinstein (1997) show that sequential communication can be used to economize on information transmission.

“Debates and Decisions: On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules,” Games and Economic Behavior, 36, 158–173

Glazer, J., and A. Rubinstein (1998). p. 6

Where the paper says it

5See also Friedman (1998), in which the decision to become an expert is a choice, as a function of the bias. 6The role of motives in the design of mechanisms is further elaborated on in Glazer and Rubinstein (1998).

“Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions,” Journal of Economic Theory, 79, 157–173

Green, J. R., and N. Stokey (2007). p. 4

Where the paper says it

As a result, commitment has no value in this environment: the judge’s payoff (the probability of identifying the expert) is pinned down entirely by how successfully the quack can masquerade as informed. Related literature: Our paper contributes to the vast literature on cheap talk models, starting with Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Green and Stokey (2007), and especially that on reputational cheap talk.

“A Two-Person Game of Information Transmission,” Journal of Economic Theory, 135, 90–104

Karlin, S. (1959). Mathematical Methods and Theory in Games, Programming, and Economics, Vol. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Separating the Wheat from the Chaff Johannes Hörner Paula Onuchic Toulouse School of Economics London School of Economics January, 2026 Abstract We study a reputational cheap-talk environment in which a judge, who is privately and imperfectly informed about a state, must choose between two speakers of unknown reliability. Exactly one speaker is an expert who perfectly observes the state, while the other is a quack with no information.

2: The Theory of Infinite Games. p. 2
Where the paper says it

(In one of our extensions, we consider epistemic knowledge about the sources themselves, reflecting some previous experience that directly affects the judge’s prior belief about each speaker’s expertise. ) Cheap-talk games admit many equilibria.

Addison-Wesley Publishing Company

Krishna, V., and J. Morgan (2001). p. 6

Where the paper says it

A smaller literature equally considers models of cheap talk with multiple senders. In Krishna and Morgan (2001) and Battaglini (2002), the experts have known biases, as in Crawford and Sobel, and Green and Stokey.

“A Model of Expertise,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 747–775

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Maskin, E. (1999). “Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality,” Review of Economic Studies, 66, 23–38

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Nichols, T. (2017). Why We Distrust Experts: The Death of Expertise Explained. p. 1

Where the paper says it

When audiences must sort through conflicting claims without an external arbiter, their problem of learning the truth becomes inseparable from that of learning about the expertise of different sources. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that speakers are not neutral conveyors of information: they are often motivated by the prospect of being recognized, trusted, or selected as experts.

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Ottaviani, M., and P. Sørensen (2001). p. 5

Where the paper says it

Olszewski (2004) considers a sender who wishes to be perceived as honest, and shows that truth-telling is an equilibrium. Our paper is more closely related to those in which senders are concerned about their reputation for expertise, such as Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Prendergast (1993), Prendergast and Stole (1996), and Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001, 2006a, 2006b).

“Information Aggregation in Debate: Who Should Speak First? p. 3
Where the paper says it

Perhaps surprisingly, this premium given to extremism does not incite the expert to exaggerate his own report. Roughly speaking, because of his private information, the probability the expert speaker assigns to his message being consistent with the judge’s signal is more elastic than the quack’s: by straying away from the truth, he knows that he risks inconsistency, whereas the quack does not know where the truth lies in the first place.

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Ottaviani, M., and P. Sørensen (2006a). p. 5

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Olszewski (2004) considers a sender who wishes to be perceived as honest, and shows that truth-telling is an equilibrium. Our paper is more closely related to those in which senders are concerned about their reputation for expertise, such as Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Prendergast (1993), Prendergast and Stole (1996), and Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001, 2006a, 2006b).

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Ottaviani, M., and P. Sørensen (2006b). p. 5

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Olszewski (2004) considers a sender who wishes to be perceived as honest, and shows that truth-telling is an equilibrium. Our paper is more closely related to those in which senders are concerned about their reputation for expertise, such as Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Prendergast (1993), Prendergast and Stole (1996), and Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001, 2006a, 2006b).

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Perego, J., and S. Yuksel (2022). p. 6

Where the paper says it

and Yuksel (2022), and the mechanism is strengthened by media competition. Our paper proposes an alternative explanation for the coexistence of widespread access to information and growing information inequality, which does not appeal to media companies pandering to their audience (remember that our benchmark equilibrium features truth-telling by the expert and no pandering by the quack).

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Prendergast, C. (1993). “A Theory of ‘Yes Men’,” American Economic Review, 83, 757–770

Prendergast, C., and L. Stole (1996). p. 5

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Olszewski (2004) considers a sender who wishes to be perceived as honest, and shows that truth-telling is an equilibrium. Our paper is more closely related to those in which senders are concerned about their reputation for expertise, such as Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Prendergast (1993), Prendergast and Stole (1996), and Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001, 2006a, 2006b).

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Scharfstein, D., and J. Stein (1990). p. 5

Where the paper says it

Olszewski (2004) considers a sender who wishes to be perceived as honest, and shows that truth-telling is an equilibrium. Our paper is more closely related to those in which senders are concerned about their reputation for expertise, such as Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Prendergast (1993), Prendergast and Stole (1996), and Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001, 2006a, 2006b).

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Pruning redundant reasoning tokens

The paper characterizes an equilibrium in which the expert always messages the true state ω and the quack’s messaging strategy replicates the prior state distribution, U[-1, 1] This equilibrium is supported by different selection strategies φ that reward speakers who send extreme messages. A key feature is that when indifferent between two consistent messages, the judge must favor the consistent speaker who sends a more extreme message This premium given to extremism does not induce exaggeration by the expert, but instead sustains truthful communication.

How the training signal is built

The judge's learning about the state is characterized by Proposition 2, which shows that the probability that the judge learns the state is given by Pn Gˆ = 1ifω o = 1 − ε¯23 This probability is increasing in the precision of the judge’s private signal. Furthermore, Proposition 3 shows that the reduction in expected posterior variance is an increasing function of the judge’s noise ε¯ ∈ [0, 1] This means that less informed judges benefit most from communication coming from competing and potentially unreliable sources in terms of posterior variance reduction.

Where the gains come from

The paper shows that competition between speakers can discipline communication: in the judge’s best equilibrium, the expert reports truthfully, the quack strategically mimics the expert’s speech, and the judge rationally favors more extreme messages when breaking ties This mechanism generates a simple way through which reliable information can be extracted from strategic claims while sometimes also amplifying pre-existing differences in audiences’ information The analysis relies on a number of stark assumptions, some of which are relaxed in extensions. In the judge’s best equilibrium, the expert reports his signal truthfully, and the quack’s messaging strategy does not “pander” to states that are most likely to arise The paper concludes by showing that sequential communication destroys the quack’s ex-ante symmetry with the expert.

Green — the paper says it, and the page is printed. Red — no passage carries it, so treat that sentence as unverified. The same check runs on your own text: check a summary against its source, $5.

Improvements for AI systems

  1. Strategic Information Extraction in Media Environments: The AI system can model how competing sources of uncertain reliability amplify informational inequality across audiences, leading to a mechanism where exposure to competing sources of uncertain reliability may amplify informational inequality across audiences.

  2. Expert Identification and Truth-Telling Robustness: The system can be designed to favor truth-telling by the expert even under noisy or partial information, as the paper shows that the key force — the greater elasticity of the informed speaker’s probability of being selected when deviating from his signal — may still favor honesty.

  3. Dynamic Prior Adjustment for Uninformed Agents: The AI can implement a strategy where uninformed agents adjust their messaging based on what they believe is most likely to be consistent with the judge's signal, as seen in the quack's behavior pandering to moderate messages when the quack’s incentives to mimic the expert don’t dampen as we go from higher to lower messages.

  4. Adaptive Selection Rules Based on Signal Precision: The system can employ a selection rule that rewards more extreme messages when breaking ties, as shown in Theorem 1, allowing the judge to learn the true state even when the judge is uncertain favors more extreme messages when breaking ties between otherwise plausible claims.

Abstract

We study a reputational cheap-talk environment in which a judge chooses between two speakers of unknown expertise, an expert and a quack. Both speakers seek to be selected, while the judge wishes to identify the expert. The best equilibrium for the judge features truth-telling by the expert, yet the judge favors speakers with more extreme messages. This bias toward extremism does not induce exaggeration, but instead sustains truthful communication. We characterize the quack's equilibrium messaging strategy, relating the degree to which it panders to the judge's prior to the state distribution, the speakers' initial reputations, and the judge's private knowledge of the state. We interpret these results in the context of two applications, the post-training of AI chatbots through human feedback and media competition.

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