The Walls Have Ears: Unveiling Cross-Chain Sandwich Attacks in DeFi
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Introduction to the show: ident: Computer Science. The day in computer science: software, systems and theory on arXiv.
Tom: We're looking at the paper: "The Walls Have Ears".
Jane: Here's the gist of the paper. Cross-chain sandwich attacks targeting liquidity pool-based cross-chain bridge protocols are investigated to uncover a critical vulnerability where attackers can exploit events emitted on the source chain to learn transaction details on the destination chain before they appear in the destination chain mempool This information advantage allows attackers to strategically place front-running and back-running transactions, ensuring that their front-running transactions always precede those of existing MEV bots monitoring the mempool of the destination chain The Nature of the Attack The attack exploits information leakage across chains by monitoring specific events emitted on source chain in CCMP protocols to learn about forthcoming cross-chain swap transactions on the destination chain The attacker continuously monitors specific events emitted by cross-chain protocols to learn about forthcoming cross-chain swap transactions on the destination chain This early access renders most previously proposed mitigations against single-chain sandwich attacks ineffective, as it does not need to wait for victim’s transaction to be visible in the destination chain’s mempool Empirical Findings and Quantification The empirical study using two months of cross-chain transaction data from the Symbiosis protocol identified attacks that collectively garnered over 5.27 million USD in profit, equivalent to 1.28% of the total bridged volume This analysis reveals that these attacks generated a total profit of approximately 5.27 million USD, representing 1.28% of the total bridged volume during the observation period Furthermore, cross-chain sandwich attacks have the greatest impact on the BSC network Detection and Heuristics The cross-chain sandwich attack detection algorithm is inspired by the method to identify potential single-chain sandwich attacks provided by Qin et al.
3: The heuristics adopted include checking the Direction, Pair, Amounts, Position, and Timestamp of transactions The algorithm queries logs for frontlogs and backlogs between specified block numbers to identify potential pairs Mitigation Limitations Existing defenses against sandwich attacks are designed for single-chain settings and therefore cannot address attacks that exploit information leakage across chains Mechanisms like Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) and private or encrypted mempools do not protect against this attack because the leak occurs before any mempool logic applies The information necessary for cross-chain sandwich attacks is obtained on the source chain, meaning future changes to destination chain mempool opacity would not prevent this attack Future Directions Future works plan to extend this line of reasoning to examine whether other MEV activities, such as arbitrage or liquidation, can gain additional advantage in cross-chain settings The authors also intend to investigate the existence and prevalence of these strategies using historical data They also discuss potential countermeasures such as private relayers and encrypted messages, though these introduce trade-offs like centralization or high gas costs The work highlights a critical security risk introduced by cross-chain interoperability and aims to inspire more robust DeFi defense mechanisms In this paper, we identify a previously unrecognized cross-chain sandwich attack in which an attacker exploits information leaked by cross-chain protocols to execute profitable front-running and back-running transactions In this setting, existing defenses against sandwich attacks fail, allowing attackers to consistently outperform current MEV bots We provide a theoretical analysis of the cross-chain sandwich attack and conduct an empirical study on historical data from a major cross-chain protocol Our results show that this class of attacks produced at least 5.27 million USD in profit over a two-month period We are the first to construct and publicly release a large-scale dataset of cross-chain sandwich attacks, providing a foundation for future research on cross-chain security The work highlights a critical security risk introduced by cross-chain interoperability and aims to inspire more robust DeFi defense mechanisms Acknowledgment This work is supported by the Guangzhou-HKUST(GZ) Joint Funding Program (No.
Jane: 2024A03J0630 and No.
Tom: 2025A03J3882), the Guangzhou Municipal Science and Technology Project (No.
Title and authors: Jane: So, moving past the setup, what’s the actual big finding here? The paper calls this a previously unrecognized cross-chain sandwich attack that completely bypasses existing single-chain defenses.
Lu: They found that by accessing transaction details before they appear on the destination chain, an attacker can consistently outperform existing MEV bots in transaction ordering competitions.
Tom: And they quantified the impact pretty clearly. They conducted a large scale empirical study using two months of cross-chain transaction data, and attackers extracted approximately five point two seven million US dollars in profit during that time, which is about one point two eight percent of the total bridged volume <ref:2511.15245#pg1>.
Meng: five million dollars from just those attacks is a lot when you think about the overall volume of cross-chain activity we see on protocols like Symbiosis or deBridge. That's significant money being extracted before it even hits the main ledger.
Jane: It’s interesting because they are not just pointing out a theoretical risk; they constructed and released the first large scale dataset of cross-chain sandwich attacks, which is a real foundation for future research on cross-chain MEV and security analysis.
The paper's summary: Tom: To summarize what they did, the researchers investigate how information leakage across chains exposes transaction metadata. They show that because relayers monitor events emitted by smart contracts on one chain, or parse outputs on another, this happens before the corresponding transactions appear in the destination chain mempool.
Lu: They outline a flow using numbered steps where a user signs a transaction on the source chain, then calls the bridge contract, and then emits an event that an attacker monitors to get details about their swap on the destination chain.
Jane: The key finding is that this information advantage allows attackers to place front-running transactions and back-running transactions in a way that ensures their front-running ones always precede those of existing MEV bots monitoring the destination chain's mempool.
Meng: So, if you’re building a system, it means the problem isn't just about securing one side of the bridge; it’s about securing the information flow between chains itself.
Tom: Right, and they also noted that this specific attack class has the greatest impact on the BSC network among those they studied.
The paper's improvements: Jane: Now, what are these authors suggesting we do to fight this? They point out that existing defenses against sandwich attacks are designed for single-chain settings, so they don’t work here because the leak occurs before any mempool logic applies.
Lu: They suggest that future research should look at whether other MEV activities like arbitrage or liquidation can gain an additional advantage in cross-chain settings, and they plan to investigate the existence and prevalence of these strategies using historical data.
Tom: And they also discuss potential countermeasures, like private relayers or encrypted messages, but they admit those introduce trade-offs like centralization or high gas costs.
Meng: From a deployment standpoint, that means we have to weigh the security gain against the operational cost and complexity of implementing things like private relayers. It’s not a simple fix.
Jane: They also propose that swap calldata generation should be moved to the destination chain, advising relayer nodes to only receive minimal intent information instead of full pool and path details, which helps prevent attackers from predicting exact future calldata.
Conclusion: Tom: So, wrapping up on "The Walls Have Ears: Unveiling Cross-Chain Sandwich Attacks in DeFi", the main point is that cross-chain interoperability introduces a critical security risk by exposing transaction details that allow attackers to consistently outmaneuver existing MEV bots.
Jane: They’ve proven this with empirical data showing profits of about five point two seven million US dollars over two months, and they provided the first large scale dataset to help everyone study this area further <ref:2511.15245#pg1>.
Lu: The implication is that we need a new set of defenses specifically tailored for cross-chain contexts, focusing on how information flows between chains rather than just securing individual chain transaction ordering.
Meng: For deployment, it means we can’t rely solely on existing single-chain security patterns; we have to build in these cross-chain leak protections from the start.
Lalam: I'm fairly certain that if you look at the data they collected, the profit distribution appears roughly symmetric around zero for the profit rate itself, but large volume opportunities tend to produce positive returns.
Tom: That's interesting because it suggests that while there are losses, when an attacker finds a good opportunity in this setting, their expected profit rate is positive under those empirical values.
Jane: So we’ve seen how these attacks work and how big the potential profit can be, and now we know where to look for new defenses when we think about building secure cross-chain applications.
Chuanlei Li, Zhicheng Sun, Jing Xin Yuu, Xuechao Wang
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou)
cs.CE
Submitted: 2025-11-19
Updated: 2026-11-16
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Importance score: 89/100
The gist: Cross-chain sandwich attacks targeting liquidity pool-based cross-chain bridge protocols are investigated to uncover a critical vulnerability where attackers can exploit events emitted on the source…
Key concepts
- Cross-Chain Sandwich Attack
- An attacker monitors specific events emitted by a cross-chain bridge protocol on the source chain to learn details about an upcoming swap transaction on the destination chain. This information advantage allows the attacker to strategically place front-running or back-running transactions, ensuring their trades execute before legitimate users' transactions in the destination chain mempool.
- Information Leakage Across Chains
- This occurs when data emitted by a protocol on one blockchain (the source chain) is accessible to an attacker who is monitoring that source chain. Because cross-chain protocols emit these events, attackers gain early knowledge of future activities on the destination chain, bypassing typical mempool privacy protections.
- Mitigation Limitations
- Current defenses against sandwich attacks are designed only for single-chain environments and fail here because the information leak happens on the source chain. Even if destination chain mempools become private later, the attacker already possesses the necessary details from the initial source chain monitoring.
Terminology
Summary
Cross-chain sandwich attacks targeting liquidity pool-based cross-chain bridge protocols are investigated to uncover a critical vulnerability where attackers can exploit events emitted on the source chain to learn transaction details on the destination chain before they appear in the destination chain mempool This information advantage allows attackers to strategically place front-running and back-running transactions, ensuring that their front-running transactions always precede those of existing MEV bots monitoring the mempool of the destination chain
The Nature of the Attack
The attack exploits information leakage across chains by monitoring specific events emitted on source chain in CCMP protocols to learn about forthcoming cross-chain swap transactions on the destination chain The attacker continuously monitors specific events emitted by cross-chain protocols to learn about forthcoming cross-chain swap transactions on the destination chain This early access renders most previously proposed mitigations against single-chain sandwich attacks ineffective, as it does not need to wait for victim’s transaction to be visible in the destination chain’s mempool
Empirical Findings and Quantification
The empirical study using two months of cross-chain transaction data from the Symbiosis protocol identified attacks that collectively garnered over 5.27 million USD in profit, equivalent to 1. p. 0 Our analysis identifies attacks that
collectively garnered over 5. 27 million USD in profit, equivalent
to 1. We collect two months of transaction records from the
Symbiosis protocol [16] (August 10 to October 10, 2025)
and apply our heuristic detection algorithm to systematically
locate cross-chain sandwich behaviors. Our analysis reveals
that these attacks generated a total profit of approximately
5. Our analysis reveals
that these attacks generated a total profit of approximately
5. 27 million USD, representing 1.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Detection and Heuristics
The cross-chain sandwich attack detection algorithm is inspired by the method to identify potential single-chain sandwich attacks provided by Qin et al. [3] The heuristics adopted include checking the Direction, Pair, Amounts, Position, and Timestamp of transactions The algorithm queries logs for frontlogs and backlogs between specified block numbers to identify potential pairs
Mitigation Limitations
Existing defenses against sandwich attacks are designed for single-chain settings and therefore cannot address attacks that exploit information leakage across chains Mechanisms like Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) and private or encrypted mempools do not protect against this attack because the leak occurs before any mempool logic applies The information necessary for cross-chain sandwich attacks is obtained on the source chain, meaning future changes to destination chain mempool opacity would not prevent this attack
Future Directions
Future works plan to extend this line of reasoning to examine whether other MEV activities, such as arbitrage or liquidation, can gain additional advantage in cross-chain settings The authors also intend to investigate the existence and prevalence of these strategies using historical data They also discuss potential countermeasures such as private relayers and encrypted messages, though these introduce trade-offs like centralization or high gas costs The work highlights a critical security risk introduced by cross-chain interoperability and aims to inspire more robust DeFi defense mechanisms
Conclusion
In this paper, we identify a previously unrecognized cross-chain sandwich attack in which an attacker exploits information leaked by cross-chain protocols to execute profitable front-running and back-running transactions In this setting, existing defenses against sandwich attacks fail, allowing attackers to consistently outperform current MEV bots We provide a theoretical analysis of the cross-chain sandwich attack and conduct an empirical study on historical data from a major cross-chain protocol Our results show that this class of attacks produced at least 5.27 million USD in profit over a two-month period We are the first to construct and publicly release a large-scale dataset of cross-chain sandwich attacks, providing a foundation for future research on cross-chain security The work highlights a critical security risk introduced by cross-chain interoperability and aims to inspire more robust DeFi defense mechanisms
Acknowledgment
This work is supported by the Guangzhou-HKUST(GZ) Joint Funding Program (No. 2024A03J0630 and No. 2025A03J3882), the Guangzhou Municipal Science and Technology Project (No. p. 0 The Walls Have Ears:
Unveiling Cross-Chain Sandwich Attacks in DeFi
Chuanlei Li†
, Zhicheng Sun†
, Jing Xin Yuu†
, Xuechao Wang†
†The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou)
Email:{cli839,zsun277,jxyuu971}@connect. cn, xuechaowang@hkust-gz. n
sπ Slippage tolerance of Tπ which is in (0, 1)
Nπ Block number of transaction Tπ
TA1 Front-running transaction from A
TA2 Back-running transaction from A
TB1 Front-running transaction from B
TB2 Back-running transaction from B
(x0, y0) Reserves of token X and Y before TA1
(xπ, yπ) Reserves of token X and Y after Tπ
(∆xπ, ∆yπ) Amounts of token X and Y exchanged in Tπ
p Probability that A does not incur a loss after the
execution of Tv with noisy transactions. q Probability that there is no noisy transactions
between TA1 and Tv
θ Percentage that A expects to extract from Tv
Prominent cross-chain messaging protocols with integrated liquidity-pool swaps include ThorSwap [25], deBridge [26], and Symbiosis [16], which have processed
total cross-chain volumes of 114.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
References
[3] K. Qin, L. Zhou, and A. Gervais, “Quantifying blockchain extractable value: How dark is the forest? p. 0 For example, institutional traders engage in high-frequency trading by minimizing latency to profit from microsecond-level price movements. A similar phenomenon has emerged in DeFi, where
participants exploit informational advantages embedded in
pending or on-chain transactions to extract profit, a practice
broadly known as Maximum Extractable Value (MEV) [3]. 28% of the total bridged volume. • To foster further research, we construct and release
the first large-scale dataset1 of cross-chain sandwich
attacks, providing an empirical foundation for future
work on cross-chain MEV and security analysis. At the time of writing, it had processed over
4,578,130 cross-chain transactions, with a total cross-chain
transaction volume reaching 6. 44 billion USD [30] since
November 2022.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
[5] P. Daian, S. Goldfeder, T. Kell, Y. Li, X. Zhao, I. Bentov, L. Breidenbach, and A. Juels, “Flash boys 2.0: Frontrunning in decentralized exchanges, miner extractable value, and consensus instability,” in 2020 IEEE symposium on security and privacy (SP). p. 0 The
DeFi market has experienced exponential growth, with the
total value locked (TVL) across protocols exceeding 145
billion USD as of November 3, 2025 [1]. At the heart of
this ecosystem are decentralized exchanges (DEXs), which
enable users to trade digital assets directly on-chain without intermediaries.Where the paper says it
[6] S. Yang, K. Nayak, and F. Zhang, “Decentralization of ethereum’s builder market,” in 2025 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). IEEE, 2025, pp. p. 0 Moreover, current sandwich-attack
defenses are ineffective against this new cross-chain variant. To quantify this threat, we conduct an empirical study using
two months (August 10 to October 10, 2025) of cross-chain
transaction data from the Symbiosis protocol and a tailored
heuristic detection model.Where the paper says it
[7] S. Wang, Y. Huang, W. Zhang, Y. Huang, X. Wang, and J. p. 0 The Walls Have Ears:
Unveiling Cross-Chain Sandwich Attacks in DeFi
Chuanlei Li†
, Zhicheng Sun†
, Jing Xin Yuu†
, Xuechao Wang†
†The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou)
Email:{cli839,zsun277,jxyuu971}@connect. cn, xuechaowang@hkust-gz.Where the paper says it
[8] A. R. Choudhuri, S. Garg, J. Piet, and G.-V. Policharla, “Mempool privacy via batched threshold encryption: Attacks and defenses,” in 33rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 24), 2024, pp. p. 2 28% of the total bridged volume. • To foster further research, we construct and release
the first large-scale dataset1 of cross-chain sandwich
attacks, providing an empirical foundation for future
work on cross-chain MEV and security analysis.Where the paper says it
[9] A. R. Choudhuri, S. Garg, G. V. Policharla, and M. Wang, “Practical mempool privacy via one-time setup batched threshold encryption,” in 34th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 25), 2025, pp. 3477–3495
[10] J. Bormet, S. Faust, H. Othman, and Z. Qu, “BEAT-MEV: Epochless approach to batched threshold encryption for MEV prevention,” in 34th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 25), 2025, pp. p. 2 28% of the total bridged volume. • To foster further research, we construct and release
the first large-scale dataset1 of cross-chain sandwich
attacks, providing an empirical foundation for future
work on cross-chain MEV and security analysis.Where the paper says it
[11] M. Kelkar, S. Deb, S. Long, A. Juels, and S. Kannan, “Themis: Fast, strong order-fairness in byzantine consensus,” in Proceedings of the 2023 acm sigsac conference on computer and communications security, 2023, pp. p. 0 Miners or
validators build blocks using ciphertexts, and a designated
committee later decrypts the included transactions once the
block is finalized, thereby preventing pre-execution visibility
and front-running. Furthermore, several works introduce
fair transaction ordering at the consensus layer [11], [12],
ensuring that users’ transactions are ordered according to
predefined fairness principles rather than miners’ discretion,
thereby reducing opportunities for manipulation.Where the paper says it
[12] Z. Li and E. Pournaras, “Sok: Consensus for fair message ordering,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2411. p. 0 Miners or
validators build blocks using ciphertexts, and a designated
committee later decrypts the included transactions once the
block is finalized, thereby preventing pre-execution visibility
and front-running. Furthermore, several works introduce
fair transaction ordering at the consensus layer [11], [12],
ensuring that users’ transactions are ordered according to
predefined fairness principles rather than miners’ discretion,
thereby reducing opportunities for manipulation.Where the paper says it
[30] “Symbiosis explorer,” https://explorer.symbiosis.finance/transactions, 2025
[36] A. Kate, E. V. Mangipudi, P. Mukherjee, H. Saleem, and S. A. K Thyagarajan, “Non-interactive vss using class groups and application to dkg,” in Proceedings of the 2024 on ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2024, pp. 4286–4300
[37] “Openocean,” https://openocean.finance/, 2025
[18] L. Heimbach and R. p. 2 (7)
If ∆yv ≥ (1 − s)∆y, the execution will be successful,
otherwise it will be reverted so that the sandwich attack fails. According to the theorem proved by Heimbach et al. At the time of writing, it had processed over
4,578,130 cross-chain transactions, with a total cross-chain
transaction volume reaching 6. 44 billion USD [30] since
November 2022.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
[19] E. Tairi, P. Moreno-Sanchez, and C. Schneidewind, “Ledgerlocks: A security framework for blockchain protocols based on adaptor signatures,” in Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2023, pp. p. 2 28% of the total bridged volume. • To foster further research, we construct and release
the first large-scale dataset1 of cross-chain sandwich
attacks, providing an empirical foundation for future
work on cross-chain MEV and security analysis.Where the paper says it
[20] ChainLink, “Understanding cross-chain token transfers,” https://chain.link/education-hub/cross-chain-token-transfers, 2025
[21] M. Herlihy, “Atomic cross-chain swaps,” in Proceedings of the 2018 ACM symposium on principles of distributed computing, 2018, pp. p. 3 The reverse process, Burn-and-Unlock [20],
burns the wrapped tokens on the destination chain and unlocks the corresponding assets on the source chain, keeping
the total supply consistent across chains. Another widely
studied interoperability mechanism is the cross-chain atomic
swap, which guarantees that a cross-chain token swap between two parties either executes fully on both chains or
does not occur at all.Where the paper says it
[33] “Coinmarketcap,” https://coinmarketcap.com/, 2025
[34] “Thorstatistics,” https://runescan.io/stat/swapVolumeUsd?time=month, 2025
Table 1 Summary of Notations
Symbol Description A Attacker that performs cross-chain sandwich attack B Attacker that performs single-chain sandwich attack f Swap fee rate of the pool which is in (0, 1) s Slippage tolerance of Tπ which is in (0, 1) Nπ Block number of transaction Tπ TA1 Front-running transaction from A TA2 Back-running transaction from A TB1 Front-running transaction from B TB2 Back-running transaction from B (x0, y0) Reserves of token X and Y before TA1 (xπ, yπ) Reserves of token X and Y after Tπ (∆xπ, ∆yπ) Amounts of token X and Y exchanged in Tπ p Probability that A does not incur a loss after the execution of Tv with noisy transactions q Probability that there is no noisy transactions between TA1 and Tv θ Percentage that A expects to extract from Tv Prominent cross-chain messaging protocols with integrated liquidity-pool swaps include ThorSwap [25], deBridge [26], and Symbiosis [16] which have processed total cross-chain volumes of 114.15 billion, 17. p. 0 Introduction
Decentralized Finance (DeFi) has emerged as one of the
most transformative innovations in the blockchain ecosystem, fundamentally reshaping financial intermediation. The
DeFi market has experienced exponential growth, with the
total value locked (TVL) across protocols exceeding 145
billion USD as of November 3, 2025 [1]. Introduction
Decentralized Finance (DeFi) has emerged as one of the
most transformative innovations in the blockchain ecosystem, fundamentally reshaping financial intermediation. The
DeFi market has experienced exponential growth, with the
total value locked (TVL) across protocols exceeding 145
billion USD as of November 3, 2025 [1].Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Table 3 Pools Sorted by Numbers of Attacks
Address Tokens Chain Protocol Number of attacks BUSD-WBNB BSC PancakeSwap V3 118731
Table 4 The Difference of Gas Price
δ = GasP riceTv − GasP riceTA2 Number Percentage δ < 0 GWei 175496 55.39%
Figure 7 Case Study of One Cross-Chain Sandwich Attack on the Ethereum Mainnet
do not consider the gas cost here, A gained an additional 0.034 WETH and achieved a 21. p. 7 In the end, excluding gas costs, A gained an
additional 0. 034 WETH and achieved a 21. In the end, excluding gas costs, A gained an
additional 0. 034 WETH and achieved a 21. 034 WETH and achieved a 21. 4% profit rate
((∆xA2 − ∆xA1)/∆xA1), whereas the profit rate of B is
only 0.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Figure 8 Distribution of Absolute Profit and Profit Rate
The distribution of the absolute profit and the profit rate for such a high concentration is that this token pair itself has a large cross-chain trading volume, reaching 330,121,414 USD
Figure 6 Relative Positions of Cross-Chain Sandwich Attacks
Empirically, A tends to sign TA1 immediately upon observing a profitable event and to submit TA2 immediately after Tv is executed in order to realize profit We observe that the distribution of relative positions for all sandwich attacks closely resembles that of profitable sandwich attacks, indicating that the attackers follow similar strategies The ratio GasP riceTA1 GasP riceTv < 1 in 99.56% of cross-chain transaction pairs, meaning almost all gas prices of TA1 is lower than that of Tv
Table 2 Top 10 Blockchain Pairs by Profit
Source chain Ethereum Base Arbitrum Avalanche Ethereum Optimism Avalanche Gnosis Ethereum Polygon Destination chain BSC BSC BSC BSC Base BSC Base BSC Arbitrum Base
Table 3 Pools Sorted by Numbers of Attacks (Continued)
Among them, the BUSD↔WBNB pools are the most frequently targeted, accounting for 57.65% of all identified attacks
Figure 4 Visualization of Profits Across Different Blockchains
The width of a node represents the attacker’s profit in USD realized on the destination chain The total profit we calculated from our dataset is 5,273,857 USD out of a total trading volume of 412,632,065 USD
Figure 8 Distribution of Absolute Profit and Profit Rate (Continued)
In our dataset, single-chain sandwich attacks produced only 6,109 USD in profit, approximately 0.116% of the total profits Taken together with the single-chain sandwich attacks, the attacker’s expected profit rate under these empirical values can be written as E(r) = (q + (1 − q)p)r++ + (1 − q)(1 − p)r− = 3. p. 8 116% of the
total profits. Taken together with the single-chain sandwichWhere the paper says it
The profit accounts for 60.1% of the total attacked volume The profit is calculated based on the tokens’ price in USD as of October 31, 2025
The largest profit from a single sandwich attack is 20,284 USD Additionally, there remains 1,425,500 USD worth of unexploited potential profit The total profit we calculated from our dataset is 5,273,857 USD out of a total trading volume of 412,632,065 USD
The chain pair Ethereum→BSC yields the highest attacker profit, with a total of 2,096,164 USD extracted
Among them, the chain pair Ethereum→BSC yields the highest attacker profit The most sandwich attack-prone token pair on the destination chain is BUSD↔WBNB with a profit of 3,170,661 USD This token pair’s pools are also the most frequently attacked, with a total of 182,620 sandwich transaction pairs The profit accounts for 60.1% of the total attacked volume
Figure 7 Case Study of One Cross-Chain Sandwich Attack on the Ethereum Mainnet (Continued)
Excluding gas costs, A gained an additional 0.034 WETH and achieved a 21.4% profit rate ((∆xA2 − ∆xA1)/∆xA1)
The distribution of the profit rate appears roughly symmetric around zero, while the absolute profit is predominantly positive, indicating that large-volume opportunities overwhelmingly produce positive returns The attacker’s expected profit rate under these empirical values can be written as E(r) = (q + (1 − q)p)r++ + (1 − q)(1 − p)r− = 3.
Green — the paper says it, and the page is printed. Red — no passage carries it, so treat that sentence as unverified. The same check runs on your own text: check a summary against its source, $5.
Improvements for AI systems
-
Cross-chain sandwich attack detection algorithms should be updated to incorporate heuristics that analyze transaction positions relative to source chain events and destination chain execution windows, specifically by implementing checks based on Algorithm 1's criteria for direction, pair matching, and timestamp ranges.
-
The improved system can accurately identify cross-chain sandwich attacks by querying swap logs both before the victim transaction (in the destination chain) and after it within a defined time interval to find front-running and back-running transactions.
-
The AI system can now quantify the threat of cross-chain sandwich attacks by calculating expected profit using empirical parameters like q (probability of no noisy transactions) and p (probability of success given noisy transactions), as shown in Equation 12, to predict attacker profitability.
-
The system can be enhanced to distinguish between single-chain and cross-chain sandwich attacks by analyzing block positions, specifically checking if front-running and back-running transactions occur within the same block versus across different blocks.
-
Mitigation strategies should be designed based on the findings that existing defenses fail because they only protect after a transaction reaches the destination chain, leading to recommendations for private relayers or encrypted messages that hide information emitted on the source chain from public observation.
-
The system can be configured to suggest moving swap calldata generation to the destination chain, as proposed in Section 5, by advising relayer nodes to only receive minimal intent information rather than full pool and path details to prevent attackers from predicting exact future calldata.
Abstract
Cross-chain interoperability is a core component of modern blockchain infrastructure, enabling seamless asset transfers and composable applications across multiple blockchain ecosystems. However, the transparency of cross-chain messages can inadvertently expose sensitive transaction information, creating opportunities for adversaries to exploit value through manipulation or front-running strategies. In this work, we investigate cross-chain sandwich attacks targeting liquidity pool-based cross-chain bridge protocols. We uncover a critical vulnerability where attackers can exploit events emitted on the source chain to learn transaction details on the destination chain before they appear in the destination chain mempool. This information advantage allows attackers to strategically place front-running and back-running transactions, ensuring that their front-running transactions always precede those of existing MEV bots monitoring the mempool of the destination chain. Moreover, current sandwich-attack defenses are ineffective against this new cross-chain variant. To quantify this threat, we conduct an empirical study using cross-chain transaction data from the Symbiosis protocol (November 21, 2022 to April 4, 2026) and Debridge (December 21, 2022 to April 4, 2026), along with a tailored heuristic detection model. Our analysis indicates that this attack has indeed had a significant impact on DeFi.
Sources
- SoK: Consensus for Fair Message Ordering
- Cross-Chain Arbitrage: The Next Frontier of MEV in Decentralized Finance
- Cross-Rollup MEV: Non-Atomic Arbitrage Across L2 Blockchains
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