The Walls Have Ears: Unveiling Cross-Chain Sandwich Attacks in DeFi
summary
The gist
Cross-chain sandwich attacks targeting liquidity pool-based cross-chain bridge protocols are investigated to uncover a critical vulnerability where attackers can exploit events emitted on the source…
In short
Researchers investigated cross-chain sandwich attacks where attackers monitor events on a source chain to predict future transactions on a destination chain before they are public. Empirical data showed these attacks generated over $5.27 million in profit, proving existing single-chain defenses are ineffective. The study highlights the critical security risk introduced by cross-chain interoperability and suggests moving swap calldata generation to the destination chain as a countermeasure.
Key concepts
- Cross-Chain Sandwich Attack
- An attacker monitors specific events emitted by a cross-chain bridge protocol on the source chain to learn details about an upcoming swap transaction on the destination chain. This information advantage allows the attacker to strategically place front-running or back-running transactions, ensuring their trades execute before legitimate users' transactions in the destination chain mempool.
- Information Leakage Across Chains
- This occurs when data emitted by a protocol on one blockchain (the source chain) is accessible to an attacker who is monitoring that source chain. Because cross-chain protocols emit these events, attackers gain early knowledge of future activities on the destination chain, bypassing typical mempool privacy protections.
- Mitigation Limitations
- Current defenses against sandwich attacks are designed only for single-chain environments and fail here because the information leak happens on the source chain. Even if destination chain mempools become private later, the attacker already possesses the necessary details from the initial source chain monitoring.
Terminology used across episodes
This episode discusses
- The Walls Have Ears: Unveiling Cross-Chain Sandwich Attacks in DeFi · Paper Radio
- SoK: Consensus for Fair Message Ordering
- Cross-Chain Arbitrage: The Next Frontier of MEV in Decentralized Finance
- Cross-Rollup MEV: Non-Atomic Arbitrage Across L2 Blockchains
The paper
The Walls Have Ears: Unveiling Cross-Chain Sandwich Attacks in DeFi · Read on arXiv
Chuanlei Li, Zhicheng Sun, Jing Xin Yuu, Xuechao Wang
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou)
Cross-chain interoperability is a core component of modern blockchain infrastructure, enabling seamless asset transfers and composable applications across multiple blockchain ecosystems. However, the transparency of cross-chain messages can inadvertently expose sensitive transaction information, creating opportunities for adversaries to exploit value through manipulation or front-running strategies. In this work, we investigate cross-chain sandwich attacks targeting liquidity pool-based cross-chain bridge protocols. We uncover a critical vulnerability where attackers can exploit events emitted on the source chain to learn transaction details on the destination chain before they appear in the destination chain mempool. This information advantage allows attackers to strategically place front-running and back-running transactions, ensuring that their front-running transactions always precede those of existing MEV bots monitoring the mempool of the destination chain. Moreover, current sandwich-attack defenses are ineffective against this new cross-chain variant. To quantify this threat, we conduct an empirical study using cross-chain transaction data from the Symbiosis protocol (November 21, 2022 to April 4, 2026) and Debridge (December 21, 2022 to April 4, 2026), along with a tailored heuristic detection model. Our analysis indicates that this attack has indeed had a significant impact on DeFi.
Transcript
Introduction to the show: ident: Computer Science. The day in computer science: software, systems and theory on arXiv.
Tom: We're looking at the paper: "The Walls Have Ears".
Jane: Here's the gist of the paper. Cross-chain sandwich attacks targeting liquidity pool-based cross-chain bridge protocols are investigated to uncover a critical vulnerability where attackers can exploit events emitted on the source chain to learn transaction details on the destination chain before they appear in the destination chain mempool This information advantage allows attackers to strategically place front-running and back-running transactions, ensuring that their front-running transactions always precede those of existing MEV bots monitoring the mempool of the destination chain The Nature of the Attack The attack exploits information leakage across chains by monitoring specific events emitted on source chain in CCMP protocols to learn about forthcoming cross-chain swap transactions on the destination chain The attacker continuously monitors specific events emitted by cross-chain protocols to learn about forthcoming cross-chain swap transactions on the destination chain This early access renders most previously proposed mitigations against single-chain sandwich attacks ineffective, as it does not need to wait for victim’s transaction to be visible in the destination chain’s mempool Empirical Findings and Quantification The empirical study using two months of cross-chain transaction data from the Symbiosis protocol identified attacks that collectively garnered over 5.27 million USD in profit, equivalent to 1.28% of the total bridged volume This analysis reveals that these attacks generated a total profit of approximately 5.27 million USD, representing 1.28% of the total bridged volume during the observation period Furthermore, cross-chain sandwich attacks have the greatest impact on the BSC network Detection and Heuristics The cross-chain sandwich attack detection algorithm is inspired by the method to identify potential single-chain sandwich attacks provided by Qin et al.
3: The heuristics adopted include checking the Direction, Pair, Amounts, Position, and Timestamp of transactions The algorithm queries logs for frontlogs and backlogs between specified block numbers to identify potential pairs Mitigation Limitations Existing defenses against sandwich attacks are designed for single-chain settings and therefore cannot address attacks that exploit information leakage across chains Mechanisms like Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) and private or encrypted mempools do not protect against this attack because the leak occurs before any mempool logic applies The information necessary for cross-chain sandwich attacks is obtained on the source chain, meaning future changes to destination chain mempool opacity would not prevent this attack Future Directions Future works plan to extend this line of reasoning to examine whether other MEV activities, such as arbitrage or liquidation, can gain additional advantage in cross-chain settings The authors also intend to investigate the existence and prevalence of these strategies using historical data They also discuss potential countermeasures such as private relayers and encrypted messages, though these introduce trade-offs like centralization or high gas costs The work highlights a critical security risk introduced by cross-chain interoperability and aims to inspire more robust DeFi defense mechanisms In this paper, we identify a previously unrecognized cross-chain sandwich attack in which an attacker exploits information leaked by cross-chain protocols to execute profitable front-running and back-running transactions In this setting, existing defenses against sandwich attacks fail, allowing attackers to consistently outperform current MEV bots We provide a theoretical analysis of the cross-chain sandwich attack and conduct an empirical study on historical data from a major cross-chain protocol Our results show that this class of attacks produced at least 5.27 million USD in profit over a two-month period We are the first to construct and publicly release a large-scale dataset of cross-chain sandwich attacks, providing a foundation for future research on cross-chain security The work highlights a critical security risk introduced by cross-chain interoperability and aims to inspire more robust DeFi defense mechanisms Acknowledgment This work is supported by the Guangzhou-HKUST(GZ) Joint Funding Program (No.
Jane: 2024A03J0630 and No.
Tom: 2025A03J3882), the Guangzhou Municipal Science and Technology Project (No.
Title and authors: Jane: So, moving past the setup, what’s the actual big finding here? The paper calls this a previously unrecognized cross-chain sandwich attack that completely bypasses existing single-chain defenses.
Lu: They found that by accessing transaction details before they appear on the destination chain, an attacker can consistently outperform existing MEV bots in transaction ordering competitions.
Tom: And they quantified the impact pretty clearly. They conducted a large scale empirical study using two months of cross-chain transaction data, and attackers extracted approximately five point two seven million US dollars in profit during that time, which is about one point two eight percent of the total bridged volume <ref:2511.15245#pg1>.
Meng: five million dollars from just those attacks is a lot when you think about the overall volume of cross-chain activity we see on protocols like Symbiosis or deBridge. That's significant money being extracted before it even hits the main ledger.
Jane: It’s interesting because they are not just pointing out a theoretical risk; they constructed and released the first large scale dataset of cross-chain sandwich attacks, which is a real foundation for future research on cross-chain MEV and security analysis.
The paper's summary: Tom: To summarize what they did, the researchers investigate how information leakage across chains exposes transaction metadata. They show that because relayers monitor events emitted by smart contracts on one chain, or parse outputs on another, this happens before the corresponding transactions appear in the destination chain mempool.
Lu: They outline a flow using numbered steps where a user signs a transaction on the source chain, then calls the bridge contract, and then emits an event that an attacker monitors to get details about their swap on the destination chain.
Jane: The key finding is that this information advantage allows attackers to place front-running transactions and back-running transactions in a way that ensures their front-running ones always precede those of existing MEV bots monitoring the destination chain's mempool.
Meng: So, if you’re building a system, it means the problem isn't just about securing one side of the bridge; it’s about securing the information flow between chains itself.
Tom: Right, and they also noted that this specific attack class has the greatest impact on the BSC network among those they studied.
The paper's improvements: Jane: Now, what are these authors suggesting we do to fight this? They point out that existing defenses against sandwich attacks are designed for single-chain settings, so they don’t work here because the leak occurs before any mempool logic applies.
Lu: They suggest that future research should look at whether other MEV activities like arbitrage or liquidation can gain an additional advantage in cross-chain settings, and they plan to investigate the existence and prevalence of these strategies using historical data.
Tom: And they also discuss potential countermeasures, like private relayers or encrypted messages, but they admit those introduce trade-offs like centralization or high gas costs.
Meng: From a deployment standpoint, that means we have to weigh the security gain against the operational cost and complexity of implementing things like private relayers. It’s not a simple fix.
Jane: They also propose that swap calldata generation should be moved to the destination chain, advising relayer nodes to only receive minimal intent information instead of full pool and path details, which helps prevent attackers from predicting exact future calldata.
Conclusion: Tom: So, wrapping up on "The Walls Have Ears: Unveiling Cross-Chain Sandwich Attacks in DeFi", the main point is that cross-chain interoperability introduces a critical security risk by exposing transaction details that allow attackers to consistently outmaneuver existing MEV bots.
Jane: They’ve proven this with empirical data showing profits of about five point two seven million US dollars over two months, and they provided the first large scale dataset to help everyone study this area further <ref:2511.15245#pg1>.
Lu: The implication is that we need a new set of defenses specifically tailored for cross-chain contexts, focusing on how information flows between chains rather than just securing individual chain transaction ordering.
Meng: For deployment, it means we can’t rely solely on existing single-chain security patterns; we have to build in these cross-chain leak protections from the start.
Lalam: I'm fairly certain that if you look at the data they collected, the profit distribution appears roughly symmetric around zero for the profit rate itself, but large volume opportunities tend to produce positive returns.
Tom: That's interesting because it suggests that while there are losses, when an attacker finds a good opportunity in this setting, their expected profit rate is positive under those empirical values.
Jane: So we’ve seen how these attacks work and how big the potential profit can be, and now we know where to look for new defenses when we think about building secure cross-chain applications.
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