The Economics of AI Foundation Models: Openness, Competition, and Governance

arXiv:2510.15200 · econ.TH, cs.AI · Submitted 2025-10-17 · Read on arXiv

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Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.

Ruth: I'm Ruth.

Warren: And I'm Warren, here with Iris.

Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "The Economics of AI Foundation Models".

Title and authors: Ruth: So we’re looking at how this paper develops that game-theoretic model to analyze how openness shapes competition in the AI value chain, and what they find about the incumbent's strategy. It seems they’ve found three distinct strategic regimes for an incumbent developer based on the strength of that data flywheel effect.

Warren: That sounds like a really useful framework for understanding real-world behavior because it moves away from just saying "open is good" or "closed is good." They’re defining when each strategy makes economic sense.

Iris: They break it down into three specific strategies: the Harvest strategy, the Defend strategy, and the Dominate strategy. Each one corresponds to a different strength of that data flywheel effect, let's call it k.

Ruth: When k is weak or very strong, like in those extremes, the incumbent prefers a higher level of openness because they can leverage that advantage effectively regardless of whether they are maximizing short-term gain or long-term market share.

Warren: But for that intermediate range of the data flywheel effect strength, the incumbent strategically restricts openness. That’s where they introduce what they call an “openness trap.”

Iris: The openness trap is a critical policy paradox because transparency mandates, which are often pushed by regulators, can actually backfire by removing firms’ strategic flexibility and lowering their investment.

Ruth: It means that if you try to force a developer into total openness when the data flywheel effect is intermediate, they might end up pivoting to a Harvest strategy instead of what they were aiming for.

The paper's summary: Ruth: To summarize, the paper constructs this game-theoretic framework where the incumbent chooses both a license price and an openness level in the first period, and how that interacts with the deployer’s ability to fine-tune in the next period.

Warren: The deployer’s main job is to take that general model and specialize it for end users through fine-tuning, and the cost of that fine-tuning changes depending on how open the model is.

Iris: Specifically, higher openness, which they call eta one, reduces the deployer’s fine-tuning cost because it makes the architecture more transparent and encourages knowledge sharing within the ecosystem.

Ruth: And that leads directly into their three canonical strategies based on k: when k is low, they harvest by maximizing openness and price for short-term profit; when k is intermediate, they defend by restricting openness to stop entrants from learning; and when k is very high, they dominate with a low price and high openness.

Warren: It really shows that the incumbent's rational choice isn't fixed; it’s dynamic based on how much advantage they actually have in terms of that data flywheel effect.

Iris: And this structure helps us see why vertical integration or simple subsidies might not work as simply as people assume, because their effectiveness is entirely conditional on how strong that data flywheel effect k is.

The paper's improvements: Ruth: The authors suggest some important improvements to the existing literature, mainly by formalizing the economics of strategic openness within a game-theoretic model rather than relying on simpler competition models.

Warren: They argue that existing models of platform competition or open-source software just don't capture the unique dynamics specific to AI value chains, so they needed this new formalization. It’s about filling a gap in the research.

Iris: They also point out that when policymakers mandate full transparency, their analysis shows a regulatory paradox—the openness trap—which implies that governance needs to be nuanced rather than one-size-fits-all.

Ruth: For incumbents, the improvement is recognizing that openness and pricing are tools to be co-optimized based on k; if the flywheel is weak, you maximize short-term revenue; if it’s strong, you accelerate lock-in with lower prices and greater openness.

Warren: And for policymakers, it’s a caution against blunt regulation. They suggest that effective governance might involve things like private model registration to provide oversight without stripping firms of their ability to compete strategically.

Iris: For downstream deployers, the paper offers a clearer test: they should evaluate whether vertical integration is actually efficiency-enhancing by checking if k is strong enough to ensure incumbent victory in the second period. If k is weak, they should avoid integration entirely because it could just lock them out of more efficient entrants.

Conclusion: Ruth: So wrapping up, the paper on The Economics of AI Foundation Models: Openness, Competition, and Governance shows that the strategic choice of openness is deeply tied to the data flywheel effect. It forces us to rethink how we analyze competition in this new value chain.

Warren: Essentially, it gives incumbents a playbook: if your advantage is weak or very strong, lean into openness; if it’s in the middle, play defensively by restricting learning opportunities for competitors.

Iris: And the main implication for regulators is that they have to be careful with mandates because forcing too much openness can actually hurt consumer welfare by causing firms to stop investing in fine-tuning.

Ruth: It really highlights that we can’t just look at the technology itself; we have to model how incentives—like licensing fees and access rules—shape behavior under different levels of competitive advantage.

Warren: It suggests that the "best" strategy isn't a single universal approach but depends entirely on where you land on that strength of the data flywheel effect, k.

Iris: That’s what it gets us thinking about how to structure governance in this space without inadvertently creating those traps for the developers themselves.

School of Business, University of Connecticut · Faculty of Business, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University

econ.TH, cs.AI

Submitted: 2025-10-17

Updated: 2026-11-17

License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/

Importance score: 73/100

The gist: The strategic choice of model “openness” has become a defining issue for the foundation model (FM) ecosystem While this choice is intensely debated…

Key concepts

Data Flywheel Effect (k)
This measures how much a model's performance improves over time due to ecosystem feedback. A strong effect means better models lead to more users, which leads to better data, creating a virtuous cycle of improvement and market dominance.
Openness Trap
This is a policy paradox where regulations forcing transparency can backfire. If a developer is in an intermediate market strength, forced openness removes their strategic flexibility, causing them to reduce investment and lower overall consumer welfare.
Harvest Strategy
When the data flywheel effect is weak, the incumbent maximizes short-term profit by choosing maximum openness combined with a high license price. This strategy focuses on capturing immediate revenue before the market shifts or competitors catch up.
Defend Strategy
For intermediate flywheel strengths, incumbents strategically restrict openness. This move is designed to intentionally hinder potential entrants' ability to learn and improve their models, securing a future advantage through strategic opacity.

Terminology

Summary

The strategic choice of model “openness” has become a defining issue for the foundation model (FM) ecosystem While this choice is intensely debated, its underlying economic drivers remain underexplored

The incumbent’s optimal openness level is surprisingly non-monotonic in the strength of its data flywheel advantage, revealing three distinct strategic regimes When the data flywheel effect is either weak or very strong, the incumbent prefers a higher level of openness; however, for an intermediate range, it strategically restricts openness to impair the entrant’s learning This dynamic gives rise to an “openness trap,” a critical policy paradox where transparency mandates can backfire by removing firms’ strategic flexibility, reducing investment, and lowering welfare

Model Structure and Key Mechanisms

The model constructs a two-period game-theoretic framework featuring an incumbent developer, a downstream deployer, and an entrant developer The incumbent chooses both a license price and an openness level in the first period The deployer invests in fine-tuning to enhance its product The extent of openness determines how much knowledge spills over to empower the entrant’s fine-tuning in the next period

The deployer’s central economic function is to transform a general-purpose FM into a specialized, high-quality product that creates value for end-users The cost of this fine-tuning is given by C1(Q1) = cQ2 1/ (1 + η1) Higher openness η1 reduces the deployer’s fine-tuning cost by making the model’s architecture more transparent and by fostering knowledge sharing in the ecosystem

Strategic Regimes of Openness

The incumbent's optimal strategy is determined by three canonical strategies based on the strength of the data flywheel effect k

(a) Harvest Strategy:

When k ≤ ¯k1, the incumbent adopts a Harvest strategy, choosing maximum openness and a high license price to maximize short-term profit before ceding the future market This corresponds to point S0 in Figure 2

(b) Defend Strategy:

For an intermediate data flywheel effect, the incumbent adopts a Defend strategy, deliberately restricting openness to impair the entrant’s learning and secure a future advantage This corresponds to point S1 in Figure 2

(c) Dominate Strategy:

When the data flywheel effect is very strong, the incumbent can afford a confident display of market power, setting a low price and a correspondingly higher openness threshold to aggressively encourage adoption This corresponds to point S2 in Figure 2

Policy Paradoxes and Interventions

The analysis reveals that other common interventions can be similarly ineffective Vertical integration only benefits the ecosystem when the data flywheel effect is strong enough to overcome the loss of a potentially more efficient competitor Government subsidies intended to spur adoption can be captured entirely by the incumbent through strategic price and openness adjustments, leaving the rest of the value chain worse off

The analysis of policy intervention reveals a regulatory paradox we term the “openness trap” If a regulator forces a developer in the Dominate regime to be fully open, it removes the firm’s ability to compete strategically The incumbent then pivots to the short-term Harvest strategy by charging a high license price This leads to a collapse in the vital fine-tuning effort by the deployer, ultimately reducing consumer surplus and social welfare

Welfare Implications of Vertical Integration and Subsidies

The welfare effects of vertical integration are conditional on the strength of the deployer’s data flywheel effect k When k is strong, integration is efficiency-enhancing; eliminating the license fee and increasing openness boosts first-period fine-tuning Q1v, which in turn strengthens the data flywheel effect 1 + kQ1v and encourages even greater second-period effort Q2v When k is weak, integration becomes anticompetitive by foreclosing a more efficient entrant

Similarly, government subsidies are vulnerable to strategic capture by the incumbent, often leaving the downstream ecosystem worse off than it was before the intervention The subsidy makes the incumbent less willing to compete for the future market

Conclusion and Managerial Insights

The paper provides an actionable playbook for market participants For an incumbent developer, the key is to recognize that openness and pricing are tools to be co-optimized based on the strength of the data flywheel effect that creates deployer lock-in When the flywheel is weak, maximize short-term revenue; when it is strong, accelerate lock-in with lower prices and greater openness; when the race is tight, strategically restrict openness to defend against fast-followers For policymakers, our research is a cautionary tale against one-size-fits-all regulation The “openness trap” suggests that effective governance may require nuanced approaches, like private model registration, that provide oversight without stripping firms of their ability to compete strategically

The paper is 2510.15200.

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Improvements for AI systems

  1. Strategic Openness Optimization: The AI system should dynamically adjust its openness level based on a real-time assessment of its data flywheel effect strength (k). When k is weak, it should maximize openness to capture short-term revenue; when k is intermediate, it must restrict openness to impair future entrants; and when k is very strong, it can confidently set high openness and low pricing.

  2. Competitive Strategy Selection: The system should employ a decision framework based on the data flywheel effect strength (k) to select one of three strategies: Harvest, Defend, or Dominate. This allows the AI to choose between maximizing short-term profit (Harvest), strategically restricting openness to defend against fast followers (Defend), or aggressively encouraging adoption with low prices and high openness when its advantage is very strong (Dominate).

  3. Policy Resilience Against Openness Traps: When faced with regulatory mandates for full model transparency, the system should anticipate that this forces a strategic pivot toward a Harvest strategy due to the openness trap. To avoid this welfare loss, it should be designed to operate effectively under private registration frameworks rather than public disclosure when its data flywheel effect is in an intermediate range.

  4. Vertical Integration Assessment: For downstream deployers, the system should evaluate whether vertical integration benefits the ecosystem by checking if the data flywheel effect (k) is strong enough to ensure incumbent victory in the second period. If k is weak, it should avoid integration to prevent foreclosure of more efficient entrants that could reduce second-period fine-tuning efforts.

  5. Subsidy Capture Mitigation: When government subsidies are introduced, the system must be designed to resist strategic capture by the upstream developer. It should be programmed to recognize that incumbents may respond by raising license fees or restricting openness; therefore, it should prioritize strategies that benefit downstream firms and consumers over those that rely on absorbing subsidy value through increased licensing fees.

Sources

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