Simple Communication
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Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.
Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "Simple Communication".
Paper summary: Ruth: To wrap up, "Simple Communication" looks at how communication costs when you have to simplify complex advice, and they show that equilibrium scores are usually linear or coarsely linear in the state <ref:2509.09621#pg1>.
Warren: The authors highlight that these equilibrium payoffs are generally lower than what you'd expect if both players were perfectly committed to a score <ref:2509.09621#pg1>.
Iris: They establish that for normally distributed states, the best equilibrium scores are linear and correspond to the ex-ante best and worst linear scores <ref:2509.09621#pg8>.
Ruth: The overall implication is that even with aligned preferences, forcing simple communication creates strategic frictions because it limits the information flow from a two-dimensional state <ref:2509.09621#pg1>.
Warren: They show that while you can have commitment to a score, you might be better off deviating into strategies that aren't scores when the problem is high-dimensional <ref:2509.09621#pg1>.
Iris: The paper points out that this whole structure depends on how the state is distributed and whether it's one-dimensional or two-dimensional <ref:2509.09621#pg8>.
Conclusion: Ruth: So, we’re wrapping up on "Simple Communication." Basically, this paper looks at what happens when an expert has to send advice using simple language instead of all the technical details they know about a complex situation.
Warren: Yeah, it boils down to how that simplicity creates friction even when both sides are trying to be nice and share the same goals. The core idea is that just because you want the same payoff doesn't mean communicating simply is as good as communicating perfectly.
Iris: From an econometric standpoint, what they nailed here is characterizing those equilibrium scores. They show that any score that actually works in this setup has to be either linear or a coarse version of a linear score. That’s pretty restrictive.
Ruth: Right, so the payoff structure itself forces the strategy to be simple in some way if it's going to hold up under strategic pressure. But the big point isn't just that scores are linear; it's what that linearity means for the information being shared.
Warren: It means you’re losing information compared to just saying everything, which is a real cost when you’re trying to maximize your expected outcome. That difference between what they can actually do and what they *should* be able to do is where the strategic cost lives.
Iris: And that two-dimensional nature of the state—having two different things that matter—is what makes it interesting. If it were just one thing, you could actually get the perfect outcome with a linear score.
Ruth: Exactly, because in a one-dimensional world, full revelation is possible and optimal. But because this is two dimensions, there are ways for players to deviate from those simple scores that aren't possible in the simpler case.
Warren: So what they’re suggesting is that you can get better results by being clever about *how* you communicate your state, not just by revealing it all. That’s a different kind of strategy than just picking the best possible score.
Iris: It sets up a big question for us: how do we model this in the real world when the state is actually high-dimensional? That leads right into what happens when things aren't normal distributions, which we’ll be looking at next.
Oslo Metropolitan University · University of Oslo
econ.TH
Submitted: 2025-09-11
Updated: 2026-11-17
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Importance score: 81/100
The gist: We study multidimensional cheap talk with simple language and aligned preferences An expert communicates with a decision-maker using a score that aggregates a multidimensional state into a…
Key concepts
- Two-Dimensional State ($ heta$)
- This represents the complex information an expert knows, defined by two variables $ heta = ( heta_1, heta_2)$. The expert observes this state with full support and finite variance. This state dictates the underlying reality that needs to be communicated.
- Equilibrium Score ($s$)
- A score is a measurable function that represents the sender's strategy. It must satisfy an Intermediate Value Property (IVP), meaning it prevents injective mappings from the state space to the message space. This structure ensures that even with simple messages, the sender cannot perfectly reveal the full state.
- Strategic Frictions
- These are barriers to effective communication arising from using simple language instead of revealing every detail. Although players have aligned preferences, this simplicity creates frictions. Linearity in equilibrium implies linear dependence between actions, leading to lower equilibrium payoffs compared to full commitment.
Terminology
Summary
We study multidimensional cheap talk with simple language and aligned preferences An expert communicates with a decision-maker using a score that aggregates a multidimensional state into a one-dimensional message Even though the expert and the decision-maker share the same payoffs, the use of simple language introduces strategic frictions. p. 0 An expert communicates with a decision-maker using a score that aggregates a multidimensional state into a one-dimensional message. Even though the expert and the
decision-maker share the same payoffs, the use of simple language introduces strategic
frictions.Where the paper says it
Model Setup
The model involves two players, a sender and a receiver, who share identical payoff functions based on their actions and a two-dimensional state of the world. The sender observes a two-dimensional state θ = (θ1, θ2) with full support and finite variance. p. 5 There are two players: a sender and a receiver. The sender
has private information about a two-dimensional state of the world, θ = (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ =
R
2
, whose distribution has full support and admits a density function f. When
there is risk of ambiguity, we write ˜θ for the random variable and θ for its realization. The
receiver takes two actions represented by a = (a1, a2) ∈ R
2
. When
there is risk of ambiguity, we write ˜θ for the random variable and θ for its realization. The
receiver takes two actions represented by a = (a1, a2) ∈ R
2
. There are two players: a sender and a receiver. The sender
has private information about a two-dimensional state of the world, θ = (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ =
R
2
, whose distribution has full support and admits a density function f.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Equilibrium Score Characterization
A score s is defined as a non-constant measurable function s: Θ → R that satisfies the Intermediate Value Property (IVP). An equilibrium score requires that for all θ, m, m′ ∈ s(Θ), s(θ) = m ⇒ −ϕ(α1(m)−θ1)2−(α2(m)−θ2)2 ≥ −ϕ(α1(m′)−θ1)2−(α2(m′)−θ2)2. p. 6 Definition 1. A score s is an equilibrium score if there is a receiver’s strategy α such that
• for all θ ∈ Θ, m, m′ ∈ s(Θ),
s(θ) = m ⇒ −ϕ(α1(m)−θ1)
2−(α2(m)−θ2)
2 ≥ −ϕ(α1(m′
)−θ1)
2−(α2(m′
)−θ2)
2
,
• for all m ∈ s(Θ),
α(m) = E[
˜θ|s(θ) = m]. Our main
result is a characterization of equilibrium scores, that is, scores that constitute the sender’s
strategy in a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. For any prior distribution, equilibrium scores
exist (Proposition 1) and must be either linear in the state or a discrete coarsening of a linear
score, up to a relabeling of messages (Proposition 2).Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Strategic Frictions and Payoffs
Communicating via linear scores or their coarsening conveys less information than revealing the state. The key barrier to effective communication is strategic frictions, despite the players’ aligned preferences. p. 2 Moreover, there are scores that yield higher payoffs for both the sender and receiver,
yet these scores are not equilibrium strategies. The key barrier to effective communication is
strategic frictions, despite the players’ aligned preferences. In Section 3, we illustrate the tension between informativeness and equilibrium
behavior in a simplified setting. A consequence of the linearity of scores is that in equilibrium the two actions are linearly
dependent (Proposition 3 and Proposition 4), which in particular implies a monotone relationship between them. Under quadratic-loss utility, any equilibrium score must be linear in the state
or a coarsening of a linear score. As a result, equilibrium payoffs are lower than those
achievable under commitment to a score.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Best Equilibrium Scores under Normal Distribution
When the state is normally distributed, the best equilibrium score is linear and coincides with the ex-ante optimal linear score. This best equilibrium linear score is an eigenvector of ΦΣ, which corresponds to the ex-ante best and worst linear scores. p. 0 As a result, equilibrium payoffs are lower than those
achievable under commitment to a score. Finally, for normally distributed states, we
characterize the equilibrium linear scores and show they correspond to the ex-ante best
and worst linear scores.Where the paper says it
Conclusion on Multidimensionality
The multidimensionality of the model plays a central role because if the state were one-dimensional, a best equilibrium score would yield the commitment payoffs. In a one-dimensional setting, if M = R, full revelation is possible and the best equilibrium yields the commitment payoffs. p. 2 A score that yields high payoffs
ex-ante might therefore not be an equilibrium score if the sender has a profitable deviation in
some states. In Section 3, we illustrate the tension between informativeness and equilibrium
behavior in a simplified setting. A score that yields high payoffs
ex-ante might therefore not be an equilibrium score if the sender has a profitable deviation in
some states. In Section 3, we illustrate the tension between informativeness and equilibrium
behavior in a simplified setting.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
References
Aybas, Y. C. and Turkel, E. p. 4 When considering the commitment problem, we impose a restriction directly on the
shape of the information structure, by limiting the sender to select among scores. In this way
we are closer to Le Treust and Tomala (2019) and Aybas and Turkel (2024), who consider
exogenous constraints on the capacity or cardinality of the message space. We also thank Katinka Holtsmark
for early discussions on this project. 1
arXiv:2509.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Ball, I. (2025), ‘Scoring strategic agents’, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 17(1), 97–129
Battaglini, M. (2002), ‘Multiple referrals and multidimensional cheap talk’, Econometrica 70(4), 1379–1401
Bloedel, A. W. and Segal, I. p. 4 , communication with
commitment, where the amount of information transmitted is limited. In Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014), the limitation comes from the cost of designing the experiment, while in
Bloedel and Segal (2021) it comes from the information-processing cost faced by the receiver.Where the paper says it
Blume, A. (2018), ‘Failure of common knowledge of language in common-interest communication games’, Games and Economic Behavior 109, 132–155
Blume, A. and Board, O. p. 3 They characterize the best equilibria and study their stability. In Blume and Board
2This literature, like us, looks at the consequences of language limitations, not its causes.Where the paper says it
Bonatti, A. and Cisternas, G. p. 4 3Other papers consider scores that aggregate a multidimensional variable in different settings. For example,
Ball (2025) and Bonatti and Cisternas (2020) study linear scores where sender and receiver have different
payoffs and the sender can manipulate the score input.Where the paper says it
Chakraborty, A. and Harbaugh, R. p. 4 This literature has shown
that multiple dimensions can be useful for information revelation, e. , Battaglini (2002),
Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2007) and Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010). This literature has shown
that multiple dimensions can be useful for information revelation, e. , Battaglini (2002),
Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2007) and Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010).Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Chakraborty, A. and Harbaugh, R. (2010), ‘Persuasion by cheap talk’, American Economic Review 100(5), 2361–2382
Gentzkow, M. and Kamenica, E. p. 4 , communication with
commitment, where the amount of information transmitted is limited. In Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014), the limitation comes from the cost of designing the experiment, while in
Bloedel and Segal (2021) it comes from the information-processing cost faced by the receiver.Where the paper says it
Hurwicz, L. (1972), ‘On informationally decentralized systems’, Decision and organization: A volume in Honor of J. p. 6 a full technical report. Second, a single message may need to serve multiple audiences, as
when a public health organization gives public advice that cannot be tailored to individual
circumstances.Where the paper says it
Jager, G., Metzger, L. P. and Riedel, F. (2011), ‘Voronoi languages: Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals’, Games and Economic Behavior 73(2), 517–537
Kallenberg, O. (2021), Foundations of modern probability, Probability Theory and Stochastic Modelling, 99, third edition. p. 8 The
analysis in this section is self-contained. Abusing notation slightly, let Θ = {0, 1}
2
and f(θ) denote the probability of state θ ∈
{0, 1}
2
.Where the paper says it
Lang, R. (1986), ‘A note on the measurability of convex sets’, Archiv der Mathematik 47, 90–92
Le Treust, M. and Tomala, T. p. 4 When considering the commitment problem, we impose a restriction directly on the
shape of the information structure, by limiting the sender to select among scores. In this way
we are closer to Le Treust and Tomala (2019) and Aybas and Turkel (2024), who consider
exogenous constraints on the capacity or cardinality of the message space.Where the paper says it
Levy, G. and Razin, R. p. 4 , Battaglini (2002),
Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2007) and Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010). In this strand
of the literature, the contribution closest to ours is Levy and Razin (2007), who show that
correlation across dimensions can limit communication by creating informational spillovers
across dimensions.Where the paper says it
Lipman, B. L. (2003), Language and economics, in ‘Cognitive Processes and Economic Behaviour’, Routledge, pp. p. 3 In Blume and Board
2This literature, like us, looks at the consequences of language limitations, not its causes. On the latter topic
see Lipman (2003) and Lipman (2025).Where the paper says it
Lipman, B. L. (2025), ‘Why is language vague? p. 3 In Blume and Board
2This literature, like us, looks at the consequences of language limitations, not its causes. On the latter topic
see Lipman (2003) and Lipman (2025).Where the paper says it
Mount, K. and Reiter, S. p. 7 This literature imposes continuity-like
assumptions on mechanisms to avoid bijections between sets of different dimensions. See for
example, Hurwicz (1972), Mount and Reiter (1974) and Reichelstein (1984).Where the paper says it
Parlett, B. N. (1998), The symmetric eigenvalue problem, SIAM
Reichelstein, S. (1984), ‘Incentive compatibility and informational requirements’, Journal of Economic Theory 34(1), 32–51
West, D. B. (2001), Introduction to graph theory, Vol. p. 1 Give me a one-handed economist. Harry Truman
1 Introduction
Decision-makers often seek advice on complex matters.Where the paper says it
--- Page 1 ---
Simple Communication
Jacopo Bizzotto Nathan Hancart
--- Page 2 ---
Give me a one-handed economist.
Harry Truman
--- Page 3 ---
Introduction
Decision-makers often seek advice on complex matters. In principle, experts can write volumes on the potential impacts of a new policy, and dietitians can craft personalized eating plans. p. 1 Policymakers consult experts about
the impact of new policies; individuals seek professional guidance across diverse domains,
including nutritional practices, exercise regimens and financial investments. In principle,
experts can write volumes on the potential impacts of a new policy, and dietitians can craft
personalized eating plans. In principle,
experts can write volumes on the potential impacts of a new policy, and dietitians can craft
personalized eating plans. In practice, however, advice must be simple. Experts present their
findings in short executive summaries. Most people rely on general dietary guidelines, such
as the “5 a day” rule, or on standard nutrition labels that cannot be tailored to their specific
nutritional needs. Most people rely on general dietary guidelines, such
as the “5 a day” rule, or on standard nutrition labels that cannot be tailored to their specific
nutritional needs. In this study, we examine the strategic incentives that arise when advice on
complex issues must be simple.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
--- Page 4 ---
To isolate the effect of simple language, we focus on settings in which the expert and the decision-maker share identical preferences. If the expert could use a language as rich as the object described, revealing every relevant aspect of the object under consideration would be both optimal and an equilibrium strategy. p. 1 To isolate the effect of simple language, we focus on settings in which the expert and the
decision-maker share identical preferences. If the expert could use a language as rich as the
object described, revealing every relevant aspect of the object under consideration would be
both optimal and an equilibrium strategy. If the expert could use a language as rich as the
object described, revealing every relevant aspect of the object under consideration would be
both optimal and an equilibrium strategy. When instead experts communicate using simple
language, the nature of communication is not immediately clear.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
--- Page 5 ---
We explore communication via simple language in a multidimensional cheap talk game. A sender observes a two-dimensional state of the world and sends a cheap-talk message to a decision-maker. p. 1 We explore communication via simple language in a multidimensional cheap talk game. A
sender observes a two-dimensional state of the world and sends a cheap-talk message to a
decision-maker. A
sender observes a two-dimensional state of the world and sends a cheap-talk message to a
decision-maker. The receiver takes a two-dimensional action to minimize a quadratic loss
function. The receiver takes a two-dimensional action to minimize a quadratic loss
function. Sender and receiver share the same payoffs. Sender and receiver share the same payoffs. The model is also equivalent to one
with two receivers, each with a one-dimensional action.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
--- Page 7 ---
We view simplicity as a notion that must hold in equilibrium. In our interpretation, the sender is an expert who, once the state is realized, is free to send any message. p. 2 1
We view simplicity as a notion that must hold in equilibrium. In our interpretation, the
sender is an expert who, once the state is realized, is free to send any message. In our interpretation, the
sender is an expert who, once the state is realized, is free to send any message. Our main
result is a characterization of equilibrium scores, that is, scores that constitute the sender’s
strategy in a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
--- Page 8 ---
2.1 Setting
There are two players: a sender and a receiver. The sender has private information about a two-dimensional state of the world, θ = (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ = R squared, whose distribution has full support and admits a density function f. p. 5 There are two players: a sender and a receiver. The sender
has private information about a two-dimensional state of the world, θ = (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ =
R
2
, whose distribution has full support and admits a density function f. The sender
has private information about a two-dimensional state of the world, θ = (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ =
R
2
, whose distribution has full support and admits a density function f. 4 Without loss of
generality, we assume that E[θ] = 0. 4 Without loss of
generality, we assume that E[θ] = 0. We also assume that the variance of θ is finite.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
--- Page 9 ---
Payoffs. Sender and receiver share the payoff function u(a, θ):= −ϕ(a1 − θ1)2 − (a2 − θ2)2. p. 5 Before the receiver acts, the
sender sends a cheap-talk message m ∈ M for some measurable space M ⊇ R. Sender and receiver share the payoff function
u(a, θ) := −ϕ(a1 − θ1)
2 − (a2 − θ2)
2
,
with ϕ > 0. Sender and receiver share the payoff function
u(a, θ) := −ϕ(a1 − θ1)
2 − (a2 − θ2)
2
,
with ϕ > 0. Both players want each action to match the corresponding component of the state. Both players want each action to match the corresponding component of the state. The parameter ϕ governs the relative cost of mismatch along each dimension.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
--- Page 10 ---
Equilibrium Selection
A score s is a non-constant measurable function s: Θ → R that satisfies the following property:5 Intermediate Value Property (IVP): for any θ, θ′ ∈ Θ such that s(θ) > s(θ′), any m ∈ [s(θ′), s(Θ)] ∩ s(Θ) and any continuous function γ: [0, 1] → Θ with γ(0) = θ′ and γ(1) = θ, there is a t ∈ [0, 1] such that s(γ(t)) = m. We denote the collection of all scores by S. p. 5 A score s is a non-constant measurable function s : Θ → R that
satisfies the following property:5
Intermediate Value Property (IVP): for any θ, θ′ ∈ Θ such that s(θ) > s(θ
′
), any
m ∈ [s(θ
′
), s(θ)] ∩ s(Θ) and any continuous function γ : [0, 1] → Θ with γ(0) = θ
′
and γ(1) = θ, there is a t ∈ [0, 1] such that s(γ(t)) = m. We denote the collection of all scores by S.Where the paper says it
--- Page 13 ---
2.2 Discussion of Scores
Scores can be continuous or discrete mappings from R squared to R. Scores prevent injective mappings. p. 7 2 Discussion of Scores
Scores capture several desirable properties of simple communication: they impose natural
constraints, they are flexible, and they prevent injective mappings. Scores can be continuous or discrete mappings from R
2
to R. Scores prevent injective mappings. By preventing injections from Θ into the message space,
scores prevent the sender from fully revealing the state.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
--- Page 14 ---
- Illustration in a 2x2 Setting
We call a score optimal if it maximizes the payoffs over all scores, subject to the receiver best-replying (BR). We now show that commitment has value, i. p. 9 α(m) = E[θ|m], ∀m ∈ s(Θ). (BR)
We now show that commitment has value, i. (BR)
We now show that commitment has value, i. , it can be the case that none of the optimal
scores are equilibrium strategies.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
--- Page 23 ---
- Analysis
We first establish that an equilibrium score exists. We first establish existence of an equilibrium score by showing that there always exists a PBE with two messages in the support of the sender’s strategy. p. 4 As a consequence, they find that ex-ante optimal strategies are equilibrium strategies. Similarly, Lipman (2025) uses the fact that optimal strategies
are equilibrium strategies to show that there is always an equilibrium in pure strategy when
preferences are aligned in cheap-talk games with a possibly constrained set of messages. Simply requiring one-dimensional messages would not, however, capture a meaningful notion of simple language: since injections from R
2
to R exist, the sender could fully reveal
the state. To prevent injections while imposing natural restrictions on communication, we
additionally require that the sender’s equilibrium strategy satisfies a weak form of continuity.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
--- Page 24 ---
Proof
If s(Θ) ≤ 2, then s cannot be injective. Otherwise, take some messages m, m1, m2 ∈ s(Θ) with m1 < m < m2, and states θ, θ1, θ2 such that s(θ) = m, s(θ1) = m1 and s(θ2) = m2. p. 7 Examples of scores include:
• s(θ) = β1θ1 + β2θ2;
• s(θ) =
1 if β1θ1 + β2θ2 ≥ c,
0 otherwise. ;
• s(θ) = p
(θ1 − c1)
2 + (θ2 − c2)
2
.Where the paper says it
--- Page 30 ---
Proof of Remark 3
We now construct a sequence of scores indexed by ε such that the sequence of associated payoffs converges to v∗ = 0. As an intermediate step, we build a sequence of correspondences. p. 2 To prevent injections while imposing natural restrictions on communication, we
additionally require that the sender’s equilibrium strategy satisfies a weak form of continuity. Specifically, we focus on mappings from the state space to the real numbers that satisfy a
property we dub the Intermediate Value Property (IVP). Viewing the square {0, 1}
2
as a simple graph where each point is a vertex and the edges of
the graph are the edges of the square, we can rewrite the IVP as follows: for any θ, θ′ ∈ Θ
with s(θ) > s(θ
′
), any m ∈ [s(θ
′
), s(θ)] ∩ s(Θ) and any path p from θ
′
to θ, there is some θ
′′
on the path such that s(θ
′′) = m. 7 Figure 1 illustrates four scores in this environment. The optimality of each score depends on the correlation structure: when the dimensions are positively correlated, the ex-ante best linear score correlates the actions and vice
versa. Accordingly, an increase in the correlation is good for welfare in the best equilibrium
but also increases the cost of coordinating on the wrong equilibrium.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
--- Page 31 ---
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of Proposition 2. All equilibrium scores are equivalent to linear or coarsely linear scores. p. 0 As a result, equilibrium payoffs are lower than those
achievable under commitment to a score. Finally, for normally distributed states, we
characterize the equilibrium linear scores and show they correspond to the ex-ante best
and worst linear scores. 6
We call an equilibrium score a best equilibrium score if it maximizes the players’ payoffs
among all equilibrium scores. We select equilibria in which the sender’s strategy is a score. 6
We call an equilibrium score a best equilibrium score if it maximizes the players’ payoffs
among all equilibrium scores. We select equilibria in which the sender’s strategy is a score.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
--- Page 35 ---
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof of Proposition 4 follows the same lines as the proof of Proposition 3 replacing the sets s−1β(m) with the sets of types indifferent between m and m − 1.
--- Page 38 ---
Proof of Proposition 5
For any strategy s(θ) = β'θ, we have the unconditional distribution over messages m induced by the score s, m ∼ N(0, σ2s) where σ2s = β21σ21 +β22σ22 + 2β1β2ρσ1σ2 = β'Σβ. The payoff of the sender can be rewritten, up to a constant, as −a'Φa + 4a'Φθ.
--- Page 39 ---
G Value of Ignorance
If the sender does not observe θ2, then score s1 is an equilibrium strategy. We show next that any equilibrium score in the standard setting is associated with a larger loss than s1. Similar arguments apply for any score such that s(θ) = s(θ′) for any two high-probability states. p. 8 Abusing notation slightly, let Θ = {0, 1}
2
and f(θ) denote the probability of state θ ∈
{0, 1}
2
. Our definition of scores does not apply directly to this finite environment but it can
be adapted by requiring that the score does not “jump” messages when moving through points
that differ by at most one coordinate.Where the paper says it
Green — the paper says it, and the page is printed. Red — no passage carries it, so treat that sentence as unverified. The same check runs on your own text: check a summary against its source, $5.
Improvements for AI systems
-
Strategic Friction Modeling for Simple Communication: The AI system can model communication where an expert uses a score that aggregates a multidimensional state into a one-dimensional message, specifically showing how
strategic frictions
arise even when experts and decision-makers share identical payoffs under quadratic-loss utility. -
Equilibrium Score Characterization: The system can determine that in equilibrium, any equilibrium score must be either linear in the state or a discrete coarsening of a linear score, which provides a structural constraint on the communication strategy space.
-
Optimal Linear Score Identification: For normally distributed states, the system can identify the ex-ante best and worst linear scores as the best and worst equilibrium scores, allowing for pre-emptive selection of an optimal simple message based on state distribution parameters like correlation and variance.
-
Welfare Comparison via Covariance Structure: The AI system can calculate a specific loss function derived from the covariance structure of state dimensions to quantify the difference between equilibrium payoffs and commitment payoffs, indicating how increases in correlation affect welfare.
-
Information Revelation Limits: The system can characterize conditions under which revealing only one dimension is an equilibrium score, demonstrating that this is only possible when the two dimensions are uncorrelated, thus providing a constraint on how much information can be conveyed simply.
Abstract
We study simple communication in a multidimensional cheap talk model with aligned preferences. An expert communicates with a decision-maker using a score, i.e., an aggregator of a multidimensional state into a one-dimensional message. Even though the expert and the decision-maker share the same payoffs, equilibrium payoffs are lower than those achievable under commitment to a score. Under quadratic-loss utility, any equilibrium score must be linear in the state or a coarsening of a linear score. Finally, for normally distributed states, we characterize the equilibrium linear scores and show they include the ex-ante best and worst linear scores.