Self-Employment as a Career Investment

arXiv:2509.01265 · econ.TH · Submitted 2025-09-01 · Read on arXiv

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Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.

Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "Self-Employment as a Career Investment".

Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. Self-Employment as a Signal: Career Concerns with Hidden Firm Performance∗ Georgy Lukyanov† Konstantin Popov‡ Shubh Lashkery§ Abstract We study a stationary labour market in which risk-averse workers privately know their permanent talent and choose, period by period, between risky self-employment, whose outcomes become part of a portable public record, and firm employment, which pays a competitive wage but keeps individual performance hidden from the outside market.

Ruth: <ref:2509.01265#pg2> Because each worker decides whether to generate another public outcome or to apply to a firm, both the population holding a given record and the pool of applicants at that record are endogenous.

Warren: <ref:2509.01265#pg4> It is shown that, when the effective continuation factor is below one half, a stationary sequential competitive equilibrium exists and occupational choice follows a talent cutoff at every record; <ref:2509.01265#pg5> the equilibrium need not be unique, and an explicit example with two distinct equilibria is provided.

Ruth: <ref:2509.01265#pg5> Firm employment persists whenever it is strictly optimal for a given type at a given record.

Paper summary: Ruth: So we're looking at this paper today called "Self-Employment as a Career Investment." It’s about how risk-averse workers decide between self-employment, where their work becomes public, and firm employment, which gives them a stable wage but keeps their performance hidden.

Warren: Exactly. The authors are studying a stationary labor market where the key is that workers privately know their permanent talent and they have to choose between these two options every period. The core question they're asking is how the market should read this public record if workers themselves are deciding whether to generate another public outcome or apply for a firm job.

Iris: It sounds like the setup is really interesting because the record itself isn't just something that happens; it’s endogenous in two ways. First, the population holding a specific record is selected by every possible occupational path that can lead to it, and second, when someone applies to a firm, they aren't just coming from everyone holding that same record.

Ruth: Right. So they construct the market beliefs in two stages. First, they figure out the stationary flow of types through all the histories leading up to and retaining each record. Only after that do they condition on what someone decides to apply for a firm job at that exact moment.

Warren: That conditioning step is crucial because it’s where the current application decision adds another layer of selection to who actually shows up at any given record. The paper claims they find a stationary sequential competitive equilibrium when the effective continuation factor is below one half.

Iris: That condition on the continuation factor, which I think relates to how much future rewards matter compared to immediate rewards, is what allows them to establish a talent cutoff at every single record. They show that this equilibrium needs not be unique either; they actually provide an explicit example with two distinct stationary equilibria.

Ruth: Two distinct ones? That’s significant because it means the structure of how people choose their careers isn't fixed, but depends on some underlying parameters in the model. They also find that firm employment persists whenever it is strictly optimal for a given type at a given record, which leads to self-confirming choices.

Warren: Self-confirming is interesting because if you are already in a job and it’s the best choice for your talent level at that record, taking the job doesn't change the public record or your wage, so you keep making that same choice until some outside event forces you out.

Iris: And when both options are chosen at a specific record, higher-talent workers choose self-employment, and lower-talent workers apply to firms. This means the competitive wage offered to applicants is below the mean talent among all holders of that record.

Paper summary: Ruth: That's where the analysis gets really concrete for us. They show that this discount—the difference between what you expect now and what you expect later—decomposes perfectly into two things: your share of workers who stay in self-employment, and the actual talent gap between those two groups.

Warren: So, when we look at the numbers, they predict that this decomposition is exactly equal to the share of people staying self-employed plus the difference in talent between public producers and applicants. It connects a decision about career choice directly to observable metrics about talent distribution.

Iris: This structure also predicts how occupational choices actually affect the flow of new public successes and failures, which tells us how much information the market actually gets from these decisions. They're not just looking at static numbers; they're looking at dynamic flows of outcomes.

Ruth: It seems like a lot of this boils down to this: the model yields four key empirical things. We’ve got positive selection into public production, a record-specific applicant wage discount, persistent choices for opaque employment spells, and these endogenous flows of public outcomes.

Warren: And what I find most interesting from an operational standpoint is that the persistence of opaque employment predicts that if you enter a firm job and things stay stable, you won't go back to public production until something outside the model forces you out with some exit probability lambda.

Iris: That exit probability lambda is tied to how long those opaque spells last, which is geometric in duration. But we have to remember the authors’ own limitation here; they are restricted by their stationary labor market assumption, and they don't explore what happens if things change more dynamically over time.

Ruth: Right, so for now, the paper gives us a very specific picture under those stationary conditions: talent cutoffs at every record and a clear way to decompose career choice into self-employment share and talent gaps. It’s about how information flows through these different career paths.

Warren: I think the title "Self-Employment as a Career Investment" fits because it frames self-employment not just as an income source, but as a signal that, at the right talent level, is better than the hidden stability of firm employment. It’s about how you invest your future performance into being public versus keeping it private for a paycheck.

Iris: So what this means for us is that if we want to understand career choices, we have to look at the record itself and how beliefs are built up over time before looking at any single decision point. That’s the identification path they use, which is pretty solid for what they claim about those cutoffs.

Ruth: Exactly. So when you think about this paper, it’s less about finding a single optimal path and more about understanding the entire structure of equilibrium that sustains itself across all possible career paths in this market setup. That's what they found with the two distinct equilibria and those cutoff behaviors at every nonterminal record.

Conclusion: Ruth: So we’re wrapping up on "Self-Employment as a Career Investment." Basically, this paper looks at how workers choose between being self-employed and working for a firm when their performance isn't immediately visible to everyone else.

Warren: It boils down to how the public record—your track record of successes and failures—shapes your career decisions over time.

Iris: The authors show that this choice isn't random; it follows a talent cutoff at every single point on that record, which means if you have a certain level of talent, you’re going one way and if you don't, another.

Ruth: And the big finding is how they break down the benefit of making those choices. The discount to taking a risk in self-employment splits perfectly between how much time you spend doing that versus the actual gap in talent between those two groups.

Warren: So, for someone just listening, it means that when you decide whether to take a risky path or stay stable with a job, your decision isn't just about the immediate money; it’s deeply tied to where you rank relative to other people holding the same record.

Iris: Exactly. And they show that even if you choose firm employment, it stays there as long as it’s still better for your specific talent level at that moment, which makes those job spells very persistent.

Ruth: It’s a lot about how information flows through these different career paths and how much the market actually learns from those choices.

Warren: If you want to see the big picture, this is about understanding why some people stick with public work while others keep their performance hidden for a paycheck.

Toulouse School of Economics · HSE University · CREST - École Polytechnique

econ.TH

Submitted: 2025-09-01

Updated: 2026-11-15

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Importance score: 89/100

The gist: Self-Employment as a Signal: Career Concerns with Hidden Firm Performance∗ Georgy Lukyanov† Konstantin Popov‡ Shubh Lashkery§ Abstract We study a stationary labour market in which risk-averse…

Key concepts

Endogenous Record Construction
The public record is not fixed; it is built dynamically by workers' choices. Workers decide whether to generate a new public outcome through self-employment or apply to a firm, meaning who holds which record depends on these ongoing decisions.
Talent Cutoff
Under certain conditions, occupational choice at any given record is determined by a specific talent threshold. Workers with talent above this threshold choose self-employment, while those below it opt for firm employment. This creates a simple structure for how people navigate different career stages.
Applicant Wage Discount Decomposition
When workers apply to firms at a specific record, the competitive wage they receive is lower than the mean talent of all holders of that record. This discount splits into two parts: the proportion of workers who remain self-employed and the talent gap between public producers and applicants.

Terminology

Summary

Self-Employment as a Signal: Career Concerns with Hidden Firm Performance∗ Georgy Lukyanov† Konstantin Popov‡ Shubh Lashkery§ Abstract We study a stationary labour market in which risk-averse workers privately know their permanent talent and choose, period by period, between risky self-employment, whose outcomes become part of a portable public record, and firm employment, which pays a competitive wage but keeps individual performance hidden from the outside market. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Self-Employment as a Signal: Career Concerns with Hidden Firm Performance∗ Georgy Lukyanov† Konstantin Popov‡ Shubh Lashkery§ Abstract We study a stationary labour market in which risk-averse workers privately know their permanent talent and choose, period by period, between risky self-employment, whose outcomes become part of a portable public record, and firm employment, which pays a competitive wage but keeps individual performance hidden from the outside market. Because each worker decides whether to generate another public outcome or to apply to a firm, both the population holding a given record and the pool of applicants at that record are endogenous.

<ref:2509.01265#pg2> Because each worker decides whether to generate another public outcome or to apply to a firm, both the population holding a given record and the pool of applicants at that record are endogenous. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Self-Employment as a Signal: Career Concerns with Hidden Firm Performance∗ Georgy Lukyanov† Konstantin Popov‡ Shubh Lashkery§ Abstract We study a stationary labour market in which risk-averse workers privately know their permanent talent and choose, period by period, between risky self-employment, whose outcomes become part of a portable public record, and firm employment, which pays a competitive wage but keeps individual performance hidden from the outside market. Because each worker decides whether to generate another public outcome or to apply to a firm, both the population holding a given record and the pool of applicants at that record are endogenous.

<ref:2509.01265#pg4> It is shown that, when the effective continuation factor is below one half, a stationary sequential competitive equilibrium exists and occupational choice follows a talent cutoff at every record; <ref:2509. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Market beliefs are therefore constructed in two stages: first from the stationary flow of types through all histories leading to—and retaining—each record, and only then by conditioning on the current application decision. It is shown that, when the effective continuation factor is below one half, a stationary sequential competitive equilibrium exists and occupational choice follows a talent cutoff at every record; the equilibrium need not be unique, and an explicit example with two distinct equilibria is provided.

01265#pg5> the equilibrium need not be unique, and an explicit example with two distinct equilibria is provided. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Market beliefs are therefore constructed in two stages: first from the stationary flow of types through all histories leading to—and retaining—each record, and only then by conditioning on the current application decision. It is shown that, when the effective continuation factor is below one half, a stationary sequential competitive equilibrium exists and occupational choice follows a talent cutoff at every record; the equilibrium need not be unique, and an explicit example with two distinct equilibria is provided.

<ref:2509.01265#pg5> Firm employment persists whenever it is strictly optimal for a given type at a given record. p. 0
Where the paper says it

It is shown that, when the effective continuation factor is below one half, a stationary sequential competitive equilibrium exists and occupational choice follows a talent cutoff at every record; the equilibrium need not be unique, and an explicit example with two distinct equilibria is provided. Firm employment persists whenever it is strictly optimal for a given type at a given record.

<ref:2509.01265#pg8> At any on-path record where both occupations are chosen, higher-talent workers select into self-employment, and the applicant wage lies below mean talent among holders of that record; <ref:2509. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Firm employment persists whenever it is strictly optimal for a given type at a given record. At any on-path record where both occupations are chosen, higher-talent workers select into self-employment, and the applicant wage lies below mean talent among holders of that record; this discount decomposes exactly into the self-employed share and the talent gap between the two groups.

01265#pg8> this discount decomposes exactly into the self-employed share and the talent gap between the two groups. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Firm employment persists whenever it is strictly optimal for a given type at a given record. At any on-path record where both occupations are chosen, higher-talent workers select into self-employment, and the applicant wage lies below mean talent among holders of that record; this discount decomposes exactly into the self-employed share and the talent gap between the two groups.

<ref:2509.01265#pg8> The model yields within-record predictions for occupational choice, wages, subsequent performance, and the duration of opaque employment spells. p. 0
Where the paper says it

At any on-path record where both occupations are chosen, higher-talent workers select into self-employment, and the applicant wage lies below mean talent among holders of that record; this discount decomposes exactly into the self-employed share and the talent gap between the two groups. The model yields within-record predictions for occupational choice, wages, subsequent performance, and the duration of opaque employment spells.

<ref:2509.01265#pg8>

The core mechanism involves endogenous record construction and belief formation

The central difficulty in the model is that the record is endogenous in two ways: first, the population holding a record is selected by every occupational path that can lead to it, and second, the current application adds a further layer of selection: firms hire from workers who apply, not everyone holding the same record. <ref:2509.01265#pg4> The analysis tracks the stationary composition of workers at every record: entry, public outcomes, survival, and decisions to retain a record through firm employment jointly determine who is present there. p. 1

Where the paper says it

2 The present paper tries to fill this gap. We track the stationary composition of workers at every record: entry, public outcomes, survival, and decisions to retain a record through firm employment jointly determine who is present there.

<ref:2509.01265#pg8> The population flow equations are determined by how records are generated and retained through firm employment. p. 5
Where the paper says it

For a fixed strategy σ, these densities are determined recursively. Let as(θ) denote inflow into record s from entrants or from self-employment at a predecessor, excluding workers already at s who retained it through firm employment.

<ref:2509.01265#pg9>

The structure of occupational choice and persistence

The first result shows that occupational choice has a simple structure under a sufficient shorthorizon condition: workers below a record-specific talent threshold choose firm employment and workers above it continue in self-employment, and a stationary equilibrium exists. <ref:2509.01265#pg8> Firm employment is selfconfirming because when it is strictly preferred, the job changes neither the public record nor the stationary wage, so a surviving worker faces the same comparison again and makes the same choice—opaque employment persists until exogenous exit. p. 2

Where the paper says it

The model then yields three qualitative implications. First, firm employment is selfconfirming: when it is strictly preferred, the job changes neither the public record nor the stationary wage, so a surviving worker faces the same comparison again and makes the same choice—opaque employment persists until exogenous exit.

<ref:2509.01265#pg9> At any record where both occupations are chosen, higher-talent workers select into self-employment, and lower-talent workers apply to firms; the competitive applicant wage therefore lies below mean talent among all holders of the record, and the discount decomposes exactly into the self-employed share and the talent gap between the two groups. p. 2
Where the paper says it

First, firm employment is selfconfirming: when it is strictly preferred, the job changes neither the public record nor the stationary wage, so a surviving worker faces the same comparison again and makes the same choice—opaque employment persists until exogenous exit. 4 Second, at any record where both occupations are chosen, higher-talent workers select into public production and lower-talent workers apply to firms; the competitive applicant wage therefore lies below mean talent among all holders of the record, and the discount decomposes exactly into the self-employed share and the talent gap between the two groups.

<ref:2509.01265#pg8>

The derivation of equilibrium existence and cutoff behavior

The model establishes that occupational choice at each record is governed by a talent threshold under Assumption 1, which requires the effective continuation factor to satisfy γ Lemma 1 provides a uniform bound showing that Us(θ) is non-decreasing in θ at every record, and for every y > x, Qs(y) − Qs(x) ≥ (1 − 2γ)(y − x) > 0. <ref:2509.01265#pg8> Proposition 2 proves that under Assumption 1, at every record s there is a cutoff cs ∈ [0, 1] such that firm employment is optimal for θ cs. p. 9

Where the paper says it

Repeating this argument proves the result. The proposition requires neither Assumption 1 nor a cutoff strategy.

<ref:2509.01265#pg9>

The empirical implications of the equilibrium structure

The model yields three qualitative implications: first, firm employment is selfconfirming because it leaves both the record and the stationary wage unchanged, so a surviving worker faces the same comparison again and makes the same choice—opaque employment persists until exogenous exit. <ref:2509.01265#pg9> Second, at any record where both occupations are chosen, higher-talent workers select into public production and lower-talent workers apply to firms; the competitive applicant wage therefore lies below mean talent among all holders of the record, and the discount decomposes exactly into the self-employed share and the talent gap between the two groups. p. 2

Where the paper says it

First, firm employment is selfconfirming: when it is strictly preferred, the job changes neither the public record nor the stationary wage, so a surviving worker faces the same comparison again and makes the same choice—opaque employment persists until exogenous exit. 4 Second, at any record where both occupations are chosen, higher-talent workers select into public production and lower-talent workers apply to firms; the competitive applicant wage therefore lies below mean talent among all holders of the record, and the discount decomposes exactly into the self-employed share and the talent gap between the two groups.

<ref:2509.01265#pg8> Third, occupational choices determine the flow of new public successes and failures, and hence how much information the market receives at all. p. 2
Where the paper says it

4 Second, at any record where both occupations are chosen, higher-talent workers select into public production and lower-talent workers apply to firms; the competitive applicant wage therefore lies below mean talent among all holders of the record, and the discount decomposes exactly into the self-employed share and the talent gap between the two groups. Third, occupational choices determine the flow of new public successes and failures, and hence how much information the market receives at all.

<ref:2509.01265#pg8> These implications are within-record comparisons: conditional on the same public record, an application for opaque employment should predict lower performance on a comparable later measure, applicant wages should display a record-specific selection discount, and moves into opaque employment should persist while the worker remains in the market. p. 2
Where the paper says it

Third, occupational choices determine the flow of new public successes and failures, and hence how much information the market receives at all. These implications are within-record comparisons: conditional on the same public record, an application for opaque employment should predict lower performance on a comparable later measure, applicant wages should display a record-specific selection discount, and moves into opaque employment should persist while the worker remains in the market.

<ref:2509.01265#pg8>

Empirical content and testable predictions

The baseline yields four closely related empirical objects: positive selection into public production, a record-specific applicant-wage discount, persistent opaque-employment choices, and endogenous flows of public outcomes. <ref:2509.01265#pg8> Within-record selection into public production suggests that conditional on the same public record, workers who remain in self-employment have higher talent than workers who apply for opaque firm employment. p. 2

Where the paper says it

First, firm employment is selfconfirming: when it is strictly preferred, the job changes neither the public record nor the stationary wage, so a surviving worker faces the same comparison again and makes the same choice—opaque employment persists until exogenous exit. 4 Second, at any record where both occupations are chosen, higher-talent workers select into public production and lower-talent workers apply to firms; the competitive applicant wage therefore lies below mean talent among all holders of the record, and the discount decomposes exactly into the self-employed share and the talent gap between the two groups.

<ref:2509.01265#pg9> Application-based wage discounts show that the competitive wage offered to applicants is below mean talent among all workers who hold the same record, and this discount decomposes exactly into the share of workers who remain in self-employment and the talent gap between public producers and applicants. p. 2
Where the paper says it

First, firm employment is selfconfirming: when it is strictly preferred, the job changes neither the public record nor the stationary wage, so a surviving worker faces the same comparison again and makes the same choice—opaque employment persists until exogenous exit. 4 Second, at any record where both occupations are chosen, higher-talent workers select into public production and lower-talent workers apply to firms; the competitive applicant wage therefore lies below mean talent among all holders of the record, and the discount decomposes exactly into the self-employed share and the talent gap between the two groups.

<ref:2509.01265#pg8> Persistence of opaque employment predicts that conditional on survival and an unchanged environment, a worker who enters opaque firm employment does not return to public production, ending only through exogenous exit with a geometric duration with exit probability λ. p. 2
Where the paper says it

First, firm employment is selfconfirming: when it is strictly preferred, the job changes neither the public record nor the stationary wage, so a surviving worker faces the same comparison again and makes the same choice—opaque employment persists until exogenous exit. 4 Second, at any record where both occupations are chosen, higher-talent workers select into public production and lower-talent workers apply to firms; the competitive applicant wage therefore lies below mean talent among all holders of the record, and the discount decomposes exactly into the self-employed share and the talent gap between the two groups.

<ref:2509.01265#pg9>

Scope and extensions

The baseline results are within-record restrictions; they do not order different records or imply that a success or failure raises or lowers wages. <ref:2509.01265#pg8> Extensions such as private learning about talent, observable age, richer public histories, in-firm signals, contracts, effort, and policy interventions change the state space or the game played by firms and require the belief system to be rebuilt from the induced paths. p. 2

Where the paper says it

Talent is fixed and known by the worker, individual performance inside firms is hidden from the outside market, and wages and strategies are stationary. Private learning, observable career age, dated histories, public in-firm signals, richer contracts, hidden effort, and welfare analysis all change the state space or the game played by firms, and require additional structure; Section 6 explains what would have to be reconstructed in each case.

<ref:2509.01265#pg9> The baseline yields four closely related empirical objects: positive selection into public production, a record-specific applicant-wage discount, persistent opaque-employment choices, and endogenous flows of public outcomes. p. 4
Where the paper says it

Relative to these literatures, the contribution of the present paper is a belief system constructed from the endogenous stationary flow of workers through records, together with the equilibrium analysis this construction supports: existence and talent-threshold behaviour without assuming that successes and failures order continuation values, persistence in opaque employment, positive selection into public production, and a record-specific applicant-wage discount with an exact decomposition. These are conditional, within-record implications; the model does not claim a general ordering of records or a globally signed effect of greater transparency.

<ref:2509.01265#pg8>

Conclusion

The analysis delivers four conclusions: when future career rewards are not too strong, a stationary equilibrium exists and occupational choice follows a record-specific talent threshold; the equilibrium need not be unique, and we exhibit a specification with two distinct equilibria sustained by the complementarity between cutoffs and applicant wages. <ref:2509.01265#pg8> Where both modes are used at a record, higher-talent workers continue in public production while lower-talent workers apply to firms, so the applicant wage lies below mean talent among all holders of the record, with a discount that decomposes exactly into the self-employed share and the talent gap between the two groups. p. 2

Where the paper says it

First, firm employment is selfconfirming: when it is strictly preferred, the job changes neither the public record nor the stationary wage, so a surviving worker faces the same comparison again and makes the same choice—opaque employment persists until exogenous exit. 4 Second, at any record where both occupations are chosen, higher-talent workers select into public production and lower-talent workers apply to firms; the competitive applicant wage therefore lies below mean talent among all holders of the record, and the discount decomposes exactly into the self-employed share and the talent gap between the two groups.

<ref:2509.01265#pg8> Firm employment is persistent whenever it is strictly preferred, because it leaves both the record and the stationary wage unchanged—the choice is self-confirming. p. 2
Where the paper says it

First, firm employment is selfconfirming: when it is strictly preferred, the job changes neither the public record nor the stationary wage, so a surviving worker faces the same comparison again and makes the same choice—opaque employment persists until exogenous exit. 4 Second, at any record where both occupations are chosen, higher-talent workers select into public production and lower-talent workers apply to firms; the competitive applicant wage therefore lies below mean talent among all holders of the record, and the discount decomposes exactly into the self-employed share and the talent gap between the two groups.

<ref:2509.01265#pg9> And occupational choices determine the flow of new public outcomes, and hence how much the market ever learns. p. 2
Where the paper says it

4 Second, at any record where both occupations are chosen, higher-talent workers select into public production and lower-talent workers apply to firms; the competitive applicant wage therefore lies below mean talent among all holders of the record, and the discount decomposes exactly into the self-employed share and the talent gap between the two groups. Third, occupational choices determine the flow of new public successes and failures, and hence how much information the market receives at all.

<ref:2509.01265#pg8>

Appendix A Technical details for stationary equilibrium

The appendix supplies the population-flow, continuity, and limiting details used in the equilibrium construction. <ref:2509.01265#pg9> Lemma 3 shows that equations (2)–(4) determine a unique collection of nonnegative integrable densities (ms)s∈S. <ref:2509.01265#pg9> For every fixed record s, there is a finite constant Cs, independent of σ, such that 0 ≤ ms(θ) ≤ Csf0(θ) for almost every θ. p. 8

Where the paper says it

A stationary sequential competitive equilibrium is a tuple (U, σ, m, G, ν, w) satisfying the following conditions. The value function U solves (13)–(14), and the action rule σ satisfies (15) at every record and for almost every talent type.

<ref:2509.01265#pg9> The densities have total mass one and satisfy Xs≥L Z 1 0 ms(θ) dθ ≤ ρ L for every L ≥ 0. p. 6
Where the paper says it

The applicant measure and its total mass at record s are As(dθ) = 1 − σs(θ) ms(θ) dθ, (6) Ds = Z 1 0 1 − σs(θ) ms(θ) dθ. (7) 9The logic is the familiar one from survival analysis—who is present carries information beyond what they display—with the difference that survivorship here is chosen rather than mechanical: a worker retains the blank record because, given the wages she faces, she prefers to.

<ref:2509.01265#pg9>

Appendix B Normalised values and two elementary wage identities

For a wage vector w, let U K s(θ;w) = (1 − γ)V K s(θ;w) be normalised lifetime utility. <ref:2509.01265#pg9> At a terminal record, U K s(θ;w) = √ws. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Self-Employment as a Signal: Career Concerns with Hidden Firm Performance∗ Georgy Lukyanov† Konstantin Popov‡ Shubh Lashkery§ Abstract We study a stationary labour market in which risk-averse workers privately know their permanent talent and choose, period by period, between risky self-employment, whose outcomes become part of a portable public record, and firm employment, which pays a competitive wage but keeps individual performance hidden from the outside market. Because each worker decides whether to generate another public outcome or to apply to a firm, both the population holding a given record and the pool of applicants at that record are endogenous.

<ref:2509.01265#pg9> At a nonterminal record define the normalised value of choosing self-employment now by Q K s(θ;w) = (1 − γ)θ + γ h θU K g+1,b(θ;w) + (1 − θ)U K g,b+1(θ;w)i. p. 7
Where the paper says it

(11) For the analysis it is convenient to normalise lifetime utility by defining Us(θ) = (1 − γ)Vs(θ). (12) Let the normalised value of choosing self-employment at s be Qs(θ) = (1 − γ)θ + γ h θUs+ (θ) + (1 − θ)Us− (θ) i .

<ref:2509.01265#pg9> Then U K s(θ;w) = max√ws, Q K s(θ;w). p. 7
Where the paper says it

Let Vs(θ) denote the expected discounted utility of a worker with talent θ at record s. The Bellman equation is Vs(θ) = max u(ws) + γVs(θ), θ + γ h θVs+ (θ) + (1 − θ)Vs− (θ) i .

<ref:2509.01265#pg9>

Appendix C A fixed-point device with forced cutoff coordinates

Lemma 8 shows that a sequence of fixed points of one of the maps constructed below is chosen with η ↓ 0. Every convergent subsequence has a limit that is a stationary sequential competitive equilibrium of the capped economy. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Market beliefs are therefore constructed in two stages: first from the stationary flow of types through all histories leading to—and retaining—each record, and only then by conditioning on the current application decision. It is shown that, when the effective continuation factor is below one half, a stationary sequential competitive equilibrium exists and occupational choice follows a talent cutoff at every record; the equilibrium need not be unique, and an explicit example with two distinct equilibria is provided.

<ref:2509.01265#pg9> Theorem 2 shows that under the assumptions of Theorem 1, the model of the paper with an unbounded public record has at least two stationary sequential competitive equilibria in pure cutoff strategies at every nonterminal record. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Market beliefs are therefore constructed in two stages: first from the stationary flow of types through all histories leading to—and retaining—each record, and only then by conditioning on the current application decision. It is shown that, when the effective continuation factor is below one half, a stationary sequential competitive equilibrium exists and occupational choice follows a talent cutoff at every record; the equilibrium need not be unique, and an explicit example with two distinct equilibria is provided.

<ref:2509.01265#pg9>

Appendix D A high equilibrium at every finite cap

Proposition 5 shows that for every K ≥ 2 and 0

Appendix E A low equilibrium at every finite cap

Proposition 6 shows that for every K ≥ 2 and 0 < γ < 1/9, there is an equilibrium with 0

Appendix F Two distinct infinite-record limits

Theorem 2 shows that under the assumptions of Theorem 1, the model of the paper with an unbounded public record has at least two stationary sequential competitive equilibria in pure cutoff strategies at every nonterminal record. <ref:2509.01265#pg9>

References

Abou El-Komboz L Goldbeck M 2025 Career concerns as a public good: The role of signaling for open source software development Labour Economics 97 102800 doi:10.16/j.labeco.2025.102800 Altonji JG Pierret CR 2001 Employer learning and statistical discrimination Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 313–350 doi:10. p. 3

Where the paper says it

(1999a,b) emphasise the role of the information structure, and Gibbons and Murphy (1992) study the interaction between career concerns and explicit contracts. Employer-learning models examine how wages respond as information about productivity accumulates (Farber and Gibbons, 1996; Altonji and Pierret, 2001), while models of internal labour markets connect learning to wage and promotion dynamics (Gibbons and Waldman, 1999, 2006; Waldman, 2013).

1162/003355399556287 Bar-Isaac H Tadelis S 2008 Seller reputation Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics 4 273–351 doi:10. p. 3
Where the paper says it

Open-source production offers a related setting in which current work becomes a portable signal: Lerner and Tirole (2002) identify career incentives and labourmarket signalling as important motives for open-source participation, Abou El-Komboz and Goldbeck (2025) study career concerns and signalling in open-source software development, and Belenzon and Schankerman (2015) examine motivation and the sorting of human capital into open innovation. More generally, reputation systems use public histories to guide later transactions (Bar-Isaac and Tadelis, 2008).

1561/0700000027 Belenzon S Schankerman M 2015 Motivation and sorting of human capital in open innovation Strategic Management Journal 36 795–820 doi:1. p. 3
Where the paper says it

Terviö (2009) studies the market failure that arises when an early employer cannot capture the full return from discovering an inexperienced worker’s talent; our baseline characterises private occupational choice and applicant wages, but does not determine whether the market produces too much or too little information. Open-source production offers a related setting in which current work becomes a portable signal: Lerner and Tirole (2002) identify career incentives and labourmarket signalling as important motives for open-source participation, Abou El-Komboz and Goldbeck (2025) study career concerns and signalling in open-source software development, and Belenzon and Schankerman (2015) examine motivation and the sorting of human capital into open innovation.

Dewatripont M Jewitt I Tirole J 1999a The economics of career concerns, part I: Comparing information structures Review of Economic Studies 66 183–198 doi:1. p. 3

Where the paper says it

The career-concerns literature shows how market learning from performance creates implicit incentives: Holmström (1999) develops the central dynamic mechanism, Dewatripont et al. (1999a,b) emphasise the role of the information structure, and Gibbons and Murphy (1992) study the interaction between career concerns and explicit contracts.

Dewatripont M Jewitt I Tirole J 1999b The economics of career concerns, part II: Application to missions and accountability of government agencies Review of Economic Studies 66 199–217 doi:1. p. 3
Where the paper says it

Terviö (2009) studies the market failure that arises when an early employer cannot capture the full return from discovering an inexperienced worker’s talent; our baseline characterises private occupational choice and applicant wages, but does not determine whether the market produces too much or too little information. Open-source production offers a related setting in which current work becomes a portable signal: Lerner and Tirole (2002) identify career incentives and labourmarket signalling as important motives for open-source participation, Abou El-Komboz and Goldbeck (2025) study career concerns and signalling in open-source software development, and Belenzon and Schankerman (2015) examine motivation and the sorting of human capital into open innovation.

Farber HS Gibbons R 1996 Learning and wage dynamics The Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 1007–1047 doi:3. p. 3
Where the paper says it

(1999a,b) emphasise the role of the information structure, and Gibbons and Murphy (1992) study the interaction between career concerns and explicit contracts. Employer-learning models examine how wages respond as information about productivity accumulates (Farber and Gibbons, 1996; Altonji and Pierret, 2001), while models of internal labour markets connect learning to wage and promotion dynamics (Gibbons and Waldman, 1999, 2006; Waldman, 2013).

Gibbons R Murphy KJ 2003 Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns: Theory and evidence Journal of Political Economy 100 468–505 doi:4. p. 3
Where the paper says it

The career-concerns literature shows how market learning from performance creates implicit incentives: Holmström (1999) develops the central dynamic mechanism, Dewatripont et al. (1999a,b) emphasise the role of the information structure, and Gibbons and Murphy (1992) study the interaction between career concerns and explicit contracts.

Gibbons R Waldman M 2999 A theory of wage and promotion dynamics inside firms The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 1321–1358 doi:5. p. 3
Where the paper says it

(1999a,b) emphasise the role of the information structure, and Gibbons and Murphy (1992) study the interaction between career concerns and explicit contracts. Employer-learning models examine how wages respond as information about productivity accumulates (Farber and Gibbons, 1996; Altonji and Pierret, 2001), while models of internal labour markets connect learning to wage and promotion dynamics (Gibbons and Waldman, 1999, 2006; Waldman, 2013).

Gibbons R Waldman M 2006 Enriching a theory of wage and promotion dynamics inside firms Journal of Labor Economics 24 59–107 doi:6. p. 3
Where the paper says it

(1999a,b) emphasise the role of the information structure, and Gibbons and Murphy (1992) study the interaction between career concerns and explicit contracts. Employer-learning models examine how wages respond as information about productivity accumulates (Farber and Gibbons, 1996; Altonji and Pierret, 2001), while models of internal labour markets connect learning to wage and promotion dynamics (Gibbons and Waldman, 1999, 2006; Waldman, 2013).

Holmström B 1999 Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspective Review of Economic Studies 66 169–182 doi:7. p. 3
Where the paper says it

Our focus is on the decision that comes before the outcome—whether to generate another public signal at all, or to enter an applicant pool instead—which makes both the population at a record and the set of applicants endogenous objects. The career-concerns literature shows how market learning from performance creates implicit incentives: Holmström (1999) develops the central dynamic mechanism, Dewatripont et al.

Kaniel R Orlov D 2025 Intermediated asymmetric information compensation and career prospects American Economic Review 115 3638–74 doi:0. p. 3
Where the paper says it

The model also belongs to the broader literature on dynamic reputation, experimentation, and career signalling, in which current choices or evolving track records shape future beliefs and payoffs (e. , Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn, 2013; Thomas, 2019; Kaniel and Orlov, 2025).

Koellinger P Mell J Pohl I 2015 Self-employed but looking A labour market experiment Economica 82 137–161 doi:0. p. 2
Where the paper says it

4 Second, at any record where both occupations are chosen, higher-talent workers select into public production and lower-talent workers apply to firms; the competitive applicant wage therefore lies below mean talent among all holders of the record, and the discount decomposes exactly into the self-employed share and the talent gap between the two groups. Third, occupational choices determine the flow of new public successes and failures, and hence how much information the market receives at all.

Lerner J Tirole J 2002 Some simple economics of open source The Journal of Industrial Economics 50 197–234 doi:3. p. 3
Where the paper says it

Terviö (2009) studies the market failure that arises when an early employer cannot capture the full return from discovering an inexperienced worker’s talent; our baseline characterises private occupational choice and applicant wages, but does not determine whether the market produces too much or too little information. Open-source production offers a related setting in which current work becomes a portable signal: Lerner and Tirole (2002) identify career incentives and labourmarket signalling as important motives for open-source participation, Abou El-Komboz and Goldbeck (2025) study career concerns and signalling in open-source software development, and Belenzon and Schankerman (2015) examine motivation and the sorting of human capital into open innovation.

Leung MD 2018 Learning to hire Hiring as a dynamic, experiential learning process in an online market for contract labor Management Science 64 5651–5668 doi:0. p. 3
Where the paper says it

More generally, reputation systems use public histories to guide later transactions (Bar-Isaac and Tadelis, 2008). 5Pallais (2014) shows experimentally that detailed public evaluations of inexperienced workers improve later employment outcomes; Stanton and Thomas (2016) study outsourcing agencies that signal worker quality; and Leung (2018) documents how employers’ earlier experiences with workers from particular countries affect later hiring from those countries.

Onuchic P Ray D 2023 Signaling and discrimination in collaborative projects American Economic Review 113 210–252 doi:4. p. 3
Where the paper says it

, Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn, 2013; Thomas, 2019; Kaniel and Orlov, 2025). Onuchic and Ray (2023) study reputational incentives in the choice between solo and collaborative projects when joint production obscures individual credit.

Pallais A 2014 Inefficient hiring in entry-level labor markets American Economic Review 104 3565–3599 doi:8. p. 3
Where the paper says it

More generally, reputation systems use public histories to guide later transactions (Bar-Isaac and Tadelis, 2008). 5Pallais (2014) shows experimentally that detailed public evaluations of inexperienced workers improve later employment outcomes; Stanton and Thomas (2016) study outsourcing agencies that signal worker quality; and Leung (2018) documents how employers’ earlier experiences with workers from particular countries affect later hiring from those countries.

Stanton CT Thomas C 2016 Landing the first job The value of intermediaries in online hiring Review of Economic Studies 83 810–854 doi:9. p. 3
Where the paper says it

More generally, reputation systems use public histories to guide later transactions (Bar-Isaac and Tadelis, 2008). 5Pallais (2014) shows experimentally that detailed public evaluations of inexperienced workers improve later employment outcomes; Stanton and Thomas (2016) study outsourcing agencies that signal worker quality; and Leung (2018) documents how employers’ earlier experiences with workers from particular countries affect later hiring from those countries.

Terviö M 2009 Superstars and mediocrities Market failure in the discovery of talent Review of Economic Studies 76 829–850 doi:1. p. 3
Where the paper says it

The model also connects to talent discovery. Terviö (2009) studies the market failure that arises when an early employer cannot capture the full return from discovering an inexperienced worker’s talent; our baseline characterises private occupational choice and applicant wages, but does not determine whether the market produces too much or too little information.

Thomas C 2019 Experimentation with reputation concerns – dynamic signalling with changing types Journal of Economic Theory 179 366–415 doi:0. p. 3
Where the paper says it

The model also belongs to the broader literature on dynamic reputation, experimentation, and career signalling, in which current choices or evolving track records shape future beliefs and payoffs (e. , Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn, 2013; Thomas, 2019; Kaniel and Orlov, 2025).

Waldman M 2013 Theory and evidence in internal labor markets In Gibbons R Roberts J The Handbook of Organizational Economics Princeton University Press Princeton pp. p. 3
Where the paper says it

(1999a,b) emphasise the role of the information structure, and Gibbons and Murphy (1992) study the interaction between career concerns and explicit contracts. Employer-learning models examine how wages respond as information about productivity accumulates (Farber and Gibbons, 1996; Altonji and Pierret, 2001), while models of internal labour markets connect learning to wage and promotion dynamics (Gibbons and Waldman, 1999, 2006; Waldman, 2013).

520–572 doi:5.

Pruning redundant reasoning tokens

The paper studies a stationary labour market in which risk-averse workers privately know their permanent talent and choose, period by period, between risky self-employment, whose outcomes become part of a portable public record, and firm employment, which pays a competitive wage but keeps individual performance hidden from the outside market. <ref:2509.01265#pg2> The central difficulty in the model is that the record is endogenous in two ways: first, the population holding a record is selected by every occupational path that can lead to it, and second, the current application adds a further layer of selection: firms hire from workers who apply, not everyone holding the same record. p. 1

Where the paper says it

The central difficulty is that the record is endogenous, and in two distinct ways. First, the population holding a record is selected by every occupational path that can lead to it.

<ref:2509.01265#pg4>

How the training signal is built

The analysis constructs beliefs in two stages: first from the stationary flow of types through all histories leading to—and retaining—each record, and only then by conditioning on the current application decision. <ref:2509.01265#pg4> The object Gs is the worker’s reputation at record s, which depends on equilibrium behaviour at every predecessor record that can lead to s and on earlier retention decisions at s itself. p. 6

Where the paper says it

(5) The object Gs is the worker’s reputation at record s. It depends on equilibrium behaviour at every predecessor record that can lead to s and on earlier retention decisions at s itself.

<ref:2509.01265#pg9> In every period, a competitive fringe of risk-neutral, short-lived firms posts a wage for applicants at each observable record. p. 6
Where the paper says it

It depends on equilibrium behaviour at every predecessor record that can lead to s and on earlier retention decisions at s itself. In every period, a competitive fringe of risk-neutral, short-lived firms posts a wage for applicants at each observable record.

<ref:2509.01265#pg9> Bayes’ rule then determines the applicant belief νs(dθ) = (1 − σs(θ))ms(θ) dθ / Ds. p. 7
Where the paper says it

If Ds > 0, Bayes’ rule gives the applicant belief νs(dθ) = 1 − σs(θ) ms(θ) dθ Ds . (8) Competition and free entry then imply the zero-profit wage ws = Z 1 0 θ νs(dθ) = Z 1 0 θ 1 − σs(θ) ms(θ) dθ Z 1 0 1 − σs(θ) ms(θ) dθ .

<ref:2509.01265#pg9>

Where the gains come from

The key gains come from the decomposition of the record-specific discount, ds = ¯θs − ws, which is exactly Rs/Ms (pS s − ws) > 0. <ref:2509.01265#pg8> This decomposition separates the discount into the share of workers who remain in self-employment and the talent gap between public producers and applicants. p. 2

Where the paper says it

First, firm employment is selfconfirming: when it is strictly preferred, the job changes neither the public record nor the stationary wage, so a surviving worker faces the same comparison again and makes the same choice—opaque employment persists until exogenous exit. 4 Second, at any record where both occupations are chosen, higher-talent workers select into public production and lower-talent workers apply to firms; the competitive applicant wage therefore lies below mean talent among all holders of the record, and the discount decomposes exactly into the self-employed share and the talent gap between the two groups.

<ref:2509.01265#pg8> The model predicts that at an on-path record with applicants, the competitive wage offered to applicants is below mean talent among all workers who hold the same record, and this discount decomposes exactly into the share of workers who remain in self-employment and the talent gap between public producers and applicants. p. 0
Where the paper says it

At any on-path record where both occupations are chosen, higher-talent workers select into self-employment, and the applicant wage lies below mean talent among holders of that record; this discount decomposes exactly into the self-employed share and the talent gap between the two groups. The model yields within-record predictions for occupational choice, wages, subsequent performance, and the duration of opaque employment spells.

<ref:2509.01265#pg8>

Persistence of opaque employment

Firm employment is persistent whenever it is strictly preferred, because it leaves both the record and the stationary wage unchanged—the choice is self-confirming. <ref:2509.01265#pg9> This prediction applies to a state–type pair, not to a record at which every worker becomes absorbed. p. 2

Where the paper says it

4Persistence attaches to a state–type pair rather than to a record. At one and the same record, lower types can be absorbed into firm employment while higher types keep producing public outcomes, so persistence and continued public-information production coexist within a record cell.

Conditional on survival and an unchanged environment, a worker who enters opaque firm employment does not return to public production. p. 9
Where the paper says it

Conditional on survival, the worker therefore faces the same record, the same stationary wage ws, and the same continuation values in the next period. The strict inequality u(ws) > Qs(θ) is unchanged, so firm employment is again uniquely optimal.

<ref:2509.01265#pg9>

The baseline yields four closely related empirical objects: positive selection into public production, a record-specific applicant-wage discount, persistent …

Green — the paper says it, and the page is printed. Red — no passage carries it, so treat that sentence as unverified. The same check runs on your own text: check a summary against its source, $5.

Improvements for AI systems

  1. Improved understanding of endogenous record formation allows AI systems to model career progression based on public outcomes rather than just internal performance metrics. This enables simulation of how workers decide whether to generate another public outcome or to apply for a firm period by period, which is central to the model's structure.

  2. Enhanced ability to predict applicant behavior at any given record by conditioning beliefs on the current application decision and the stationary flow through all histories leading to that record. This allows for more nuanced predictions of how firms observe the record and the worker’s current application reveals information about talent.

  3. Development of a mechanism to calculate an exact decomposition of applicant wage discounts into two components: the self-employed share and the talent gap between the two groups. This provides a precise way to attribute wage differences observed in labor market data to specific behavioral choices rather than general performance changes.

  4. Capacity for simulating persistence in employment spells, where firm employment persists whenever it is strictly optimal for a given type at a given record, even when that choice is opaque. AI can model the duration of these spells as geometrically distributed with an exit probability lambda, reflecting the economic incentive to maintain opacity.

  5. Ability to perform within-record comparisons: predicting that higher-talent workers select into self-employment and lower-talent workers apply to firms at any on-path record where both occupations are chosen. This allows for specific predictions about observable performance measures conditional on the complete public record, rather than just general changes in wages.

Abstract

This paper studies self-employment as an investment in future employment. Workers know their ability and choose between a safe wage and a risky independent project whose outcome becomes public. Employers pay the mean productivity of their applicants. In a two-period model with uniform ability and square-root utility, we establish a range of discount factors on which greater concern for future income increases independent production in both periods and lowers all employment wages. Some workers sacrifice current expected utility to produce a record, then accept employment after either outcome. The record is most valuable to a worker of intermediate ability; the highest types remain independent. We distinguish current income insurance from the cost of giving up this record opportunity. Identifying employers' recruitment cohorts reduces the payment needed to attract some applicant pools, but leaves the equilibrium unchanged on the established range.

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