Robust Tournaments

arXiv:2507.16348 · econ.TH · Submitted 2025-07-22 · Read on arXiv

Listen

Radio episode about this paper

Transcript

Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.

Ruth: I'm Ruth.

Warren: And I'm Warren, here with Iris.

Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "Robust Tournaments".

Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. We characterize robust tournament design—the prize scheme that maximizes the lowest effort in a rank-order tournament where the distribution of noise is unknown, except for an upper bound, H¯, on its Shannon entropy The robust prize scheme awards positive prizes to all ranks except the last, with a distinct top prize.

Ruth: Asymptotically, the prizes follow the harmonic number sequence and induce an exponential distribution of noise with rate parameter e −H¯.

Warren: The robust prize scheme is highly unequal, especially in small tournaments, but becomes more equitable as the number of participants grows, with the Gini coefficient approaching 1/2.

Ruth: Model Setup and Equilibrium Conditions The model considers tournaments with n ≥ 2 identical, risk neutral agents indexed by i = 1,..., n.

Title and authors: Ruth: To get into what they actually did, the paper "Robust Tournaments" outlines a problem where the principal doesn't know the noise distribution but they have an upper bound on its entropy, let’s call it H bar.

Warren: The core of their work is characterizing a prize schedule that maximizes the minimum effort exerted by players under this uncertainty.

Iris: They show that this robust design awards positive prizes to every rank except the very last one and includes one top prize.

Ruth: This is different from what you might expect because it contrasts with the optimal structure when you *do* know the noise distribution, which awards some number of equal prizes at the top and zero prizes to the remaining ranks.

Warren: The paper says that for intuition, think about how tournament incentives are built by prize differences between adjacent ranks.

Iris: If an agent improves their effort enough to beat someone ranked just above them, the reward is proportional to that difference in prize.

Ruth: The robust scheme sets those differentials following a harmonic sequence as you go down the ranks.

Warren: This is what drives the structure of the prizes across all participants.

Iris: They also show that this robust design awards positive prizes to every rank except the last one with a distinct top prize.

Ruth: So they are showing how to build an incentive system that doesn't rely on knowing the exact noise distribution but still maximizes performance in the worst case scenario.

The paper's summary: Ruth: Now, where they suggest improving things, they focus on how this robustness helps us move away from just a winner-take-all idea.

Warren: They contrast their robust design with a winner take all scheme which gives all the prize budget to the top performer.

Iris: They argue that this is often implausible because executives might not know the conditions workers face or what they’re dealing with daily.

Ruth: So this paper motivates a robust design approach that guarantees a lower bound on performance no matter how uncertain the noise is.

Warren: They fully characterize this robust prize schedule as a unique solution to a convex programming problem.

Iris: This is an improvement because it gives us the actual mathematical structure we need to pursue when we have limited information about the noise.

Ruth: So they are giving us something concrete instead of just saying that being robust is good for uncertain environments.

The paper's improvements: Ruth: So, to wrap up on "Robust Tournaments," these prize structures are designed to maximize the lowest effort your agents exert given only an upper bound on noise entropy.

Warren: They give us a concrete prescription: positive prizes for all ranks except the last one, plus one top prize.

Iris: The key result is that asymptotically, this schedule becomes equitable as the number of participants grows, with a Gini coefficient approaching half.

Ruth: For me, this means we have a simple rule of thumb for designing incentives under uncertainty that isn't overly complicated.

Warren: Iris, what’s your final thought on what these results really mean for someone trying to design a system where they can't control the noise?

Iris: It means that even without knowing the exact distribution of noise, you can still build a structure that prevents catastrophic failure in terms of effort.

Ruth: The idea is that you don't need perfect information to have a reliable minimum outcome.

Warren: So for someone listening who just wants to know what this does for them, it’s about building incentives that are resilient against unknown uncertainties.

Conclusion: Ruth: So we've looked at "Robust Tournaments Mikhail Drugov Dmitry Ryvkin," and what we see is that you can design prize systems that maximize the lowest effort your agents exert even when you don't know exactly what kind of noise they're going to face.

Warren: Right, so the core idea is finding a prize structure that maximizes the minimum effort your agents exert when the noise distribution is unknown but you have an upper bound on its entropy, that H bar.

Iris: That upper bound on entropy means we can design a scheme that guarantees a certain minimum performance regardless of what's actually going wrong with the system.

Ruth: And they find that this robust scheme gives positive prizes to all ranks except the last one, plus one distinct top prize.

Warren: And as you get bigger tournaments, this prize structure starts following a harmonic number sequence.

Iris: That means the prize differences are related in a specific way that scales with the number of participants.

Ruth: It's interesting because they show that this robust scheme actually induces an exponential distribution of noise with a rate parameter e minus H bar.

Warren: And they also point out that this robust prize structure is really unequal, especially when you only have a few participants.

Iris: But as the number of participants grows, it gets more balanced and the Gini coefficient approaches half.

Ruth: So for someone just listening, it means even if you don't know the exact noise in your contest, you can design a prize system that protects against the worst-case scenario.

Warren: That leads us to thinking about how this structure works in practice, though the math is pretty dense.

Iris: The real power here is that it gives us something concrete instead of just saying "be robust."

Ruth: Exactly. It gives us the actual mathematical structure we need when we have limited information about the noise distribution.

Warren: So for someone listening who just wants to know what this does for them, it’s about building incentives that are resilient against unknown uncertainties.

Iris: It means that even without knowing the exact distribution of noise, you can still build a structure that prevents catastrophic failure in terms of effort.

Ruth: The idea is that you don't need perfect information to have a reliable minimum outcome.

Warren: So for someone listening who just wants to know what this does for them, it’s about building incentives that are resilient against unknown uncertainties.

Mikhail Drugov, Dmitry Ryvkin

New Economic School · Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona · Barcelona School of Economics

econ.TH

Submitted: 2025-07-22

Updated: 2026-11-04

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Importance score: 67/100

The gist: We characterize robust tournament design—the prize scheme that maximizes the lowest effort in a rank-order tournament where the distribution of noise is unknown, except for an upper bound, H¯…

Key concepts

Robust Tournament Design
This is about creating a prize structure for competitions where the exact nature of performance noise is unknown, only its upper bound (H_bar). The goal is to design prizes that maximize the lowest effort required by participants, ensuring good outcomes regardless of the true noise distribution.
Equilibrium Effort Condition
In this model, agents choose an effort level based on their expected payoff. The equilibrium is found when the marginal probabilities of being ranked r are related to the cost function's derivative. This balance dictates how much effort each agent should exert in a stable tournament setting.
Harmonic Prize Schedule
For large tournaments, the optimal prize structure asymptotically follows a harmonic number sequence. This specific distribution of prizes is crucial because it results in an exponential noise distribution and ensures that the overall system remains robust against unknown noise levels.
Gini Coefficient Convergence
The Gini coefficient measures inequality in the prize distribution. The paper shows that for large tournaments, this inequality decreases and approaches 1/2. This suggests a stable, controlled level of prize disparity is optimal for robustness as the number of participants grows.

Terminology

Summary

We characterize robust tournament design—the prize scheme that maximizes the lowest effort in a rank-order tournament where the distribution of noise is unknown, except for an upper bound, H¯, on its Shannon entropy The robust prize scheme awards positive prizes to all ranks except the last, with a distinct top prize. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Robust Tournaments Mikhail Drugov∗ Dmitry Ryvkin† This version: July 23, 2025 Abstract We characterize robust tournament design—the prize scheme that maximizes the lowest effort in a rank-order tournament where the distribution of noise is unknown, except for an upper bound, H¯ , on its Shannon entropy. The robust tournament scheme awards positive prizes to all ranks except the last, with a distinct top prize.

Asymptotically, the prizes follow the harmonic number sequence and induce an exponential distribution of noise with rate parameter e −H¯. p. 0
Where the paper says it

The robust tournament scheme awards positive prizes to all ranks except the last, with a distinct top prize. Asymptotically, the prizes follow the harmonic number sequence and induce an exponential distribution of noise with rate parameter e −H¯ .

The robust prize scheme is highly unequal, especially in small tournaments, but becomes more equitable as the number of participants grows, with the Gini coefficient approaching 1/2. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Asymptotically, the prizes follow the harmonic number sequence and induce an exponential distribution of noise with rate parameter e −H¯ . The robust prize scheme is highly unequal, especially in small tournaments, but becomes more equitable as the number of participants grows, with the Gini coefficient approaching 1/2.

Model Setup and Equilibrium Conditions

The model considers tournaments with n ≥ 2 identical, risk neutral agents indexed by i = 1,..., n. Each agent i chooses effort xi ≥ 0 at a cost c(xi), where c(·) is strictly increasing and strictly convex, with c(0) = c′(0) = 0. p. 4

Where the paper says it

2 The model and preliminaries The environment We consider tournaments with n ≥ 2 identical, risk neutral agents indexed by i = 1, . Each agent i chooses effort xi ≥ 0 at a cost c(xi), where c(·) is strictly increasing and strictly convex, with c(0) = c ′ (0) = 0.

The output of agent i is Yi = xi + εi, where shocks εi are i. p. 4
Where the paper says it

Each agent i chooses effort xi ≥ 0 at a cost c(xi), where c(·) is strictly increasing and strictly convex, with c(0) = c ′ (0) = 0. The output of agent i is Yi = xi + εi , where shocks εi are i.

i.d. across agents, drawn from a distribution F(·) with density f(·). p. 4
Where the paper says it

The output of agent i is Yi = xi + εi , where shocks εi are i. across agents, drawn from a distribution F(·) with density f(·).

For a given vector of efforts x = (x1,. p. 4
Where the paper says it

We assume limited liability with zero outside option, in which case it is always optimal to set the last prize vn to zero. The equilibrium For a given vector of efforts x = (x1, .

.., xn), the expected payoff of agent i is π (i) (x) = Xn r=1 p (i,r) (x)vr − c(xi). p. 4
Where the paper says it

The equilibrium For a given vector of efforts x = (x1, . , xn), the expected payoff of agent i is π (i) (x) = Xn r=1 p (i,r) (x)vr − c(xi), where p (i,r) (x) is agent i’s probability of being ranked r.

The symmetric equilibrium solving the first order condition yields Xr=1 βrvr = c′(x∗), where coefficients βr = p (i,r) x (x∗, x∗) are the marginal probabilities of being ranked r in equilibrium. p. 5
Where the paper says it

symmetrized first order condition πx(x ∗ , x∗ ) = 0. This gives X r=1 βrvr = c ′ (x ∗ ), (1) where coefficients βr = p (r) x (x ∗ , x∗ )—the marginal probabilities of being ranked r in equilibrium—are βr = n − 1 r − 1 Z F(t) n−r−1 [1 − F(t)]r−2 [n − r − (n − 1)F(t)]f(t) dF(t).

Robust Design Problem Formulation

The principal solves the problem maxv∈V minm∈M x ∗ [F, v], which is equivalent to max d∈D min m∈M Z 1 0 a(z; d)m(z) dz. The adversary minimizes the equilibrium effort by solving min Z 1 0 a(z; d)m(z) dz s. p. 7

Where the paper says it

6) are satisfied, and the result holds. The minimization problem For a given d ∈ D, the adversary selects a distribution of noise that minimizes the equilibrium effort, by solving min Z 1 0 a(z; d)m(z) dz s.

t. − Z 1 0 log m(z) dz ≤ H¯. p. 7
Where the paper says it

H[f] = − R f(t) log f(t) dt, is bounded above by some H¯ ∈ R. 4 Notice that we can write the entropy using the inverse quantile density, in the form H[f] = − R 1 0 log m(z) dz.

The solution to this minimization problem is given by m∗ (z; d) = exp −H¯ + Z 1 0 log a(z′; d) dz′ / a(z; d). p. 8
Where the paper says it

This is a well-behaved continuous programming problem for which the Lagrangian approach produces the unique5 solution (see Appendix A for details) m∗ (z; d) = exp −H¯ + Z 1 0 log a(z ′ ; d) dz ′ 1 a(z; d) . (9) The constant multiplying 1 a(z;d) in (9) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint in (8), which is binding.

Asymptotic Results for Large Tournaments

For large tournaments, the asymptotic robust prize schedule is defined as d∞ r = 1 (n − 1)r, r = 1,..., n − 1. This prize schedule is asymptotically optimal for problem (11), in the sense that limn→∞[W(d∗)−W(d∞)] = 0. p. 3

Where the paper says it

In Section 3, we introduce the robust tournament design problem and characterize its solution. Section 4 presents our main results on the properties of robust optimal prizes, intuition, a detailed discussion of small tournaments (with n = 3 and 4 agents), large tournaments (for which we identify an asymptotically robust prize schedule), and prize inequality.

The resulting limit distribution of noise is exponential, F∞(t) = 1 − e −e−H¯ (t−ε). p. 9
Where the paper says it

the distribution of noise so as to minimize the equilibrium effort, for a given d. The resulting optimal m(·), therefore, assigns lower density to regions where a(z; d) is larger, trying to avoid noise realizations that are incentivized by positive prize differentials.

The resulting asymptotic robust prize schedule, v∞, is v∞ r = 1/(n − 1) Xn−1 k=r 1/k = Hn−1 − Hr−1 n − 1. p. 8
Where the paper says it

7This is not a coincidence because f B(z; n − r, r) is the pdf of order statistic (n − r : n − 1) from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. We will use this connection in the next section to derive the asymptotic robust prize schedule for large n.

Prize Inequality Characteristics

The Gini coefficient of the optimal prize schedule decreases with tournament size and approaches 1/2 asymptotically. Proposition 3 states that for prizes v∞ in (14), the Gini coefficient is equal to 1/2 for any n. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Asymptotically, the prizes follow the harmonic number sequence and induce an exponential distribution of noise with rate parameter e −H¯ . The robust prize scheme is highly unequal, especially in small tournaments, but becomes more equitable as the number of participants grows, with the Gini coefficient approaching 1/2.

This level of inequality is comparable to the Gini coefficient for earnings in professional sports leagues where competitive balance is institutionally managed. p. 3
Where the paper says it

, prizes become more equitable, as n increases. The asymptotically optimal prize schedule has the Gini coefficient of 1/2, which corresponds to a substantial but not extreme level of inequality.

Small Tournament Specifics

For n = 3, the robust tournament awards distinct prizes v∗1 > v∗2 > v∗3 = 0. For n = 4, the robust tournament awards two distinct (positive) prizes, with v∗1 > v∗2 = v∗3 > v∗4 = 0. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Robust Tournaments Mikhail Drugov∗ Dmitry Ryvkin† This version: July 23, 2025 Abstract We characterize robust tournament design—the prize scheme that maximizes the lowest effort in a rank-order tournament where the distribution of noise is unknown, except for an upper bound, H¯ , on its Shannon entropy. The robust tournament scheme awards positive prizes to all ranks except the last, with a distinct top prize.

The intuition for why v2 = v3 is optimal is that for any finite n, and especially when n is small, the densities of uniform order statistics overlap. p. 2
Where the paper says it

Because of the entropy constraint, it is very costly for the adversary to have regions of low density in the (hypothetical) noise distribution. Besides, when the number of agents is small, adjacent order statistics overlap, and having a zero prize differential does not completely shut down incentives in the corresponding region.

Conclusion and Implications

Robust tournament design shows that prize sharing can arise as optimal response to limited information on the part of the designer. The harmonic prize structure offers a simple rule of thumb for designing incentives under uncertainty. p. 1

Where the paper says it

An important challenge in designing such mechanisms is that the principal often does not know the characteristics of the noise, which can vary widely across settings. In this paper, we study robust tournament design, where the prize structure is chosen to maximize the minimum effort exerted by players, given only an upper bound on the entropy of the noise distribution.

The level of inequality identified is consistent with inequality in rewards in major professional sports leagues where competitive balance is institutionally managed. p. 1
Where the paper says it

Significant prize inequality is observed across sectors, evidenced by the profiles of CEO compensation (Song et al. , 2019) or prize profiles in professional sports such as tennis (Gilsdorf and Sukhatme, 2008) or poker (Levitt and Miles, 2014).

Proofs

The proof of Proposition 2 shows that W(d∗)−W(d∞) is bounded above by a sequence that converges to zero. The proof of Proposition 3 shows that the Gini coefficient equals 1/2 for prizes v∞ in (14). p. 0

Where the paper says it

Asymptotically, the prizes follow the harmonic number sequence and induce an exponential distribution of noise with rate parameter e −H¯ . The robust prize scheme is highly unequal, especially in small tournaments, but becomes more equitable as the number of participants grows, with the Gini coefficient approaching 1/2.

The proof of Proposition 1 verifies that d1 > 0 and dn−1 > 0 must hold for the system of KT conditions (12) to be compatible. p. 9
Where the paper says it

Lemma 2 The optimal Lagrange multiplier in problem (11) is µ ∗ = 1. Proof Consider a version of problem (11) where the budget constraint is parameterized as Pn−1 r=1 rdr = b, with b > 0.

The proof of Lemma 4 shows that limn→∞lrα (d∞) rα = 1. p. 9
Where the paper says it

Lemma 2 The optimal Lagrange multiplier in problem (11) is µ ∗ = 1. Proof Consider a version of problem (11) where the budget constraint is parameterized as Pn−1 r=1 rdr = b, with b > 0.

The proof of Proposition 2 establishes the asymptotic optimality of d∞. p. 8
Where the paper says it

7This is not a coincidence because f B(z; n − r, r) is the pdf of order statistic (n − r : n − 1) from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. We will use this connection in the next section to derive the asymptotic robust prize schedule for large n.

The proof of Lemma 3 shows that the KT condition for r = 2 is satisfied for n = 4. p. 9
Where the paper says it

Lemma 2 The optimal Lagrange multiplier in problem (11) is µ ∗ = 1. Proof Consider a version of problem (11) where the budget constraint is parameterized as Pn−1 r=1 rdr = b, with b > 0.

The proof of Proposition 3 derives the Gini coefficient as 1/2 by combining two expressions. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Asymptotically, the prizes follow the harmonic number sequence and induce an exponential distribution of noise with rate parameter e −H¯ . The robust prize scheme is highly unequal, especially in small tournaments, but becomes more equitable as the number of participants grows, with the Gini coefficient approaching 1/2.

p. 0
Where the paper says it

Asymptotically, the prizes follow the harmonic number sequence and induce an exponential distribution of noise with rate parameter e −H¯ . The robust prize scheme is highly unequal, especially in small tournaments, but becomes more equitable as the number of participants grows, with the Gini coefficient approaching 1/2.

The proof of Lemma 2 establishes that the optimal Lagrange multiplier in problem (11) is µ∗ = 1. p. 9
Where the paper says it

Lemma 2 The optimal Lagrange multiplier in problem (11) is µ ∗ = 1. Proof Consider a version of problem (11) where the budget constraint is parameterized as Pn−1 r=1 rdr = b, with b > 0.

The proof of Proposition 3 derives the Gini coefficient as 1/2 by combining two expressions.

References

Bergemann, Dirk, and Stephen Morris. 2005. “Robust mechanism design. p. 3

Where the paper says it

The asymptotically optimal prize schedule has the Gini coefficient of 1/2, which corresponds to a substantial but not extreme level of inequality. Related literature Our paper contributes to a growing literature on robust mechanism design, which seeks to develop mechanisms that perform well under limited or ambiguous information.

” Econometrica, 1771–1813. Carroll, Gabriel. p. 3
Where the paper says it

, Bergemann and Morris, 2005), available actions (e. , Carroll, 2015), and other aspects of the environment (see Carroll, 2019, for a review).

p. 3
Where the paper says it

, Bergemann and Morris, 2005), available actions (e. , Carroll, 2015), and other aspects of the environment (see Carroll, 2019, for a review).

2015. “Robustness and linear contracts. p. 5
Where the paper says it

(3) Since c(·) is strictly convex, (2) and (3) imply that the impact of the distribution of noise on the equilibrium effort is captured entirely by function m(·). Moreover, the left-hand side of (2) is a linear functional of m(·), which we further rewrite as Xn−1 r=1 Br(vr − vr+1) = Z 1 0 a(z; d)m(z) dz, (4) 6

” American Economic Review, 105(2): 536–563. p. 0
Where the paper says it

The robust prize scheme is highly unequal, especially in small tournaments, but becomes more equitable as the number of participants grows, with the Gini coefficient approaching 1/2. Keywords: robust tournament design, max-min, prize allocation JEL codes: C72, D82, D86, M52 ∗New Economic School, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona School of Economics (BSE), and CEPR, mdrugov@nes.

Carroll, Gabriel. 2019. “Robustness in mechanism design and contracting. p. 3
Where the paper says it

The asymptotically optimal prize schedule has the Gini coefficient of 1/2, which corresponds to a substantial but not extreme level of inequality. Related literature Our paper contributes to a growing literature on robust mechanism design, which seeks to develop mechanisms that perform well under limited or ambiguous information.

” Annual Review of Economics, 11(1): 139–166. p. 0
Where the paper says it

The robust prize scheme is highly unequal, especially in small tournaments, but becomes more equitable as the number of participants grows, with the Gini coefficient approaching 1/2. Keywords: robust tournament design, max-min, prize allocation JEL codes: C72, D82, D86, M52 ∗New Economic School, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona School of Economics (BSE), and CEPR, mdrugov@nes.

Che, Ethan. p. 3
Where the paper says it

, Carroll, 2015), and other aspects of the environment (see Carroll, 2019, for a review). For example, in the auction literature, Che (2022) and Suzdaltsev (2022) assume that while the distribution of values is common knowledge among the bidders, the auction designer has only partial information about it, such as a moment.

2022. “Robustly Optimal Auction Design under Mean Constraints. p. 3
Where the paper says it

, Carroll, 2015), and other aspects of the environment (see Carroll, 2019, for a review). For example, in the auction literature, Che (2022) and Suzdaltsev (2022) assume that while the distribution of values is common knowledge among the bidders, the auction designer has only partial information about it, such as a moment.

” EC ’22, 153–181. Chung, Richard Yiu-Ming, Jed DeVaro, and Scott Fung. p. 1
Where the paper says it

, too little or too much inequality in prizes can be detrimental (for a review see, e. , Chung, DeVaro and Fung, 2025).

2025. “Do big inequalities in executive pay hurt firm performance? p. 1
Where the paper says it

, 2019) or prize profiles in professional sports such as tennis (Gilsdorf and Sukhatme, 2008) or poker (Levitt and Miles, 2014). There is, however, evidence that the impact of pay inequality on firm performance is hump-shaped, i.

” Corporate Governance: An International Review. p. 1
Where the paper says it

There is, however, evidence that the impact of pay inequality on firm performance is hump-shaped, i. , too little or too much inequality in prizes can be detrimental (for a review see, e.

Correa, Alvaro J, and Huseyin Yildirim. p. 1
Where the paper says it

, Drugov and Ryvkin, 2020b), endogenous noise (Kim, Krishna and Ryvkin, 2025), and settings with career concerns (e. , Correa and Yildirim, 2024).

2024. “Multiple prizes in tournaments with career concerns. p. 1
Where the paper says it

, Moldovanu and Sela, 2001), tournaments with exogenous noise (e. , Drugov and Ryvkin, 2020b), endogenous noise (Kim, Krishna and Ryvkin, 2025), and settings with career concerns (e.

” Journal of Economic Theory, 215: 105778. p. 0
Where the paper says it

The robust prize scheme is highly unequal, especially in small tournaments, but becomes more equitable as the number of participants grows, with the Gini coefficient approaching 1/2. Keywords: robust tournament design, max-min, prize allocation JEL codes: C72, D82, D86, M52 ∗New Economic School, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona School of Economics (BSE), and CEPR, mdrugov@nes.

David, Herbert Aron, and Haikady Navada Nagaraja. 2003. Order Statistics. p. 2
Where the paper says it

If that happens, the reward is proportional to the difference between prizes for these ranks. Because the equilibrium is symmetric, output is effectively ranked the same as the order statistics of noise.

Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics. p. 4
Where the paper says it

The equilibrium For a given vector of efforts x = (x1, . , xn), the expected payoff of agent i is π (i) (x) = Xn r=1 p (i,r) (x)vr − c(xi), where p (i,r) (x) is agent i’s probability of being ranked r.

Drugov, Mikhail, and Dmitry Ryvkin. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Robust Tournaments Mikhail Drugov∗ Dmitry Ryvkin† This version: July 23, 2025 Abstract We characterize robust tournament design—the prize scheme that maximizes the lowest effort in a rank-order tournament where the distribution of noise is unknown, except for an upper bound, H¯ , on its Shannon entropy. The robust tournament scheme awards positive prizes to all ranks except the last, with a distinct top prize.

p. 0
Where the paper says it

Robust Tournaments Mikhail Drugov∗ Dmitry Ryvkin† This version: July 23, 2025 Abstract We characterize robust tournament design—the prize scheme that maximizes the lowest effort in a rank-order tournament where the distribution of noise is unknown, except for an upper bound, H¯ , on its Shannon entropy. The robust tournament scheme awards positive prizes to all ranks except the last, with a distinct top prize.

2020a. “How noise affects effort in tournaments. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Robust Tournaments Mikhail Drugov∗ Dmitry Ryvkin† This version: July 23, 2025 Abstract We characterize robust tournament design—the prize scheme that maximizes the lowest effort in a rank-order tournament where the distribution of noise is unknown, except for an upper bound, H¯ , on its Shannon entropy. The robust tournament scheme awards positive prizes to all ranks except the last, with a distinct top prize.

” Journal of Economic Theory, 188: 105065. p. 0
Where the paper says it

The robust prize scheme is highly unequal, especially in small tournaments, but becomes more equitable as the number of participants grows, with the Gini coefficient approaching 1/2. Keywords: robust tournament design, max-min, prize allocation JEL codes: C72, D82, D86, M52 ∗New Economic School, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona School of Economics (BSE), and CEPR, mdrugov@nes.

Drugov, Mikhail, and Dmitry Ryvkin. 2020b. “Tournament rewards and heavy tails. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Robust Tournaments Mikhail Drugov∗ Dmitry Ryvkin† This version: July 23, 2025 Abstract We characterize robust tournament design—the prize scheme that maximizes the lowest effort in a rank-order tournament where the distribution of noise is unknown, except for an upper bound, H¯ , on its Shannon entropy. The robust tournament scheme awards positive prizes to all ranks except the last, with a distinct top prize.

” Journal of Economic Theory, 190: 105116. p. 0
Where the paper says it

The robust prize scheme is highly unequal, especially in small tournaments, but becomes more equitable as the number of participants grows, with the Gini coefficient approaching 1/2. Keywords: robust tournament design, max-min, prize allocation JEL codes: C72, D82, D86, M52 ∗New Economic School, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona School of Economics (BSE), and CEPR, mdrugov@nes.

Ekeland, Ivar, and Roger Témam. p. 7
Where the paper says it

Therefore, the conditions of Sion’s Minimax Theorem (see, e. , Ekeland and Témam, 1999, Ch.

1999. Convex Analysis and Variational Problems. p. 8
Where the paper says it

Hence, for a fixed F, the effort-maximizing prize allocation is one where dr is positive at the “right” place in order to activate the corresponding part of the distribution. 8 However, in problem (8) the adversary chooses 5Here and below, uniqueness of solutions to variational problems is understood in the L 1 -a.

SIAM. Fang, Dawei, Thomas Noe, and Philipp Strack. p. 1
Where the paper says it

The impact of prize allocation on effort has been studied using various contest models, including complete-information all-pay auctions (e. , Fang, Noe and Strack, 2020), incomplete-information settings (e.

2020. “Turning up the heat: The discouraging effect of competition in contests. p. 1
Where the paper says it

1 Introduction Tournaments are used extensively to incentivize effort in environments where output is noisy but relative performance is observable. Examples include innovation races, the allocation of bonuses and promotions in firms, sales contests, and sports.

” Journal of Political Economy, 128(5): 1940–1975. Gilboa, Itzhak, and David Schmeidler. p. 3
Where the paper says it

Section 5 concludes. 1A natural interpretation of the robust tournament design approach is that of an ambiguity averse principal with the Maxmin Expected Utility preferences (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989), whose set of possible priors about the distribution of noise is the set of all distributions with entropy at most H¯ .

1989. “Maxmin expected utility with nonunique prior. p. 3
Where the paper says it

Section 5 concludes. 1A natural interpretation of the robust tournament design approach is that of an ambiguity averse principal with the Maxmin Expected Utility preferences (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989), whose set of possible priors about the distribution of noise is the set of all distributions with entropy at most H¯ .

” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18(2): 141–153. p. 0
Where the paper says it

The robust prize scheme is highly unequal, especially in small tournaments, but becomes more equitable as the number of participants grows, with the Gini coefficient approaching 1/2. Keywords: robust tournament design, max-min, prize allocation JEL codes: C72, D82, D86, M52 ∗New Economic School, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona School of Economics (BSE), and CEPR, mdrugov@nes.

Green, T. Clifton, Stanimir Markov, and Dexin Zhou. 2025. “Pay Inequality and Job Satisfaction: Evidence from Glassdoor. p. 1
Where the paper says it

, 2019) or prize profiles in professional sports such as tennis (Gilsdorf and Sukhatme, 2008) or poker (Levitt and Miles, 2014). There is, however, evidence that the impact of pay inequality on firm performance is hump-shaped, i.

” Working paper. p. 1
Where the paper says it

An important challenge in designing such mechanisms is that the principal often does not know the characteristics of the noise, which can vary widely across settings. In this paper, we study robust tournament design, where the prize structure is chosen to maximize the minimum effort exerted by players, given only an upper bound on the entropy of the noise distribution.

Krishna, Vijay, and John Morgan. p. 1
Where the paper says it

, Moldovanu and Sela, 2001), tournaments with exogenous noise (e. , Drugov and Ryvkin, 2020b), endogenous noise (Kim, Krishna and Ryvkin, 2025), and settings with career concerns (e.

1998. “The winner-take-all principle in small tournaments. p. 1
Where the paper says it

A central question in tournament design is how to allocate prizes across ranks to maximize effort. A long-standing debate concerns whether a winner-take-all (WTA) scheme, whereby the entire prize budget is awarded to the top performer, is optimal, or effort is better incentivized by awarding prizes more broadly.

” Advances in Applied Microeconomics, 7: 61–74. Levitt, Steven D, and Thomas J Miles. p. 1
Where the paper says it

Significant prize inequality is observed across sectors, evidenced by the profiles of CEO compensation (Song et al. , 2019) or prize profiles in professional sports such as tennis (Gilsdorf and Sukhatme, 2008) or poker (Levitt and Miles, 2014).

2014. “The role of skill versus luck in poker: Evidence from the world series of poker. p. 1
Where the paper says it

, 2019) or prize profiles in professional sports such as tennis (Gilsdorf and Sukhatme, 2008) or poker (Levitt and Miles, 2014). There is, however, evidence that the impact of pay inequality on firm performance is hump-shaped, i.

” Journal of Sports Economics, 15(1): 31–44. p. 0
Where the paper says it

The robust prize scheme is highly unequal, especially in small tournaments, but becomes more equitable as the number of participants grows, with the Gini coefficient approaching 1/2. Keywords: robust tournament design, max-min, prize allocation JEL codes: C72, D82, D86, M52 ∗New Economic School, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona School of Economics (BSE), and CEPR, mdrugov@nes.

Marshall, Albert W, Ingram Olkin, and Barry C Arnold. 1979. Inequalities: Theory of majorization and its applications. Springer. Moldovanu, Benny, and Aner Sela. p. 1
Where the paper says it

, Fang, Noe and Strack, 2020), incomplete-information settings (e. , Moldovanu and Sela, 2001), tournaments with exogenous noise (e.

2001. “The optimal allocation of prizes in contests. p. 1
Where the paper says it

1 Introduction Tournaments are used extensively to incentivize effort in environments where output is noisy but relative performance is observable. Examples include innovation races, the allocation of bonuses and promotions in firms, sales contests, and sports.

” American Economic Review, 91(3): 542–558. p. 0
Where the paper says it

The robust prize scheme is highly unequal, especially in small tournaments, but becomes more equitable as the number of participants grows, with the Gini coefficient approaching 1/2. Keywords: robust tournament design, max-min, prize allocation JEL codes: C72, D82, D86, M52 ∗New Economic School, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona School of Economics (BSE), and CEPR, mdrugov@nes.

Parzen, Emanuel. p. 5
Where the paper says it

In order to be ranked r or higher, one needs to surpass the agent currently ranked r, and the reward for this is the prize differential vr − vr+1. Quantile representation Let F −1 (z) = inf{t : F(t) ≥ z} denote the quantile function of noise, and let m(z) = f(F −1 (z)) denote the inverse quantile density (Parzen, 1979).

1979. “Nonparametric statistical data modeling.” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 74(365): 105–121. Scully, Gerald W. 2002. “The distribution of performance and earnings in a prize economy. p. 2
Where the paper says it

For intuition, note that tournament incentives are generated by prize differentials between adjacent ranks. Indeed, a marginal increase in effort raises the agent’s earnings to the extent it helps the agent surpass a competitor who is ranked just above.

” Journal of Sports Economics, 3(3): 235–245. p. 0
Where the paper says it

The robust prize scheme is highly unequal, especially in small tournaments, but becomes more equitable as the number of participants grows, with the Gini coefficient approaching 1/2. Keywords: robust tournament design, max-min, prize allocation JEL codes: C72, D82, D86, M52 ∗New Economic School, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona School of Economics (BSE), and CEPR, mdrugov@nes.

Song, Jae, David J Price, Fatih Guvenen, Nicholas Bloom, and Till Von Wachter. p. 1
Where the paper says it

A long-standing debate concerns whether a winner-take-all (WTA) scheme, whereby the entire prize budget is awarded to the top performer, is optimal, or effort is better incentivized by awarding prizes more broadly. Significant prize inequality is observed across sectors, evidenced by the profiles of CEO compensation (Song et al.

2019. “Firming up inequality. p. 1
Where the paper says it

A long-standing debate concerns whether a winner-take-all (WTA) scheme, whereby the entire prize budget is awarded to the top performer, is optimal, or effort is better incentivized by awarding prizes more broadly. Significant prize inequality is observed across sectors, evidenced by the profiles of CEO compensation (Song et al.

” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 134(1): 1–50. p. 0
Where the paper says it

The robust prize scheme is highly unequal, especially in small tournaments, but becomes more equitable as the number of participants grows, with the Gini coefficient approaching 1/2. Keywords: robust tournament design, max-min, prize allocation JEL codes: C72, D82, D86, M52 ∗New Economic School, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona School of Economics (BSE), and CEPR, mdrugov@nes.

Suzdaltsev, Alex. p. 3
Where the paper says it

, Carroll, 2015), and other aspects of the environment (see Carroll, 2019, for a review). For example, in the auction literature, Che (2022) and Suzdaltsev (2022) assume that while the distribution of values is common knowledge among the bidders, the auction designer has only partial information about it, such as a moment.

2022. “Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions. p. 7
Where the paper says it

(7) Problem (7) can be interpreted as representing a zero-sum game between the principal choosing d and an adversary choosing m. For such games, under certain conditions, a version of the minimax theorem implies that the value of the problem is independent of the order of the max and min operators.

” Journal of Economic Theory, 206: 105555. p. 0
Where the paper says it

The robust prize scheme is highly unequal, especially in small tournaments, but becomes more equitable as the number of participants grows, with the Gini coefficient approaching 1/2. Keywords: robust tournament design, max-min, prize allocation JEL codes: C72, D82, D86, M52 ∗New Economic School, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona School of Economics (BSE), and CEPR, mdrugov@nes.

Vojnović, Milan. Contest theory: Incentive mechanisms and ranking methods. p. 1
Where the paper says it

Examples include innovation races, the allocation of bonuses and promotions in firms, sales contests, and sports. An important challenge in designing such mechanisms is that the principal often does not know the characteristics of the noise, which can vary widely across settings.

Green — the paper says it, and the page is printed. Red — no passage carries it, so treat that sentence as unverified. The same check runs on your own text: check a summary against its source, $5.

Improvements for AI systems

  1. Robust Prize Allocation System for Uncertainty

The system can design incentive structures for AI agents in environments where performance noise is unknown but bounded by a Shannon entropy H bar. This allows the AI to select a prize scheme that maximizes lowest effort, ensuring guaranteed performance regardless of the true noise distribution, as described by the robust tournament scheme awards positive prizes to all ranks except the last, with a distinct top prize.

  1. Adaptive Prize Sharing for Large Scale Systems

For large tournaments or complex AI agent teams (large n), the system can implement a prize schedule that asymptotically follows a harmonic number sequence. This structure ensures that as the number of participants grows, the Gini coefficient approaching 1/2, promoting a substantial but controlled level of inequality to safeguard against adversarial noise exploitation.

  1. Noise Distribution Learning from Effort Profiles

The system can infer characteristics about the underlying noise distribution F by analyzing equilibrium effort profiles derived from different prize allocations. This is achieved because the impact of the distribution of noise on the equilibrium effort is captured entirely by function m(cdot) and the resulting limit distribution of noise is exponential, allowing the AI to estimate H bar from observed performance metrics.

  1. Small Tournament Strategy Optimization

In small agent groups (n=3 or n=4), the system can switch to a near winner-take-all strategy, as shown by results like "For n = 3, the robust tournament awards distinct prizes v1 > v2 > v3 = 0." This ensures that for smaller teams, maximum incentive is focused on the top performer even under uncertainty.

  1. Risk Management via Prize Differential Tuning

The system can dynamically adjust prize differentials (d r) based on a pre-defined set of incentives to minimize equilibrium effort against an adversarial noise distribution. This involves solving the maximization problem: max d in D min m in M Z 1 0 a(z; d)m(z) dz, effectively choosing which regions of noise to incentivize or suppress.

Abstract

We characterize robust tournament design---the prize scheme that maximizes the lowest equilibrium effort in a rank-order tournament where the distribution of noise is unknown, except for an upper bound, H bar, on its Shannon entropy. The robust tournament awards positive prizes to all ranks except the last, with a distinct top prize. Robust prizes spread marginal incentives as evenly as possible across performance quantiles, minimizing the Kullback--Leibler divergence from the uniform distribution to the induced distribution of performance cutoffs. Asymptotically, robust prizes follow the harmonic number sequence, while the worst-case distribution of noise converges to an exponential distribution with rate e 1-H bar. The prize scheme is highly unequal, especially in small tournaments, but becomes more equitable as the number of agents grows, with the Gini coefficient approaching 1/2. In the large tournament model, logarithmic prizes and an exponential worst-case distribution also arise under a bound on expected noise above the lower endpoint of its support, and more generally under bounds on a class of means of the quantile hazard.

Related papers