Measuring Information Burden: From Coalition-Based Reasoning to the Price System

arXiv:1802.04595 · econ.TH · Submitted 2018-02-13 · Read on arXiv

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Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.

Ruth: I'm Ruth.

Warren: And I'm Warren, here with Iris.

Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "Measuring Information Burden".

Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. The price system is often said to economize on information <ref:1802.04595#pg2> This paper asks how much information it saves <ref:1802.04595#pg4>.

Ruth: Formal Framework for Measuring Burden The authors develop a formal framework for measuring the informational burden that agents would have to bear if they had to reason individually over feasible coalitional alternatives <ref:1802.04595#pg5>.

Warren: Taking the convergence theorem of Debreu and Scarf (1963) as the benchmark, they ask how much coalition-feasibility information must be held, and how it must be distributed, for individual acceptance decisions to recover the core <ref:1802.04595#pg5>.

Ruth: Agents’ information is represented as finite sets of meaning-bearing sentences in a formal language, and reasoning is modeled as proof in Gentzen’s sequent calculus <ref:1802.04595#pg8>.

Title and authors: Ruth: So we're talking about the paper "Measuring Information Burden: From Coalition-Based Reasoning to the Price System," and it’s about quantifying the informational savings of using prices instead of individual reasoning over coalitions.

Warren: It’s essentially building a formal way to measure that burden, looking at how much information agents need to hold if they have to reason individually over every possible combination of players >

Iris: The paper sets up this framework by using a formal language for agent information and modeling the decision-making process as a proof in Gentzen’s sequent calculus >

Ruth: And they use the convergence theorem of Debreu and Scarf from one thousand nine hundred sixty-three as their benchmark to figure out exactly how much coalition feasibility information is needed to recover the core > <ref:1802.04595#pg1,the convergence theorem of Debreu and Scarf>

Warren: The main finding there is that for unanimous acceptability to match the core across all transferable utility games, every coalition must be known by at least one member >

Iris: They also show that if you remove even a single coalition's information from everyone in it, you can break that equivalence for certain games >

Ruth: So they redefine the core as this exact boundary for what we can unanimously justify with a minimal but well-defined information structure >

Warren: Then they take this and apply it to the k-fold replica economy to count exactly which coalitions' feasibility information must be distributed across the entire population >

Iris: This leads them to show that the average per agent informational burden scales as Theta of four k over k cubed over two, which is exponential in terms of the economy's size >

The paper's summary: Ruth: To summarize what they’re doing, this paper takes the classical idea that institutions economize on knowledge and shows how much that saving actually is when we switch from individual reasoning to a price system >

Warren: They use a formal proof structure to determine the exact minimal informational structure required for unanimous acceptability to coincide with the core in these types of games >

Iris: They establish that this minimal structure requires every coalition to be known by at least one agent, and that removing just one piece of information from a coalition breaks the agreement >

Ruth: The paper then moves into a quantitative measure by applying this to replica economies to count the load-bearing coalitions and find their average per agent informational burden >

Warren: They find that this burden grows exponentially in terms of the number of players or agents, specifically as Theta of four k over k cubed over two >

Iris: This result is significant because it gives a precise, formal answer to the Hayekian question about how much information the price system actually saves >

Ruth: It moves beyond just saying prices save info; it shows exactly *how much* information, quantified by this specific scaling factor, is being saved in terms of agent cognitive load >

The paper's improvements: Warren: The authors suggest that the framework itself is a major improvement because it provides a rigorous method for measuring relevant information that isn't just some vague intuition >

Ruth: They introduce the formal language and proof-theoretic apparatus, which gives them exactly the kind of structure needed to make information measurable, not just an abstract concept >

Iris: The real methodological value is in providing this formal setting where relevant information can be measured, showing that institutions economize not only on transaction costs but also on this informational burden >

Ruth: They’ve also applied it to the pure exchange economy and found that the load-bearing coalitions are determined by the geometry of the core in replica economies >

Warren: In an exchange economy setting, they show that for a k-fold replica economy where k is greater than or equal to two, there’s a set Lk of load-bearing coalitions that includes individual coalitions and mixed pairs and one-asymmetric coalitions and the grand coalition >

Iris: And they confirm that the average per agent informational burden in this exchange economy setting grows as Theta of four k over k cubed over two, which diverges to infinity >

Conclusion: Ruth: So to wrap up, the paper "Measuring Information Burden: From Coalition-Based Reasoning to the Price System" gives us a formal answer on how much information is saved by the price system in terms of agent cognitive burden >

Warren: They show that this saving is quantified by an average per agent informational burden growing as Theta of four k over k cubed over two, which means this saving gets exponentially bigger as the economy gets larger >

Iris: The paper provides a rigorous way to measure information, using formal logic and proof theory to determine the minimal knowledge structure needed for equilibrium >

Ruth: It really frames institutional efficiency in terms of information cost, showing that mechanisms economize on cognitive simplicity alongside transaction costs >

Warren: So this is a precise answer to the Hayekian question about how much information the price system saves, quantified by this specific scaling factor and diverging as we scale up >

Department of Decision Sciences, Bocconi University

econ.TH

Submitted: 2018-02-13

Updated: 2026-11-11

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/

Importance score: 84/100

The gist: The price system is often said to economize on information <ref:1802.04595#pg2> This paper asks how much information it saves <ref:1802.04595#pg4>.

Key concepts

Informational Burden
This is the cognitive load agents face when they must reason individually over all possible coalition alternatives to make a decision. The paper formalizes this burden using logic, showing how much information must be held for individual acceptance decisions to recover the core.
Core Boundary
The core is reinterpreted as the exact boundary where unanimous acceptability matches the core. The authors find that this boundary is characterized by requiring every coalition to be known to at least one member, establishing a minimal informational structure needed for unanimous justification.
Load-Bearing Coalitions
These are specific coalitions whose feasibility information must be distributed across the population in a k-fold replica economy. Counting these coalitions provides a quantitative measure of the extra information that agents must bear due to market structures.
Gentzen’s Sequent Calculus
This is a formal system used to model agent reasoning as mathematical proofs. By using this calculus, the authors can rigorously verify whether an agent can derive a decision criterion from their specific set of held sentences, linking information structure directly to logical conclusions.

Terminology

Summary

The price system is often said to economize on information <ref:1802. p. 0

Where the paper says it

it June 2, 2026 Abstract. The price system is often said to economize on information.

p. 0
Where the paper says it

it June 2, 2026 Abstract. The price system is often said to economize on information.

04595#pg2> This paper asks how much information it saves <ref:1802. p. 0
Where the paper says it

The price system is often said to economize on information. This paper asks how much information it saves.

p. 0
Where the paper says it

The price system is often said to economize on information. This paper asks how much information it saves.

04595#pg4>.

Formal Framework for Measuring Burden

The authors develop a formal framework for measuring the informational burden that agents would have to bear if they had to reason individually over feasible coalitional alternatives <ref:1802.04595#pg5>. Taking the convergence theorem of Debreu and Scarf (1963) as the benchmark, they ask how much coalition-feasibility information must be held, and how it must be distributed, for individual acceptance decisions to recover the core <ref:1802. p. 0

Where the paper says it

I develop a formal framework for measuring the informational burden that agents would have to bear if they had to reason individually over feasible coalitional alternatives. Taking the convergence theorem of Debreu and Scarf (1963) as the benchmark, I ask how much coalition-feasibility information must be held, and how it must be distributed, for individual acceptance decisions to recover the core.

04595#pg5>. Agents’ information is represented as finite sets of meaning-bearing sentences in a formal language, and reasoning is modeled as proof in Gentzen’s sequent calculus <ref:1802. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Taking the convergence theorem of Debreu and Scarf (1963) as the benchmark, I ask how much coalition-feasibility information must be held, and how it must be distributed, for individual acceptance decisions to recover the core. Agents’ information is represented as finite sets of meaning-bearing sentences in a formal language, and reasoning is modeled as proof in Gentzen’s sequent calculus.

04595#pg8>.

Characterizing the Core Boundary

The main result characterizes the minimal informational structure under which unanimous acceptability coincides with the core for all transferable-utility games on a fixed player set: every coalition must be known to at least one of its members <ref:1802.04595#pg9>. Removing information about even a single coalition from all of its members suffices to break the equivalence for some game <ref:1802. p. 0

Where the paper says it

The main result characterizes the minimal informational structure under which unanimous acceptability coincides with the core for all transferable-utility games on a fixed player set: every coalition must be known to at least one of its members. Removing information about even a single coalition from all of its members suffices to break the equivalence for some game.

04595#pg9>. The core is thereby reinterpreted not merely as a normative benchmark, but as the exact boundary of what can be unanimously justified under a minimal but well-defined information structure. p. 3
Where the paper says it

Theorem 1 gives the tight answer: unanimous acceptability coincides with core membership if and only if every non-empty coalition is known to at least one of its members; in particular, removing information of even a single coalition from all of its members suffices to break the equivalence for some game, in which a non-core payoff vector goes unanimously unchallenged. The core is thereby reinterpreted not merely as a normative benchmark, but as the exact boundary of what can be unanimously justified under a minimal but well-defined information structure, which might be hard to be satisfied when the game (objectively) becomes large: as the number of participants grows, the informational burden cannot be kept uniformly low across agents.

Quantitative Measure in Replica Economies

Applying this result to the k-fold replica economy, they identify and count the load-bearing coalitions whose feasibility information must be distributed across the population. The associated average per-agent informational burden grows as Θ(4k/k 3/2)—exponentially in the size of the economy. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Applying this result to the k-fold replica economy, I identify and count the load-bearing coalitions whose feasibility information must be distributed across the population. The associated average per-agent informational burden grows as Θ(4 k/k 3/2)—exponentially in the size of the economy.

This is, precisely and formally, what the price system saves. p. 0
Where the paper says it

The associated average per-agent informational burden grows as Θ(4 k/k 3/2)—exponentially in the size of the economy. This is, precisely and formally, what the price system saves.

Methodological Significance

The broader ambition of this paper is methodological, as it provides a framework in which relevant information is measurable. The formal language and proof-theoretic apparatus introduced here provide exactly such a framework, and the application is a demonstration for a general methodology. p. 4

Where the paper says it

Without a framework in which information is a measurable syntactic object and reasoning is an explicit proof, the intuition cannot be made precise, cannot be applied systematically, and cannot be generalized. The formal language and proof-theoretic apparatus introduced here provide exactly such a framework, and the application is a demonstration for a general methodology.

Institutions economize not only on transaction costs, but also on the informational burden. p. 4
Where the paper says it

The answer suggested by this paper is that such reasoning is itself costly. Institutions economize not only on transaction costs, but also on the informational burden.

Application to Exchange Economies

In the pure-exchange economy setting, the load-bearing coalitions are determined by the geometry of the core in the replica economy. For a k-fold replica Ek (k ≥ 2), the set Lk of load-bearing coalitions consists of individual coalitions, mixed pairs, one-asymmetric coalitions, and the grand coalition. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Removing information about even a single coalition from all of its members suffices to break the equivalence for some game. Applying this result to the k-fold replica economy, I identify and count the load-bearing coalitions whose feasibility information must be distributed across the population.

The average per-agent informational burden grows as Θ(4k/k 3/2) and diverges to infinity. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Applying this result to the k-fold replica economy, I identify and count the load-bearing coalitions whose feasibility information must be distributed across the population. The associated average per-agent informational burden grows as Θ(4 k/k 3/2)—exponentially in the size of the economy.

Conclusion on Information Cost

The total number of load-bearing coalitions grows as Lk ∼ 4k/√πk, while the number of agents grows only linearly. Hence the average informational burden per agent grows as Θ(4k/k 3/2) and diverges. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Applying this result to the k-fold replica economy, I identify and count the load-bearing coalitions whose feasibility information must be distributed across the population. The associated average per-agent informational burden grows as Θ(4 k/k 3/2)—exponentially in the size of the economy.

This gives a precise answer, in the present environment, to the Hayekian question of how much information the price system saves. p. 5
Where the paper says it

The collective question of this literature is whether prices successfully incorporate dispersed information, how completely they do so, and at what welfare cost. The present paper studies a complementary side of the same Hayekian idea: not how information flows through prices, but how much information and reasoning the price system saves relative to direct coalitional reasoning.

References

Albagli, E., Hellwig, C. p. 4

Where the paper says it

A large literature following Hayek studies the informational role of prices. Radner (1968, 1972, 1979) established the foundations of equilibrium under asymmetric information; subsequent work, most influentially Grossman and Stiglitz (2025) and Hellwig (1980), asked how well prices aggregate dispersed private information and with what welfare consequences.

, Tsyvinski, A. p. 5
Where the paper says it

Measuring Information Burden Shuige Liu consequences of dispersed private information (Chabakauri, Yuan, and Zachariadis, 2022; Galanis, Ioannou, Kotronis, 2024; Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski, 2023). The collective question of this literature is whether prices successfully incorporate dispersed information, how completely they do so, and at what welfare cost.

(2023). “Imperfect financial markets and investment inefficiencies. p. 4
Where the paper says it

In this respect, the argument is parallel in spirit to Coase’s (1937) theory of the firm. Coase asked why firms exist if markets can coordinate economic activity, and his answer was that using markets is itself costly.

” American Economic Review 113, 2323-2354. p. 2
Where the paper says it

An agent’s information is then represented as a finite, consistent set of such meaning-bearing sentences. The point is not merely to count sentences mechanically, but to make information decomposable into explicit units of economic content.

Barelli, P. p. 5

Where the paper says it

The present paper studies a complementary side of the same Hayekian idea: not how information flows through prices, but how much information and reasoning the price system saves relative to direct coalitional reasoning. A related literature asks whether decentralized market mechanisms converge to competitive outcomes when traders have private information (Wilson, 1977; Milgrom, 1979, 1981; Palfrey, 1985; Vives, 1988; Reny and Perry, 1979; Barelli, Govindan, Wilson, 2024).

, Govindan, S. p. 5
Where the paper says it

The present paper studies a complementary side of the same Hayekian idea: not how information flows through prices, but how much information and reasoning the price system saves relative to direct coalitional reasoning. A related literature asks whether decentralized market mechanisms converge to competitive outcomes when traders have private information (Wilson, 1977; Milgrom, 1979, 1981; Palfrey, 1985; Vives, 1988; Reny and Perry, 1979; Barelli, Govindan, Wilson, 2024).

, Wilson, R. p. 5
Where the paper says it

The present paper studies a complementary side of the same Hayekian idea: not how information flows through prices, but how much information and reasoning the price system saves relative to direct coalitional reasoning. A related literature asks whether decentralized market mechanisms converge to competitive outcomes when traders have private information (Wilson, 1977; Milgrom, 1979, 1981; Palfrey, 1985; Vives, 1988; Reny and Perry, 1979; Barelli, Govindan, Wilson, 2024).

(2024). “Strategic foundations of efficient rational expectations. p. 5
Where the paper says it

Our paper poses the inverse question: taking the outcome concept—the core—as given, we ask how much information agents must hold, and how that burden grows, for decentralized coalition-based reasoning to sustain stability. The strategic-foundations literature takes the information structure as given and asks whether mechanisms achieve efficiency; we take the efficiency concept as given and measure the informational cost of reaching it through explicit reasoning.

” Review of Economic Studies 91, 3190-3216. p. 6
Where the paper says it

Earlier proof-theoretic work in game theory studies the structure of interpersonal reasoning itself. Here, the same constructive perspective is brought to bear on a classical problem in economic theory: the informational conditions under which decentralized reasoning recovers the core, and the informational burden hidden behind the Debreu-Scarf convergence.

Battigalli, Pierpaolo and Giacomo Bonanno (1999), “Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory” Research in Economics, 53(2), 149–225. p. 0

Where the paper says it

JEL Codes: C71, D51, D83, D90 Early versions of this paper had been circulated under the title “Knowledge and Unanimous Acceptance of Core Payoffs: An Epistemic Foundation for Cooperative Game Theory”. The author grateful to Pierpaolo Battigalli, Giacomo Bonanno, Justus Preusser, and Niccolò Urbinati for their detailed comments.

Bonanno, Giacomo (2008), “A syntactic approach to rationality in games with ordinal payoffs. p. 6

Where the paper says it

In particular, epistemic game theory has used formal languages to represent players’ beliefs, higher-order beliefs, and the informational structure of strategic situations (for surveys, see Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Verdi, 1995; Battigalli and Bonanno, 1999; Bonanno, 2015). In particular, this paper is related in spirit to Bonanno’s (2015) syntactic treatment of common belief of rationality in non-cooperative games.

” In Logic and the Foundation of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT 7) (G. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Keywords: Information burden, Price system, Cooperative game theory, Core, Debreu-Scarf theorem, Formal language, Proof theory. JEL Codes: C71, D51, D83, D90 Early versions of this paper had been circulated under the title “Knowledge and Unanimous Acceptance of Core Payoffs: An Epistemic Foundation for Cooperative Game Theory”.

Bonanno, W. p. 0
Where the paper says it

JEL Codes: C71, D51, D83, D90 Early versions of this paper had been circulated under the title “Knowledge and Unanimous Acceptance of Core Payoffs: An Epistemic Foundation for Cooperative Game Theory”. The author grateful to Pierpaolo Battigalli, Giacomo Bonanno, Justus Preusser, and Niccolò Urbinati for their detailed comments.

van der Hoek, M. Wooldridge eds.), 59–86.

Bonanno, Giacomo (2015), “Epistemic foundation of game theory. p. 0

Where the paper says it

JEL Codes: C71, D51, D83, D90 Early versions of this paper had been circulated under the title “Knowledge and Unanimous Acceptance of Core Payoffs: An Epistemic Foundation for Cooperative Game Theory”. The author grateful to Pierpaolo Battigalli, Giacomo Bonanno, Justus Preusser, and Niccolò Urbinati for their detailed comments.

” In Handbook of Epistemic Logic (H. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Keywords: Information burden, Price system, Cooperative game theory, Core, Debreu-Scarf theorem, Formal language, Proof theory. JEL Codes: C71, D51, D83, D90 Early versions of this paper had been circulated under the title “Knowledge and Unanimous Acceptance of Core Payoffs: An Epistemic Foundation for Cooperative Game Theory”.

van Ditmarsch, J. Y. Halpern, W. p. 6
Where the paper says it

Formal languages and logical methods have long been useful in economic theory. In particular, epistemic game theory has used formal languages to represent players’ beliefs, higher-order beliefs, and the informational structure of strategic situations (for surveys, see Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Verdi, 1995; Battigalli and Bonanno, 1999; Bonanno, 2015).

van der Hoek, B. Kooi eds.), 443–487.

Bondareva, Olga N. p. 7

Where the paper says it

6Not every TU game has a non-empty core. Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) characterize the non-emptiness of the core in terms of balancedness.

(1963), “Some applications of linear programming methods to the theory of cooperative games. p. 6
Where the paper says it

Seen in this way, the comparison helps isolate both a shared logical core and the additional structure needed for cooperative games. By contrast, proof-theoretic methods, introduced into game theoretical research by Kaneko and Nagashima (1996, 1997), have been used much less frequently (see Kaneko (2002) for a survey).

” [in Russian] Problemy Kybernetiki, 10, 119–139.

Boolos, George. (1984) “Don’t eliminate cut.” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 13: 373–378.

Chabakauri, G. p. 5

Where the paper says it

Measuring Information Burden Shuige Liu consequences of dispersed private information (Chabakauri, Yuan, and Zachariadis, 2022; Galanis, Ioannou, Kotronis, 2024; Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski, 2023). The collective question of this literature is whether prices successfully incorporate dispersed information, how completely they do so, and at what welfare cost.

, Yuan, K., Zachariadis, K. p. 5
Where the paper says it

Measuring Information Burden Shuige Liu consequences of dispersed private information (Chabakauri, Yuan, and Zachariadis, 2022; Galanis, Ioannou, Kotronis, 2024; Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski, 2023). The collective question of this literature is whether prices successfully incorporate dispersed information, how completely they do so, and at what welfare cost.

E. (2022). “Multi-asset noisy rational expectations equilibrium with contingent claims. p. 4
Where the paper says it

Radner (1968, 1972, 1979) established the foundations of equilibrium under asymmetric information; subsequent work, most influentially Grossman and Stiglitz (2025) and Hellwig (1980), asked how well prices aggregate dispersed private information and with what welfare consequences. This program continues in recent contributions that examine, among other things, multi-asset rationalexpectations models, the effects of ambiguity on information aggregation, and the real investment 5

” Review of Economic Studies 89, 2445-2490. p. 6
Where the paper says it

Earlier proof-theoretic work in game theory studies the structure of interpersonal reasoning itself. Here, the same constructive perspective is brought to bear on a classical problem in economic theory: the informational conditions under which decentralized reasoning recovers the core, and the informational burden hidden behind the Debreu-Scarf convergence.

Chade, Hector (2006) “Matching with noise and the acceptance curse. p. 5

Where the paper says it

The coverage condition in Theorem 1 and the quantitative measure behind the Debreu–Scarf application follow from this shift. 2A closely related body of work studies incomplete information in stable matching, where similar tensions between stability and efficiency arise; see Roth (1989); Chade (2006); Ehlers and Massó (2007); Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela (2009); Liu, Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2014); Pomatto (2022), and Chade, Lewis, and Smith (2014).

” Journal of Economic Theory 129(1), 81–113. p. 4
Where the paper says it

In this respect, the argument is parallel in spirit to Coase’s (1937) theory of the firm. Coase asked why firms exist if markets can coordinate economic activity, and his answer was that using markets is itself costly.

Chade, Hector, Gregory Lewis, and Lones Smith (2014) “Student portfolios and the college admissions problem. p. 5

Where the paper says it

The coverage condition in Theorem 1 and the quantitative measure behind the Debreu–Scarf application follow from this shift. 2A closely related body of work studies incomplete information in stable matching, where similar tensions between stability and efficiency arise; see Roth (1989); Chade (2006); Ehlers and Massó (2007); Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela (2009); Liu, Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2014); Pomatto (2022), and Chade, Lewis, and Smith (2014).

" Review of Economic Studies 81(3): 971–1002.

Coase, R. H. (1937). “The Nature of the Firm. p. 4

Where the paper says it

Institutions do not merely coordinate actions, allocate resources, or enforce rules; they also absorb informational and cognitive burdens that agents would otherwise have to bear themselves. In this respect, the argument is parallel in spirit to Coase’s (1937) theory of the firm.

” Economica, 4, 386–405.

Debreu, Gerard and Scarf, Herbert (1963), “A limit theorem on the core of an economy. p. 0

Where the paper says it

I develop a formal framework for measuring the informational burden that agents would have to bear if they had to reason individually over feasible coalitional alternatives. Taking the convergence theorem of Debreu and Scarf (1963) as the benchmark, I ask how much coalition-feasibility information must be held, and how it must be distributed, for individual acceptance decisions to recover the core.

” International Economic Review, 4(3), 235–246. p. 2
Where the paper says it

An agent’s information is then represented as a finite, consistent set of such meaning-bearing sentences. The point is not merely to count sentences mechanically, but to make information decomposable into explicit units of economic content.

de Clippel, Geoffroy (2007), “The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information. p. 5

Where the paper says it

Incomplete information and the core. The literature on the core under incomplete information, beginning with Wilson (1978) and developed by Vohra (1999); Dutta and Vohra (2005); Serrano and Vohra (2007); de Clippel (2007), and Myerson (2007), among others, transforms the cooperative setting into a decentralized problem of individual strategic reasoning and endows each player with a doxastic or epistemic structure representing her beliefs.

” Journal of Economic Theory 135(1): 144-158. p. 4
Where the paper says it

In this respect, the argument is parallel in spirit to Coase’s (1937) theory of the firm. Coase asked why firms exist if markets can coordinate economic activity, and his answer was that using markets is itself costly.

Dekel, Eddie and Siniscalchi, Marciano (2015), “Epistemic game theory. p. 6

Where the paper says it

Formal languages and logical methods have long been useful in economic theory. In particular, epistemic game theory has used formal languages to represent players’ beliefs, higher-order beliefs, and the informational structure of strategic situations (for surveys, see Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Verdi, 1995; Battigalli and Bonanno, 1999; Bonanno, 2015).

” In Handbooks of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Vol. p. 6
Where the paper says it

Formal languages and logical methods have long been useful in economic theory. In particular, epistemic game theory has used formal languages to represent players’ beliefs, higher-order beliefs, and the informational structure of strategic situations (for surveys, see Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Verdi, 1995; Battigalli and Bonanno, 1999; Bonanno, 2015).

p. 6
Where the paper says it

Formal languages and logical methods have long been useful in economic theory. In particular, epistemic game theory has used formal languages to represent players’ beliefs, higher-order beliefs, and the informational structure of strategic situations (for surveys, see Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Verdi, 1995; Battigalli and Bonanno, 1999; Bonanno, 2015).

4 (P.H. Young and S. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Wáng, and participants of 13th LOFT Conference, IV Italian Junior Theory Workshop, seminars in Bocconi University, University of Cologne, and Otago University for valuable discussions and encouragements. The paper was partially supported by Grant-in-Aids for Young Scientists (B) of JSPS No.

Zamir, eds.), 619–702.

Dutta, Bhaskar and Vohra, Rajiv (2005), “Incomplete information, credibility and the core. p. 5

Where the paper says it

Incomplete information and the core. The literature on the core under incomplete information, beginning with Wilson (1978) and developed by Vohra (1999); Dutta and Vohra (2005); Serrano and Vohra (2007); de Clippel (2007), and Myerson (2007), among others, transforms the cooperative setting into a decentralized problem of individual strategic reasoning and endows each player with a doxastic or epistemic structure representing her beliefs.

” Mathematical Social Science, 50(2), 148–165. p. 3
Where the paper says it

The next step is to specify what it means for Ci(x) to be derivable from an agent’s information. In much of the existing literature, this question is left implicit: decision-makers are assumed to have whatever mathematical or probabilistic reasoning capacity needed to draw the relevant inferences, so that the connection between information and conclusion is absorbed into the model’s background assumptions rather than examined in its own right.

Ebbinghaus, Heinz-Dieter, Flum, Jörg, and Thomas, Wolfgang (2021), Mathematical Logic. p. 3

Where the paper says it

The next step is to specify what it means for Ci(x) to be derivable from an agent’s information. In much of the existing literature, this question is left implicit: decision-makers are assumed to have whatever mathematical or probabilistic reasoning capacity needed to draw the relevant inferences, so that the connection between information and conclusion is absorbed into the model’s background assumptions rather than examined in its own right.

Springer Nature, Switzerland.

Ehlers, Lars and Jordi Massó (2007) “Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets. p. 5

Where the paper says it

The coverage condition in Theorem 1 and the quantitative measure behind the Debreu–Scarf application follow from this shift. 2A closely related body of work studies incomplete information in stable matching, where similar tensions between stability and efficiency arise; see Roth (1989); Chade (2006); Ehlers and Massó (2007); Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela (2009); Liu, Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2014); Pomatto (2022), and Chade, Lewis, and Smith (2014).

" Journal of Economic Theory 136(1): 587-600.

Fagin, Ronald, Halpern, Joseph Y. p. 6

Where the paper says it

Formal languages and logical methods have long been useful in economic theory. In particular, epistemic game theory has used formal languages to represent players’ beliefs, higher-order beliefs, and the informational structure of strategic situations (for surveys, see Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Verdi, 1995; Battigalli and Bonanno, 1999; Bonanno, 2015).

, Moses, Yoram, and Verdi, MosheY. p. 6
Where the paper says it

Formal languages and logical methods have long been useful in economic theory. In particular, epistemic game theory has used formal languages to represent players’ beliefs, higher-order beliefs, and the informational structure of strategic situations (for surveys, see Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Verdi, 1995; Battigalli and Bonanno, 1999; Bonanno, 2015).

(1995), Reasoning about Knowledge. p. 5
Where the paper says it

The literature on the core under incomplete information, beginning with Wilson (1978) and developed by Vohra (1999); Dutta and Vohra (2005); Serrano and Vohra (2007); de Clippel (2007), and Myerson (2007), among others, transforms the cooperative setting into a decentralized problem of individual strategic reasoning and endows each player with a doxastic or epistemic structure representing her beliefs. 2 A central finding of this literature is that stability under incomplete information generally diverges from efficiency under complete information: solution concepts based on agents’ limited knowledge may yield outcomes that are stable given what agents know yet fail to coincide with the efficient core.

The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

Galanis, S. p. 5

Where the paper says it

Measuring Information Burden Shuige Liu consequences of dispersed private information (Chabakauri, Yuan, and Zachariadis, 2022; Galanis, Ioannou, Kotronis, 2024; Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski, 2023). The collective question of this literature is whether prices successfully incorporate dispersed information, how completely they do so, and at what welfare cost.

, Ioannou, C. p. 5
Where the paper says it

Measuring Information Burden Shuige Liu consequences of dispersed private information (Chabakauri, Yuan, and Zachariadis, 2022; Galanis, Ioannou, Kotronis, 2024; Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski, 2023). The collective question of this literature is whether prices successfully incorporate dispersed information, how completely they do so, and at what welfare cost.

A., Kotronis, S. p. 5
Where the paper says it

Measuring Information Burden Shuige Liu consequences of dispersed private information (Chabakauri, Yuan, and Zachariadis, 2022; Galanis, Ioannou, Kotronis, 2024; Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski, 2023). The collective question of this literature is whether prices successfully incorporate dispersed information, how completely they do so, and at what welfare cost.

(2024). “Information aggregation under ambiguity: theory and experimental evidence. p. 4
Where the paper says it

Radner (1968, 1972, 1979) established the foundations of equilibrium under asymmetric information; subsequent work, most influentially Grossman and Stiglitz (2025) and Hellwig (1980), asked how well prices aggregate dispersed private information and with what welfare consequences. This program continues in recent contributions that examine, among other things, multi-asset rationalexpectations models, the effects of ambiguity on information aggregation, and the real investment 5

” Review of Economic Studies 91, 3423-3467. p. 6
Where the paper says it

Earlier proof-theoretic work in game theory studies the structure of interpersonal reasoning itself. Here, the same constructive perspective is brought to bear on a classical problem in economic theory: the informational conditions under which decentralized reasoning recovers the core, and the informational burden hidden behind the Debreu-Scarf convergence.

Gentzen, Gerhard Karl Erich (1935a), “Untersuchungen über das logische Schließen. p. 3

Where the paper says it

If our goal is to identify which pieces of information do which inferential work—which sentences are load-bearing for a given conclusion and which are redundant—then derivability itself must be made a precise, transparent object. We formalize it as the existence of a proof in Gentzen’s (1935a; 1935b) sequent calculus: a finite, tree-structured process that begins from the atomic expression and proceeds via explicit inference rules which captures an agent’s reasoning structure/ability, with every step on record.

I”. Mathematische Zeitschrift. 39 (2),176–210.

Gentzen, Gerhard Karl Erich (1935b), “Untersuchungen über das logische Schließen. p. 3

Where the paper says it

If our goal is to identify which pieces of information do which inferential work—which sentences are load-bearing for a given conclusion and which are redundant—then derivability itself must be made a precise, transparent object. We formalize it as the existence of a proof in Gentzen’s (1935a; 1935b) sequent calculus: a finite, tree-structured process that begins from the atomic expression and proceeds via explicit inference rules which captures an agent’s reasoning structure/ability, with every step on record.

II”. Mathematische Zeitschrift. 39 (3), 405–431.

Grossman, S. p. 4

Where the paper says it

A large literature following Hayek studies the informational role of prices. Radner (1968, 1972, 1979) established the foundations of equilibrium under asymmetric information; subsequent work, most influentially Grossman and Stiglitz (2025) and Hellwig (1980), asked how well prices aggregate dispersed private information and with what welfare consequences.

J., Stiglitz, J. p. 4
Where the paper says it

A large literature following Hayek studies the informational role of prices. Radner (1968, 1972, 1979) established the foundations of equilibrium under asymmetric information; subsequent work, most influentially Grossman and Stiglitz (2025) and Hellwig (1980), asked how well prices aggregate dispersed private information and with what welfare consequences.

E. (1980). “On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets. p. 3
Where the paper says it

The framework in hand, we can now characterize precisely how information must be distributed for unanimous acceptance to coincide with the core—and the answer turns on a simple but consequential asymmetry. Core payoff vectors are informationally robust: since no profitable coalitional objection exists, they are accepted under any information structure.

” American Economic Review 70, 393-408. p. 2
Where the paper says it

An agent’s information is then represented as a finite, consistent set of such meaning-bearing sentences. The point is not merely to count sentences mechanically, but to make information decomposable into explicit units of economic content.

Hayek, Friedrich A. p. 2

Where the paper says it

It is clear that if the concept is to have any empirical significance it cannot presuppose that everybody knows everything. Hayek, “Economics and Knowledge” (1937) 1 Introduction One of the classical insights of economics is that institutions do not merely allocate resources; they also economize on what agents need to know.

p. 2
Where the paper says it

It is clear that if the concept is to have any empirical significance it cannot presuppose that everybody knows everything. Hayek, “Economics and Knowledge” (1937) 1 Introduction One of the classical insights of economics is that institutions do not merely allocate resources; they also economize on what agents need to know.

p. 2
Where the paper says it

It is clear that if the concept is to have any empirical significance it cannot presuppose that everybody knows everything. Hayek, “Economics and Knowledge” (1937) 1 Introduction One of the classical insights of economics is that institutions do not merely allocate resources; they also economize on what agents need to know.

p. 2
Where the paper says it

It is clear that if the concept is to have any empirical significance it cannot presuppose that everybody knows everything. Hayek, “Economics and Knowledge” (1937) 1 Introduction One of the classical insights of economics is that institutions do not merely allocate resources; they also economize on what agents need to know.

p. 2
Where the paper says it

It is clear that if the concept is to have any empirical significance it cannot presuppose that everybody knows everything. Hayek, “Economics and Knowledge” (1937) 1 Introduction One of the classical insights of economics is that institutions do not merely allocate resources; they also economize on what agents need to know.

(1935) “The nature and history of the problem. p. 2
Where the paper says it

The point is not merely to count sentences mechanically, but to make information decomposable into explicit units of economic content. Once this is done, the framework can identify which units of information is 1This question has a classic origin in the history of economics.

” In Collectivist Economic Planning ed. p. 2
Where the paper says it

In the socialist calculation debates of the 1930s and 1940s, Hayek emphasized two complementary informational roles of the price system. First, echoing earlier arguments by von von Mises (1920), Hayek (1935a,b, 1940, 1942) argued that competitive prices integrate dispersed, local, and tacit knowledge that no central planning committee could construct from scratch.

by F. A. Hayek, 1–40; Reprinred in Individualism and economic order (1945) ed. p. 2
Where the paper says it

First, echoing earlier arguments by von von Mises (1920), Hayek (1935a,b, 1940, 1942) argued that competitive prices integrate dispersed, local, and tacit knowledge that no central planning committee could construct from scratch. Second, following a tradition running from Adam Smith through Walras, Hayek (1935a, 1945)argued that, once such a system exists, each participant can act on a dramatically reduced informational basis: her own preferences, her endowments, and the prevailing price vector.

by F. A. Hayek, 119–147, University of Chicago Press. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Measuring Information Burden: From Coalition-Based Reasoning to the Price System Shuige Liu Department of Decision Sciences, Bocconi University Milan, Italy shuige. liu@unibocconi.

Hayek, Friedrich A. (1937). “Economics and knowledge. p. 2

Where the paper says it

It is clear that if the concept is to have any empirical significance it cannot presuppose that everybody knows everything. Hayek, “Economics and Knowledge” (1937) 1 Introduction One of the classical insights of economics is that institutions do not merely allocate resources; they also economize on what agents need to know.

” Economica, 4(13), 33–54.

Hayek, Friedrich A. (1940). “Socialist calculation: The competitive ‘solution’. p. 2

Where the paper says it

In the socialist calculation debates of the 1930s and 1940s, Hayek emphasized two complementary informational roles of the price system. First, echoing earlier arguments by von von Mises (1920), Hayek (1935a,b, 1940, 1942) argued that competitive prices integrate dispersed, local, and tacit knowledge that no central planning committee could construct from scratch.

” Economica 7(26), 125–149.

Hayek, Friedrich A. (1943). “The facts of the social sciences. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Measuring Information Burden: From Coalition-Based Reasoning to the Price System Shuige Liu Department of Decision Sciences, Bocconi University Milan, Italy shuige. liu@unibocconi.

” Ethics, 54(1), 1–13.

Hayek, Friedrich A. (1945) “The use of knowledge in society. p. 2

Where the paper says it

First, echoing earlier arguments by von von Mises (1920), Hayek (1935a,b, 1940, 1942) argued that competitive prices integrate dispersed, local, and tacit knowledge that no central planning committee could construct from scratch. Second, following a tradition running from Adam Smith through Walras, Hayek (1935a, 1945)argued that, once such a system exists, each participant can act on a dramatically reduced informational basis: her own preferences, her endowments, and the prevailing price vector.

” American Economic Review, 35, 519–530. p. 2
Where the paper says it

An agent’s information is then represented as a finite, consistent set of such meaning-bearing sentences. The point is not merely to count sentences mechanically, but to make information decomposable into explicit units of economic content.

Heifetz, Aviad, Martin Meier and Burkhard C. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Bach, Lorenzo Bastianello, Chih Chang, Pietro Dall’Ara, Meng-Jhang Fong, Satoshi Fukuda, Yukihiko Funaki, Peter Gibbard, Pierfrancesco Guarino, Mamoru Kaneko, Nenad Kos, Fabio Maccheroni, Suraj Malladi, Massimo Marinacci, Zsombor Z. Méder, Antonio Penta, Andrés Perea, Ronald Peeters, Paolo Pin, Rasto Ratislav, Marten Ritterath, Pietro Salmaso, Enrico Mattia Salonia, Burkhard Schipper, Christoph Schottmüller, Fernando Vega-Redondo, Murat Üngor, Yanjing Wang, Yì N.

Schipper (2013), “Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Bach, Lorenzo Bastianello, Chih Chang, Pietro Dall’Ara, Meng-Jhang Fong, Satoshi Fukuda, Yukihiko Funaki, Peter Gibbard, Pierfrancesco Guarino, Mamoru Kaneko, Nenad Kos, Fabio Maccheroni, Suraj Malladi, Massimo Marinacci, Zsombor Z. Méder, Antonio Penta, Andrés Perea, Ronald Peeters, Paolo Pin, Rasto Ratislav, Marten Ritterath, Pietro Salmaso, Enrico Mattia Salonia, Burkhard Schipper, Christoph Schottmüller, Fernando Vega-Redondo, Murat Üngor, Yanjing Wang, Yì N.

” Games and Economic Behavior, 81, 50–68. p. 2
Where the paper says it

An agent’s information is then represented as a finite, consistent set of such meaning-bearing sentences. The point is not merely to count sentences mechanically, but to make information decomposable into explicit units of economic content.

Hellwig, M. p. 4

Where the paper says it

A large literature following Hayek studies the informational role of prices. Radner (1968, 1972, 1979) established the foundations of equilibrium under asymmetric information; subsequent work, most influentially Grossman and Stiglitz (2025) and Hellwig (1980), asked how well prices aggregate dispersed private information and with what welfare consequences.

F. (1980). “On the aggregation of information in competitive markets. p. 4
Where the paper says it

Radner (1968, 1972, 1979) established the foundations of equilibrium under asymmetric information; subsequent work, most influentially Grossman and Stiglitz (2025) and Hellwig (1980), asked how well prices aggregate dispersed private information and with what welfare consequences. This program continues in recent contributions that examine, among other things, multi-asset rationalexpectations models, the effects of ambiguity on information aggregation, and the real investment 5

” Journal of economic theory 22, 477-498. p. 4
Where the paper says it

In this respect, the argument is parallel in spirit to Coase’s (1937) theory of the firm. Coase asked why firms exist if markets can coordinate economic activity, and his answer was that using markets is itself costly.

Hoppe, Heidrun C. p. 5

Where the paper says it

The coverage condition in Theorem 1 and the quantitative measure behind the Debreu–Scarf application follow from this shift. 2A closely related body of work studies incomplete information in stable matching, where similar tensions between stability and efficiency arise; see Roth (1989); Chade (2006); Ehlers and Massó (2007); Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela (2009); Liu, Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2014); Pomatto (2022), and Chade, Lewis, and Smith (2014).

, Benny Moldovanu, and Aner Sela (2009) “The theory of assortative matching based on costly signals. p. 5
Where the paper says it

The coverage condition in Theorem 1 and the quantitative measure behind the Debreu–Scarf application follow from this shift. 2A closely related body of work studies incomplete information in stable matching, where similar tensions between stability and efficiency arise; see Roth (1989); Chade (2006); Ehlers and Massó (2007); Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela (2009); Liu, Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2014); Pomatto (2022), and Chade, Lewis, and Smith (2014).

" The Review of Economic Studies 76(1): 253–281.

Hurwicz, L. p. 2

Where the paper says it

A natural starting point is syntactic measurement: to count symbols, expressions, or sentences. Yet Hurwicz (1969) already raised a pointed objection to this approach: without knowing what a symbol means, counting symbols is meaningless.

(1969). “On the concept and possibility of informational decentralization. p. 5
Where the paper says it

Our paper poses the inverse question: taking the outcome concept—the core—as given, we ask how much information agents must hold, and how that burden grows, for decentralized coalition-based reasoning to sustain stability. The strategic-foundations literature takes the information structure as given and asks whether mechanisms achieve efficiency; we take the efficiency concept as given and measure the informational cost of reaching it through explicit reasoning.

” The American Economic Review, 59(2), 513-524. p. 2
Where the paper says it

An agent’s information is then represented as a finite, consistent set of such meaning-bearing sentences. The point is not merely to count sentences mechanically, but to make information decomposable into explicit units of economic content.

Indrzejczak, Andrzej (2021) Sequents and Trees. Springer.

Kaneko, Mamoru (2002), “Epistemic logics and their game theoretic applications: Introduction. p. 6

Where the paper says it

Seen in this way, the comparison helps isolate both a shared logical core and the additional structure needed for cooperative games. By contrast, proof-theoretic methods, introduced into game theoretical research by Kaneko and Nagashima (1996, 1997), have been used much less frequently (see Kaneko (2002) for a survey).

” Economic Theory, 19(1), 7–62. p. 4
Where the paper says it

In this respect, the argument is parallel in spirit to Coase’s (1937) theory of the firm. Coase asked why firms exist if markets can coordinate economic activity, and his answer was that using markets is itself costly.

Kaneko, Mamoru and Nagashima, Takashi (1996) “Game logic and its applications I” Studia Logica, 57 (2-3), 325–354. p. 6

Where the paper says it

Seen in this way, the comparison helps isolate both a shared logical core and the additional structure needed for cooperative games. By contrast, proof-theoretic methods, introduced into game theoretical research by Kaneko and Nagashima (1996, 1997), have been used much less frequently (see Kaneko (2002) for a survey).

Kaneko, Mamoru and Nagashima, Takashi (1997) “Game logic and its applications II” Studia Logica, 58 (2), 273–303. p. 6

Where the paper says it

Seen in this way, the comparison helps isolate both a shared logical core and the additional structure needed for cooperative games. By contrast, proof-theoretic methods, introduced into game theoretical research by Kaneko and Nagashima (1996, 1997), have been used much less frequently (see Kaneko (2002) for a survey).

Kaneko, Mamoru and Suzuki, Nobu-Yuki (2002), “Bounded interpersonal inferences and decision making. p. 6

Where the paper says it

By contrast, proof-theoretic methods, introduced into game theoretical research by Kaneko and Nagashima (1996, 1997), have been used much less frequently (see Kaneko (2002) for a survey). 3 Existing work shows that they can illuminate the logical structure of strategic reasoning and bounded interpersonal inference.

” Economic Theory, 19(1), 63–103. p. 4
Where the paper says it

In this respect, the argument is parallel in spirit to Coase’s (1937) theory of the firm. Coase asked why firms exist if markets can coordinate economic activity, and his answer was that using markets is itself costly.

Kannai, Yakar (1992), “The core and balancedness. p. 6

Where the paper says it

2 TU Games and the Core: An Overview This subsection provides an overview of cooperative games with transferable utility, as well as the concept of the core. For a more detailed treatment, see Kannai (1992) and sections 2 and 3 of Peleg and Sudhoelter (2007).

” In Handbooks of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Vol. 1 (R.J. Aumann and S. Hart eds.), 355–395, Elsevier, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

Kaplow, L. (2011). “On the optimal burden of proof. p. 0

Where the paper says it

This is, precisely and formally, what the price system saves. Keywords: Information burden, Price system, Cooperative game theory, Core, Debreu-Scarf theorem, Formal language, Proof theory.

” Journal of Political Economy 119, 1104-1140. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Removing information about even a single coalition from all of its members suffices to break the equivalence for some game. Applying this result to the k-fold replica economy, I identify and count the load-bearing coalitions whose feasibility information must be distributed across the population.

Li, S. (2017). “Obviously strategy-proof mechanisms. p. 4

Where the paper says it

Coase asked why firms exist if markets can coordinate economic activity, and his answer was that using markets is itself costly. The question here is analogous: why do institutional mechanisms matter if agents could, in principle, each acting on her own initiative, determine what is collectively acceptable without them?

”?, 3257-3287.

Liu, Qingmin, Mailath, George J. p. 5

Where the paper says it

The coverage condition in Theorem 1 and the quantitative measure behind the Debreu–Scarf application follow from this shift. 2A closely related body of work studies incomplete information in stable matching, where similar tensions between stability and efficiency arise; see Roth (1989); Chade (2006); Ehlers and Massó (2007); Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela (2009); Liu, Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2014); Pomatto (2022), and Chade, Lewis, and Smith (2014).

, Postlewaite, Andrew and Samuelson, Larry (2014), “Stable matching with incomplete information. p. 5
Where the paper says it

The coverage condition in Theorem 1 and the quantitative measure behind the Debreu–Scarf application follow from this shift. 2A closely related body of work studies incomplete information in stable matching, where similar tensions between stability and efficiency arise; see Roth (1989); Chade (2006); Ehlers and Massó (2007); Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela (2009); Liu, Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2014); Pomatto (2022), and Chade, Lewis, and Smith (2014).

” Econometrica 82, 541–587.

Mancosu, Paolo, Galvan, Sergio and Zach, Richard (2021) An Introduction to Proof Theory: Normalization, Cut-Elimination, and Consistency Proofs. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Méder, Antonio Penta, Andrés Perea, Ronald Peeters, Paolo Pin, Rasto Ratislav, Marten Ritterath, Pietro Salmaso, Enrico Mattia Salonia, Burkhard Schipper, Christoph Schottmüller, Fernando Vega-Redondo, Murat Üngor, Yanjing Wang, Yì N. Wáng, and participants of 13th LOFT Conference, IV Italian Junior Theory Workshop, seminars in Bocconi University, University of Cologne, and Otago University for valuable discussions and encouragements.

Oxford University Press, Oxford U. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Measuring Information Burden: From Coalition-Based Reasoning to the Price System Shuige Liu Department of Decision Sciences, Bocconi University Milan, Italy shuige. liu@unibocconi.

K.

Mendelson, Eliott (2015) Introduction to Mathematical Logic, 6th edition CRC Press.

Milgrom, P. p. 5

Where the paper says it

The present paper studies a complementary side of the same Hayekian idea: not how information flows through prices, but how much information and reasoning the price system saves relative to direct coalitional reasoning. A related literature asks whether decentralized market mechanisms converge to competitive outcomes when traders have private information (Wilson, 1977; Milgrom, 1979, 1981; Palfrey, 1985; Vives, 1988; Reny and Perry, 1979; Barelli, Govindan, Wilson, 2024).

p. 5
Where the paper says it

The present paper studies a complementary side of the same Hayekian idea: not how information flows through prices, but how much information and reasoning the price system saves relative to direct coalitional reasoning. A related literature asks whether decentralized market mechanisms converge to competitive outcomes when traders have private information (Wilson, 1977; Milgrom, 1979, 1981; Palfrey, 1985; Vives, 1988; Reny and Perry, 1979; Barelli, Govindan, Wilson, 2024).

R. (1979). “A convergence theorem for competitive bidding with differential information. p. 0
Where the paper says it

I develop a formal framework for measuring the informational burden that agents would have to bear if they had to reason individually over feasible coalitional alternatives. Taking the convergence theorem of Debreu and Scarf (1963) as the benchmark, I ask how much coalition-feasibility information must be held, and how it must be distributed, for individual acceptance decisions to recover the core.

” Econometrica 47, 679-688.

Milgrom, P. R. (1981). “Rational expectations, information acquisition, and competitive bidding. p. 5

Where the paper says it

The present paper studies a complementary side of the same Hayekian idea: not how information flows through prices, but how much information and reasoning the price system saves relative to direct coalitional reasoning. A related literature asks whether decentralized market mechanisms converge to competitive outcomes when traders have private information (Wilson, 1977; Milgrom, 1979, 1981; Palfrey, 1985; Vives, 1988; Reny and Perry, 1979; Barelli, Govindan, Wilson, 2024).

” Econometrica 49, 921-943.

Myerson, Roger B. p. 5

Where the paper says it

Incomplete information and the core. The literature on the core under incomplete information, beginning with Wilson (1978) and developed by Vohra (1999); Dutta and Vohra (2005); Serrano and Vohra (2007); de Clippel (2007), and Myerson (2007), among others, transforms the cooperative setting into a decentralized problem of individual strategic reasoning and endows each player with a doxastic or epistemic structure representing her beliefs.

(2007), “Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information. p. 6
Where the paper says it

2 TU Games and the Core: An Overview This subsection provides an overview of cooperative games with transferable utility, as well as the concept of the core. For a more detailed treatment, see Kannai (1992) and sections 2 and 3 of Peleg and Sudhoelter (2007).

” Journal of Economic Theory, 136(1), 260–285. p. 4
Where the paper says it

In this respect, the argument is parallel in spirit to Coase’s (1937) theory of the firm. Coase asked why firms exist if markets can coordinate economic activity, and his answer was that using markets is itself costly.

Negri, Sara and Jan Von Plato. p. 2

Where the paper says it

In the socialist calculation debates of the 1930s and 1940s, Hayek emphasized two complementary informational roles of the price system. First, echoing earlier arguments by von von Mises (1920), Hayek (1935a,b, 1940, 1942) argued that competitive prices integrate dispersed, local, and tacit knowledge that no central planning committee could construct from scratch.

Structural proof theory. p. 0
Where the paper says it

This is, precisely and formally, what the price system saves. Keywords: Information burden, Price system, Cooperative game theory, Core, Debreu-Scarf theorem, Formal language, Proof theory.

Cambridge university press, 2008. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Measuring Information Burden: From Coalition-Based Reasoning to the Price System Shuige Liu Department of Decision Sciences, Bocconi University Milan, Italy shuige. liu@unibocconi.

Palfrey, T. p. 5

Where the paper says it

The present paper studies a complementary side of the same Hayekian idea: not how information flows through prices, but how much information and reasoning the price system saves relative to direct coalitional reasoning. A related literature asks whether decentralized market mechanisms converge to competitive outcomes when traders have private information (Wilson, 1977; Milgrom, 1979, 1981; Palfrey, 1985; Vives, 1988; Reny and Perry, 1979; Barelli, Govindan, Wilson, 2024).

R. (1985). “Uncertainty Resolution, Private Information Aggregation and the Cournot Competitive Limit. p. 4
Where the paper says it

Radner (1968, 1972, 1979) established the foundations of equilibrium under asymmetric information; subsequent work, most influentially Grossman and Stiglitz (2025) and Hellwig (1980), asked how well prices aggregate dispersed private information and with what welfare consequences. This program continues in recent contributions that examine, among other things, multi-asset rationalexpectations models, the effects of ambiguity on information aggregation, and the real investment 5

” Review of Economic Studies 52, 69-83. p. 6
Where the paper says it

Earlier proof-theoretic work in game theory studies the structure of interpersonal reasoning itself. Here, the same constructive perspective is brought to bear on a classical problem in economic theory: the informational conditions under which decentralized reasoning recovers the core, and the informational burden hidden behind the Debreu-Scarf convergence.

Peleg, Bezalel and Sudhoelter, Peter (2007), Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games. p. 6

Where the paper says it

2 TU Games and the Core: An Overview This subsection provides an overview of cooperative games with transferable utility, as well as the concept of the core. For a more detailed treatment, see Kannai (1992) and sections 2 and 3 of Peleg and Sudhoelter (2007).

2nd ed., Springer, New York NY U. p. 4
Where the paper says it

Institutions economize not only on transaction costs, but also on the informational burden. This suggests a new dimension along which institutions can be compared and evaluated: not only by what they achieve, but by what they spare agents from having to know.

S. A.

Pomatto, Luciano (2022). p. 5

Where the paper says it

The coverage condition in Theorem 1 and the quantitative measure behind the Debreu–Scarf application follow from this shift. 2A closely related body of work studies incomplete information in stable matching, where similar tensions between stability and efficiency arise; see Roth (1989); Chade (2006); Ehlers and Massó (2007); Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela (2009); Liu, Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2014); Pomatto (2022), and Chade, Lewis, and Smith (2014).

“Stable matching under forward-induction reasoning. p. 5
Where the paper says it

The coverage condition in Theorem 1 and the quantitative measure behind the Debreu–Scarf application follow from this shift. 2A closely related body of work studies incomplete information in stable matching, where similar tensions between stability and efficiency arise; see Roth (1989); Chade (2006); Ehlers and Massó (2007); Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela (2009); Liu, Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2014); Pomatto (2022), and Chade, Lewis, and Smith (2014).

” Theoretical Economics 17, 1619-1649. p. 6
Where the paper says it

Seen in this way, the comparison helps isolate both a shared logical core and the additional structure needed for cooperative games. By contrast, proof-theoretic methods, introduced into game theoretical research by Kaneko and Nagashima (1996, 1997), have been used much less frequently (see Kaneko (2002) for a survey).

Radner, R. (1968). “Competitive Equilibrium Under Uncertainty. p. 2

Where the paper says it

This paper therefore begins with the reasoning that would be required without the price system. Among many possible formulations, the replica process in the theorem of Debreu and Scarf (1963) is a natural benchmark: it provides an implicit process in which agents, acting on their own initiative, progressively reject allocations for which they can individually identify a feasible improvement, until competitive equilibrium—both the allocation and the price system— emerges as the only outcome that survives.

” Econometrica 36, 31–58.

Radner, R. (1972). “Existence of Equilibrium of Plans, Prices, and Price Expectations in a Sequence of Markets. p. 4

Where the paper says it

A large literature following Hayek studies the informational role of prices. Radner (1968, 1972, 1979) established the foundations of equilibrium under asymmetric information; subsequent work, most influentially Grossman and Stiglitz (2025) and Hellwig (1980), asked how well prices aggregate dispersed private information and with what welfare consequences.

” Econometrica 40, 289-303.

Radner, R. (1979). “Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices. p. 4

Where the paper says it

A large literature following Hayek studies the informational role of prices. Radner (1968, 1972, 1979) established the foundations of equilibrium under asymmetric information; subsequent work, most influentially Grossman and Stiglitz (2025) and Hellwig (1980), asked how well prices aggregate dispersed private information and with what welfare consequences.

” Econometrica 47, 655-678.

Reny, P. J., Perry, M. p. 5

Where the paper says it

The present paper studies a complementary side of the same Hayekian idea: not how information flows through prices, but how much information and reasoning the price system saves relative to direct coalitional reasoning. A related literature asks whether decentralized market mechanisms converge to competitive outcomes when traders have private information (Wilson, 1977; Milgrom, 1979, 1981; Palfrey, 1985; Vives, 1988; Reny and Perry, 1979; Barelli, Govindan, Wilson, 2024).

(2006). “Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Keywords: Information burden, Price system, Cooperative game theory, Core, Debreu-Scarf theorem, Formal language, Proof theory. JEL Codes: C71, D51, D83, D90 Early versions of this paper had been circulated under the title “Knowledge and Unanimous Acceptance of Core Payoffs: An Epistemic Foundation for Cooperative Game Theory”.

” Econometrica 74, 1231-1269.

Roth, Alvin E. p. 5

Where the paper says it

The coverage condition in Theorem 1 and the quantitative measure behind the Debreu–Scarf application follow from this shift. 2A closely related body of work studies incomplete information in stable matching, where similar tensions between stability and efficiency arise; see Roth (1989); Chade (2006); Ehlers and Massó (2007); Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela (2009); Liu, Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2014); Pomatto (2022), and Chade, Lewis, and Smith (2014).

(1989), “Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others’ preferences. p. 5
Where the paper says it

The coverage condition in Theorem 1 and the quantitative measure behind the Debreu–Scarf application follow from this shift. 2A closely related body of work studies incomplete information in stable matching, where similar tensions between stability and efficiency arise; see Roth (1989); Chade (2006); Ehlers and Massó (2007); Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela (2009); Liu, Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2014); Pomatto (2022), and Chade, Lewis, and Smith (2014).

” Games and Economic Behavior, 1(2), 191–209. p. 2
Where the paper says it

An agent’s information is then represented as a finite, consistent set of such meaning-bearing sentences. The point is not merely to count sentences mechanically, but to make information decomposable into explicit units of economic content.

Serrano, Roberto and Vohra, Rajiv (2007), “Information transmission in coalitional voting games. p. 5

Where the paper says it

Incomplete information and the core. The literature on the core under incomplete information, beginning with Wilson (1978) and developed by Vohra (1999); Dutta and Vohra (2005); Serrano and Vohra (2007); de Clippel (2007), and Myerson (2007), among others, transforms the cooperative setting into a decentralized problem of individual strategic reasoning and endows each player with a doxastic or epistemic structure representing her beliefs.

” Journal of Economic Theory, 134, 117–137. p. 4
Where the paper says it

In this respect, the argument is parallel in spirit to Coase’s (1937) theory of the firm. Coase asked why firms exist if markets can coordinate economic activity, and his answer was that using markets is itself costly.

Shapley, Lloyd S. p. 4

Where the paper says it

But the reduction obtained in Theorem 1 remains available: what matters is which coalitions’ feasibility sets must be known somewhere among their members. Using results in Shapley (1975), Section 5 identifies the minimal collection of such load-bearing coalitions in the k-fold replica economy, counts them exactly, and shows that the associated average per-agent (coalition-level) informational burden grows as Θ(4 k/k 3/2)—— exponentially in the size of the economy.

p. 4
Where the paper says it

But the reduction obtained in Theorem 1 remains available: what matters is which coalitions’ feasibility sets must be known somewhere among their members. Using results in Shapley (1975), Section 5 identifies the minimal collection of such load-bearing coalitions in the k-fold replica economy, counts them exactly, and shows that the associated average per-agent (coalition-level) informational burden grows as Θ(4 k/k 3/2)—— exponentially in the size of the economy.

(1967), “On balanced sets and cores. p. 7
Where the paper says it

6Not every TU game has a non-empty core. Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) characterize the non-emptiness of the core in terms of balancedness.

” Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 14(4), 453–460. p. 0
Where the paper says it

The paper was partially supported by Grant-in-Aids for Young Scientists (B) of JSPS No. 17K13707 and Grant for Special Research Project No.

Shapley, Lloyd S. (1975), “An example of a slow-converging core. p. 4

Where the paper says it

But the reduction obtained in Theorem 1 remains available: what matters is which coalitions’ feasibility sets must be known somewhere among their members. Using results in Shapley (1975), Section 5 identifies the minimal collection of such load-bearing coalitions in the k-fold replica economy, counts them exactly, and shows that the associated average per-agent (coalition-level) informational burden grows as Θ(4 k/k 3/2)—— exponentially in the size of the economy.

” International Economic Review, 16(2), 345–351. p. 2
Where the paper says it

An agent’s information is then represented as a finite, consistent set of such meaning-bearing sentences. The point is not merely to count sentences mechanically, but to make information decomposable into explicit units of economic content.

Vohra, Rajiv (1999), “Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core. p. 5

Where the paper says it

Incomplete information and the core. The literature on the core under incomplete information, beginning with Wilson (1978) and developed by Vohra (1999); Dutta and Vohra (2005); Serrano and Vohra (2007); de Clippel (2007), and Myerson (2007), among others, transforms the cooperative setting into a decentralized problem of individual strategic reasoning and endows each player with a doxastic or epistemic structure representing her beliefs.

” Journal of Economic Theory, 86(1): 123–147. p. 4
Where the paper says it

In this respect, the argument is parallel in spirit to Coase’s (1937) theory of the firm. Coase asked why firms exist if markets can coordinate economic activity, and his answer was that using markets is itself costly.

von Mises, Ludwig (2910) “Die Wirtschaftsrechnung im sozialistischen Gemeinwesen”, Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 47: 86-121. p. 2

Where the paper says it

In the socialist calculation debates of the 1930s and 1940s, Hayek emphasized two complementary informational roles of the price system. First, echoing earlier arguments by von von Mises (1920), Hayek (1935a,b, 1940, 1942) argued that competitive prices integrate dispersed, local, and tacit knowledge that no central planning committee could construct from scratch.

Wilson, R. (1977). “A bidding model of perfect competition. p. 3

Where the paper says it

The next step is to specify what it means for Ci(x) to be derivable from an agent’s information. In much of the existing literature, this question is left implicit: decision-makers are assumed to have whatever mathematical or probabilistic reasoning capacity needed to draw the relevant inferences, so that the connection between information and conclusion is absorbed into the model’s background assumptions rather than examined in its own right.

” Review of Economic Studies 44, 511-518. p. 6
Where the paper says it

Earlier proof-theoretic work in game theory studies the structure of interpersonal reasoning itself. Here, the same constructive perspective is brought to bear on a classical problem in economic theory: the informational conditions under which decentralized reasoning recovers the core, and the informational burden hidden behind the Debreu-Scarf convergence.

Wilson, Robert (1978), “Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy. p. 5

Where the paper says it

The literature on the core under incomplete information, beginning with Wilson (1978) and developed by Vohra (1999); Dutta and Vohra (2005); Serrano and Vohra (2007); de Clippel (2007), and Myerson (2007), among others, transforms the cooperative setting into a decentralized problem of individual strategic reasoning and endows each player with a doxastic or epistemic structure representing her beliefs. 2 A central finding of this literature is that stability under incomplete information generally diverges from efficiency under complete information: solution concepts based on agents’ limited knowledge may yield outcomes that are stable given what agents know yet fail to coincide with the efficient core.

” Econometrica, 46(4), 807–816.

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Measuring Information Burden: From Coalition-Based Reasoning to the Price System Shuige Liu Department of Decision Sciences, Bocconi University Milan, Italy June 2, 2026 Abstract. The price system is often said to economize on information <ref:1802.04595#pg2>. This paper asks how much information it saves <ref:1802.04595#pg4>.

Green — the paper says it, and the page is printed. Red — no passage carries it, so treat that sentence as unverified. The same check runs on your own text: check a summary against its source, $5.

Improvements for AI systems

  1. Precise measurement of informational burden: The improved AI system can formally calculate how much information is saved by a price system by counting load-bearing coalitions whose feasibility information must be distributed across the population, following the formula for average per-agent informational burden growth as Theta(4k/k(3/2)).

  2. Formal reasoning under explicit belief structures: The system can use Gentzen's sequent calculus to verify whether an agent can derive a decision criterion Ci(x) from her specific set of held sentences, making the connection between information and conclusion transparent.

  3. Identifying minimal information requirements for equilibrium: The AI can determine the exact coverage condition that ensures unanimous acceptability coincides with the core for all games on a fixed player set, which is the weakest sufficient condition.

  4. Evaluating mechanism design via informational cost: The system can assess mechanisms not only by efficiency and incentive compatibility but also by what a mechanism demands that agents know and infer, providing an explicit account of informational and cognitive simplicity to mechanism evaluation.

Abstract

The price system is often said to economize on what individuals need to know. This paper measures a particular informational burden associated with decentralized reasoning in its absence: the coalition-feasibility information required for individual rejection decisions to recover the core. We develop a proof-theoretic framework in which information is represented by economically meaningful sentences and reasoning by derivations in Gentzen's sequent calculus. An agent rejects a proposed payoff vector only when she can establish the existence of a profitable coalitional deviation; failure to reject may instead reflect ignorance. For each transferable-utility game, the main theorem characterizes the informational distributions under which the set of unopposed payoff vectors coincides with the core: every noncore payoff vector must have a blocking coalition known to at least one of its members. This yields a game-specific measure of minimum informational burden. We extend the characterization to pure-exchange economies through a first-order framework that preserves finite informational premises. Applying the result to Shapley's (1975) replica economy, within the core-convergence tradition of Debreu and Scarf (1963), we show that the minimum average coalition-level informational burden grows as Θ(4 k/k 3/2), exponentially with replication. The result quantifies an informational requirement of direct decentralized coalitional reasoning that price-mediated coordination can spare agents, without claiming to measure the total informational savings of prices.

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