Trading Before a Committed Rebalance

arXiv:2611.25762 · q-fin.TR, math.OC, q-fin.MF · Submitted 2026-11-19 · Read on arXiv

q-fin.TR, math.OC, q-fin.MF

Submitted: 2026-11-19

Updated: 2026-11-19

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

The gist: An institution must complete a portfolio adjustment, but traders who prepare inventory for it can choose whether to participate.

Abstract

An institution must complete a portfolio adjustment, but traders who prepare inventory for it can choose whether to participate. We study how public forecasts affect the institution's cost in a Bayesian execution game with optional activation, transient impact, and uniform-price terminal completion. The curvature of equilibrium cost as a function of the posterior target mean determines the value of information. In the scalar model, information benefits every fixed participation roster. Optional supply can reverse this ranking at entry, at full participation, and in a smooth interior with lognormal activation costs. For centered scalar targets, information weakly lowers cost relative to no information, strictly when the posterior mean is nonzero with positive probability. Centered Gaussian precision gains are always beneficial. An exact symmetric finite-population equilibrium identifies how information resolution and individual strategic size interact near entry. A portfolio extension gives a matrix criterion for the fixed-roster ranking, which can fail under general cross-impact. Even with isotropic execution, shared activation allows equally accurate signals about target magnitude and composition to have opposite execution values under one unchanged prior. Intraday ETF price data is used to characterize target uncertainty and trading conditions without identifying activation or institutional costs.

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