Payoff-Aware Prediction of Population Game Dynamics
cs.LG
Submitted: 2026-11-09
Updated: 2026-11-09
Comments: NeurIPS 2026
Code: https://github.com/wangkng/PA-RmD
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
The gist: Population game dynamics describe how aggregate behavior evolves in response to payoff signals.
Terminology
Abstract
Population game dynamics describe how aggregate behavior evolves in response to payoff signals. In many applications, the payoff function may change, and the goal is to predict the population trajectory induced by a new payoff design before trajectory data under that design are available. We study this problem as payoff-aware prediction of population game dynamics. Standard dynamics learning methods fit the motion observed under training payoffs, but do not separate the payoff-dependent incentive from the payoff-independent response structure needed for prediction under new payoffs. Building on the existing framework of Riemannian game dynamics, we propose PA-RmD, a payoff-aware learning method that keeps payoff information explicit and learns the payoff-independent response structure from data. Theoretically, we show that the learned model preserves fixed-payoff Nash equilibria and derive finite-time one-step prediction bounds under shared-response and payoff-coverage conditions. Empirically, we evaluate PA-RmD on synthetic zero-sum and potential games, as well as a YouTube Trending multi-country dataset, showing that our method performs well under changing payoff designs.
Sources
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