Welfare in Envy-free Contracts: When Agents Have Sparse Interests
cs.GT
Submitted: 2026-11-08
Updated: 2026-11-08
Terminology
Sources
- Approximate Optimality of Linear Contracts Under Uncertainty
- Multi-Agent Contract Design beyond Binary Actions
- Algorithmic Fair Contracts
- Fair Team Contracts
- Strict Fairness at What Cost? Envy-Free Contracts with Subsidies
- Are Bounded Contracts Learnable and Approximately Optimal?
- Ambiguous Contracts
- Equal-Pay Contracts
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