One Strategic Woman: Sharp Ranks and a Persistent Core
cs.GT
Submitted: 2026-11-04
Updated: 2026-11-04
Terminology
Sources
- The Influence of One Strategic Agent on the Core of Stable Matchings
- Descending the Stable Matching Lattice: How many Strategic Agents are required to turn Pessimality to Optimality?
- On likely solutions of the stable matching problem with unequal numbers of men and women
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