Coercive at the equilibrium, monotone nowhere: exact convergence certificates for learning in first-price auctions
cs.GT
Submitted: 2026-11-03
Updated: 2026-11-03
Terminology
Sources
- Computing Bayes Nash Equilibrium Strategies in Auction Games via Simultaneous Online Dual Averaging
- Characterizing the Convergence of Game Dynamics via Potentialness
- On the Convergence of Learning Algorithms in Bayesian Auction Games
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