Where Does MCP Security End? A Three-Tier Mitigation Mapping Framework for the OWASP MCP Top 10
cs.CR
Submitted: 2026-11-02
Updated: 2026-11-02
Code: https://github.com/cisco-ai-defense/mcpscanner
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
The gist: The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has become a leading standard for connecting Large Language Models (LLMs) to external tools, software, and data sources.
Terminology
Abstract
The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has become a leading standard for connecting Large Language Models (LLMs) to external tools, software, and data sources. MCP architecture favors ease of integration over security, blending the data and control planes into a single natural language channel. This introduces confused deputy and prompt injection vulnerabilities that cannot be completely mitigated in the software development lifecycle (SDLC) of an MCP server. Structured security guidance for server developers has been outpaced by this adoption trend, leaving them without a clear way to identify where vulnerabilities can be addressed at the server layer and where architectural constraints create hard limits. This paper presents a framework based on OWASP MCP Top 10 mapped to three architectural tiers, developed using Design Science Research (DSR). Vulnerabilities are classified as server-primary, gateway-primary, or protocol-primary applying a cascading decision tree following four questions, resulting in reproducible tier assignments and confidence levels independent of who applies it. The framework was validated against an enterprise-grade Managed File Transfer (MFT) MCP server built in Go. Validation results showed that high-confidence server-tier controls worked as predicted, and low-confidence protocol-tier controls failed for architectural reasons beyond server implementation. The architectural ceiling encountered during practical validation is the main contribution and shows how secure-by-design development can reduce the MCP attack surface but not completely mitigate it.
Sources
- Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection
- Bypassing LLM Guardrails: An Empirical Analysis of Evasion Attacks against Prompt Injection and Jailbreak Detection Systems
- Securing Agentic AI: A Comprehensive Threat Model and Mitigation Framework for Generative AI Agents
- Enterprise-Grade Security for the Model Context Protocol (MCP): Frameworks and Mitigation Strategies
- Model Context Protocol (MCP) at First Glance: Studying the Security and Maintainability of MCP Servers
- A Large-Scale Evolvable Dataset for Model Context Protocol Ecosystem and Security Analysis
- Beyond the Protocol: Unveiling Attack Vectors in the Model Context Protocol (MCP) Ecosystem
- MCP-38: A Comprehensive Threat Taxonomy for Model Context Protocol Systems (v1.0)
- Agentic Misalignment: How LLMs Could Be Insider Threats
- Deception in LLMs: Self-Preservation and Autonomous Goals in Large Language Models
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