Secret Sharing from Non-Extractable Randomness

arXiv:2610.20173 · cs.CR · Submitted 2026-10-14 · Read on arXiv

cs.CR

Submitted: 2026-10-14

Updated: 2026-10-14

License: http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/

The gist: Bosley and Dodis (TCC 2007) proved that a class of imperfect randomness sources that suffices for information-theoretic encryption of messages longer than the logarithm of the key length must admit

Abstract

Bosley and Dodis (TCC 2007) proved that a class of imperfect randomness sources that suffices for information-theoretic encryption of messages longer than the logarithm of the key length must admit deterministic extraction of nearly uniform bits, and asked whether the same is true of two-out-of-two secret sharing. Aggarwal, Chung, Obremski, and Ribeiro (TCC 2022) gave a positive answer for schemes that are in addition leakage-resilient or non-malleable; the original question remained open. We answer it in the negative. For every b 2 we construct a class of flat sources on 0,1 b+2, each of min-entropy at least b, together with a perfectly correct and perfectly private two-out-of-two scheme that shares a b-bit secret into two (b+1) -bit shares using any source in the class, and we show that every deterministic map from 0,1 b+2 to 0,1 is at statistical distance at least 1/6 from uniform on some source in the class. This implies that sharing a long enough secret does not require extractable randomness. The proof is a short parity argument. The idea of the construction extends to other thresholds: for two-out-of- n and r-out-of- r sharing we give perfect schemes with (b+1) -bit shares, private for classes of flat sources from which no single bit can be extracted with error below 1/(4n-2) and 1/(2(2 r-1)), respectively.

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