Can agents whose sole duty is to keep humans alive be hijacked to kill? Delayed multi-turn derived-action trap attacks in simulated high-stakes environments
cs.AI, cs.CR
Submitted: 2026-10-10
Updated: 2026-10-10
Code: https://github.com/scottbell/biosim
Sources
- Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection
- The Instruction Hierarchy: Training LLMs to Prioritize Privileged Instructions
- AgentLAB: Benchmarking LLM Agents against Long-Horizon Attacks
- LPS-Bench: Benchmarking Safety Awareness of Computer-Use Agents in Long-Horizon Planning under Benign and Adversarial Scenarios
- AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents
- Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandbox
- SafeAgentBench: A Benchmark for Safe Task Planning of Embodied LLM Agents
- AGENTSAFE: Benchmarking the Safety of Embodied Agents on Hazardous Instructions
- Human-Guided Harm Recovery for Computer Use Agents
- Values in the Wild: Discovering and Analyzing Values in Real-World Language Model Interactions
- Large Language Models Often Know When They Are Being Evaluated
- Evaluation Awareness in Language Models Has Limited Effect on Behaviour
- Indirect Prompt Injections: Are Firewalls All You Need, or Stronger Benchmarks?
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