Adaptive Incentive Design for Linear-Quadratic Dynamic Games: No-Regret Social Coordination

arXiv:2610.13448 · eess.SY, cs.SY · Submitted 2026-10-09 · Read on arXiv

eess.SY, cs.SY

Submitted: 2026-10-09

Updated: 2026-10-09

Comments: 16 pages

License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/

Terminology

• Regret — 1× in this paper · explained in 3 episodes

Sources

• Incentive Design without Hypergradients: A Social-Gradient Method
• Active Inverse Methods in Stackelberg Games with Bounded Rationality
• Optimal Functional Incentives for Control: The Linear-Quadratic Case with Bilinear Incentives
• Stochastic Adaptive Control for Systems with Nonlinear Parameterization: Almost Sure Stability and Tracking

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