Reward Hacking as a Transmissible Strategy in Multi-Agent Coding Systems
cs.AI, cs.CR, cs.MA
Submitted: 2026-10-09
Updated: 2026-10-12
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
The gist: Multi-agent systems are increasingly used to solve coding tasks by coordinating agents that share code and plans.
Terminology
Abstract
Multi-agent systems are increasingly used to solve coding tasks by coordinating agents that share code and plans. These agents are often optimized with reinforcement learning (RL) using automated evaluators, but bypassing evaluation can earn reward without producing a genuine solution. Prior work has largely treated reward hacking as a single-agent failure. In this work, we show that a reward-hacking strategy elicited in one agent can propagate to others and affect system coordination. Across four open-weight backbones, coding RL elicits and amplifies reward hacking in two settings: explicit mechanism descriptions in the system prompt and mid-training that models upstream exposure to facts about the coding environment. Using post-RL agents from the mid-training setting as sources, we observe propagation through code and shared memory, and across roles through natural-language plans. Even agents based on small open-weight models induce reward hacking in stronger closed-weight targets. On hard tasks, propagation can intensify along a transmission chain after the original source leaves as the code acquires more persuasive justifications. We also theoretically analyze conditions under which reward hacking amplifies, persists, or decays across agent interactions. Beyond propagation, reward hacking can bias task routing toward reward-hacking agents and survive candidate aggregation. As potential mitigations, we evaluate code review by the coder or a separate verifier, both of which reduce delivered hacks. Together, these results establish reward hacking as a transmissible strategy whose effects extend beyond the agent in which it first emerges.
Sources
- gpt-oss-120b & gpt-oss-20b Model Card
- Monitoring Reasoning Models for Misbehavior and the Risks of Promoting Obfuscation
- The Llama 3 Herd of Models
- Alignment faking in large language models
- Chain-of-thought obfuscation learned from output supervision can generalise to unseen tasks
- MalTool: Malicious Tool Attacks on LLM Agents
- Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist Through Safety Training
- Qwen2.5-Coder Technical Report
- Tulu 3: Pushing Frontiers in Open Language Model Post-Training
- Natural Emergent Misalignment from Reward Hacking in Production RL
- On the Design of Qwen3.8-Next Architecture: Evaluation, Efficiency, and Training Stability
- DeepSeekMath: Pushing the Limits of Mathematical Reasoning in Open Language Models
- Gemma 3 Technical Report
- Reward Hacking Benchmark: Measuring Exploits in LLM Agents with Tool Use
- Reward Hacking in the Era of Large Models: Mechanisms, Emergent Misalignment, Challenges
- Qwen3 Technical Report
Related papers
- MAVEN-T: Reinforced Heterogeneous Distillation for Real-Time Multi-Agent Trajectory Prediction
- Model Discovery Agent: LLM-assisted Bayesian experiment design for data-efficient discovery of mechanistic world models
- Agents' Last Exam
- The Clinician's Veto: Navigating Trust, Liability, and Uncertainty in Autonomous AI Prescribing
- MindHelper: Closed-Loop Embodied Mental-State Reasoning for Precision Intervention
- Incumbent Advantage: Brand Bias and Cognitive Manipulation Dynamics in LLM Recommendation Systems