Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations

arXiv:2610.08447 · econ.GN, q-fin.EC · Submitted 2026-10-06 · Read on arXiv

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Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.

Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "Organizational Lifespan as Commitment".

Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. An organization may bind future decision makers through a commitment over its own lifespan > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610.08447#pg2> This paper studies that choice for philanthropic foundations > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610.08447#pg2> Key Institutional Regimes The analysis compares three regimes: a spend-down foundation S(T) commits to terminate at a finite date T, a perpetual foundation P commits not to terminate voluntarily while solvent, and an open-ended foundation N leaves the stopping decision to future governing bodies > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610.08447#pg3> These arrangements govern the lifespan of the organization rather than merely its rate of spending > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610.08447#pg3> The distinction is a commitment choice over future control of the institution’s existence > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610.08447#pg3> Commitment Benefits and Costs The first benefit arises from investment in organization-specific capital, where Perpetuity removes the ex-ante commitment problem and raises investment > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610.08447#pg4> The second benefit works in the opposite direction, as sequential discretion creates an entrenchment problem that a terminal commitment limits > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610.08447#pg4> These two commitment problems generate a three-way institutional choice > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610.08447#pg4> Optimal Lifespan Determination The paper identifies three conditions under which each regime is optimal: Perpetuity is preferred when durable organization-specific capital is sufficiently productive, open-ended discretion is preferred when the option value of state-contingent stopping is large and governance is aligned, and a finite lifespan is preferred when future survival incentives generate sufficiently costly overcontinuation > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610.08447#pg4> Institutional Design Implications The analysis suggests that payout, lifespan, and capital preservation are separate margins, meaning a payout rule constrains current deployment relative to assets, a terminal rule constrains how long the institution may exist, and a preservation rule constrains the asset path > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610.08447#pg17> A practical implication is that a foundation charter should distinguish at least four decisions: the institutional lifespan, the payout policy, the degree of corpus preservation, and the horizon of individual grant commitments > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610.08447#pg17> External Factors and Constraints Information received after date 0 increases the value of preserving a stopping option, while external learning generates the opposite force by increasing the value of sequential discretion > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610.08447#pg13> Risk changes the value of retaining a long institutional horizon but does not alter the commitment logic above, and a perpetual charter should not be interpreted as a guarantee of physical survival in every financial state > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610.08447#pg16> Organizational lifespan is a commitment margin, and the resulting three-regime characterization gives each institutional form a distinct economic role > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610.08447#pg18> Perpetuity protects investment in durable organizational capacity, open-ended discretion preserves state-contingent adaptation, and a terminal commitment disciplines excessive future survival > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610.08447#pg18> The resulting three-regime characterization gives each institutional form a distinct economic role > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610.08447#pg18> References Afik, Z., and H.

Ruth: Katz.

Ruth: “Reconsidering the Philanthropic Foundation Minimum Payout Policy under a ‘New Normal’.” Journal of Policy Modeling 41(2): 219–233 > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610.08447#pg22> Afik, Z., A.

Paper summary: Ruth: We’ve looked at how different commitment choices—terminating, perpetual, or discretionary—affect investment and future governance in philanthropic foundations.

Warren: The authors of "Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations" argue that organizational lifespan is actually a distinct commitment margin <ref:2610.08447#pg18>.

Iris: They characterize each institutional form by its economic role, saying perpetuity protects investment in durable organizational capacity, discretion preserves state-contingent adaptation, and a terminal commitment disciplines excessive future survival <ref:2610.08447#pg18>.

Ruth: So for the listener who just wants the high-level picture of what this paper is about, think of it this way: it’s not just about how much you give today, but what kind of organization you're building that can actually survive over time <ref:2610.08447#pg2>.

Warren: It gives us a way to think about the tension between locking in investments for the long term and having an exit strategy in place <ref:2610.08447#pg3>.

Iris: The real implication is that foundations need to be thinking about their entire life cycle, not just their current spending decisions <ref:2610.08447#pg17>.

Ruth: That's the big picture from this study on "Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations" <ref:2610.08447#pg1>.

Conclusion: Ruth: So we’ve been diving into how different ways of structuring foundations—ending them at a certain time, keeping them open forever, or letting future leaders decide—actually change how much they invest and what kind of organization they end up with.

Warren: It really boils down to this idea that the way you commit to an organization's lifespan is just as important as the actual spending rules you set <ref:2610.08447#pg3>.

Iris: And it suggests that we need to look at these commitment choices not just as a funding mechanism, but really as a strategy for controlling the institution's entire life cycle, not just its yearly budget <ref:2610.08447#pg3>.

Ruth: Exactly. The paper is titled "Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations," and it frames the whole discussion around how that commitment choice acts as a constraint on future behavior <ref:2610.08447#pg18>.

Warren: And the authors are looking at three specific regimes: spend-down foundations, perpetual foundations, and open-ended ones, each with different consequences for capital deployment and governance <ref:2610.08447#pg3>.

Iris: The core finding is that perpetuities help lock in investments in things that last a long time, while a finite commitment forces the organization to be more disciplined about its future spending <ref:2610.08447#pg18>.

Ruth: It seems like this study gives us a framework for thinking about what we actually mean when we talk about "commitment" in the world of large endowments and foundations <ref:2610.08447#pg18>.

Warren: It shows that the optimal structure depends on whether your specific assets are productive enough to justify perpetual survival or if you need that flexibility to adapt as things change <ref:two thousand six hundred ten point zero eight four four seven#pg4.

Iris: The authors end up suggesting we need to separate payout rules, lifespan rules, and capital preservation rules because they all constrain the organization in different ways <ref:2610.08447#pg17>.

Ruth: So the big picture here is that for foundations, you can't just look at one number; you have to consider how your choice about the foundation's lifespan interacts with how much you spend and how much you try to save <ref:2610.08447#pg17>.

Warren: It’s a lot of levers to pull, and it shows that the structure of the commitment is what fundamentally defines the economic role of that foundation <ref:two thousand six hundred ten point zero eight four four seven#pg18.

Iris: It opens up some real questions about how these institutional choices play out when external factors, like new information or risk, start changing over time <ref:2610.08447#pg13>.

Christian Jaag

Swiss Economics · Somaha Foundation

econ.GN, q-fin.EC

Submitted: 2026-10-06

Updated: 2026-11-09

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Importance score: 92/100

The gist: An organization may bind future decision makers through a commitment over its own lifespan > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment…

Key concepts

Spend-down Foundation S(T)
This regime commits the foundation to terminate at a specific future date T. It involves a finite lifespan where the decision to end is pre-set by a fixed time horizon. This contrasts with perpetual or open-ended models, focusing on limiting the organization's existence over time.
Perpetual Foundation P
This foundation commits not to terminate voluntarily as long as it remains solvent. It removes the ex-ante commitment problem regarding termination timing. This choice is beneficial when durable organizational capital is highly productive, protecting investment.
Open-ended Foundation N
This regime leaves the decision to stop the organization to future governing bodies. It involves sequential discretion, meaning stopping is a future option that depends on subsequent governance decisions. This creates an entrenchment problem that terminal commitments can limit.

Terminology

Summary

An organization may bind future decision makers through a commitment over its own lifespan > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations Christian Jaag∗ October 2026 Abstract An organization may bind future decision makers through a commitment over its own lifespan. This paper studies that choice for philanthropic foundations.

08447#pg2> This paper studies that choice for philanthropic foundations > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations Christian Jaag∗ October 2026 Abstract An organization may bind future decision makers through a commitment over its own lifespan. This paper studies that choice for philanthropic foundations.

08447#pg2>

Key Institutional Regimes

The analysis compares three regimes: a spend-down foundation S(T) commits to terminate at a finite date T, a perpetual foundation P commits not to terminate voluntarily while solvent, and an open-ended foundation N leaves the stopping decision to future governing bodies > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610.08447#pg3> These arrangements govern the lifespan of the organization rather than merely its rate of spending > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610. p. 1

Where the paper says it

A foundation may be established to spend down by a specified date, to exist in perpetuity, or without a predetermined terminal date. These arrangements govern the lifespan of the organization rather than merely its rate of spending.

08447#pg3> The distinction is a commitment choice over future control of the institution’s existence > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610. p. 1
Where the paper says it

An open-ended foundation N leaves the stopping decision to future governing bodies. The distinction is a commitment choice over future control of the institution’s existence: P removes discretion to terminate, S(T) removes discretion to continue beyond T, and N preserves both options.

08447#pg3>

Commitment Benefits and Costs

The first benefit arises from investment in organization-specific capital, where Perpetuity removes the ex-ante commitment problem and raises investment > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610.08447#pg4> The second benefit works in the opposite direction, as sequential discretion creates an entrenchment problem that a terminal commitment limits > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610. p. 2

Where the paper says it

Sequential discretion then creates an entrenchment problem: the institution may continue after its social continuation value has become negative. A terminal commitment limits that distortion.

08447#pg4> These two commitment problems generate a three-way institutional choice > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610. p. 2
Where the paper says it

These two commitment problems generate a three-way institutional choice. There are nonempty parameter regions in which each lifespan regime is optimal.

08447#pg4>

Optimal Lifespan Determination

The paper identifies three conditions under which each regime is optimal: Perpetuity is preferred when durable organization-specific capital is sufficiently productive, open-ended discretion is preferred when the option value of state-contingent stopping is large and governance is aligned, and a finite lifespan is preferred when future survival incentives generate sufficiently costly overcontinuation > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610.08447#pg4>

Institutional Design Implications

The analysis suggests that payout, lifespan, and capital preservation are separate margins, meaning a payout rule constrains current deployment relative to assets, a terminal rule constrains how long the institution may exist, and a preservation rule constrains the asset path > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610.08447#pg17> A practical implication is that a foundation charter should distinguish at least four decisions: the institutional lifespan, the payout policy, the degree of corpus preservation, and the horizon of individual grant commitments > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610. p. 3

Where the paper says it

It differs from grant duration because an enforceable multiyear contract may bind support to a recipient without binding the foundation to exist indefinitely. It also differs from real-corpus preservation, which is an additional constraint on the asset path rather than a necessary implication of perpetuity.

08447#pg17>

External Factors and Constraints

Information received after date 0 increases the value of preserving a stopping option, while external learning generates the opposite force by increasing the value of sequential discretion > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610.08447#pg13> Risk changes the value of retaining a long institutional horizon but does not alter the commitment logic above, and a perpetual charter should not be interpreted as a guarantee of physical survival in every financial state > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610.08447#pg16>

Conclusion on Commitment

Organizational lifespan is a commitment margin, and the resulting three-regime characterization gives each institutional form a distinct economic role > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610.08447#pg18> Perpetuity protects investment in durable organizational capacity, open-ended discretion preserves state-contingent adaptation, and a terminal commitment disciplines excessive future survival > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610. p. 2

Where the paper says it

A finite lifespan is preferred when future survival incentives generate sufficiently costly overcontinuation. The result gives the three institutional forms symmetric interpretations: commitment to continuity protects organizational investment, commitment to termination disciplines future governance, and discretion preserves adaptation.

08447#pg18> The resulting three-regime characterization gives each institutional form a distinct economic role > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610. p. 2
Where the paper says it

A finite lifespan is preferred when future survival incentives generate sufficiently costly overcontinuation. The result gives the three institutional forms symmetric interpretations: commitment to continuity protects organizational investment, commitment to termination disciplines future governance, and discretion preserves adaptation.

08447#pg18>

References

Afik, Z., and H. Katz. 2019. “Reconsidering the Philanthropic Foundation Minimum Payout Policy under a ‘New Normal’. p. 5

Where the paper says it

The analysis also relates to multiyear grantmaking. Afik, Levy, and Katz (2018) study payout jointly with multiyear grants and show that grant duration is a separate margin of foundation policy.

” Journal of Policy Modeling 41(2): 219–233 > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations Christian Jaag∗ October 2026 Abstract An organization may bind future decision makers through a commitment over its own lifespan. This paper studies that choice for philanthropic foundations.

08447#pg22>

Afik, Z., A. Levy, and H. p. 5

Where the paper says it

The analysis also relates to multiyear grantmaking. Afik, Levy, and Katz (2018) study payout jointly with multiyear grants and show that grant duration is a separate margin of foundation policy.

Katz. 2018. “Philanthropic Foundations Payout and Multiyear Grants: Between Giving Today and Giving Tomorrow. p. 3
Where the paper says it

The paper also contributes to the economics of foundations. Existing work studies payout, endowment management, multiyear grants, and limited-life foundations.

” Journal of Wealth Management 20(4): 33–45 > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations Christian Jaag∗ October 2026 Abstract An organization may bind future decision makers through a commitment over its own lifespan. This paper studies that choice for philanthropic foundations.

08447#pg22>

Grossman, S. J., and O. D. Hart. 1986. “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Perpetuity instead raises investment in foundation-specific organizational capital whose return is partly lost upon termination. A terminal commitment limits excessive continuation when future governing bodies obtain private benefits from organizational survival.

” Journal of Political Economy 94(4): 691–719 > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations Christian Jaag∗ October 2026 Abstract An organization may bind future decision makers through a commitment over its own lifespan. This paper studies that choice for philanthropic foundations.

08447#pg22>

Hart, O., and J. Moore. 1990. “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm. p. 1

Where the paper says it

1 Introduction Organizations routinely constrain future decision makers. They allocate control rights, write long-term contracts, protect particular objectives, and restrict the use of assets.

” Journal of Political Economy 98(6): 1119–1158 > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations

Hansmann, H. 1990. “Why Do Universities Have Endowments? p. 4

Where the paper says it

Afik and Katz (2019) show how payout and portfolio choices affect longevity under alternative capital-market environments. Hansmann (1990) studies the functions of long-lived endowments, while Brown et al.

” Journal of Legal Studies 19(1): 3–42 > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations

Hansmann, H., and S. Thomsen. 2021. “The Governance of Foundation-Owned Firms. p. 4

Where the paper says it

Durable organizational arrangements allocate authority over future actions when relevant contingencies cannot be fully specified ex ante (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). Hansmann and Thomsen (2021) show, in the setting of foundation-owned firms, how the foundation form may provide long-run commitment.

” Journal of Legal Analysis 13(1): 172–230 > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations

Brown, J. R., S. G. Dimmock, J.-K. Kang, and S. J. Weisbenner. 2014. “How University Endowments Respond to Financial Market Shocks: Evidence and Implications. p. 4

Where the paper says it

Klausner (2003) explains why financial compounding alone does not resolve the intergenerational allocation problem, because the relevant comparison includes the social return to charitable spending. Afik and Katz (2019) show how payout and portfolio choices affect longevity under alternative capital-market environments.

” American Economic Review 104(3): 931–962 > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations Christian Jaag∗ October 2026 Abstract An organization may bind future decision makers through a commitment over its own lifespan. This paper studies that choice for philanthropic foundations.

08447#pg22>

Loh, C., and E. Buteau. 2017. A Date Certain: Lessons from Limited Life Foundations > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations Christian Jaag∗ October 2026 Abstract An organization may bind future decision makers through a commitment over its own lifespan. This paper studies that choice for philanthropic foundations.

08447#pg22>

Crook, M. 2023. “Mission Impossible: Foundation Investment Policy in the Post-COVID World. p. 5

Where the paper says it

The analysis also relates to multiyear grantmaking. Afik, Levy, and Katz (2018) study payout jointly with multiyear grants and show that grant duration is a separate margin of foundation policy.

” Journal of Investing 32(2): 97–107 > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations Christian Jaag∗ October 2026 Abstract An organization may bind future decision makers through a commitment over its own lifespan. This paper studies that choice for philanthropic foundations.

08447#pg22>

Deep, A., and P. Frumkin. 2006. “The Foundation Payout Puzzle. p. 3

Where the paper says it

The mechanism is distinct from familiar financing margins. Institutional lifespan differs from payout because a long-lived foundation may spend principal aggressively, while a finite-life foundation may initially retain substantial assets.

” In Taking Philanthropy Seriously: Beyond Noble Intentions to Responsible Giving, edited by W. p. 1
Where the paper says it

An open-ended foundation N leaves the stopping decision to future governing bodies. The distinction is a commitment choice over future control of the institution’s existence: P removes discretion to terminate, S(T) removes discretion to continue beyond T, and N preserves both options.

Damon and S. Verducci, 189–204 > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations Christian Jaag∗ October 2026 Abstract An organization may bind future decision makers through a commitment over its own lifespan. This paper studies that choice for philanthropic foundations.

08447#pg22>

Ghadamian, R. 2026. “The Perpetuity Trap: Why Foundation Endowments Misallocate Capital. p. 5

Where the paper says it

Ochoa-Carreno (2026) studies perpetuity and spend-down in relation to investment and technological transitions. Ghadamian (2026) argues that perpetual endowments may misallocate capital when realcorpus preservation constrains mission spending.

” IRSA Working Paper > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations Christian Jaag∗ October 2026 Abstract An organization may bind future decision makers through a commitment over its own lifespan. This paper studies that choice for philanthropic foundations.

08447#pg22>

Hengevoss, A., and G. von Schnurbein. p. 5

Where the paper says it

Loh and Buteau (2017) show that limited-life foundations make distinct choices about strategy, staffing, grantmaking, evaluation, and grantee relationships. Hengevoss and von Schnurbein (2025) identify strategic patterns among sunset foundations.

2025. “All Good Things Come to an End: Emerging Strategic Patterns of Sunset Foundations. p. 5
Where the paper says it

Loh and Buteau (2017) show that limited-life foundations make distinct choices about strategy, staffing, grantmaking, evaluation, and grantee relationships. Hengevoss and von Schnurbein (2025) identify strategic patterns among sunset foundations.

” Journal of Philanthropy 30(1): e70015 > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations Christian Jaag∗ October 2026 Abstract An organization may bind future decision makers through a commitment over its own lifespan. This paper studies that choice for philanthropic foundations.

08447#pg22>

Klausner, M. D. 2003. “When Time Isn’t Money: Foundation Payouts and the Time Value of Money. p. 1

Where the paper says it

They matter because a foundation is both a pool of assets and an organization. It may accumulate expertise, screening capacity, reputation, networks, and institutional memory whose value depends on continued operation.

” Stanford Law School Working Paper > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations Christian Jaag∗ October 2026 Abstract An organization may bind future decision makers through a commitment over its own lifespan. This paper studies that choice for philanthropic foundations.

08447#pg22>

Internal Revenue Service. 2026. “Minimum Investment Return. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Discretion preserves state-contingent stopping. Perpetuity instead raises investment in foundation-specific organizational capital whose return is partly lost upon termination.

” Accessed September 2026 > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations Christian Jaag∗ October 2026 Abstract An organization may bind future decision makers through a commitment over its own lifespan. This paper studies that choice for philanthropic foundations.

08447#pg16>

Ochoa-Carreno, L. 2026. “Perpetuity and Spend-Down: The Role of Investment and Technological Transitions in Philanthropy. p. 5

Where the paper says it

Recent work has renewed the normative debate over perpetuity. Ochoa-Carreno (2026) studies perpetuity and spend-down in relation to investment and technological transitions.

” New Political Economy > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations Christian Jaag∗ October 2026 Abstract An organization may bind future decision makers through a commitment over its own lifespan. This paper studies that choice for philanthropic foundations.

08447#pg16>

Roth Tran, B. 2019. “Divest, Disregard, or Double Down? Philanthropic Endowment Investments in Objectionable Firms. p. 4

Where the paper says it

Durable organizational arrangements allocate authority over future actions when relevant contingencies cannot be fully specified ex ante (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). Hansmann and Thomsen (2021) show, in the setting of foundation-owned firms, how the foundation form may provide long-run commitment.

” American Economic Review: Insights 1(2): 241–256 > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations Christian Jaag∗ October 2026 Abstract An organization may bind future decision makers through a commitment over its own lifespan. This paper studies that choice for philanthropic foundations.

08447#pg22>

Thelin, J. R., and R. W. Trollinger. p. 5

Where the paper says it

A third literature studies limited-life foundations directly. Thelin and Trollinger (2009) document historical and contemporary spend-down cases.

2009. Time Is of the Essence: Foundations and the Policies of Limited Life and Endowment Spend-Down > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations<ref:2610. p. 3
Where the paper says it

Existing work studies payout, endowment management, multiyear grants, and limited-life foundations. The present analysis makes the foundation’s own lifespan the choice variable and formally includes the open-ended regime that lies between predetermined termination and perpetuity.

08447#pg22>

Jaag, C. 2026a. “Grant or Loan? p. 3

Where the paper says it

Institutional lifespan differs from payout because a long-lived foundation may spend principal aggressively, while a finite-life foundation may initially retain substantial assets. It differs from grant duration because an enforceable multiyear contract may bind support to a recipient without binding the foundation to exist indefinitely.

Allocating Impact Capital under Scarcity. p. 6
Where the paper says it

studies grants versus repayable impact finance at a fixed gross commitment. Jaag (2026b) compares private, philanthropic, and state capital in staged financing, where provider identity determines later continuation and recipient relationship-specific investment.

” Unpublished manuscript > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations

Jaag, C. 2026b. “Financing Social Value: Private, Philanthropic, and State Capital. p. 6

Where the paper says it

studies grants versus repayable impact finance at a fixed gross commitment. Jaag (2026b) compares private, philanthropic, and state capital in staged financing, where provider identity determines later continuation and recipient relationship-specific investment.

” Unpublished manuscript > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations

Jaag, C. 2026c. “When Future Intervention Weakens Mission: Organizational Commitment under Future Contracting. p. 6

Where the paper says it

The foundation form is fixed here, and the object of commitment is the foundation’s lifespan; recipient investment appears only in an extension. Jaag (2026c) studies mission commitments chosen before future intervention contracts and focuses on organizational rights and responsiveness to later contracting.

” Unpublished manuscript > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations

Lo, A. W., E. V. Matveyev, and S. p. 4

Where the paper says it

(2014) and Roth Tran (2019) examine smoothing and mission-related portfolio choices. Lo, Matveyev, and Zeume (2025, revised 2026) provide large-sample evidence on nonprofit endowments, including their relation to mission spending, revenue hedging, investment performance, and governance.

Zeume. 2025. “The Risk, Reward, and Asset Allocation of Nonprofit Endowment Funds. p. 4
Where the paper says it

Lo, Matveyev, and Zeume (2025, revised 2026) provide large-sample evidence on nonprofit endowments, including their relation to mission spending, revenue hedging, investment performance, and governance. The present paper separates this asset-allocation problem from the organizational choice of lifespan.

” NBER Working Paper 34078, revised February 2026 > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations

Mananzala, R., and C. Rojas. 2026. “The Tidal Foundation: Unmooring Philanthropy From Perpetuity Versus Spend Down. p. 5

Where the paper says it

Recent practice has also questioned the binary framing of perpetuity versus spend-down. Mananzala and Rojas (2026) describe a “tidal” approach in which spending and corpus evolve with mission conditions rather than a fixed terminal date.

” Center for Effective Philanthropy, September 10, 2026 > Organizational Lifespan as Commitment: The Case of Foundations

Matveyev, E., and S. Zeume. 2026. “Financing Nonprofits. p. 3

Where the paper says it

The mechanism is distinct from familiar financing margins. Institutional lifespan differs from payout because a long-lived foundation may spend principal aggressively, while a finite-life foundation may initially retain substantial assets.

Green — the paper says it, and the page is printed. Red — no passage carries it, so treat that sentence as unverified. The same check runs on your own text: check a summary against its source, $5.

Improvements for AI systems

  1. Optimization of institutional design by determining which lifespan regime is optimal based on organizational capital productivity, governance alignment, and state-contingent stopping flexibility. The improved system can select between perpetuity, spend-down, or open-ended discretion based on whether durable organization specific capital is sufficiently productive, stopping flexibility is valuable and governance is aligned, or if future survival incentives generate sufficiently costly overcontinuation.

  2. Quantification of the value of organizational commitment by comparing the welfare gains from different regimes. The system can calculate the difference between the optimal welfare under perpetuity, open-ended discretion, and a finite terminal commitment based on whether organization specific capital is sufficiently productive or if future survival incentives create sufficiently costly entrenchment.

  3. Dynamic adjustment of investment strategy based on future information and institutional constraints. When an external learning signal arrives, the system can increase the value of sequential discretion relative to fixed lifespan commitments because a more informative signal about future social continuation values weakly increases the value of sequential discretion.

  4. Modeling grant relationships as a separate margin from institutional lifespan. The improved AI can determine that institutional perpetuity then has no additional commitment value through the grantee-investment channel if the contract horizon H equals the relationship investment horizon L, thereby preventing conflation of these two distinct policy choices.

  5. Risk assessment for perpetual foundations by distinguishing between institutional continuity and capital preservation. The system can evaluate whether a perpetual charter is a guarantee of physical survival in every financial state versus a commitment against voluntary termination while solvent, noting that the economic case for institutional perpetuity and the economic case for preserving the initial corpus are separate.

  6. Policy recommendation for foundation charters based on distinct margins. The AI can advise that a foundation charter should distinguish at least four decisions: the institutional lifespan, the payout policy, the degree of corpus preservation, and the horizon of individual grant commitments, ensuring that the institutional form and the spending rule need not move together.

Abstract

An organization's lifespan may commit future decision makers to continue, terminate, or retain discretion. We identify when each rule has value for philanthropic foundations. If the same aligned actor chooses investment and subsequent survival, discretion weakly dominates fixed rules; a commonly used investment comparison fails because it omits the option to invest enough to make continuation desirable in adverse states. With noncontractible organizational investment delegated to an earlier actor, however, perpetuity may improve incentives despite inefficient continuation in some states. The result survives an observable-investment extension. A finite terminal date is valuable under governance-induced overcontinuation, and its optimum reflects both direct operating benefits and investment incentives. We establish nonempty environments favoring each regime and distinguish institutional lifespan from payout policy, requirements to preserve the foundation's endowment capital, and the duration of grant commitments.

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