SkillPoison: Progressive Skill Poisoning via Successful Experiences
cs.CR, cs.AI
Submitted: 2026-10-06
Updated: 2026-10-06
Code: https://github.com/DEEP-JLU/SkillPoison
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
The gist: Self-improving LLM agents increasingly distill successful experiences into persistent, reusable skills.
Abstract
Self-improving LLM agents increasingly distill successful experiences into persistent, reusable skills. Existing skill attack methods corrupt this learning pipeline by injecting malicious triggers, behaviors, or false facts into individual experiences or extracted skills. However, such attacks are easily detected, and the injected malicious behaviors often fail to accumulate as persistent skills. In this paper, we show that skill poisoning can arise even from verified successful experiences, without making any individual trajectory malicious. Based on this insight, we propose SkillPoison, a novel framework that progressively poisons skill via successful experiences. SkillPoison first constructs a set of successful experiences that reinforce a target behavior, and then removes the contextual conditions that constrain when the behavior applies. Rather than injecting malicious content, SkillPoison shapes how the skill extractor generalizes, allowing useful behavior to support task success while inducing harmful behavior when they are misapplied. Extensive experiments on three benchmarks show that SkillPoison achieves 95.71% attack success rates, while all injected experiences remain task-correct and pass verification and lexical inspection. Our code, data and implementation details are available for the community at https://github.com/DEEP-JLU/SkillPoison.
Sources
- EvoSkill: Automated Skill Discovery for Multi-Agent Systems
- Agent Skill Security: Threat Models, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation
- SkillDAG: Self-Evolving Typed Skill Graphs for LLM Skill Selection at Scale
- When Experience Becomes Instruction: Trajectory Poisoning in Self-Evolving Agent Skill Systems
- SkillCAT: Contrastive, Assessment-Augmented and Topology-AwareSkill Self-Evolution for LLM Agents
- AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases
- How Your Credentials Are Leaked by LLM Agent Skills: An Empirical Study
- From Untrusted Input to Trusted Memory: A Systematic Study of Memory Poisoning Attacks in LLM Agents
- Memory Injection Attacks on LLM Agents via Query-Only Interaction
- Detecting Malicious Agent Skills in the Wild using Attention
- MemPoison: Uncovering Persistent Memory Threats and Structural Blind Spots in LLM Agents
- When Malicious Instructions Persist: Persistent Memory Poisoning Attack on Harness-Based Agents
- Skill Self-Play: Pushing the Frontier of LLM Capability with Co-Evolving Skills
- EvoSkill Injection: Red-Teaming Autonomous Skill Generation and Evolution in Self-Evolving Agents
- Towards Secure Agent Skills: Architecture, Threat Taxonomy, and Security Analysis
- MUSE-Autoskill: Self-Evolving Agents via Skill Creation, Memory, Management, and Evaluation
- SkillForge: Forging Domain-Specific, Self-Evolving Agent Skills in Cloud Technical Support
- Agent Skills in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Security Vulnerabilities at Scale
- Trust Me, Import This: Dependency Steering Attacks via Malicious Agent Skills
- Rethinking Self-Evolving Agent Skills: Feedback Dynamics over Multiple Rounds
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