Dynamical low-rank equilibrium computation for stochastic games between advanced persistent threats and moving target defense

cs.GT, cs.AI, cs.CR, cs.SY, eess.SY

Submitted: 2026-09-20

Updated: 2026-10-07

Comments: Regular Paper, under review at Automatica (submission 26-2265). v2: corrected the utility-loss figure in Experiment 5 (2.3%). This preprint is the full-length version; the journal submission is a condensed 16-page two-column version. Source code: https://github.com/tz98lab/dlr-ne-ics-security

Code: https://github.com/tz98lab/dlr-ne-ics-security

License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/

Sources

• LoRA: Low-Rank Adaptation of Large Language Models

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