Maximizing p-Mean Social Welfare in the High-Multiplicity Setting: Few Agent Types and Few Item Types
cs.GT, cs.AI
Submitted: 2026-10-03
Updated: 2026-10-03
License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
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