Autonomous Active Directory Exploitation via Multi-Model Harness Orchestration: A Benchmark Study with NeuroSploit on GOAD
cs.CR
Submitted: 2026-10-03
Updated: 2026-10-03
Comments: 20 pages, 15 figures, 7 tables, 4 listings, 23 references
Code: https://github.com/Orange-Cyberdefense/GOAD
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
The gist: Active Directory (AD) remains the predominant identity and access management infrastructure in enterprise environments, and its compromise represents the highest-impact outcome in internal
Terminology
Abstract
Active Directory (AD) remains the predominant identity and access management infrastructure in enterprise environments, and its compromise represents the highest-impact outcome in internal penetration tests. Recent work has shown that large language models (LLMs) can autonomously conduct assumed-breach penetration testing against AD, but these studies employ standalone agents lacking structured guardrails, deterministic validation, and multi-stage chain orchestration. We present a benchmark evaluation of NeuroSploit v4.2.0, an open-source Rust-based autonomous pentest harness, against the Game of Active Directory (GOAD), a deliberately vulnerable multi-forest AD lab maintained by Orange Cyberdefense comprising five virtual machines, two forests, and three domains. The harness orchestrates 22 AD-specific agents and 7 multi-stage attack-chain playbooks covering the full AD kill chain: enumeration, Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting, NTLM relay and coercion, Kerberos delegation abuse, AD CS exploitation (ESC1-ESC8), MSSQL linked-server pivoting, DCSync, cross-forest trust abuse, and persistence detection. We benchmark nine frontier LLMs (Claude Opus 4.6/4.7/4.8, GPT-6 Astra, GPT-5.6 Sol, Grok 4.6, Qwen 3.8, GLM 5.3, Kimi k3) within the harness, comparing against direct invocation across 14 technique categories and 7 chains. The harness achieves 96-100% technique coverage with 90-97% precision, while direct invocation covers only 21-54% and produces 3.2x more false positives. Time to full three-domain compromise with Opus 4.8 was 134 minutes with guardrail activations preventing lockout-triggering sprays, unauthorized DCSync dumps, and out-of-scope reconnaissance. Results demonstrate that structured harness orchestration with domain-specialized agents, POMDP belief tracking, and cross-model voting substantially outperforms unstructured LLM usage for AD penetration testing.
Sources
- Can LLMs Hack Enterprise Networks? Autonomous Assumed Breach Penetration-Testing Active Directory Networks
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- A Survey of LLM-Driven Penetration Testing: Taxonomy, Co-Evolution, and Open Challenges
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- Benchmarking Practices in LLM-driven Offensive Security: Testbeds, Metrics, and Experiment Design
- ZeroDayBench: Evaluating LLM Agents on Unseen Zero-Day Vulnerabilities for Cyberdefense
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