MemLeak: Cross-User Semantic Leakage in Multi-Tenant AI Agent Memory

arXiv:2610.04195 · cs.AI, cs.LG · Submitted 2026-10-03 · Read on arXiv

cs.AI, cs.LG

Submitted: 2026-10-03

Updated: 2026-10-03

Comments: Neurips-PALM 2026

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

The gist: Personal AI agents in enterprise multi-tenant deployments share a common vector store for long-term memory.

Terminology

Abstract

Personal AI agents in enterprise multi-tenant deployments share a common vector store for long-term memory. Shared embedding spaces create a surface for cross-user memory leakage: a user's query can retrieve semantically adjacent memories belonging to another user through ordinary cosine-similarity retrieval, without any exploit. We formalize this as cross-user admissibility failure and evaluate it across six experiments, plus follow-up ablations, under both sparse (TF-IDF) and production-faithful (MiniLM-L6-v2) retrieval. Non-adversarial, incidental leakage reaches 70--100% under pooled same-team retrieval; adversarially crafted memories achieve 90--100% top- k placement, exceeding weaker keyword-based attacker baselines, with score lifts of +0.416 to +0.511 under production-faithful dense retrieval (Config B); and end-to-end response contamination reaches 5.00/5 under a production retrieval path and 4.67/5 with Claude Sonnet 4.5, with contaminated responses often scoring as helpful or more helpful than clean ones, a gap validated against human judgment. Among three architectural mitigations, only hard post-retrieval ownership gating consistently restores the clean baseline (1.00/5) across two generation models, at a measured latency overhead of roughly 1.4 ms per query.

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