MemLeak: Cross-User Semantic Leakage in Multi-Tenant AI Agent Memory
cs.AI, cs.LG
Submitted: 2026-10-03
Updated: 2026-10-03
Comments: Neurips-PALM 2026
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
The gist: Personal AI agents in enterprise multi-tenant deployments share a common vector store for long-term memory.
Terminology
Abstract
Personal AI agents in enterprise multi-tenant deployments share a common vector store for long-term memory. Shared embedding spaces create a surface for cross-user memory leakage: a user's query can retrieve semantically adjacent memories belonging to another user through ordinary cosine-similarity retrieval, without any exploit. We formalize this as cross-user admissibility failure and evaluate it across six experiments, plus follow-up ablations, under both sparse (TF-IDF) and production-faithful (MiniLM-L6-v2) retrieval. Non-adversarial, incidental leakage reaches 70--100% under pooled same-team retrieval; adversarially crafted memories achieve 90--100% top- k placement, exceeding weaker keyword-based attacker baselines, with score lifts of +0.416 to +0.511 under production-faithful dense retrieval (Config B); and end-to-end response contamination reaches 5.00/5 under a production retrieval path and 4.67/5 with Claude Sonnet 4.5, with contaminated responses often scoring as helpful or more helpful than clean ones, a gap validated against human judgment. Among three architectural mitigations, only hard post-retrieval ownership gating consistently restores the clean baseline (1.00/5) across two generation models, at a measured latency overhead of roughly 1.4 ms per query.
Sources
- Phantom: General Backdoor Attacks on Retrieval Augmented Language Generation
- Mem0: Building Production-Ready AI Agents with Scalable Long-Term Memory
- Gemini 2.5: Pushing the Frontier with Advanced Reasoning, Multimodality, Long Context, and Next Generation Agentic Capabilities
- When Personalization Legitimizes Risks: Uncovering Safety Vulnerabilities in Personalized Dialogue Agents
- MemOS: An Operating System for Memory-Augmented Generation (MAG) in Large Language Models
- MemGPT: Towards LLMs as Operating Systems
- Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Models
- PersistBench: When Should Long-Term Memories Be Forgotten by LLMs?
- Text Embeddings by Weakly-Supervised Contrastive Pre-training
Related papers
- MAVEN-T: Reinforced Heterogeneous Distillation for Real-Time Multi-Agent Trajectory Prediction
- Model Discovery Agent: LLM-assisted Bayesian experiment design for data-efficient discovery of mechanistic world models
- Agents' Last Exam
- The Clinician's Veto: Navigating Trust, Liability, and Uncertainty in Autonomous AI Prescribing
- MindHelper: Closed-Loop Embodied Mental-State Reasoning for Precision Intervention
- Incumbent Advantage: Brand Bias and Cognitive Manipulation Dynamics in LLM Recommendation Systems