Control OSWorld: An AI Control Environment for GUI Computer Use Agents
cs.CR
Submitted: 2026-10-02
Updated: 2026-10-12
Code: https://github.com/mariasrap/control-osworld
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
The gist: AI agents that operate a computer through its graphical user interface (GUI) are being widely deployed.
Abstract
AI agents that operate a computer through its graphical user interface (GUI) are being widely deployed. AI control studies how to prevent an AI system from causing harm even if it is misaligned and actively trying to do so. Most control research to date has focused on coding agents, leaving computer use largely unexplored. We introduce Control OSWorld, a control evaluation that pairs 318 tasks from OSWorld with 81 harmful side tasks (e.g., exfiltrating a private file) that an agent must complete without being caught. We use Control OSWorld to create and study control monitors that detect malicious agents interacting with a GUI. We find that a weaker monitor can reliably distinguish honest from malicious trajectories produced by a more capable agent when it sees the full trajectory (97% recall at 3% false positive rate). However, when the monitor has to score each step before it is executed, recall drops at low false positive rates because each action is judged with less context. Monitor performance also depends on what the monitor can see: access to the agent's visible text is critical, while screenshots provide little additional value.
Sources
- OSWorld-Human: Benchmarking the Efficiency of Computer-Use Agents
- Sabotage Evaluations for Frontier Models
- Ctrl-Z: Controlling AI Agents via Resampling
- Scheming AIs: Will AIs fake alignment during training in order to get power?
- A Survey on the Safety and Security Threats of Computer-Using Agents: JARVIS or Ultron?
- AI Control: Improving Safety Despite Intentional Subversion
- Unsolved Problems in ML Safety
- Distributed Attacks in Persistent-State AI Control
- Reliable Weak-to-Strong Monitoring of LLM Agents
- BashArena: A Control Setting for Highly Privileged AI Agents
- Evaluating Control Protocols for Untrusted AI Agents
- SHADE-Arena: Evaluating Sabotage and Monitoring in LLM Agents
- Retrying vs Resampling in AI Control
- Agentic Misalignment: How LLMs Could Be Insider Threats
- Frontier Models are Capable of In-context Scheming
- OS-Marathon: Benchmarking Computer-Use Agents on Long-Horizon Repetitive Tasks
- UI-TARS: Pioneering Automated GUI Interaction with Native Agents
- AndroidWorld: A Dynamic Benchmarking Environment for Autonomous Agents
- Removing Sandbagging in LLMs by Training with Weak Supervision
- Attack Selection Reduces Safety in Concentrated AI Control Settings against Trusted Monitoring
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