Revisiting Certified Defense with Differential Privacy on Vision Transformers

arXiv:2609.31310 · cs.CR, stat.AP · Submitted 2026-09-25 · Read on arXiv

cs.CR, stat.AP

Submitted: 2026-09-25

Updated: 2026-09-25

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

The gist: Certified defenses that incorporate differential privacy have proven effective on Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs), furnishing rigorous robustness guarantees against norm-bounded adversaries.

Terminology

Abstract

Certified defenses that incorporate differential privacy have proven effective on Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs), furnishing rigorous robustness guarantees against norm-bounded adversaries. However, the certified robustness behavior of Pixel Differential Privacy (PixelDP) remains largely unexplored with the self-attention architecture now dominating the deep-learning landscape. Given that the Transformer has a profound impact on our daily applications from the digital world to the physical world, it is crucial to study certified robustness through differential-privacy-style stability. To fill this research gap, we revisit this construction in Vision Transformers and identify a failure mode that is largely hidden in the convolutional setting. When noise is injected after the patch embedding, the Laplace mechanism with the inherited grouped 1 sensitivity bound collapses to chance-level accuracy across noise scales, whereas the Gaussian mechanism remains trainable. This contrast isolates the source of failure: not the injected noise itself, but the geometry of the sensitivity constraint. We show that the attenuation induced by the inherited Δ 1,1 projection increases with layer width and kernel size according to a random-matrix scale C/(sqrt M + sqrt N). Replacing the 1-type constraint with a spectral-norm constraint eliminates the collapse across datasets and architectures, but creates a fundamental obstacle: the repaired models no longer satisfy the sensitivity condition required by the standard Laplace certificate. We resolve this mismatch by deriving a dimension-free (epsilon, δ) -privacy guarantee for the Laplace mechanism under 2 sensitivity through concentration of the privacy loss.

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