Understanding and Exploiting Initialization Anchoring Weakness in Feedback-Based Agent Planning
cs.CR, cs.AI
Submitted: 2026-08-31
Updated: 2026-08-31
Code: https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
The gist: Feedback-based planning improves agent reliability by incorporating tool observations and corrective feedback.
Terminology
Abstract
Feedback-based planning improves agent reliability by incorporating tool observations and corrective feedback. However, its protection may not be distributed uniformly across planning stages. We conduct a round-wise analysis of four representative feedback mechanisms and uncover an initialization anchoring weakness: the first feedback round corrects 46% of adversarial directions, whereas the rates fall to 13% and 7% among directions surviving into the next two rounds. Our analysis attributes this weakness to three interacting factors: a contextually plausible shift in the initial plan, insufficient counterevidence, and the persistence of accepted directions in the accumulated trajectory. Based on these findings, we propose InitAnchor, a black-box framework for exploiting this weakness through attacker-controlled external materials. It operationalizes the three factors as directional-shift, contextual-plausibility, and counterevidence-resilience signals under either limited target access or no target access. Across 112 tasks from 16 domains, six agent architectures, and five backbone LLMs, InitAnchor achieves average ASRs of 76.1% and 72.0% under the two settings while reducing first-round mitigation rates to 21.0% and 25.0%, respectively. It also remains effective against six defenses and across six real-world agent systems. These findings show that feedback-based agents can retain early biases even when later correction is available.
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