Existence of the Core in Approval-Based Committee Elections
cs.GT
Submitted: 2026-09-10
Updated: 2026-11-03
Terminology
Sources
- Core Existence in Approval-Based Committee Elections with up to Five Voter Types
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Public Goods
- A Polynomial-Time Rule Satisfying Full Justified Representation
- Computation of Approximately Stable Committees in Approval-based Elections
- Computing Lindahl Equilibrium for Public Goods with and without Funding Caps
- Proportionality and the Limits of Welfarism
- Strengthening Full Justified Representation: Efficient Verification and Computation
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