Will the User Ever Know? Covert Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Tool-Using LLM Agents
cs.AI, cs.CL
Submitted: 2026-08-31
Updated: 2026-10-02
Comments: EMNLP 2026 Main (Oral), Project website: https://yslmoment.github.io/ICoA/
Project page: https://yslmoment.github.io/ICoA
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
The gist: As LLM agents take real-world actions through tools, indirect prompt injection (IPI) has emerged as a serious threat.
Terminology
Abstract
As LLM agents take real-world actions through tools, indirect prompt injection (IPI) has emerged as a serious threat. The standard metric, Attack Success Rate (ASR), counts whether an injection succeeds but ignores what the user notices in the agent's final response. Looking at successful injection traces, we find two distinct outcomes: the agent executes the injection while returning an otherwise normal response, or reports the injected action in its final response, giving the user a chance to notice. We call these covert and overt successes. From the user's perspective, we decompose ASR into the Covert Success Rate (CSR), counting successes leaving no trace in the final response, and the Overt Success Rate (OSR), counting successes the user can detect. To understand what drives the gap, we analyze successful trajectories and find that the agent's behavior after the injection separates covert from overt: covert traces hand control back to the user task before ending, while overt traces end at the attack itself. This split follows from the ReAct format, where the final response summarizes the most recent action. Building on this observation, we propose ICoA (Induced Covert Attack), an IPI attack designed to induce covert outcomes by steering the agent back to the user task after executing the injection. Across four target models on AgentDojo, ICoA achieves the highest CSR, with gains of 3.79-12.01 percentage points over the strongest baseline.
Sources
- VPI-Bench: Visual Prompt Injection Attacks for Computer-Use Agents
- Mind the GAP: Text Safety Does Not Transfer to Tool-Call Safety in LLM Agents
- ChatInject: Abusing Chat Templates for Prompt Injection in LLM Agents
- Gemini 2.5: Pushing the Frontier with Advanced Reasoning, Multimodality, Long Context, and Next Generation Agentic Capabilities
- WASP: Benchmarking Web Agent Security Against Prompt Injection Attacks
- The Llama 3 Herd of Models
- Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks With Spotlighting
- Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist Through Safety Training
- GPT-4o System Card
- AgentLAB: Benchmarking LLM Agents against Long-Horizon Attacks
- Refusal-Trained LLMs Are Easily Jailbroken As Browser Agents
- WebGPT: Browser-assisted question-answering with human feedback
- Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Models
- Large Language Models can Strategically Deceive their Users when Put Under Pressure
- MUZZLE: Adaptive Agentic Red-Teaming of Web Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks
- The Instruction Hierarchy: Training LLMs to Prioritize Privileged Instructions
- Defending against Indirect Prompt Injection by Instruction Detection
- Qwen3 Technical Report
- ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Models
- Language Agent Tree Search Unifies Reasoning Acting and Planning in Language Models
Related papers
- MAVEN-T: Reinforced Heterogeneous Distillation for Real-Time Multi-Agent Trajectory Prediction
- Model Discovery Agent: LLM-assisted Bayesian experiment design for data-efficient discovery of mechanistic world models
- Agents' Last Exam
- The Clinician's Veto: Navigating Trust, Liability, and Uncertainty in Autonomous AI Prescribing
- MindHelper: Closed-Loop Embodied Mental-State Reasoning for Precision Intervention
- Incumbent Advantage: Brand Bias and Cognitive Manipulation Dynamics in LLM Recommendation Systems