ToolMinimize: Auditing and Rewriting LLM Agent Tool Calls to Minimize Privacy Exposure
cs.CR, cs.SE
Submitted: 2026-08-25
Updated: 2026-08-25
License: http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/
The gist: LLM agents routinely include privacy-sensitive data (PSD) in tool call arguments beyond what the invoked tools require, crossing trust boundaries to third-party services on every invocation.
Terminology
Abstract
LLM agents routinely include privacy-sensitive data (PSD) in tool call arguments beyond what the invoked tools require, crossing trust boundaries to third-party services on every invocation. A controlled measurement on three production LLMs (GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Llama-3.3-70B) shows that 81--88% of tool calls include unnecessary PSD under default prompts; explicit privacy instructions still leave 36--76% over-sharing. Existing defenses gate calls (allow/block) or label flows (information-flow control) but cannot rewrite argument values, and PII detection tools miss implicit PSD like ``Memorial Sloan Kettering'' (a hospital name that implies a diagnosis). We present, a middleware that intercepts tool calls and rewrites their arguments to the minimum data necessary for tool functionality, combining schema-aware necessity analysis with four operations: removal, generalization, substitution, and truncation. Live validation on 307 tool calls across the three LLMs above reduces privacy cost by 81.2--92.0% at 100% argument-level task validity (TOST equivalence p < 0.001 at Δ = 1.0); on 25 unannotated Model Context Protocol (MCP) schemas, by 79.0% with no minimum_necessary metadata. An optional LLM content-necessity layer strips task-irrelevant PSD from otherwise-necessary free-text fields, raising live-LLM reduction to 85.1--95.6% and author-schema reduction from 71.1% to 90.9%. Median latency is 1.77,ms.
Sources
- Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Tools
- Tool Learning with Large Language Models: A Survey
- AudAgent: Automated Auditing of Privacy Policy Compliance in AI Agents
- Privacy in Action: Towards Realistic Privacy Mitigation and Evaluation for LLM-Powered Agents
- Progent: Securing AI Agents with Privilege Control
- Securing AI Agents with Information-Flow Control
- RTBAS: Defending LLM Agents Against Prompt Injection and Privacy Leakage
- Defeating Prompt Injections by Design
- AgentDAM: Privacy Leakage Evaluation for Autonomous Web Agents
- Agent Tools Orchestration Leaks More: Dataset, Benchmark, and Mitigation
- AgentLeak: A Benchmark for Internal-Channel Privacy Leakage in Multi-Agent LLM Systems
- The Emerged Security and Privacy of LLM Agent: A Survey with Case Studies
- MCP Safety Audit: LLMs with the Model Context Protocol Allow Major Security Exploits
- Model Context Protocol (MCP): Landscape, Security Threats, and Future Research Directions
- Securing the Model Context Protocol (MCP): Risks, Controls, and Governance
- The Sum Leaks More Than Its Parts: Compositional Privacy Risks and Mitigations in Multi-Agent Collaboration
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- Open Challenges in Multi-Agent Security: Towards Secure Systems of Interacting AI Agents
- IP Leakage Attacks Targeting LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems
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