CyberLLM: A Multi-Agent LLM Framework for Autonomous Detection and Guarded Response in Automotive Cybersecurity
Nenad Petrovic, Oussama Jeddou, Feres Ben Fraj, Vahid Zolfaghari, Fengjunjie Pan, Andre Schamschurko, Alois Knoll
cs.CR, cs.SE
Submitted: 2026-08-06
Updated: 2026-08-10
Code: https://github.com/Jeddou10/CyberLLM
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
The gist: Software-Defined Vehicles (SDVs) expand the automotive attack surface across source code, runtime logs, and deployment topologies, while safety constraints forbid autonomous agents from acting
Terminology
Abstract
Software-Defined Vehicles (SDVs) expand the automotive attack surface across source code, runtime logs, and deployment topologies, while safety constraints forbid autonomous agents from acting without oversight. This paper presents CyberLLM, a multi-agent, LLM-orchestrated framework that autonomously detects vulnerabilities and executes remediations under a formal, runtime safety guard. Detection combines a deterministic layer (regex rules, AST analyzers, and topology graph checks) with an LLM refinement pass, so a high-recall floor is complemented by high-precision reasoning. A decision agent aggregates findings, tags them with a human-centric asset taxonomy, and selects a tiered response, ratcheting its confidence with signed cross-session memory and re-planning feedback. Every action is validated against four contextual security properties and an independent action-alignment oracle before it is allowed to run, and refused actions trigger escalation and re-planning. A symmetric attack pipeline generates and replays exploits so both sides can be exercised on the same scenarios. On an independent, ground-truthed benchmark of nine original automotive ECU modules in C, C++, and Rust seeding 47 layered vulnerabilities plus clean controls, the always-on deterministic layer covers 34% of the labeled vulnerabilities at perfect precision, and adding the grounded LLM refinement and completeness passes roughly doubles coverage to about 70% (F1 0.83) while producing zero false positives on the clean controls. The results indicate that LLM agents can perform useful autonomous cyber-defense when wrapped in a deterministic, auditable safety envelope.
Sources
- A Framework for Formalizing LLM Agent Security
- Agent2Agent Threats in Safety-Critical LLM Assistants: A Human-Centric Taxonomy
- LLM-Empowered Functional Safety and Security by Design in Automotive Systems
- GPT-4o System Card
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