From Behavior to Mechanism: Tracing Divergent Response Modes in Frontier Language Models
cs.AI, cs.CL, cs.LG
Submitted: 2026-08-06
Updated: 2026-09-28
Code: https://github.com/alijalalkamali/lbe
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
The gist: Frontier language models are trained using distinct data, objectives, and safety pipelines.
Terminology
Abstract
Frontier language models are trained using distinct data, objectives, and safety pipelines. Whether these differences produce measurably different behaviors under explicit steering pressure remains underexplored. This study evaluates behavioral steerability across six frontier models from six developers using 300 paired base and steered items over three categories: values-conflict, reasoning-elicitation, and reasoning-suppression (plus 40 validation items). All six models act as blind peer judges and classify every response based on fixed behavioral rubrics. The resulting 24,480 judgments are scored by leave-one-out consensus. We find that models differ not just in how much steering shifts their behavior but in what kind (mode) of response they give, and some response modes appear in only one or two of them. GPT-5 deflects requests to disclose its reasoning while leaving its answer intact (99% vs. 0% for all other models). Claude Opus 4.7 and GPT-5 resist explicit suppression instructions and in different ways. Using Llama as the open-weight model, we trace the largest behavioral split to its internals. A linear probe decodes the behavior from the residual stream at 0.87 held-out accuracy while injecting that direction during generation drives the behavior from 0% to 86% across an intervention sweep. Every finding holds under both a token-budget remediation and a control experiment with a hypothesis-blind judgment prompt.
Sources
- Understanding intermediate layers using linear classifier probes
- Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Direction
- Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedback
- A Course Correction in Steerability Evaluation: Revealing Miscalibration and Side Effects in LLMs
- STEER-BENCH: A Benchmark for Evaluating the Steerability of Large Language Models
- Reasoning Models Don't Always Say What They Think
- Red Teaming Language Models to Reduce Harms: Methods, Scaling Behaviors, and Lessons Learned
- Alignment faking in large language models
- Deliberative Alignment: Reasoning Enables Safer Language Models
- Values in the Wild: Discovering and Analyzing Values in Real-World Language Model Interactions
- DarkBench: Benchmarking Dark Patterns in Large Language Models
- Measuring Faithfulness in Chain-of-Thought Reasoning
- Towards Understanding Sycophancy in Language Models
- Steering Language Models With Activation Engineering
- Language Models Don't Always Say What They Think: Unfaithful Explanations in Chain-of-Thought Prompting
- Replacing Judges with Juries: Evaluating LLM Generations with a Panel of Diverse Models
- Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arena
- Instruction-Following Evaluation for Large Language Models
- Representation Engineering: A Top-Down Approach to AI Transparency
Related papers
- MAVEN-T: Reinforced Heterogeneous Distillation for Real-Time Multi-Agent Trajectory Prediction
- Model Discovery Agent: LLM-assisted Bayesian experiment design for data-efficient discovery of mechanistic world models
- Agents' Last Exam
- The Clinician's Veto: Navigating Trust, Liability, and Uncertainty in Autonomous AI Prescribing
- MindHelper: Closed-Loop Embodied Mental-State Reasoning for Precision Intervention
- Incumbent Advantage: Brand Bias and Cognitive Manipulation Dynamics in LLM Recommendation Systems